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ABSTRACT	
NIXON’S	WAR	ON	TERRORISM	
THE	FBI,	LEFTIST	GUERRILLAS,	AND	THE	ORIGINS	OF	WATERGATE		
SEPTEMBER	2016	
DANIEL	S.	CHARD,	B.A.,	UNIVERSITY	OF	SOUTHERN	MAINE		
M.A.	UNIVERSITY	OF	MASSACHUSETTS	AMHERST	
Ph.D.,	UNIVERSITY	OF	MASSACHUSETTS	AMHERST	
Directed	by:	Professor	Christian	G.	Appy	
In	1969,	militant	factions	within	both	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	the	
Black	Panther	Party	(BPP)	began	to	form	the	United	States’	first	clandestine	
revolutionary	urban	guerrilla	organizations:	the	Weather	Underground	and	the	Black	
Liberation	Army	(BLA).	These	groups	carried	out	bombings,	police	ambushes,	and	other	
attacks	throughout	the	country,	prompting	responses	from	the	Federal	Bureau	of	
Investigation	(FBI)	and	the	administration	of	President	Richard	M.	Nixon.		
	 Several	historians	have	analyzed	U.S.	leftist	guerrillas’	motives,	and	much	has	
been	written	on	FBI	operations	against	the	Black	Power	movement	and	New	Left,	
including	the	Bureau’s	covert	counterintelligence	programs	(COINTELPROs)	designed	
to	“neutralize”	these	movements.	Most	of	this	scholarship	has	been	one-sided,	however,	
framing	FBI	activities	as	“state	repression”	without	analyzing	how	state	actors	
understood	and	responded	to	leftist	violence.	Drawing	on	declassified	FBI	documents	
and	materials	in	the	Richard	Nixon	Presidential	Library,	“Nixon’s	War	on	Terrorism”	
revises	this	literature,	explaining	for	the	first	time	how	domestic	leftist	guerrilla	
violence	reshaped	the	FBI	and	American	politics	during	the	Nixon	administration.		
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	 War	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	transformed	the	FBI’s	surveillance	practices,	
spawned	the	United	States’	earliest	institutions	explicitly	dedicated	to	combatting	
“terrorism,”	and	triggered	a	bureaucratic	struggle	between	the	Nixon	White	House	and	
the	FBI	that	played	a	critical	role	in	fomenting	the	Watergate	Scandal	and	Nixon’s	
August	1974	resignation.	This	dissertation	examines	how	the	FBI	came	to	expand	its	
surveillance	of	the	U.S.	Left	and	revive	mail-opening,	warrantless	wiretapping,	and	
break-ins—illegal	spy	techniques	that	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	had	employed	widely	
against	the	Communist	Party	after	World	War	II	but	banned	during	the	mid-1960s.	This	
is	a	story	of	unintended	consequences	and	conjuncture.	Leftist	guerrillas	did	not	
achieve	their	goal	of	sparking	a	socialist	revolution,	and	the	FBI	was	unsuccessful	in	its	
aim	of	preventing	guerrilla	violence.	The	Nixon	administration	was	also	unable	to	halt	
guerrilla	attacks.	But	together—through	their	conflicts	with	one	another—leftist	
guerrillas,	FBI	officials,	and	the	Nixon	administration	triggered	Watergate,	the	Church	
Committee,	antiterrorism	politics,	and	a	crisis	of	popular	legitimacy	from	which	neither	
the	Bureau	nor	the	federal	government	have	ever	fully	recovered.	
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INTRODUCTION	
RETHINKING	AMERICA’S	“SECOND	CIVIL	WAR”	
	
During	the	years	of	Richard	Nixon’s	presidency,	from	1969	and	1974,	Black	Power	and	
New	Left	radicals	detonated	hundreds	of	bombs	inside	the	United	States.	Most	of	this	
violence	occurred	during	Nixon’s	first	two	years	in	office.	Between	January	1969	and	
April	1970,	American	leftists	carried	out	more	than	four	hundred	politically	motivated	
bombings	and	arsons,	with	urban	police	stations	and	university	Reserve	Officers	
Training	Corps	(ROTC)	offices	among	the	most	frequent	targets.1	A	small	number	of	
young	radicals	went	further,	taking	their	commitment	to	armed	revolutionary	struggle	
																																																								
1	This	estimate	comes	from	Kirkpatrick	Sale,	SDS	(New	York:	Random	House,	1973),	632,	and	draws	from	
several	sources	outlined	below.	More	research	is	needed	to	arrive	at	a	precise	number,	though	most	
government	reports	put	the	numbers	far	higher.	A	July	1970	report	by	the	Senate	Investigations	
Subcommittee,	for	example,	documented	1,188	bombings,	arsons,	and	attempted	bombings	during	this	
period.	Another	report	drafted	around	the	same	time	by	the	Alcohol,	Tobacco,	and	Firearms	Division	of	
the	U.S.	Treasury	documented	40,934	bombings,	attempts,	and	threats	during	this	period,	of	which	Sale	
extrapolated	approximately	2,800	were	leftist	bombings.	In	his	memoir,	Richard	Nixon	(presumably	
drawing	from	the	Treasury	report)	stated	that	there	were	over	40,000	bombings	during	this	period.	A	
special	January	1971	special	issue	of	the	leftist	magazine	Scanlan’s	on	“Guerrilla	War	in	the	U.S.A.”	
documented	over	1,000	examples	of	“guerrilla	acts	of	sabotage	and	terrorism	in	the	United	States”	in	
1969	and	1970.	All	of	these	studies,	however,	included	many	examples	of	unclaimed	bombings	at	schools,	
businesses,	homes,	and	other	locations	that	were	not	necessarily	politically	motivated.	Both	radicals	from	
Scanlan’s	and	conservative	proponents	of	“law-and-order,”	including	Nixon	and	politicians	who	chaired	
the	government	investigating	committees,	had	political	motivations	for	overstating	these	numbers,	the	
former	in	order	to	celebrate	a	supposed	incipient	guerrilla	revolution	in	the	United	States,	and	the	latter	
in	order	to	emphasize	the	need	for	a	stronger	federal	response	to	such	activity.	See	Senate	Committee	on	
Government	Operations,	Permanent	Subcommittee	on	Investigations,	Hearings	on	Riots,	Civil,	and	
Criminal	Disorders,	Part	25,	91st	Cong.,	2nd	sess.,	July	31,	August	4,	5,	and	6	1970;	Richard	Nixon,	RN:	The	
Memoirs	of	Richard	Nixon,	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1990),	470;	and	Scanlan’s	1	no.	8	
(January	1971),	copy	in	author’s	possession	courtesy	of	Trevor	Griffey.	Journalist	Bryan	Burrough	wrote	
in	his	recent	book	that	there	were	over	2,500	bombings	“during	an	eighteen-month	period	in	1971	and	
1972,”	1,900	of	them	in	1972.	Burrough	cited	an	interview	with	a	retired	FBI	agent	as	his	source	for	this	
information,	but	provided	no	documentary	evidence.	The	dates	attributed	to	this	figure	are	almost	
certainly	the	result	of	the	agent’s	mistaken	memory,	since	the	peak	of	leftist	bombing	activity	occurred	
from	1969	to	1971	and	dropped	precipitously	in	1972.	See	Bryan	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage:	America’s	
Radical	Underground,	The	FBI,	and	the	Forgotten	Age	of	Revolutionary	Violence	(New	York:	Penguin	Press,	
2015),	5.	For	a	more	conservative	quantitative	study	of	political	bombings	from	1969	to	1975	that	is	
missing	data	from	1969	but	shows	1972	and	1973	as	a	low	point	in	the	period’s	bombings,	when	fewer	
than	60	occurred	over	a	two	year	period,	see	National	Advisory	Committee	on	Criminal	Justice	Standards	
and	Goals,	Report	of	the	Task	Force	on	Disorders	and	Terrorism	(Washington,	1976),	509.	
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beyond	sporadic	bomb	attacks.	Beginning	in	1969,	militant	factions	within	both	
Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	the	Black	Panther	Party	(BPP)—the	
principle	organizations	of	the	predominantly	white	New	Left	and	the	Black	Power	
movement—began	to	form	the	United	States’	first	clandestine	revolutionary	urban	
guerrilla	organizations:	the	Weather	Underground	and	the	Black	Liberation	Army	
(BLA).		
	 America’s	leftist	guerrillas	adopted	clandestinity	in	hopes	of	evading	state	
surveillance	while	launching	sustained	campaigns	of	revolutionary	urban	guerrilla	
warfare.2	They	took	inspiration	from	Latin	American	theorists	Ernesto	“Ché”	Guevara	
and	Carlos	Marighella,	who	believed	that	spectacular	armed	actions	carried	out	by	small	
“focos”	of	highly	disciplined	guerrillas	could	spark	popular	revolutionary	uprisings,	
rendering	unnecessary	traditional	leftist	strategies	of	grassroots	organizing	and	party	
building.	Modeling	themselves	after	Uruguay’s	Tupamaros	and	other	Latin	American	
guerrilla	organizations,	members	of	the	Weather	Underground	and	BLA	established	a	
revolutionary	“underground”	from	which	to	launch	guerrilla	attacks	on	America’s	
																																																								
2	My	thinking	on	clandestinity	draws	from	Donna	della	Porta,	Clandestine	Political	Violence	(New	York:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2013),	2;	Gilda	Zwerman,	Patricia	G.	Steinhoff,	and	Donatella	della	Porta,	
“Disappearing	Social	Movements:	Clandestinity	in	the	Cycle	of	New	Left	Protest	in	the	U.S.,	Japan,	
Germany,	and	Italy,”	Mobilization:	An	International	Journal	5,	no.	1	(2000),	85-104;	and	Carlos	Marighella,	
“Minimanual	of	the	Urban	Guerrilla,”	in	Terror	and	Urban	Guerrillas:	A	Study	of	Tactics	and	Documents,	ed.	
Jay	Mallin	(Coral	Gables:	University	of	Florida	Press,	1982),	70-115.	Della	Porta	defines	clandestine	
political	violence	as	violence	carried	out	“by	small,	underground	groups	(or	even	single	individuals)	
oriented	to	(more	or	less	clearly	stated)	political	aims.”	However,	neither	della	Porta,	Zwerman,	nor	
Steinhoff	offer	a	clear	definition	for	clandestinity.	I	define	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	organizations	as	
groups	whose	members	developed	underground	infrastructures	of	safe	houses,	fake	IDs,	and	secret	
communication	networks	for	the	purpose	of	evading	state	surveillance	while	conducting	sustained	
campaigns	of	politically-motivated	urban	guerilla	warfare,	in	the	form	of	bombings,	police	assassinations,	
and	other	attacks.	Timothy	B.	Wickham-Crowley	characterizes	guerrilla	warfare	as	combat	typically	
undertaken	by	non-state	insurgents	who	“avoid	massed	direct	engagements	with	the	enemy	and	instead	
…	concentrate	on	sapping	the	enemy’s	strength	and	morale	through	ambushes,	minor	skirmishes,	lighting	
raids	and	withdrawals,	cutting	of	communications	and	supply	lines,	and	similar	techniques.”	Timothy	B.	
Wickham-Crowley,	Guerrillas	and	Revolution	in	Latin	America:	A	Comparative	Study	of	Insurgents	and	
Regimes	since	1956	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1992),	3.	
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corporations,	military,	and	police.	They	took	on	assumed	names	and	forged	false	
identifications	(IDs).	They	built	an	infrastructure	of	secret	“safe	houses”	located	
throughout	the	country.	They	trained	themselves	in	the	use	of	firearms	and	the	
manufacture	of	explosives.	And	they	were	not	alone.	These	organizations	were	part	of	a	
larger	trend	within	the	international	left—in	Brazil,	Italy,	Japan,	Northern	Ireland,	
South	Africa,	West	Germany,	and	elsewhere	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s—in	
which	revolutionaries	adopted	urban	guerrilla	warfare	as	a	strategy	for	overthrowing	
the	state	and	creating	a	socialist	society.3		
	 Instead	of	inspiring	a	socialist	revolution,	however,	America’s	homegrown	leftist	
guerrillas	provoked	backlash	from	the	Nixon	administration	and	U.S.	police	agencies.	
Though	responsible	for	only	a	fraction	of	the	revolutionary	violence	carried	out	in	the	
United	States	during	the	Nixon	years,	the	Weather	Underground	and	BLA	attracted	a	
disproportionate	amount	of	police	attention.	These	guerrilla	organizations	had	a	
particularly	strong	influence	on	the	primary	agency	responsible	for	safeguarding	
America’s	“internal	security”:	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(FBI).		
	 The	Weather	Underground,	which	emerged	in	1969,	two	years	prior	to	the	BLA,	
provoked	the	FBI	with	their	clandestinity—their	ability	to	elude	capture	while	carrying	
out	bombings	throughout	the	country	and	taking	credit	for	them	in	widely	publicized	
communiqués.	The	Weather	Underground	also	incited	Nixon	and	his	White	House	staff,	
who	personally	and	repeatedly	implored	FBI	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	to	suppress	
																																																								
3	Lindsey	Churchill,	Becoming	Tupamaros:	Solidarity	and	Transnational	Revolutionaries	in	Uruguay	and	
the	United	States	(Nashville:	Vanderbilt	University	Press,	2014);	Jeremy	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home:	
The	Weather	Underground,	the	Red	Army	Faction,	and	Revolutionary	Violence	in	the	Sixties	and	Seventies	
(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2004);	Donatella	della	Porta,	Social	Movements,	Political	
Violence,	and	the	State:	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	Italy	and	Germany	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	1995);	Wickham-Crowley,	Guerrillas	and	Revolution	in	Latin	America;	Zwerman,	et	al.,	
“Disappearing	Social	Movements.”	
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America’s	guerrilla	insurgency.	Initiated	in	1970,	the	FBI’s	Weather	Underground	
investigation	(codenamed	WEATHFUG)	was	the	Bureau’s	largest	investigation	since	the	
Charles	Lindbergh	kidnapping	case	of	1932-34.	The	FBI	only	captured	a	few	of	the	
Weather	Underground’s	dozens	of	members,	however,	and	was	unable	to	prevent	the	
group’s	bombings.	The	Weather	Underground	carried	out	over	twenty	bombings	
throughout	the	United	States	before	disbanding	in	1976,	hitting	the	Capitol,	the	
Pentagon,	and	the	State	Department	among	other	targets.4		
	 The	BLA	also	attracted	massive,	nationwide	FBI	investigations,	many	of	them	
coordinated	with	those	of	local	police	agencies.	Seeking	to	retaliate	for	police	violence	
against	black	communities	and	build	an	armed	revolutionary	movement	inside	the	
United	States,	the	BLA	assassinated	police	officers,	broke	comrades	out	of	jail,	and	
robbed	banks	to	fund	its	underground	activities.	From	1971	to	1974,	BLA	guerrillas	
killed	at	least	eight	police	officers	in	New	York,	San	Francisco,	Atlanta,	and	New	Jersey,	
and	wounded	more	than	a	dozen.	Seven	of	the	group’s	own	members	also	perished	in	
shootouts	with	law	enforcement.	The	BLA’s	wave	of	assaults	did	not	last	as	long	as	the	
Weather	Underground’s	because	the	group	engaged	in	riskier	actions	that	exposed	its	
members	to	police	capture,	and	because	as	African	Americans,	the	BLA’s	underground	
																																																								
4	The	strongest	scholarly	study	of	the	Weather	Underground	is	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	which	
compares	the	organization	with	West	Germany’s	Red	Army	Faction.	Dan	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America:	The	
Weather	Underground	and	the	Politics	of	Solidarity	(Oakland:	AK	Press,	2006)	offers	further	details	on	the	
group’s	history,	much	of	it	from	oral	histories,	though	it	lacks	peer	review.	Also	see	Ron	Jacobs,	The	Way	
the	Wind	Blew:	A	History	of	the	Weather	Underground	(New	York:	Verso,	1997).	For	primary	sources	
produced	by	the	Weather	Underground,	see	Bernadine	Dohrn,	Bill	Ayers,	and	Jeff	Jones,	eds.,	Sing	a	Battle	
Song:	The	Revolutionary	Poetry,	Statements,	and	Communiqués	of	the	Weather	Underground,	1970-1974	
(New	York:	Seven	Stories	Press,	2006).	Several	former	Weather	Underground	members	have	published	
memoirs:	David	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle:	My	Life	in	SDS,	the	Weather	Underground,	and	Beyond	
(Oakland:	PM	Press,	2011);	Mark	Rudd,	Underground:	My	Life	with	SDS	ad	the	Weathermen	(New	York:	
Harper	Collins,	2009);	Cathy	Wilkerson,	Flying	Close	to	the	Sun:	My	Life	and	Times	as	a	Weatherman	(New	
York:	Seven	Stories	Press,	2007);	Bill	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days:	Memoirs	of	a	Antiwar	Activist,	2nd	ed.	(Boston:	
Beacon	Press,	2009);	Susan	Stern,	With	the	Weathermen:	The	Personal	Journal	of	a	Revolutionary	Woman	
(New	York:	Doubleday	&	Company,	1975).	
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guerrillas	were	vulnerable	to	racial	profiling	by	law	enforcement.	By	the	time	Nixon	
resigned	from	office	on	August	9,	1974,	police	had	sent	most	BLA	members	to	prison	or	
the	grave.5		
	 A	number	of	historians	have	explained	revolutionary	guerrillas’	motives,	citing	
the	U.S.	war	in	Vietnam,	repressive	police	violence,	and	the	post-World	War	II	era’s	
global	wave	of	armed	anticolonial	rebellion	as	some	of	the	prime	factors	driving	
American	radicals	to	take	up	arms.6	Scholars	have	also	written	a	great	deal	on	FBI	
operations	against	the	U.S.	Left,	including	a	number	of	works	on	FBI	surveillance	and	
the	Bureau’s	secret	counterintelligence	programs	(COINTELPROs)	established	in	1956	
to	undermine	the	Communist	Party	and	expanded	in	1967	and	1968	to	“destroy,	
disrupt,	or	otherwise	neutralize,”	America’s	Black	Power	and	antiwar	movements.7	
																																																								
5	The	BLA	managed	a	brief	resurgence	between	November	2,	1979,	when	the	group	broke	its	member	
Assata	Shakur	from	prison,	until	October	20,	1981,	when	a	botched	armored	truck	heist	in	Nyack,	New	
York	led	to	the	capture	or	death	of	its	last	members.	Historians	have	yet	to	publish	a	full	history	of	the	
BLA.	The	best	published	scholarly	source	is	Akinyele	O.	Umoja,	“The	Black	Liberation	Army	and	the	
Radical	Legacy	of	the	Black	Panther	Party,”	in	Black	Power	in	the	Belly	of	the	Beast,	edited	by	Judson	L.	
Jeffries	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2006),	224-251.	For	a	dissertation	on	the	BLA,	see	Gaidi	
Faraj,	“Unearthing	the	Underground:	A	Study	of	Radical	Activism	in	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	Black	
Liberation	Army”	(PhD	dissertation,	University	of	California	Berkeley,	2007).	For	a	brief	overview	of	the	
BLA’s	history	by	one	of	its	incarcerated	former	members,	see	Jalil	Muntaqim,	On	the	Black	Liberation	
Army	(Montreal:	Arm	the	Spirit/Solidarity,	2002).	For	a	memoir	by	a	former	BLA	member,	see	Jamal	
Joseph,	Panther	Baby:	A	Life	of	Rebellion	and	Reinvention	(Chapel	Hill:	Algonquin	Books,	2012).	
6	Daniel	Burton-Rose,	Guerrilla	USA:	The	George	Jackson	Brigade	and	the	Anticapitalist	Underground	of	the	
1970s	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2010);	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America;	Varon,	Bringing	the	
War	Home;	Zwerman,	et	al.,	“Disappearing	Social	Movements.”	For	a	sensational	true	crime	account	of	the	
Weather	Underground,	the	BLA,	and	other	U.S.	leftist	guerrilla	groups	during	the	1970s	and	80s,	see	
Burrough,	Days	of	Rage.	
7	Works	covering	late-1960s	FBI	operations	against	the	U.S.	left	include	David	Cunningham,	There’s	
Something	Happening	Here:	The	New	Left,	the	Klan,	and	FBI	Counterintelligence	(Berkeley:	University	of	
California	Press,	2004);	James	Kirkpatrick	Davis,	Spying	on	America:	The	FBI’s	Domestic	
Counterintelligence	Program	(New	York:	Praeger,	1992);	Kenneth	O’Reilly,	“Racial	Matters”:	The	FBI’s	File	
on	Black	America,	1960-1972	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1989);	and	Athan	Theoharis,	Spying	on	Americans:	
Political	Surveillance	from	Hoover	to	the	Huston	Plan	(Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1978).	On	
the	April	1971	burglary	of	an	FBI	office	in	Media,	Pennsylvania	that	first	exposed	the	FBI’s	mass	domestic	
surveillance	and	counterintelligence	operations,	see	Betty	Medsger,	The	Burglary:	The	Discovery	of	J.	
Edgar	Hoover’s	Secret	FBI	(New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2014).	For	a	sociological	study	of	FBI	reforms	and	
institutional	changes	during	the	1970s	and	80s,	see	Tony	Poveda,	The	FBI	in	Transition:	Lawlessness	and	
Reform	(Pacific	Grove,	CA:	Brooks/Cole	Publishing,	1990).	Scholarly	works	covering	the	sweep	of	FBI	
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However,	despite	a	mountain	of	literature	on	the	FBI,	the	Nixon	administration,	and	
1960s-era	social	movements,	historians	have	yet	to	address	fundamental	questions:	
How	did	members	of	the	FBI	and	Nixon	administration	understand	and	respond	to	
Black	Power	and	New	Left	violence?	How	did	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	violence	affect	
the	FBI’s	surveillance,	counterintelligence,	and	investigative	practices?	How	did	the	
FBI’s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	influence	the	Nixon	White	House	and	
																																																																																																																																																																												
history	from	1908	to	the	early	twenty-first	century	include	Rhodri	Jeffreys-Jones,	The	FBI:	A	History	(New	
Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2007);	Athan	Theoharis,	The	FBI	and	American	Democracy:	A	Brief	Critical	
History	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2004);	and	Richard	Gid	Powers,	Broken:	The	Troubled	Past	
and	Uncertain	Future	of	the	FBI	(New	York:	Free	Press,	2004).	Much	of	the	FBI’s	history	has	been	written	
as	biographies	of	J.	Edgar	Hoover	(1895-1972),	who	served	as	FBI	Director	from	1924	to	1972.	See	
Beverly	Gage,	G-Man:	J.	Edgar	Hoover	and	the	American	Century	(forthcoming,	New	York:	Viking,	2017);	
Anthony	Summers,	Official	and	Confidential:	The	Secret	Life	of	J.	Edgar	Hoover	(New	York:	G.	P.	Putnam’s	
Sons,	1993);	Curt	Gentry,	J.	Edgar	Hoover:	The	Man	and	the	Secrets	(New	York:	W.	W.	Norton,	1991);	
Athan	Theoharis	and	John	Stuart	Cox,	The	Boss:	J.	Edgar	Hoover	and	the	Great	American	Inquisition	
(Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1988);	and	Richard	Gid	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power:	The	Life	of	J.	
Edgar	Hoover	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1987).	For	unreliable	accounts	of	FBI	operations,	see	Ward	
Churchill	and	Jim	Vander	Wall,	Agents	of	Repression:	The	FBI’s	Secret	Wars	Against	the	Black	Panther	Party	
and	the	American	Indian	Movement,	3rd	ed.	(Cambridge,	MA:	South	End	Press,	2002),	and	The	
COINTELPRO	Papers:	Documents	from	the	FBI’s	Secret	Wars	against	Dissent	in	the	United	States,	2nd	ed.	
(Cambridge,	MA:	South	End	Press,	2002).	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall	based	their	work	largely	on	previous	
scholars’	research	(much	of	which	they	misrepresented)	and	memoirs	by	leftist	activists	and	police	
informants.	Among	other	works,	the	pair	uncritically	drew	upon	former	Black	Panther	leader	Huey	P.	
Newton’s	questionable	Ph.D	dissertation	“War	Against	the	Panthers:	A	Study	of	Repression	in	America,”	
(Ph.D.	dissertation,	University	of	California	Santa	Cruz,	1980).	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall	wrote	The	
COINTELPRO	Papers	in	response	to	a	review	of	Agents	of	Repression	published	in	the	Washington	Post	
preeminent	FBI	history	Athan	Theoharis,	which	argued	that	the	authors	did	not	provide	evidence	to	back	
their	claims.	See	Athan	Theoharis,	“Building	a	File:	The	Case	Against	the	FBI:	AIM	and	the	FBI,”	
Washington	Post,	October	30,	1988.	Though	The	COINTELPRO	Papers	includes	excerpts	of	some	FBI	
documents,	the	authors	misrepresent	many	of	these	sources,	or	interpret	them	out	of	historical	context,	
just	as	they	did	in	their	previous	book.	In	2007,	Ward	Churchill	(who	never	earned	a	Ph.D.)	was	forced	
from	his	faculty	position	in	the	Ethnic	Studies	Department	at	the	University	of	Colorado	Boulder	after	a	
panel	of	experts	determined	that	he	had	misrepresented	evidence	in	several	of	his	books	on	Native	
American	history	(the	panel	did	not	review	his	books	on	the	FBI).	Because	the	University	launched	the	
investigation	in	response	to	complaints	from	right	wing	activists	about	an	essay	he	wrote	after	the	9/11	
attacks	arguing	that	some	of	the	victims	deserved	their	fate,	some	of	Churchill’s	supporters	on	the	
militant	left	continue	to	believe	that	his	dismissal	was	entirely	politically	motivated,	rather	than	
motivated	partially	by	politics	and	partially	by	his	spurious	scholarship.	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall	
remain	widely	cited	in	scholarly	literature	on	the	New	Left	and	Black	Power	movement.	Independent	
scholar	Ernesto	Vigil	is	currently	finishing	revisions	of	a	forthcoming	book	critical	of	Ward	Churchill	and	
his	scholarship	on	the	FBI	and	the	American	Indian	Movement	for	University	of	Oklahoma	Press.	Ivan	
Greenberg,	The	Dangers	of	Dissent:	The	FBI	and	Civil	Liberties	since	1965	(Lanham,	MD:	Lexington	Books,	
2010)	draws	from	research	in	large	collections	of	declassified	documents	previously	unseen	by	scholars	
that	the	author	obtained	through	FOIA	requests	and	lawsuits.	The	book	lacks	peer	review,	however,	and	
offers	conspiratorial	arguments	without	adequate	corroboration	or	consideration	of	revolutionary	
violence.	
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American	politics	beyond	the	radical	left?8	More	broadly,	how	did	conflict	between	
leftist	militants	and	the	state	shape	the	punitive,	“law-and-order”	turn	in	American	
politics	that	led	to	the	rise	of	counterterrorism,	militarized	policing,	and	the	racialized	
system	of	mass	incarceration	that	scholars	have	termed	the	“carceral	state”	and	the	
“New	Jim	Crow”?9	
	 Most	literature	on	the	topic	explains	FBI	operations	against	the	Black	Power	
movement	and	New	Left	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	in	one-sided	terms,	
chronicling	examples	of	Bureau	misconduct	in	exposé-style	narratives.	Framing	FBI	
operations	under	the	broad	rubric	of	“political	repression,”	scholars	have	portrayed	the	
Bureau’s	counterintelligence	and	domestic	surveillance	programs	as	products	of	
officials’	paranoia,	anticommunist	hatred,	racism,	or	hunger	for	power	without	
considering	how	state	actors	understood	and	responded	to	revolutionary	violence.10	
Journalist	Betty	Medsger,	for	example,	has	argued	that	the	FBI	carried	out	its	secret	
operations	merely	to	“silence	people	whose	political	opinions	the	director	[Hoover]	
opposed.”11	Similarly,	sociologist	David	Cunningham	asserted,	without	presenting	
evidence,	“the	FBI	has	gone	beyond	the	passive	monitoring	of	dissidents	[and	instituted	
																																																								
8	An	amazon.com	search	for	books	on	“FBI	History”	yields	over	2,000	results,	yet	there	are	no	reliable	
works	on	FBI	operations	targeting	the	U.S.	Left	during	the	critical	period	of	the	Nixon	presidency	(1969-
1974).	For	a	journalistic	overview	of	FBI	history	that	makes	limited	reference	to	Nixon-era	revolutionary	
violence,	see	Tim	Weiner,	Enemies:	A	History	of	the	FBI	(New	York:	Random	House,	2012).		
9	Kelly	Lytle	Hernandez,	Khalil	Gibran	Muhammad,	and	Heather	Ann	Thompson,	eds.,	“Historians	and	the	
Carceral	State,”	special	issue,	Journal	of	American	History	102,	no.	1	(2015);	Michelle	Alexander,	The	New	
Jim	Crow:	Mass	Incarceration	in	the	Age	of	Colorblindness,	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	The	New	Press,	2013);	
Michael	Flamm,	Law	and	Order:	Street	Crime,	Civil	Unrest,	and	the	Crisis	of	Liberalism	in	the	1960s	(New	
York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2005).	
10	For	an	older,	but	influential	work	exhibiting	such	tendencies,	see	Robert	Justin	Goldstein,	Political	
Repression	in	Modern	America:	From	1870	to	the	Present	(Boston:	G	K.	Hall	&	Co.,	1978).	Churchill	and	
Vander	Wall’s	book	have	also	been	influential	in	this	regard.	O’Reilly,	“Racial	Matters,”	acknowledges	that	
concerns	over	political	violence	motivated	FBI	operations	against	the	Black	Panthers,	but	does	not	fully	
analyze	this.	Clayborne	Carson	makes	similar	observations	about	SNCC	in	In	Struggle:	SNCC	and	the	Black	
Awakening	of	the	1960s,	2nd	ed.	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1995).	
11	Medsger,	The	Burglary,	7.	
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disruptive	counterintelligence	programs]	whenever	threats	to	the	status	quo	have	
intensified.”12	Ward	Churchill	and	Jim	Vander	Wall,	who	remain	highly	cited	despite	
being	discredited	as	reliable	scholars,	contended	a	core	lesson	to	be	learned	from	the	
history	of	the	FBI	and	the	U.S.	left	is	that	“to	the	extent	that	you	become	effective	at	
advocating	and	organizing	around	your	agenda,	you	will	be	targeted	by	the	FBI	for	
systematic	undermining	and	discrediting,	harassment,	and—ultimately—outright	
elimination	by	counterintelligence	operatives.”13	
	 Though	varying	in	scholarly	merit,	most	literature	on	FBI	operations	against	
American	leftists	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	offer	analyses	mirroring	those	
of	the	Senate	Select	Committee	to	Study	Governmental	Operations	with	respect	to	
Intelligence	Activities,	popularly	known	as	the	“Church	Committee”	after	its	chair,	
Senator	Frank	Church	(D,	ID).	In	January	1975,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Watergate	
Scandal	and	President	Nixon’s	resignation,	the	Senate	charged	the	Church	Committee	
with	the	task	of	investigating	American	federal	intelligence	agencies’	involvement	in	
“illegal,	improper,	or	unethical	activities”14	Based	on	unprecedented	Congressional	
access	to	thousands	of	formerly	classified	intelligence	documents,	the	Church	
Committee’s	nearly	1,400	pages	of	reports	on	the	FBI	revealed	for	the	first	time	how	the	
Bureau	used	electronic	surveillance,	informants,	mail-opening,	break-ins,	and	covert	
counterintelligence	programs	against	American	citizens	in	order	to	undermine	
dissident	social	movements,	manipulate	the	mass	media,	and	influence	government	
																																																								
12	Cunningham,	There’s	Something	Happening	Here,	8-9.	
13	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall,	Agents	of	Repression,	384.	See	footnote	7	for	further	discussion	on	
Churchill’s	scholarship.	
14	Senate	Select	Committee	to	Study	Governmental	Operations	with	respect	to	Intelligence	Activities	
(hereafter,	Church	Committee),	Final	Report,	Intelligence	Activities	and	the	Rights	of	Americans,	Book	II,	
94th	Cong.,	2d	sess.,	1976,	v.	
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policy	from	1936	through	the	early	1970s.15	The	Church	Committee	reports	offer	what	
remain	the	most	detailed	studies	of	FBI	operations	against	dissident	social	movements	
during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s,	and	include	extensive	evidence	on	how	
insurgent	political	violence	influenced	the	FBI	during	this	period.	However,	due	to	their	
post-Watergate	focus	on	uncovering	FBI	improprieties	as	a	step	towards	reforming	U.S.	
intelligence	agencies,	and	because	of	their	thematic	rather	than	chronological	
framework,	the	Church	Committee	reports	do	not	sufficiently	analyze	how	domestic	
revolutionary	violence	contributed	to	changes	in	FBI	practices	over	time.16		
	 Instead	of	explaining	the	changing	motives	and	political	conflicts	underlying	FBI	
operations,	the	Church	Committee	reports	offered	broad-brush	passive-voice	claims	
implying	that	FBI	officials	were	driven	primarily	by	political	bias.	The	reports	argued,	
for	example,	that	the	postwar	FBI	was	characterized	by	“a	relentless	expansion	of	
domestic	intelligence	activity	beyond	investigation	of	criminal	conduct	toward	the	
collection	of	political	intelligence	and	the	launching	of	secret	offensive	actions	against	
Americans,”	and	that	“the	unexpressed	major	premise	of	the	[counterintelligence]	
programs	was	that	a	law	enforcement	agency	has	the	duty	to	do	whatever	is	necessary	
to	combat	perceived	threats	to	the	existing	social	and	political	order.”17	While	these	
statements	are	not	entirely	inaccurate,	they	do	not	explain	the	motives	behind	FBI	
																																																								
15	Church	Committee,	Book	II,	and	Final	Report,	Supplementary	Detailed	Staff	Reports	on	Intelligence	
Activities	and	the	Rights	of	Americans,	Book	III,	94th	Cong.,	2d	sess.,	1976.	
16	In	addition	to	its	main	final	report	on	Intelligence	Activities	and	the	Rights	of	Americans	(Book	II),	which	
overviews	FBI	improprieties	and	offers	policy	recommendations,	the	Church	Committee’s	Supplementary	
Detailed	Staff	Reports	on	Intelligence	Activities	and	the	Rights	of	Americans	(Book	III)	includes	separate	
reports	on	break-ins,	informants,	counterintelligence	operations,	mail	opening,	and	other	topics.	For	an	
analysis	of	the	Church	Committee	as	a	post-Watergate	effort	to	restore	the	popular	legitimacy	of	
America’s	intelligence	agencies,	see	Kathryn	S.	Olmstead,	Challenging	the	Secret	Government:	The	Post-
Watergate	Investigations	of	the	CIA	and	FBI	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1996).	Also	
see	Loch	K.	Johnson,	A	Season	of	Inquiry	Revisited:	The	Church	Committee	Confronts	America’s	Spy	Agencies	
(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2015).	
17	Church	Committee,	Book	II,	21,	and	Book	III,	3.	
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operations,	which	cannot	be	understood	solely	as	products	of	officials’	political	biases.	
The	Church	Committee’s	focus	on	documenting	FBI	misdeeds	without	fully	analyzing	
the	motives	behind	them	obscured	the	fact	that	by	1969,	homegrown	revolutionary	
violence	had	become	a	core,	urgent	concern	for	both	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	
administration.	Without	analyzing	leftist	violence,	however,	we	cannot	properly	
understand	the	FBI’s	Nixon	era	operations	against	political	dissidents,	the	origins	of	the	
Watergate,	or	the	rise	of	counterterrorism	and	mass	incarceration.	
	 This	study	is	the	most	significant	revision	of	scholarship	on	FBI	operations	
against	the	Black	Power	movement	and	New	Left	since	the	Church	Committee	reports.	
Drawing	upon	materials	in	the	Richard	Nixon	Library	and	numerous	declassified	FBI	
files,	“Nixon’s	War	on	Terrorism”	offers	new	perspectives	on	social	movements,	
policing,	and	political	violence	in	the	postwar	United	States,	examining	for	the	first	time	
how	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	and	debates	over	a	problem	officials	framed	as	
“terrorism”	reshaped	the	FBI	and	American	politics	during	the	Nixon	administration.		
	 War	with	homegrown	revolutionary	guerrillas	transformed	the	FBI’s	
surveillance	practices,	spawned	the	United	States’	earliest	institutions	explicitly	
dedicated	to	combatting	“terrorism,”	and	triggered	a	bureaucratic	struggle	between	the	
Nixon	White	House	and	the	FBI	that	played	a	critical	role	in	fomenting	the	Watergate	
Scandal.	This	story	centers	on	how	the	FBI	came	to	expand	its	surveillance	of	America’s	
Black	Power	and	antiwar	movements	by	increasing	its	use	of	paid	informants	inside	
leftist	groups	and	reviving	mail-opening,	warrantless	wiretapping,	and	break-ins,	illegal	
spy	techniques	that	Hoover	had	employed	widely	against	the	Communist	Party	USA	
after	World	War	II	but	banned	during	the	mid-1960s.	It	is	a	story	of	unintended	
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consequences	and	conjuncture.	Leftist	guerrillas	did	not	achieve	their	goal	of	kick-
starting	a	socialist	revolution.	And	despite	overhauling	its	surveillance	operations,	the	
FBI	was	unsuccessful	in	its	aim	of	preventing	guerrilla	violence.	The	Nixon	
administration	was	also	largely	ineffective	in	halting	guerrilla	attacks,	in	spite	of	the	
immense	pressure	it	put	upon	the	FBI	to	accomplish	this	task.	But	together—through	
their	conflicts	with	one	another—leftist	guerrillas,	FBI	officials,	and	the	Nixon	
administration	triggered	Watergate,	the	Church	Committee,	antiterrorism	politics,	and	
a	crisis	of	popular	legitimacy	from	which	neither	the	Bureau	nor	the	federal	
government	have	ever	fully	recovered.	
	
	
W.	Mark	Felt,	who	oversaw	FBI	investigations	of	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	
leftist	guerrillas	during	the	Nixon	years	later	recalled,	“In	the	late	Sixties	and	early	
Seventies,	the	country	was	at	war—civil	war—though	very	few	knew	it.”18	This	world	of	
violent	civil	war	would	have	been	unthinkable	at	the	outset	of	the	1960s.	In	President	
John	F.	Kennedy’s	America,	the	civil	rights	and	student	movements	devoted	themselves	
to	nonviolent	direct	action	and	participatory	democracy.	The	group	most	responsible	
for	domestic	bombings	was	the	racist	Ku	Klux	Klan.	In	early-1960s	Birmingham,	
Alabama,	the	Klan’s	use	of	explosives	to	terrorize	African	Americans	was	so	prolific	that	
the	city	gained	the	nickname	“Bombingham.”19	Before	long,	however,	the	United	States	
government	became	the	world’s	leading	bomber.	After	Kennedy’s	November	22,	1963	
																																																								
18	W.	Mark	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside	(New	York:	Putnam,	1979),	11.		
19	David	Mark	Chalmers,	Backfire:	How	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	Helped	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	(Lanham,	MD:	
Rowman	&	Littlefield,	2005),	15-20.	
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assassination,	President	Lyndon	B.	Johnson	escalated	his	predecessor’s	creeping	
military	intervention	in	Vietnam	into	a	full-blown	invasion,	and	oversaw	the	most	
extensive	aerial	bombardment	in	human	history.	By	the	end	of	the	war	the	U.S.	had	
dropped	over	eight	million	tons	of	explosives	and	napalm	on	Vietnam,	Laos,	and	
Cambodia,	four	times	the	amount	of	all	U.S.	aerial	bombs	employed	during	World	War	
II.20	In	response,	the	student	movement—radicalized	by	state	violence	and	their	
inability	to	stop	it	through	normal	political	channels—rose	to	the	forefront	of	the	
antiwar	movement	and	escalated	its	strategy	from	one	of	protest	to	physical	resistance.	
A	militant	subset	eventually	turned	to	armed	revolution.	The	student	antiwar	
movements’	trajectory	mirrored	that	of	the	African	American	freedom	struggle,	whose	
participants	increasingly	questioned	the	efficacy	of	nonviolence	after	the	Civil	Rights	
Act	of	1964	and	the	Voting	Rights	Act	of	1965	left	untouched	the	longstanding	problem	
of	police	brutality	in	Northern	and	West	Coast	cities.	The	massive	wave	of	more	than	
250	urban	riots	during	the	Johnson	years	reflected	this	reality,	as	did	the	rise	of	the	
Black	Panther	Party,	which	mushroomed	during	the	brief	period	of	1967	to	1969	from	
an	obscure	local	group	in	Oakland,	California	into	a	nationwide	organization	whose	
leaders	called	upon	members	to	prepare	for	armed	revolution	against	police	and	the	
American	government.21	
																																																								
20	Marilyn	B.	Young,	“Bombing	Civilians:	An	American	Tradition,”	History	News	Network,	April	11,	2009,	
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/67717.	
21	Elizabeth	Hinton,	“‘A	War	within	Our	Own	Boundaries’:	Lyndon	Johnson’s	Great	Society	and	the	Rise	of	
the	Carceral	State,”	Journal	of	American	History	102,	no.	1	(2015),	100-112;	Amanda	I.	Seligman,	“But	
Burn—No”:	The	Rest	of	the	Crowd	in	Three	Civil	Disorders	in	1960s	Chicago,”	Journal	of	Urban	History	
vol.	37,	no.	2	(2011),	230-255.	Scholars	disagree	on	what	terminology	to	use	for	describing	the	civil	
disorders	of	the	1960s.	Emphasizing	the	political	grievances	underlying	the	events,	some	have	insisted	on	
using	the	terms	“uprising”	or	“rebellion”	over	“riot,”	which	many	contemporary	critics	used	to	emphasize	
the	unlawful	and	destructive	nature	of	the	incidents.	Others	insist	on	more	“neutral”	terms	such	as	
“disorder,”	“disturbance,”	and	“upheaval.”	For	further	overview	of	this	debate	and	current	scholarship	on	
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	 Several	historians	have	invoked	the	notion	of	civil	war	to	discuss	the	social	
conflicts	that	shook	American	society	during	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	and	left	in	their	
wake	a	legacy	of	heightened	political	partisanship	and	shattered	faith	in	American	
exceptionalism.	As	Maurice	Isserman	and	Michael	Kazin	put	it,	“In	the	course	of	the	
1960s,	many	Americans	came	to	regard	groups	of	fellow	countrymen	[sic]	as	enemies	
with	whom	they	were	engaged	in	a	struggle	for	the	nation’s	very	soul.	Whites	versus	
blacks,	liberals	versus	conservatives	(as	well	as	liberals	versus	radicals),	young	versus	
old,	men	versus	women,	hawks	versus	doves,	rich	versus	poor,	taxpayers	versus	
welfare	recipients,	the	religious	versus	the	secular,	the	hip	versus	the	straight,	the	gay	
versus	the	straight—everywhere	one	looked,	new	battalions	took	to	the	field,	in	a	spirit	
that	ranged	from	that	of	redemptive	sacrifice	to	vengeful	defiance.”22	Similarly,	Rick	
Perlstein	argued,	“between	1965	and	1972,	America	experienced	no	less	than	a	second	
civil	war.	Out	of	it	the	political	world	we	know	now	was	born.”23	But	the	conflict	
Perlstein	referred	to	as	America’s	“second	civil	war”	was	fought	not	only	between	
contesting	social	groups	and	political	ideologies.	This	“war”	also	included	a	violent	
informal	military	conflict	between	leftist	guerrillas,	who	sought	to	topple	U.S.	
imperialism,	and	the	FBI,	which	endeavored	to	defend	America’s	national	security	from	
revolutionary	violence.	In	contrast	to	the	“high	intensity”	combat	between	formal	
																																																																																																																																																																												
civil	disturbances,	see	Seligman,	“But	Burn—No,”	247-248.	I	use	these	terms	interchangeably,	since	the	
riots	were	complex,	and	featured	overlapping	incidents	of	insurgent,	criminal,	and	state	violence.	
22	Maurice	Isserman	and	Michael	Kazin,	America	Divided:	The	Civil	War	of	the	1960s,	4th	ed.	(New	York:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	3-4.	For	another	synthetic	overview	of	1960s-era	America	that	invokes	
the	theme	of	civil	war,	see	Mark	Hamilton,	America’s	Uncivil	Wars:	The	Sixties	Era	from	Elvis	to	Richard	
Nixon	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005).	For	an	explanation	of	how	the	U.S.	“war	at	home”	
during	the	war	in	Vietnam	shattered	faith	in	American	exceptionalism,	see	Christian	G.	Appy,	“The	War	at	
Home,”	Chapter	7	in	American	Reckoning:	The	Vietnam	War	and	Our	National	Identity	(New	York:	Viking,	
2015).	Also	see	Stanley	Kutler,	The	Wars	of	Watergate:	The	Last	Crisis	of	Richard	Nixon	(New	York:	Alfred	
A.	Knopf,	1990).	
23	Rick	Perlstein,	Nixonland:	The	Rise	of	a	President	and	the	Fracturing	of	America	(New	York:	Scribner,	
2008),	front	jacket	flap.		
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military	forces	that	characterized	the	American	Civil	War,	however,	the	FBI’s	covert	war	
with	domestic	guerrillas	more	resembled	the	“low	intensity	conflicts”	the	U.S.	pursued	
to	crush	revolutionary	regimes	and	movements	in	Latin	America	and	Southeast	Asia	
during	the	Reagan	administration.24	
	 To	characterize	the	FBI’s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	as	part	of	a	second	
American	civil	war	is	dramatic,	but	historically	inaccurate.	For	one,	the	U.S.	home	front	
of	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	was	not	exceptionally	violent.	Though	published	in	1969,	
just	before	the	rate	of	leftist	bombings	reached	its	peak,	a	report	compiled	for	the	
National	Commission	on	the	Causes	and	Prevention	of	Violence	determined	that	the	
period	from	1939	to	1968	was	actually	one	of	the	least	violent	in	U.S.	history.25	There	
were	also	antecedents	for	the	FBI’s	1970s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas.	During	
World	War	I	and	the	years	immediately	after,	the	Bureau	of	Investigation,	the	Justice	
Department,	and	Congress	responded	to	a	surge	of	anarchist	bombings	by	broadly	
targeting	the	U.S.	labor	and	antiwar	movements	with	political	surveillance,	arrests,	
deportations,	and	legislative	criminalization	of	speech,	most	significantly	in	what	came	
to	be	known	as	the	“Palmer	Raids”	of	1919-1920.26		
																																																								
24	Ivan	Malloy,	Rolling	Back	Revolution:	The	Emergence	of	Low	Intensity	Conflict	(Sterling,	VA:	Pluto	Press,	
2001).	
25	Sheldon	G.	Levy,	“A	150-Year	Study	of	Political	Violence	in	the	United	States,”	in	Violence	in	America:	
Historical	and	Comparative	Perspectives:	A	Report	to	the	National	Commission	on	the	Causes	and	
Prevention	of	Violence,	edited	by	Hugh	Davis	Graham	and	Ted	Robert	Gurr	(New	York:	New	American	
Library,	1969).	
26	The	most	thorough	study	of	the	Palmer	Raids	(named	after	Attorney	General	A.	Mitchell	Palmer)	is	
Regin	Schmidt,	Red	Scare:	FBI	and	the	Origins	of	Anticommunism	in	the	United	States	(Copenhagen:	
Museum	Tusculanum	Press,	2000).	For	an	analysis	of	how	federal	government	surveillance	partnerships	
with	private	social	activist	organizations	forged	in	response	to	antiwar	and	anarchist	bombings	from	
1914	to	1919	laid	a	foundation	for	the	Bureau	of	Investigation’s	involvement	in	red	scare	of	1919-1920,	
see	Jennifer	Fronc,	New	York	Undercover:	Private	Surveillance	in	the	Progressive	Era	(Chicago:	University	
of	Chicago	Press,	2009),	177-188.	Also	see	Beverly	Gage,	The	Day	Wall	Street	Exploded:	A	Story	of	America	
in	its	First	Age	of	Terror	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009).	For	discussion	on	how	state	and	
vigilante	repression	shaped	the	anarchist	movement,	particularly	its	Italian	women,	see	Jennifer	
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	 The	notion	of	a	second	civil	war	also	overstates	leftist	guerrillas’	power.	The	
United	States	underwent	tremendous	change	during	the	1960s,	as	powerful	social	
movements	toppled	the	South’s	racist	Jim	Crow	regime,	overhauled	traditional	gender	
norms,	and	reconfigured	the	Democratic	and	Republican	parties.	Unlike	during	the	Civil	
War,	however,	at	no	point	during	the	1960s	or	1970s	was	the	United	States	in	a	
“revolutionary	situation,”	which	Rod	Aya	defines	as	when	“two	or	more	groups	of	
power	holders	vie	for	sovereignty	of	one	territory	formerly	governed	by	one	power.”27	
American	workers	never	carried	out	enough	strikes	during	the	1960s	to	halt	industrial	
production.	Though	massive	GI	rebellion	in	1971	played	an	important	role	in	
compelling	Nixon	to	pull	U.S.	military	forces	out	of	Southeast	Asia,	there	was	no	mutiny	
among	America’s	domestic	police	agencies.28	And	although	mass	street	protests	and	
leftist	guerrilla	bombings	gave	rise	to	an	institutional	conflict	between	the	FBI	and	
Nixon	administration,	radicals	never	succeeded	in	preventing	state	officials	from	
carrying	out	their	daily	executive	decisions	or	maintaining	any	significant	level	of	
popular	legitimacy.29	In	other	words,	not	only	was	this	conflict	“asymmetrical”—
America’s	leftist	guerrillas	never	stood	a	chance	of	overthrowing	the	state.	Though	their	
violence	was	“revolutionary”	in	intention,	it	was	never	revolutionary	in	practice.	By	
embracing	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	warfare,	the	Weather	Underground	and	BLA	
vastly	underestimated	U.S.	state	power	and	overestimated	their	own.	Their	decision	to	
																																																																																																																																																																												
Guglielmo,	Living	the	Revolution:	Italian	Women’s	Resistance	and	Radicalism	in	New	York	City,	1880-1945	
(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2010),	199-209.	
27	Rod	Aya,	Rethinking	Revolutions	and	Collective	Violence:	Studies	on	Concept,	Theory,	and	Method	
(Amsterdam:	Het	Spinhuis,	1990),	71.		
28	Appy,	American	Reckoning,	212-216.	
29	I	thank	John	Higginson	for	pushing	me	to	think	through	these	points,	and	for	introducing	me	to	Rod	
Aya’s	book.	See	John	Higginson’s	work	on	political	violence,	Collective	Violence	and	the	Agrarian	Origins	of	
South	African	Apartheid,	1900-1948	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015).	
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forgo	the	difficult	task	of	organizing	leftist	social	movements	was	a	grave	strategic	
error.	
	 Although	the	notion	of	a	second	Civil	War	is	inappropriate,	war	is	a	useful	
framework	for	rethinking	FBI	operations	against	the	Black	Power	movement	and	New	
Left	during	the	Nixon	administration.	Understanding	the	FBI	and	leftist	guerrillas	as	
combatants	in	an	informal	war—in	which	both	state	forces	and	leftist	guerrillas	
inflicted	and	suffered	violence—can	help	us	move	beyond	inaccurate	narratives	that	
explain	Bureau	operations	as	part	of	a	centralized	government	conspiracy	to	quash	
dissent,	or	argue	that	America’s	leftist	guerrilla	violence	had	little	impact	on	the	state.		
	 In	recent	years,	historians	have	published	a	great	deal	of	literature	on	groups	
associated	with	America’s	late	1960s	and	1970s	militant	left,	particularly	the	Black	
Panther	Party.30	This	scholarship	has	been	driven	by	a	new	generation	of	social	
movement	historians	seeking	to	amend	earlier	participant-observer	accounts	that	
dismissed	such	groups	as	reckless	or	blamed	them	for	the	left’s	decline.31	While	this	
new	work	has	greatly	enriched	our	understanding	of	the	era’s	social	movements,	it	has	
																																																								
30	Recent	monographs	on	the	Black	Panther	Party	include	Joshua	Bloom	and	Waldo	E.	Martin	Jr.,	Black	
Against	Empire:	The	History	and	Politics	of	the	Black	Panther	Party	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	
Press,	2013);	Donna	Jean	Murch,	Living	for	the	City:	Migration,	Education,	and	the	Rise	of	the	Black	Panther	
Party	in	Oakland,	California	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2010);	Jane	Rhodes,	Framing	
the	Black	Panthers:	The	Spectacular	Rise	of	a	Black	Power	Icon	(New	York:	New	Press,	2007);	Paul	
Alkebulan,	Survival	Pending	Revolution:	The	History	of	the	Black	Panther	Party	(Tuscaloosa:	University	of	
Alabama	Press,	2007);	and	Curtis	Austin,	Up	Against	the	Wall:	Violence	and	the	Making	and	Unmaking	of	
the	Black	Panther	Party	(Fayetteville:	University	of	Arkansas	Press,	2006).	For	an	analytical	overview	of	
Black	Panther	historiography	up	to	2009,	see	Joe	Street,	“The	Historiography	of	the	Black	Panther	Party,”	
Journal	of	American	Studies	vol.	44	no.	2	(2010),	351-375.	See	footnotes	4-6	for	overviews	of	literature	on	
the	Weather	Underground	and	other	American	leftist	guerrilla	groups.	Also	see	Dan	Berger,	Captive	
Nation:	Prison	Organizing	in	the	Civil	Rights	Era	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2014);	
and	ed.,	The	Hidden	1970s:	Histories	of	Radicalism	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	2010).	
31	See,	for	example,	Peter	Collier	and	David	Horowitz,	The	Destructive	Generation:	Second	Thoughts	About	
the	Sixties	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1996);	Hugh	Pearson,	Shadow	of	the	Panther:	Huey	Newton	and	the	
Price	of	Black	Power	in	America	(Cambridge:	Perseus,	1995);	Eric	Cummins,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	
California’s	Prisoners’	Rights	Movement	(Palo	Alto:	Stanford	University	Press,	1994);	and	Todd	Gitlin,	The	
Sixties:	Days	of	Hope	and	Rage,	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	Bantham	Books,	1993).	
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not	included	significant	new	primary	source	research	on	the	FBI.	Indeed,	this	literature	
has	tended	to	reproduce	one-sided	interpretations	of	FBI	operations	while	neglecting	to	
examine	how	militant	leftists’	violent	rhetoric	and	actions	influenced	U.S.	police	
agencies,	policies,	and	political	culture.	Moreover,	the	literature	has	tended	to	blur	key	
distinctions	in	police	activity:	between	FBI	activities	and	those	of	other	police	and	
intelligence	agencies;	between	counterintelligence	and	surveillance;	between	officially-
sanctioned	and	informal	FBI	actions;	and	between	paid	informants	and	undercover	
agents.32	As	a	result,	FBI	operations	against	the	Black	Panthers	and	SDS,	which	were	
central	to	the	larger	conflicts	that	rocked	American	society	during	the	Nixon	years,	
remain	widely	misunderstood.	
	 One-sided	interpretations	of	FBI	operations	are	especially	pronounced	in	the	
recent	historiography	of	the	Black	Panther	Party.	Early	journalistic	and	participant-
observer	accounts	of	the	BPP	chronicled	stories	of	Panther	violence	against	police,	
neighbors,	and	their	own	members	and	allies,	asserting	that	the	organization	in	many	
ways	resembled	a	gang.33	Over	the	past	ten	years,	scholarly	studies	of	the	organization	
have	downplayed	Panthers’	fratricidal	and	criminal	violence,	instead	exploring	how	
experiences	of	state	violence	in	the	form	racial	inequality,	police	brutality,	and	
incarceration	shaped	the	organization’s	changing	political	ideology,	programs,	and	
																																																								
32	Bloom	and	Martin	acknowledged,	“It	is	not	clear	whether	the	wave	of	raids	of	Panther	offices	that	
followed	[Nixon’s	election]	was	the	independent	response	of	local	police	to	the	victory	of	Nixon’s	Law	and	
Order	campaign	in	the	polls	or	whether	the	FBI	systematically	encouraged	the	change	in	policy	
nationwide.”	Nonetheless,	the	authors	lumped	the	actions	of	various	police	and	other	state	agencies	
together	as	part	of	a	singular	“state	repression”	without	analyzing	conflict	within	and	among	state	
agencies	or	the	role	of	Panther	violence	and	violent	rhetoric	in	influencing	state	actors’	decisions.		
33	David	Hilliard,	This	Side	of	Glory:	The	Autobiography	of	David	Hilliard	and	the	Story	of	the	Black	Panther	
Party	(Boston:	Little,	Brown,	1993),	314;	and	Collier	and	Horowitz,	Destructive	Generation,	141-165.	Also	
see	Street,	“The	Historiography	of	the	Black	Panther	Party,”	359,	360-362,	372,	374.	
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strategies.34	In	regards	to	the	FBI,	however,	most	recent	books	on	Black	Panther	history	
offer	only	slightly	modified	versions	of	Huey	P.	Newton’s	conspiratorial	thesis	from	his	
1980	Ph.D.	dissertation	“War	Against	the	Panthers”—that	the	FBI	and	other	“agencies	
and	officers	of	the	federal	government”	endeavored	to	destroy	the	BPP	because	of	the	
organization’s	“political	ideology	and	potential	for	organizing	a	sizeable	group	of	the	
country’s	population	that	has	been	historically	denied	equal	opportunity.”35	By	and	
large,	historians	of	the	Black	Panthers	have	not	engaged	with	the	strongest	post-Church	
Committee	study	of	FBI	operations	against	the	Party,	Kenneth	O’Reilly’s	1989	book,	
“Racial	Matters,”	which	argues	that	violent	Panther	rhetoric	“invited”	much	of	the	“FBI	
repression”	of	the	Party.36	
	 The	scholarly	monographs	on	Black	Panther	history	published	since	2006	base	
their	interpretations	of	FBI	operations	against	the	Party	primarily	upon	three	key	
declassified	FBI	documents	originally	excerpted	in	the	Church	Committee	reports,	
highlighted	in	Newton’s	dissertation,	and	reprinted	in	Ward	Churchill	and	Jim	Vander	
Wall’s	unreliable	1990	book	The	COINTELPRO	Papers.37	These	FBI	documents	are	as	
follows:	a	August	25,	1967	memo	authorizing	the	Bureau’s	counterintelligence	program	
against	so-called	“Black	Nationalist-Hate	Groups”	(COINTELPRO-BHNG)	with	its	aim	to	
“expose,	disrupt,	misdirect,	discredit,	or	otherwise	neutralize”	the	black	freedom	
movement	and	its	leaders;	a	March	4,	1968	memo	expanding	COINTELPRO-BNHG	
operations	to	forty-one	field	offices	in	order	to	prevent	the	rise	of	a	black	“messiah”	
																																																								
34	See	footnote	30.	
35	Newton,	“War	Against	the	Panthers.”	
36	O’Reilly,	“Racial	Matters,”	295.	Bloom	and	Martin,	Rhodes,	and	Austin	cited	O’Reilly	but	did	not	engage	
with	his	argument.	Murch	and	Alkebulan	did	not	cite	O’Reilly.		
37	For	commentary	on	the	dubious	scholarly	merits	of	Newton’s	dissertation	and	the	works	of	Churchill	
and	Vander	Wall,	see	footnote	7	and	Street,	“The	Historiography	of	the	Black	Panther	Party,”	355,	357-
358.	
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capable	of	unifying	the	“militant	black	nationalist	movement”;	and	a	September	1968	
memo	naming	the	Black	Panthers	as	the	new	primary	target	of	COINTELPRO-BNHG.38	
These	books	also	cite	COINTELPRO	memos	on	operations	designed	to	exacerbate	
violent	tensions	between	the	Panthers	and	groups	such	as	the	cultural	nationalist	US	
organization,	as	well	as	documents	in	which	Hoover	calls	for	counterintelligence	
programs	to	undermine	the	Panthers’	free	breakfast	programs	for	children.39	In	
addition,	the	Black	Panther	histories	cite	Hoover’s	July	1969	statement	(often	misdated	
as	having	been	said	in	September	or	November	1968)	that	the	Black	Panthers	posed	the	
“greatest	threat	to	the	internal	security	of	the	country,”	and	the	Church	Committee’s	
finding	that	233	of	the	FBI’s	295	COINTELPRO-BNHG	operations	(79	percent)	targeted	
the	Black	Panther	Party.40	Furthermore,	the	Black	Panther	monographs	chronicle	
federal	and	state	indictments	of	individual	Panthers,	Internal	Revenue	Service	(IRS)	
surveillance	of	the	Party,	and	local	police	raids	on	BPP	offices.41		
	 Citing	this	information,	Black	Panther	historians	have	argued	that	the	FBI	and	
other	agencies	targeted	the	Black	Panther	Party	with	a	“virulent”	and	“systematic”	
campaign	of	“state	repression”	motivated	by	officials’	desires	to	combat	the	supposed	
																																																								
38	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	201-203,	211;	Murch,	Living	for	the	City,	160-161,	184;	
Alkebulan,	Survival	Pending	Revolution,	84;	Rhodes,	Framing	the	Black	Panthers,	184-185;	Austin,	Up	
Against	the	Wall,	191-193;	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall,	The	COINTELPRO	Papers,	92-93,	108-111,	124-125;	
Church	Committee,	Book	III,	20-22,	187-188.	
39	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	211,	218;	Murch,	Living	for	the	City,	184;	Alkebulan,	Survival	
Pending	Revolution,	84-85;	Austin,	Up	Against	the	Wall,	230-240;	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall,	The	
COINTELPRO	Papers,	130-133;	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	189-195.	
40	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	210	(for	a	discussion	of	sources	on	Hoover’s	statement	see	
444	fn45);	Murch,	Living	for	the	City,	184;	Alkebulan,	Survival	Pending	Revolution,	84;	Austin,	Up	Against	
the	Wall,	xxvi-xxvii;	Rhodes,	Framing	the	Black	Panthers,	293;	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall,	The	
COINTELPRO	Papers,	123.	
41	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	199-215.	
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threat	that	the	Party	posed	to	America’s	political	order.42	In	his	book	on	the	BPP	and	
violence,	for	example,	Curtis	Austin	contended	that	“it	was	not	Panther	violence	but	the	
violence	of	the	state	that	ultimately	determined	the	tactics	of	the	party”	and	that	the	
BPP	“immediately	incurred	the	decidedly	violent	and	deadly	wrath	of	all	levels	of	
government	after	they	took	full	responsibility	for	their	own	survival	and	advancement	
and	after	they	openly	challenged	the	white	monopoly	on	violence	in	black	
communities.”43	Similarly,	in	Black	Against	Empire,	described	by	reviewers	as	the	
“definitive”	“comprehensive	history”	of	the	Black	Panther	Party,	Joshua	Bloom	and	
Waldo	E.	Martin	Jr.	argued	that	the	FBI	targeted	the	Party	with	counterintelligence	
programs	because	of	the	group’s	“influence,	growing	national	scope,	and	the	political	
challenge	it	…	posed	to	the	status	quo.”44	The	authors	also	reiterated	the	assertion	that	
“no	aspect	of	the	Black	Panther	program	was	of	greater	concern	to	the	FBI	than	the	Free	
Breakfast	for	Children	Program.”45	Bloom	and	Martin	provided	no	evidence	that	the	
BPP	ever	seriously	threatened	America’s	political	order,	however,	and	attributed	the	
organization’s	decline	to	state	repression	and	decreased	support	from	more	moderate	
allies	in	the	Black	freedom	and	antiwar	movements	without	considering	how	violent	
Panther	rhetoric	and	actions	contributed	to	such	developments.46	Donna	Jean	Murch	
incorporated	more	Panther	agency	into	her	assessment	of	how	FBI	operations	
contributed	to	the	Party’s	downfall,	asserting	that	the	“seeds”	of	the	BPP’s	destruction	
“were	sewn	not	only	by	state	repression	but	also	by	the	leadership’s	reliance	on	an	
																																																								
42	Ibid,	200;	Murch,	Living	for	the	City,	148.	Also	see	Alkebulan,	Survival	Pending	Revolution,	83-86;	Austin,	
Up	Against	the	Wall,	191-193,	246-247;		
43	Austin,	Up	Against	the	Wall,	xxii.		
44	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	203.	
45	Ibid,	211.	
46	Ibid,	393-394.	
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armed	wing,”	“the	failure	to	establish	democratic	procedures	within	the	organization,”	
and	leaders’	“pronouncements	endorsing	urban	guerrilla	warfare.”47	Murch	did	not	
fully	develop	this	argument	or	conduct	substantial	new	research	in	FBI	sources,	
however,	and	her	overall	account	of	FBI	operations	mirrors	those	of	other	Panther	
historians.48		
	 A	full	reevaluation	of	FBI	surveillance	and	counterintelligence	operations	against	
the	Black	Panther	Party	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation.	However,	by	freshly	
examining	declassified	FBI	sources	and	shifting	the	framework	from	one	of	government	
conspiracy	to	one	of	mutually	constitutive	war,	this	dissertation	illustrates	how	conflict	
between	the	FBI	and	the	militant	left	gave	rise	to	the	Weather	Underground	and	Black	
Liberation	Army	as	well	as	further	conflict	between	leftist	guerrillas	and	the	state.	In	
doing	so,	it	contributes	to	recent	scholarship	on	the	historical	origins	of	today’s	crisis	of	
mass	incarceration,	which	has	rightly	explained	the	rise	of	law-and-order	politics	
during	the	1960s	and	1970s	as	a	state	backlash	(or	“frontlash”)	against	the	Black	
freedom	movement,	but	without	sufficiently	analyzing	how	leftist	violence	informed	
state	actors’	policy	decisions.49	Nixon’s	War	on	Terrorism	underscores	the	importance	of	
																																																								
47	Murch,	Living	for	the	City,	189.	
48	Murch’s	account	of	FBI	and	police	operations	against	the	Panthers	drew	primarily	from	unpublished	
dissertations	and	the	works	of	Newton,	Churchill	and	Vander	Wall,	and	Austin.	Rhodes	also	added	a	twist	
to	the	story	of	state	repression	of	the	Panthers,	arguing	that	“constant	media	attention”	was	a	“catalyst	
for	the	government’s	scrutiny	of	the	Panthers.”	Rhodes	based	this	statement	on	an	interpretation	of	
October	1969	House	Internal	Security	Committee	hearings,	but	she	did	not	engage	in	new	research	in	FBI	
primary	sources.	See	Rhodes,	Framing	the	Black	Panthers,	294-295.	
49	Elizabeth	Hinton’s	recent	work	is	an	important	exception,	analyzing	how	urban	riots	informed	
President	Johnson’s	War	on	Crime.	See	Elizabeth	Hinton,	From	the	War	on	Poverty	to	the	War	on	Crime:	
The	Making	of	Mass	Incarceration	in	America	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2016);	and	“‘A	War	
within	Our	Own	Boundaries.’”	Analysis	of	the	FBI,	however,	is	almost	entirely	absent	from	this	literature.	
For	more	on	mass	incarceration,	see	Heather	Ann	Thompson,	“Why	Mass	Incarceration	Matters:	
Rethinking	Crisis,	Decline,	and	Transformation	in	Postwar	American	History,”	Journal	of	American	History	
97,	no.	3	(2010),	703-734;	Alexander,	The	New	Jim	Crow;	and	Vesla	Weaver,	“Frontlash:	Race	and	the	
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social	movement’s	strategies	in	affecting	the	outcome	of	their	struggles,	explaining	for	
the	first	time	how	militant	leftists’	choices	to	pursue	urban	guerrilla	warfare	shaped	the	
FBI	and	the	larger	conflicts	that	gave	rise	to	the	punitive	turn	in	American	politics.		
	 A	domestic	war	framework	also	challenges	the	popular	post-9/11	belief	that	
those	who	engage	in	violence	labeled	as	“terrorism”	are	somehow	motivated	by	
psychosis	or	irrational	“extremist”	ideologies	rather	than	by	understandable	political	
grievances.	Politically,	this	view	tends	to	legitimize	state	violence	and	surveillance	
carried	out	in	the	name	of	“counterterrorism.”50	Historians	have	written	a	great	deal	on	
the	circumstances	that	radicalized	Black	Power	and	New	Left	activists,	and	notions	of	a	
psychologically	abnormal	“terrorist	mindset”	as	the	source	of	non-state	political	
violence	have	been	thoroughly	interrogated	in	critical	scholarly	literature	as	
deterministic	and	politically	biased.51	Nonetheless,	a	separate	body	of	work	on	the	
history	of	“terrorism”	tends	to	reinforce	this	view	by	applying	today’s	dominant	state-
centric	definition	of	“terrorism”—a	tactic	of	political	violence	carried	out	by	non-state	
actors	with	the	aim	to	spreading	fear	beyond	the	immediate	target—to	a	vast	array	of	
examples	across	time	and	space	without	sufficiently	contextualizing	them	in	relation	to	
state	violence	and	political	conflict.52	Moreover,	terrorist	experts,	often	with	ties	to	
																																																																																																																																																																												
Development	of	American	Punitive	Crime	Policy,”	Studies	in	American	Political	Development	21	(2007),	
230-265.		
50	Sam	Rafael,	“In	the	Service	of	Power:	Terrorism	Studies	and	U.S.	Intervention	in	the	Global	South”;	
Richard	Jackson,	“Knowledge,	Power	and	Politics	in	the	Study	of	Political	Terrorism”;	and	Richard	
Jackson,	Marie	Breen	Smyth,	and	Jeroen	Gunning,	“Critical	Terrorism	Studies:	Framing	a	New	Research	
Agenda,”	in	Critical	Terrorism	Studies:	A	New	Research	Agenda,	edited	by	Richard	Jackson,	Marie	Breen	
Smyth,	and	Jeroen	Gunning	(New	York:	Routledge,	2009),	34-48,	49-65,	216-236.	
51	Jackson,	“Knowledge,	Power	and	Politics,”	72,	76.	
52	The	first	historian	to	popularize	this	approach	was	Walter	Lacquer,	an	influential	early	terrorist	expert,	
and	one	of	the	field’s	few	historians,	with	a	long	career	as	a	policy	analyst	for	the	Georgetown	Center	for	
Strategic	and	International	Studies	and	other	corporate	funded	policy	institutes	with	close	ties	to	U.S.	and	
Israeli	intelligence	agencies.	Walter	Laqueur,	A	History	of	Terrorism,	6th	ed.	(New	Brunswick,	NJ:	
Transaction	Press,	2008).	Also	see	Randall	D.	Law,	ed.,	The	Routledge	History	of	Terrorism	(New	York:	
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state	security	forces,	continue	to	frame	the	Weather	Underground,	BLA,	and	other	
1970s	U.S.	leftist	guerrilla	groups	as	“terrorists.”53		
	 My	approach	takes	a	great	deal	of	inspiration	from	scholars	in	the	subfield	of	
Critical	Terrorism	Studies	(CTS),	who	have	called	upon	Terrorism	Studies	scholars	to	
analyze	“terrorist”	violence	within	broader	historical	and	political	contexts.	Mikkel	
Thorup,	for	instance,	has	argued	that	instead	of	uncritically	adopting	state	definitions	
for	the	term	“terrorism,”	“one	has	to	write	the	history	of	terrorism	as	a	dialectics	or	
‘dialogue’	between	the	state	and	its	violent	challengers.”54	Sociologist	Lisa	Stampnitzky	
has	demonstrated	that	the	history	of	the	term	“terrorism”	is	itself	critical	to	
understanding	conflicts	between	insurgents	and	the	state.55	Though	late	nineteenth	and	
early	twentieth	century	state	officials	sometimes	referred	to	anarchist	bombings	as	
“terrorism,”	for	example,	they	more	typically	framed	such	violence	as	“anarchism,”	a	
term	that	then	carried	heavier	overtones	of	illegitimacy	and	existential	threat	to	
																																																																																																																																																																												
Routledge,	2015),	and	Terrorism:	A	History	(Malden,	MA:	Polity	Press,	2009);	Richard	Bach	Jensen,	The	
Battle	Against	Anarchist	Terrorism:	An	International	History,	1878-1934	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2014);	Timothy	Messer-Kruse,	The	Trial	of	the	Haymarket	Anarchists:	Terrorism	and	Justice	in	the	
Gilded	Age	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011);	Beverly	Gage,	“Terrorism	and	the	American	
Experience:	A	State	of	the	Field,”	Journal	of	American	History	98,	no.	1	(2011),	73-94,	and	The	Day	Wall	
Street	Exploded;	and	David	C.	Rapoport,	“The	Four	Waves	of	Modern	Terrorism,”	in	Attacking	Terrorism:	
Elements	of	a	Grand	Strategy,	edited	by	Audrey	Kurth	Cronin	and	James	M.	Ludes	(Washington:	
Georgetown	University	Press,	2004):	46-73.	For	critical	responses	to	Gage’s	JAH	article,	see	Ann	Larabee,	
“Why	Historians	Should	Use	Caution	When	Using	the	Word	‘Terrorism,’”	D.	J.	Mulloy,	“Is	There	a	‘Field’?	
And	if	There	Isn’t,	Should	we	be	Worried	about	It?,”	and	Jeremy	Varon,	“A	History	of	Violence	and	the	
Myth	of	American	Exceptionalism,”	Journal	of	American	History	98,	no.	1	(2011):	106-110,	111-114,	and	
121-124.	
53	William	Rosenau,	“‘Our	Backs	Are	Against	the	Wall’:	The	Black	Liberation	Army	and	Domestic	
Terrorism	in	1970s	America,”	Studies	in	Conflict	&	Terrorism	36,	no.	2	(2013),	176-192;	Rapoport,	“The	
Four	Waves	of	Modern	Terrorism.”	
54	Mikkel	Thorup,	An	Intellectual	History	of	Terror:	War,	Violence,	and	the	State	(New	York:	Routledge,	
2010),	2.	
55	Lisa	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror:	How	the	Experts	Invented	“Terrorism”	(New	York:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	2013).	
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Western	civilization.56	During	the	1930s	and	after	World	War	II,	“Communism”	would	
become	America’s	new	bogeyman.	Not	until	the	1970s	did	“terrorism”	become,	as	
Stampnitzky	put	it,	“the	dominant	framework	for	understanding	illegitimate	political	
violence,”	as	Americans	came	to	associate	the	term	almost	exclusively	with	political	
violence	carried	out	by	non-state	actors.57		
	 Stampnitzky	has	located	the	origins	of	this	trend	in	the	Palestinian	nationalist	
Black	September	Organization’s	attack	on	the	Israeli	Olympic	team	during	the	
September	1972	Munich	Games,	after	which	a	new	community	of	terrorism	experts,	
supported	in	part	by	Nixon’s	newly	formed	Cabinet	Committee	to	Combat	Terrorism,	
invented	the	modern	concept	of	“terrorism”	and	gained	influence	among	state	officials	
in	the	U.S.	and	elsewhere.58	This	study,	however,	demonstrates	that	U.S.	officials	began	
to	frame	“terrorism”	as	a	“governable	problem”	two	years	earlier,	in	order	to	devise	
police	responses	to	American	guerrillas’	bombings	and	police	assassinations.59	Hoover	
and	his	men	viewed	1970s	leftist	guerrilla	“terrorism”	as	distinct	from	the	anarchist	
bombers	of	the	early	twentieth	century.	Writing	in	internal	documents	that	they	never	
imagined	would	one	day	be	declassified	for	public	viewing,	Hoover	and	other	FBI	
officials	discussed	the	Weather	Underground,	with	its	clandestine	infrastructure	
resistant	to	surveillance	and	infiltration,	as	an	unprecedented	national	security	threat	
that	they	were	unprepared	to	confront.	During	the	final	years	of	Hoover’s	life,	before	
																																																								
56	Thorup,	An	Intellectual	History	of	Terror,	103;	James	Green,	Death	in	the	Haymarket:	A	Story	of	Chicago,	
the	First	Labor	Movement,	and	the	Bombing	that	Divided	Gilded	Age	America	(New	York:	Random	House,	
2006).	
57	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror,	4.	Also	see	Thorup,	An	Intellectual	History	of	Terror,	103.	
58	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror,	21-23.	The	leading	scholarly	work	on	the	history	of	U.S.	
counterterrorism	also	identified	the	Munich	Games	as	the	moment	when	U.S.	officials	began	to	develop	
explicit	“counterterrorism”	policies	and	techniques.	See	Timothy	Naftali,	Blind	Spot:	The	Secret	History	of	
American	Counterterrorism	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2005),	52-53.	
59	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror,	106.		
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U.S.	officials	developed	“counterterrorism”	strategies	for	managing	Palestinian	
nationalist	militants’	international	hijackings,	kidnappings,	and	hostage	situations,	
America’s	covert	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	prompted	the	FBI	and	Nixon	
administration	to	develop	the	United	States’	first	policing	tactics,	surveillance	
measures,	and	policies	dedicated	to	combatting	a	problem	state	officials	explicitly	
framed	as	“terrorism.”		
	 Finally,	the	FBI’s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	played	a	critical—and	
heretofore	overlooked—role	in	the	chain	of	events	that	culminated	in	the	Watergate	
Scandal	and	Nixon’s	August	1974	resignation.	Historians	have	long	acknowledged	the	
FBI’s	role	in	exposing	the	White	House	crimes	that	led	to	the	Watergate	Scandal.	Stanley	
Kutler’s	book	The	Wars	of	Watergate	(1992),	the	most	comprehensive	study	on	the	
topic,	argued	that	a	bureaucratic	“War	of	FBI	Succession”	following	J.	Edgar	Hoover’s	
death	on	May	2,	1972	motivated	the	leaks	that	led	to	Watergate.60	Scholars	have	further	
examined	the	FBI’s	role	in	Watergate	since	2005,	when	W.	Mark	Felt,	the	Bureau’s	
Associate	Director	from	May	1972	to	June	1973,	came	forward	as	“Deep	Throat,”	the	
confidential	source	whose	disclosures	enabled	Washington	Post	journalist	Bob	
Woodward	to	expose	Nixon	Cabinet	members’	involvement	in	the	June	17,	1972	break-
in	at	the	Democratic	National	Committee	headquarters	in	Washington’s	Watergate	
office	complex	and	the	President’s	efforts	to	cover-up	his	staffers’	crimes.61	In	her	2013	
article	“Deep	Throat,	Watergate,	and	the	Bureaucratic	Politics	of	the	FBI,”	Beverly	Gage	
demonstrated	that	both	the	crimes	of	Watergate	and	the	exposure	of	those	crimes	were	
products	not	only	of	a	power	struggle	within	the	FBI	hierarchy,	but	of	a	nearly	six-year-
																																																								
60	Kutler,	The	Wars	of	Watergate,	120.	
61	Max	Holland,	Leak:	Why	Mark	Felt	Became	Deep	Throat	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2012).	
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long	institutional	conflict	between	Hoover’s	FBI	and	the	Nixon	White	House.	Gage	
explained	Hoover-loyalist	Mark	Felt’s	decision	to	disclose	information	on	the	Nixon	
administration’s	misdeeds	not	as	merely	a	matter	of	personal	vendetta	or	jockeying	for	
promotion,	but	as	an	effort	to	safeguard	the	FBI’s	autonomy	from	White	House	efforts	
to	control	the	Bureau.62	While	Gage	rightfully	acknowledged	that	“concern	over	the	rise	
in	domestic	bombings	stemming	from	a	radicalized	antiwar	left”	played	an	important	
role	in	fomenting	this	bureaucratic	struggle,	her	article	did	not	fully	explore	how	leftist	
guerrilla	attacks	informed	the	conflict.63	Building	upon	Gage’s	analysis,	this	dissertation	
demonstrates	that	leftist	guerrilla	violence	was	the	central	catalyst	for	the	FBI’s	
institutional	conflict	with	the	Nixon	White	House	and	a	key	source	of	the	Watergate	
Scandal.	
	 Some	researchers	have	implied	that	a	dearth	of	declassified	sources	has	severely	
limited	possibilities	for	substantial	revision	of	scholarship	on	FBI	operations	against	the	
Black	Power	and	antiwar	movements.	Donna	Jean	Murch,	for	example,	has	stated	that	
because	of	“the	tremendously	difficult,	intricate,	and	expensive	protocols	of	Freedom	of	
Information	Act	(FOIA)	requests,	combined	with	the	near	impossibility	of	accessing	
state,	local,	and	federal	law-enforcement	records,”	“we	simply	do	not	know	the	full	
extent	and	scale	of	state	surveillance	and	repression	…	of	radical	social	movements	of	
the	1960s.”64	Journalist	Bryan	Burrough	has	asserted,	“FBI	files,	those	the	Bureau	has	
																																																								
62	Beverly	Gage,	“Deep	Throat,	Watergate,	and	the	Bureaucratic	Politics	of	the	FBI,”	Journal	of	Policy	
History	24,	no.	2	(2012),	176.	Bob	Woodward	made	a	similar	argument	in	his	2005	book	on	his	
relationship	with	Felt,	which	he	released	after	Felt’s	attorney	John	O’Connor	publicly	identified	his	client	
as	Deep	Throat.	Bob	Woodward,	The	Secret	Man:	The	Story	of	Watergate’s	Deep	Throat	(New	York:	Simon	
&	Schuster,	2005),	104-105.	
63	Gage,	“Deep	Throat,	Watergate,	and	the	Bureaucratic	Politics	of	the	FBI,”	157,	170.	
64	Donna	Jean	Murch,	“Countering	Subversion:	Black	Panther	Scholarship,	Popular	History,	and	the	
Richard	Aoki	Controversy,”	Perspectives	on	History	online	edition,	October	2012,	
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made	publicly	available,	are	almost	useless	to	a	historian.	Only	a	fraction	of	the	
paperwork	these	investigations	generated	has	been	issued,	and	almost	all	of	it	is	dreck,	
either	highly	redacted	headquarters	summaries	or	page	after	page	of	highly	redacted,	
and	highly	repetitive,	‘airtels’	and	telegrams.”65		
	 These	statements	are	misleading.	Though	many	of	the	FBI’s	files	on	American	
leftist	guerrillas	remain	classified,	hundreds	of	thousands—perhaps	millions—of	pages	
of	public	and	declassified	sources	related	to	Bureau	investigations	of	1960s	era	social	
movements	and	guerrilla	violence	are	hidden	in	plain	sight.	My	dissertation	draws	upon	
the	reports	and	published	hearings	of	Church	Committee	and	other	government	
entities,	as	well	as	from	thousands	of	pages	of	declassified	FBI	files	available	on	
microfilm,	online,	in	physical	archives,	or	through	Freedom	of	Information	Act	requests.	
These	include	the	Weather	Underground	file	(published	on	microfilm);	the	Black	
Liberation	Army	file	(published	in	the	Gale	Cengage	Archives	Unbound	digital	
database);	digitized	files	on	the	FBI’s	online	database	(including	COINTELPRO	files	and	
the	Black	September	file);	files	in	the	Kenneth	O’Reilly	Papers	at	Marquette	University	
in	Milwaukee,	Wisconsin;	and	L.	Patrick	Gray’s	6,510-page	Director’s	File,	which	I	
obtained	through	a	Freedom	of	Information	Act	(FOIA)	request.66	I	also	utilized	FBI	and	
White	House	documents	housed	in	the	Richard	Nixon	Library,	including	sources	from	
																																																																																																																																																																												
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/october-
2012/countering-subversion.		
65	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	xi.	
66	Ivan	Greenberg	first	obtained	this	file	in	2008	through	a	FOIA	lawsuit.	See	Greenberg,	The	Dangers	of	
Dissent,	9.	The	L.	Patrick	Gray	File	was	particularly	critical	to	my	research.	This	file	contains	documents	
released	through	the	pretrial	discovery	process	in	1978	when	Gray	faced	federal	felony	charges	in	
connection	with	FBI’s	break-ins	targeting	suspected	Weather	Underground	associates	carried	out	during	
his	term	as	Acting	Director.	Sources	in	this	file	offer	the	most	detailed	surviving	evidence	of	the	FBI’s	use	
of	break-ins	and	other	illegal	surveillance	tactics	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s.	A	reference	book	
that	helped	me	to	decipher	FBI	documents	was	Gerald	K.	Haines	and	David	A.	Langbart,	Unlocking	the	
Files	of	the	FBI:	A	Guide	to	Its	Records	and	Classification	System	(Wilmington,	DE:	Scholarly	Resources	Inc.,	
1993).	
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the	Cabinet	Committee	to	Combat	Terrorism	(CCCT).	In	addition	to	researching	
government	and	FBI	sources,	I	examined	newspaper	articles;	archival	sources	on	leftist	
movements	housed	at	Amherst	College	in	Amherst,	Massachusetts	and	the	Freedom	
Archives	in	San	Francisco,	California;	and	published	memoirs	and	oral	histories	of	
former	FBI	personnel,	Nixon	White	House	officials,	and	leftist	guerrillas.67	My	main	
research	challenge	was	not	a	lack	of	declassified	sources,	but	navigating	and	translating	
an	overabundance	of	publicly	available	primary	documents	and	a	massive	body	of	
secondary	literature.		
	
	
Americans	today	tend	to	associate	J.	Edgar	Hoover	with	a	host	of	nefarious	covert	
operations	against	his	perceived	political	enemies.68	During	the	late	1960s,	however,	
Hoover	was	highly	reluctant	to	expand	surveillance	of	American	dissident	movements.	
Throughout	his	four-decade	career	as	Director,	Hoover	had	carefully	crafted	the	FBI’s	
public	image	as	trusted	crime-fighters	and	defenders	of	national	security,	knowing	that	
this	image	played	a	key	role	in	enabling	the	Bureau	to	maintain	powerful	institutional	
																																																								
67	Digital	technology	was	central	to	my	research.	Nearly	all	of	the	FBI	documents	I	used	for	my	research	
were	digitized.	I	either	accessed	these	sources	from	online	digital	databases;	received	them	as	digital	files	
from	the	FBI	in	response	to	FOIA	requests;	received	emailed	scanned	copies	of	FBI	files	from	librarians	at	
physical	archives;	or	digitized	files	on	my	own,	using	a	digital	camera	at	physical	archives	or	scanning	
files	published	on	microfilm	using	the	ScanPro	2000	microform	scanner	available	at	the	University	of	
Massachusetts	Amherst’s	W.	E.	B.	Du	Bois	Library.	I	also	used	Adobe	Acrobat	Pro	DC	software	to	convert	
scanned	FBI	documents	into	text-readable	PDF	files,	allowing	me	to	search	thousands	of	pages	of	FBI	
documents	for	key	words	(“terror,”	“bomb,”	etc.).	This	software	also	allowed	me	to	type	notes	directly	
onto	the	digitized	FBI	documents.	In	other	words,	digital	technology	and	online	access	to	FBI	files	
enabled	me	to	write	a	dissertation	that	would	have	been	impossible	ten	years	ago.	
68	Hoover	is	also	known	for	rumors	that	he	cross-dressed	and	kept	a	secret	homosexual	relationship	with	
his	close	friend,	FBI	Associate	Director	Clyde	Tolson.	For	a	popular	fictionalized	film	portrayal	with	actor	
Leonardo	DiCaprio	playing	the	role	of	J.	Edgar	Hoover,	see	J.	Edgar,	directed	by	Clint	Eastwood,	Imagine	
Entertainment,	2011.	For	an	historical	discussion	of	Hoover’s	alleged	homosexuality,	see	Doug	Charles,	
Hoover’s	War	on	Gays:	Exposing	the	FBI’s	‘Sex	Deviates’	Program	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	
2015).		
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autonomy	from	Congress	and	the	White	House.69	But	in	the	mid-1960s	dissident	
activists	and	politicians	began	to	challenge	the	FBI’s	authority,	and	as	Hoover	aged	into	
his	seventies,	President	Lyndon	B.	Johnson	started	to	question	the	Director’s	continued	
ability	to	lead.	In	an	effort	to	safeguard	the	FBI’s	institutional	autonomy	during	the	
period	of	growing	political	dissent	from	1965	to	1967,	Hoover	restricted	the	Bureau’s	
use	of	teenaged	informants,	mail-opening,	warrantless	wiretapping,	and	break-ins.70		
	 The	story	of	how	the	FBI	came	to	revive	these	tactics	begins	on	January	20,	1969,	
the	day	of	President	Richard	Nixon’s	inauguration,	an	event	marred	by	militant,	
disruptive	protests	in	Washington	D.C.	and	leftist	radicals’	bombing	of	a	transmission	
tower	servicing	a	Colorado	munitions	plant.	Nixon’s	inauguration	was	a	critical	turning	
point	in	what	I	refer	to	as	a	“violent	dialectic”	of	state	and	insurgent	violence	that	had	
escalated	over	the	previous	five	years	of	President	Lyndon	B.	Johnson’s	administration,	
amid	police	brutality,	urban	riots,	the	war	in	Vietnam,	and	the	largest	antiwar	
demonstrations	in	U.S.	history.	State	violence	and	insurgent	violence	profoundly	
influenced	one	another	during	Nixon’s	time	in	office,	kindling	internal	cleavages	within	
both	the	state	and	the	left,	while	pushing	a	small	number	of	radicals	to	embrace	
violence	as	a	means	to	achieve	social	change.	Guerrilla	bombings	and	police	
assassinations,	in	turn,	profoundly	reshaped	FBI	surveillance	practices	and	the	Bureau’s	
relationship	with	the	Nixon	White	House.	
																																																								
69	Matthew	Cecil,	Branding	Hoover’s	FBI:	How	the	Boss’s	PR	Men	Sold	the	Bureau	to	America	(Lawrence:	
University	Press	of	Kansas,	2016);	and	Hoover’s	FBI	and	the	Fifth	Estate:	The	Campaign	to	Control	the	
Press	and	the	Bureau’s	Image	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2014).	
70	Athan	Theoharis,	Spying	on	Americans:	Political	Surveillance	from	Hoover	to	the	Huston	Plan	
(Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1978).	
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	 As	I	explain	in	Chapter	One,	Nixon	came	to	office	determined	to	clamp	down	on	
rioters,	bombers,	and	other	law-breaking	political	dissidents	by	fulfilling	his	campaign	
promise	to	restore	“law	and	order”	to	American	society,	but	his	efforts	largely	
backfired.	The	Nixon	administration	strained	relations	with	FBI	Director	J.	Edgar	
Hoover,	who	resisted	White	House	requests	for	illegal	political	surveillance	measures	
that	risked	jeopardizing	the	Bureau’s	public	image	and	institutional	autonomy.	
Meanwhile,	federal	and	state	indictments,	violent	police	raids,	and	covert	FBI	
counterintelligence	operations	targeting	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	SDS	further	
radicalized	members	of	the	militant	left,	who	increasingly	embraced	Third	World-
imported	strategies	of	revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare.	Chapter	Two	illustrates	how	by	
the	end	of	1969,	militant	SDS	members	had	committed	themselves	to	forming	the	
Weather	Underground,	the	United	States’	first	clandestine	revolutionary	urban	guerrilla	
organization,	and	members	of	the	Black	Panther	Party	were	making	similar	plans	for	
armed	resistance.	At	the	same	time,	William	C.	Sullivan,	the	FBI’s	Assistant	Director	for	
Domestic	Security,	had	begun	meeting	with	young	Nixon	aide	Tom	Huston	in	June	1969	
to	discuss	strategies	for	combating	leftist	violence.	Over	the	next	year,	they	would	
become	key	figures	in	Hoover’s	bureaucratic	struggle	with	the	Nixon	White	House.	
	 In	1970,	leftist	bombings	and	the	emergence	of	the	Weather	Underground	
precipitated	a	full-blown	institutional	conflict	between	Hoover’s	FBI	and	the	Nixon	
administration,	a	development	I	analyze	in	Chapter	Three.	On	March	6,	1970,	three	
Weather	Underground	members	died	from	an	accidental	explosion	in	a	Greenwich	
Village	townhouse	they	were	using	as	a	bomb-making	laboratory.	Hoping	to	prevent	the	
Weather	Underground	from	carrying	out	deadly	bomb	attacks,	Nixon	called	on	
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intelligence	officials	to	develop	a	plan	to	combat	what	he	called	“revolutionary	
terrorism.”	The	result	was	what	would	become	known	during	the	Senate	Watergate	
hearings	as	the	“Huston	Plan,”	a	proposal	for	the	greatest	consolidation	of	federal	
intelligence	agencies	in	U.S.	history.	Drafted	behind	Director	Hoover’s	back	by	William	
Sullivan	and	Tom	Huston,	the	Huston	Plan	coordinated	the	FBI,	the	Central	Intelligence	
Agency	(CIA),	the	National	Security	Agency	(NSA),	and	the	Army	Defense	Intelligence	
Agency	(DIA)	under	the	direct	command	of	the	White	House,	while	lifting	Hoover’s	
restrictions	on	domestic	warrantless	wiretapping,	underage	informants,	mail-opening,	
and	break-ins.	The	Plan’s	core	objective	was	to	expand	intelligence	agencies’	capacity	to	
obtain	“preventative,”	advance	warning	of	“terrorist”	attacks.		
	 Nixon	approved	the	Huston	Plan	on	July	14,	1970,	but	cancelled	it	two	weeks	
later	under	pressure	from	Hoover.	Hoover	had	no	moral	qualms	with	illegal	
surveillance	techniques;	rather	he	sought	to	preserve	the	FBI’s	autonomy,	public	image,	
and	jurisdiction	over	domestic	surveillance.	Hoover	informed	the	President	and	
Attorney	General	John	Mitchell	that	he	would	not	authorize	FBI	involvement	in	any	of	
the	illegal	surveillance	measures	outlined	in	the	Huston	Plan	without	written	approval	
from	the	White	House	or	the	Justice	Department.	Nixon	backed	out	of	the	Huston	Plan	
because,	like	Hoover,	he	sought	to	avoid	liability	for	the	outrage	that	would	likely	ensue	
if	details	of	its	existence	ever	leaked	to	the	public.	
	 After	Hoover	sabotaged	the	Huston	Plan,	relations	between	the	FBI	and	Nixon	
White	House	deteriorated	while	leftist	guerrilla	violence	surged.	On	August	7,	1970,	
seventeen-year-old	black	militant	Jonathan	Jackson	launched	an	armed	raid	on	a	
courtroom	in	Marin	County,	California	that	left	him	and	two	others	dead.	Later	that	
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month,	on	August	24,	the	bombing	of	a	University	of	Wisconsin	research	facility	by	a	
group	of	young	white	radicals	resulted	in	the	accidental	death	of	postdoctoral	
researcher.	I	explain	in	Chapter	Four	how	in	response,	under	increased	pressure	from	
Nixon,	Hoover	dramatically	expanded	domestic	surveillance	of	the	American	Black	
Power	and	antiwar	movements,	initiating	a	plan	to	cultivate	informants	in	every	African	
American	and	New	Left	university	student	group	in	the	country.	The	measure	was	a	
clear	violation	of	law-abiding	citizens’	privacy,	but	Hoover	was	desperate	to	combat	the	
problem	of	guerrilla	violence.	FBI	officials	called	upon	agents	to	“identify	potential	and	
actual	extremists,	revolutionaries	and	terrorists	and	to	assess	their	threat	to	the	
internal	security	of	the	Government,”	while	Hoover	asserted	that	radical	campus	groups	
collectively	constituted	a	“a	breeding	ground	for	revolutionaries,	extremists,	and	
terrorists.”71	Between	1969	and	1972,	the	FBI	expanded	domestic	surveillance	
investigations	of	political	radicals	by	over	fifty	percent,	opening	thousands	of	new	
investigations	in	response	to	bombings	and	other	acts	of	domestic	insurgent	violence.72		
	 The	FBI	also	began	to	reintroduce	illegal	surveillance	tactics	outlined	in	the	
Huston	Plan.	During	the	fall	of	1970,	Hoover	lowered	the	FBI’s	minimum	age	for	
university	campus	informants	from	twenty-one	to	eighteen.	Furthermore,	through	
euphemistic	threats	and	suggestions,	Hoover	pressured	local	field	offices	to	informally	
reinstitute	warrantless	wiretapping,	mail-opening,	and	break-ins	in	domestic	
																																																								
71	FBI	memo,	Executives	Conference	to	Tolson,	“Proposed	Intensification	of	Certain	Investigations	in	the	
Security	Field,”	October	29,	1970;	and	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SAC	Albany,	“Security	Investigations	of	
Individuals	who	are	Members	of	the	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	and	Militant	New	Left	Campus	
Organizations,”	November	5,	1970,	in	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation,	FBI	File	on	Students	for	a	
Democratic	Society	and	the	Weather	Underground	Organization,	(Wilmington,	DE:	Scholarly	Resources	
Inc.,	1991),	Microfilm	(hereafter	FBI	WUO),	Roll	6,	Section	66.	
72	U.S.	General	Accounting	Office,	FBI	Domestic	Intelligence	Operations—Their	Purpose	and	Scope:	Issues	
That	Need	To	Be	Resolved:	Report	to	the	House	Judiciary	Committee	by	the	Comptroller	General	of	the	
United	States,	February	24,	1976	(hereafter	GAO,	FBI	Domestic	Intelligence	Operations),	133-134.	
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“terrorism”	investigations,	a	move	that	removed	FBI	Headquarters	from	liability	for	its	
agents’	involvement	in	illegal	surveillance	practices.		
	 Instead	of	preventing	violence,	however,	Hoover’s	zealous	efforts	to	combat	
leftist	guerrillas	backfired.	On	November	27,	1970,	amid	a	wave	of	leftist	bombings	
throughout	the	country,	Hoover	publically	accused	eight	East	Coast	peace	activists	of	a	
far-fetched	plot	to	set	off	bombs	in	Washington	D.	C.	and	kidnap	Secretary	of	State	
Henry	Kissinger.	One	of	the	individuals	Hoover	falsely	accused	was	physics	professor	
William	Davidon,	who	interpreted	the	charges	as	part	of	a	covert	FBI	conspiracy	to	
destroy	the	American	left.	Seeking	evidence	of	such	a	conspiracy,	Davidon	led	a	group	of	
peace	activists	in	burglarizing	a	small	FBI	office	in	Media,	Pennsylvania	and	releasing	
stolen	classified	surveillance	documents	to	the	press.	In	the	spring	of	1971,	newspaper	
articles	on	the	stolen	documents	unleashed	a	tidal	wave	of	controversy	over	revelations	
of	FBI	spying	as	well	as	unprecedented	calls	for	Hoover’s	resignation.	In	response,	
Hoover	quietly	cancelled	all	of	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	programs.	Over	the	next	
four	years,	controversy	over	FBI	surveillance	would	continue	to	grow,	culminating	in	
the	extensive	Church	Committee	hearings	of	1975.	Few	realized,	however,	that	the	
Bureau	had	initiated	much	of	the	surveillance	uncovered	through	the	Media	burglary	in	
a	desperate	attempt	to	thwart	leftist	guerrilla	violence.		
	 While	the	Media	burglary	brought	about	increased	public	scrutiny	of	FBI	
operations,	the	ongoing	problem	of	guerrilla	violence	kindled	a	mounting	crisis	inside	
the	Bureau,	a	topic	I	explore	in	Chapter	Five.	The	Black	Liberation	Army	began	its	
campaign	of	assassinating	cops	on	May	1971	with	a	pair	of	bloody	police	ambushes	in	
New	York	City.	The	attack	prompted	renewed	demands	from	Nixon	that	the	FBI	prevent	
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guerrilla	violence,	and	another	round	of	Hoover	orders	for	his	agents	to	“intensify”	their	
leftist	guerrilla	investigations.	Just	as	the	arrest	of	two	BLA	members	began	to	ease	
tensions	between	Hoover	and	Nixon,	however,	the	New	York	Times’	publication	of	
excerpts	from	the	top-secret	“Pentagon	Papers”	on	June	13,	1971	enflamed	institutional	
conflict	between	the	FBI	and	the	White	House.	The	leaked	documents	revealed	a	
pattern	of	U.S.	presidents	lying	about	the	war	in	Vietnam	over	two	decades,	and	Nixon	
feared	that	further	leaks	could	damage	his	war	efforts	in	Southeast	Asia.	When	Hoover	
refused	the	President’s	request	that	the	Bureau	aggressively	investigate	whistleblower	
Daniel	Ellsberg,	Nixon	went	through	the	roof.	He	even	tried	to	fire	the	aging	FBI	
Director,	but	thought	twice	after	Hoover	subtly	reminded	him	that	doing	so	would	
alienate	many	of	his	conservative	supporters	ahead	of	the	1972	election.		
	 In	response	to	Hoover’s	inaction	in	the	“Pentagon	Papers”	case,	Nixon’s	staff	
established	a	secret	team	of	operatives	known	as	“the	Plumbers,”	who	broke	into	the	
Los	Angeles	office	of	Ellsberg’s	psychiatrist	in	September	1971,	searching	for	
information	they	could	use	to	discredit	him.	A	year	later,	the	Plumbers	would	set	off	the	
Watergate	Scandal	after	getting	caught	burglarizing	the	Democratic	Party	headquarters	
in	Washington’s	Watergate	office	complex.	Meanwhile,	FBI	agents	carried	out	their	own	
break-ins	in	search	of	Weather	Underground	fugitives.	They	did	so	anxiously,	however,	
growing	increasingly	worried	about	whether	or	not	officials	at	FBI	Headquarters	would	
support	them	if	they	got	caught.	The	simmering	crisis	guerrilla	violence,	illegal	
surveillance,	and	institutional	conflict	generated	within	the	FBI	during	the	last	year	of	
Hoover’s	life	would	boil	over	after	his	death	on	May	2,	1972.	
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	 The	man	Nixon	chose	as	Hoover’s	successor	was	L.	Patrick	Gray,	a	Bureau	
outsider	and	longtime	supporter	of	the	President.	Nixon’s	choice	did	not	go	over	well	
with	W.	Mark	Felt,	a	Hoover-loyalist	and	longtime	bureaucrat	who	had	worked	his	way	
up	to	the	FBI’s	number	three	position	during	the	last	year	of	the	late	Director’s	life,	
surpassing	the	rank	of	William	Sullivan,	whom	Hoover	pushed	out	of	the	Bureau	after	
discovering	his	disloyalty.	Felt	resented	Nixon’s	appointment	of	Gray	to	the	position	of	
the	FBI’s	Acting	Director	not	only	because	he	viewed	himself	as	a	more	suitable	
candidate	for	the	position,	but	also	because	he	saw	the	move	as	part	of	a	Nixon	effort	to	
exert	a	power	over	the	Bureau	that	the	White	House	had	been	unable	to	obtain	while	
Hoover	was	alive.	Two	years	after	leftist	guerrilla	violence	prompted	a	bureaucratic	
struggle	between	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	White	House,	Felt	became	a	central	figure	in	
this	institutional	conflict.	In	Chapter	Six	I	analyze	how	during	the	year	after	Hoover’s	
death,	Felt	used	his	new	position	as	the	FBI’s	second	ranking	Associate	Director	to	
conduct	two	secret	wars:	one	against	leftist	guerrillas,	and	the	other	against	the	
President	and	the	Acting	Director	of	the	FBI.		
	 Felt	sought	to	discredit	Nixon	and	Gray	in	an	effort	to	defend	the	FBI’s	autonomy	
from	the	White	House,	and	to	officially	reinstitute	the	FBI’s	use	of	break-ins	in	leftist	
guerrilla	investigations,	a	move	he	hoped	would	ease	the	anxieties	of	field	agents	
engaged	in	the	practice	on	an	informal	basis.	To	achieve	these	goals,	Felt	exploited	two	
critical,	unexpected	events.	The	first	was	the	June	17,	1972	Watergate	break-in.	In	the	
days	and	months	following	the	incident,	Felt	leaked	information	from	the	FBI’s	
Watergate	investigation	to	several	reporters,	including	Washington	Post	journalist	Bob	
Woodard,	who	gradually	exposed	to	the	world	how	President	Nixon	and	his	staff	
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attempted	to	cover-up	their	role	in	the	burglary.	Not	until	2005,	however,	would	Felt	
come	forward	as	the	mysterious	“Deep	Throat,”	the	pseudonym	Woodward	had	coined	
for	his	top-secret	source.		
	 While	leaking	information	on	Watergate	to	the	press,	Felt	seized	on	Black	
September’s	deadly,	internationally	televised	September	5,	1972	raid	at	the	Munich	
Olympics	as	an	opportunity	to	officially	reinstitute	the	Bureau’s	use	of	illegal	break-ins,	
an	initiative	the	FBI’s	Assistant	Director	Edward	Miller	had	been	unsuccessfully	
requesting	from	Gray	since	he	took	office.	Two	days	after	the	Munich	attack,	without	
Gray’s	knowledge,	Felt	and	Miller	authorized	a	request	from	the	Bureau’s	Dallas	field	
office	for	a	break-in	at	the	office	of	the	Arab	Information	Center,	a	public	relations	outfit	
affiliated	with	the	Arab	League.	Fearing	a	bloody	Munich-style	attack	in	the	United	
States,	the	FBI	sought	information	on	Palestinian	militants	dwelling	inside	the	country.	
Two	weeks	later,	Nixon	formed	the	Cabinet	Committee	to	Combat	Terrorism	(CCCT),	
comprised	of	Secretary	of	State	Kissinger,	the	FBI’s	Acting	Director	Gray,	and	the	other	
top	intelligence	and	military	officials.	After	the	aborted	Huston	Plan,	the	CCCT	was	
America’s	first	federal	institution	explicitly	dedicated	to	combating	“terrorism.”	In	the	
midst	of	his	staffers’	involvement	in	the	Watergate	cover-up,	however,	Nixon	did	not	
attempt	another	consolidation	of	U.S.	intelligence	agencies.	Instead,	he	gave	the	FBI	sole	
jurisdiction	over	terrorist	attacks	inside	the	United	States.	
	 After	the	Munich	attacks,	Gray	faced	tremendous	pressure	to	prevent	an	
international	terrorist	attack	in	the	U.S.	After	Nixon	formed	the	CCCT,	and	Felt	and	
Miller	informed	him	that	they	had	approved	the	Dallas	break-in,	Gray	gave	the	latter	
officials	verbal	approval	for	authorizing	further	break-ins.	During	the	next	seven	
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months,	Felt	and	Miller	approved	at	least	twelve	more	FBI	break-ins,	two	of	them	
targeting	Arabs,	seven	of	them	focused	on	suspected	associates	of	the	Weather	
Underground,	and	three	related	to	foreign	espionage	investigations.	In	the	midst	of	
growing	public	concern	over	FBI	surveillance	and	Americans’	civil	liberties,	Gray	also	
initiated	an	overhaul	of	the	Bureau’s	domestic	surveillance	operations.	For	the	first	
time	in	the	FBI’s	history,	Gray	authorized	FBI	agents	to	conduct	undercover	operations,	
a	tactic	Hoover	had	always	forbidden	out	of	concern	for	his	men’s	safety.	In	Los	Angeles,	
a	small	unit	of	FBI	agents	had	already	gone	undercover	on	an	unofficial	basis,	growing	
beards	and	long	hair	in	order	to	infiltrate	the	leftwing	Vietnam	Veterans	Against	the	
War.	Under	Gray’s	top-secret	orders,	undercover	agents,	known	as	“beards,”	went	deep	
undercover	with	FBI	Headquarters	approval,	smoking	pot,	infiltrating	hippy	communes,	
and	having	sex	with	leftist	women	in	attempts	to	track	down	Weather	Underground	
fugitives.	Beginning	in	early	1973,	amid	a	decline	in	bombings	and	mass	street	protest,	
Gray	also	began	to	cut	back	on	the	FBI’s	domestic	surveillance	operations,	closing	
hundreds	of	investigative	files	that	officials	determined	were	not	related	to	the	
prevention	of	espionage	or	terrorism.	
		 Just	as	Hoover’s	efforts	to	combat	guerrilla	violence	backfired,	Felt’s	secret	wars	
accomplished	the	exact	opposite	of	what	they	intended.	Felt’s	leaks	enflamed	the	
Watergate	Scandal	and	helped	bring	down	Nixon	and	Gray,	but	they	ended	his	own	
career	as	well.	Moreover,	they	badly	damaged	the	FBI’s	reputation.	On	April	27,	1973,	
after	brutal	Senate	confirmation	hearings	in	which	lawmakers	grilled	him	over	
authorizing	political	surveillance	and	obstructing	the	Watergate	investigation	on	behalf	
of	the	White	House,	Gray	dropped	his	bid	to	become	the	permanent	Director	of	the	FBI.	
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Two	weeks	later,	at	Nixon’s	insistence,	the	FBI’s	new	Acting	Director	William	D.	
Ruckelshaus	fired	Felt,	whom	the	President	secretly	suspected	of	being	Deep	Throat.	It	
would	be	another	year	before	Nixon’s	resignation,	but	by	this	point	Watergate	
conspirators	in	the	President’s	Cabinet	had	already	begun	to	confess	or	resign	from	
their	positions.	Institutional	conflict	between	the	FBI	and	Nixon	White	House—sparked	
three	years	earlier	by	leftist	guerrilla	violence—had	already	set	the	President	on	the	
road	to	his	downfall.	Furthermore,	In	1978,	when	President	Jimmy	Carter’s	Justice	
Department	indicted	Felt,	Miller,	and	Gray	for	authorizing	the	Weather	Underground	
break-ins.	Gray	managed	to	beat	the	charges,	but	Felt	and	Miller	gained	felony	
convictions	in	November	1980,	though	President	Ronald	Reagan	pardoned	Felt	and	
Miller	in	April	1981,	shortly	after	taking	office.	Meanwhile,	most	members	of	the	
Weather	Underground,	the	primary	organization	responsible	for	sparking	the	Hoover-
Nixon	feud,	came	out	of	hiding	during	the	late	1970s	without	facing	serious	criminal	
charges.	
	 The	FBI’s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	was	not	the	only	cause	of	
Watergate.	Given	Nixon’s	fervid	desire	to	crush	his	perceived	political	enemies,	a	
similar	scandal	could	have	taken	place	even	if	Hoover	had	faithfully	complied	with	the	
President’s	requests	for	illegal	political	surveillance.	In	telling	the	history	of	Watergate	
as	it	happened,	however,	there	can	be	no	denying	that	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	
violence	played	a	critical	role	in	provoking	the	institutional	conflict	that	precipitated	
both	the	crimes	of	Watergate	and	the	exposure	of	those	crimes.	In	other	words,	without	
the	Weather	Underground	and	other	leftist	insurgents,	there	would	have	been	no	
Huston	Plan,	no	mass	expansion	of	FBI	surveillance	against	the	Black	Power	movement	
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and	New	Left,	no	reviving	of	illegal	FBI	surveillance	practices,	no	Media	burglary,	no	
COINTELPRO	controversy,	and	no	motivation	for	Mark	Felt	to	become	Deep	Throat.		
	 Though	they	severely	damaged	each	other	and	themselves,	the	FBI	and	the	
Nixon	White	House	failed	to	prevent	guerrilla	violence.	Indeed,	through	their	punitive	
responses	to	the	Black	Power	movement	and	New	Left,	and	through	their	
encouragement	of	police	violence,	Hoover	and	Nixon	helped	inspire	those	who	
embraced	revolutionary	guerrilla	resistance.	The	core	reason	officials	failed	to	preempt	
America’s	guerrilla	insurgency	is	because	officials	never	asked	what	Chalmers	Johnson	
called	the	“forensic	question”:	“what	were	their	motives?”73	FBI	and	White	House	
officials	rarely	gave	seriously	thought	to	why	a	small	number	of	young	American	leftists	
made	the	difficult	decision	to	transform	themselves	into	urban	guerrilla	
revolutionaries,	and	they	certainly	did	not	seek	abiding	remedies	to	the	racial	
inequality	and	state	violence	that	led	many	to	see	violence	as	a	necessary	means	for	
social	change.	Instead,	drawing	upon	earlier	inaccurate	understanding	of	Communists,	
FBI	and	Nixon	officials	characterized	leftist	guerrilla	“terrorists”	as	innately	irrational	
and	deranged,	and	as	a	national	security	problem	to	be	managed	through	mass	
“preventative”	surveillance,	covert	operations,	police	raids,	and	incarceration.	As	I	
discuss	in	the	Epilogue,	this	is	the	greatest	legacy	of	the	FBI’s	war	with	America’s	leftist	
guerrillas,	one	that	continues	to	shape	our	world	today.	
	 		
																																																								
73	Johnson	quoted	in	Why	We	Fight,	directed	by	Eugene	Jarecki,	Sony	Pictures	Classics,	2006.	See	also	
Chalmers	Johnson,	Blowback:	The	Costs	and	Consequences	of	American	Empire,	3rd	ed.	(New	York:	Owl	
Books,	2004).	
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CHAPTER	1	
VIOLENT	DIALECTIC:	NIXON,	THE	FBI,	AND	AMERICA’S	GUERRILLA	INSURGENCY		
		
President	Richard	Milhous	Nixon	spoke	of	peace.	In	his	first	inaugural	address,	on	
January	20,	1969,	Nixon	conveyed	his	desire	to	move	the	country	beyond	the	previous	
four	years	of	domestic	turmoil.	Under	the	administration	of	President	Lyndon	B.	
Johnson,	urban	rebellions,	rowdy	university	protests,	and	massive	demonstrations	
against	the	U.S.	war	in	Vietnam	had	become	regular	features	of	American	life.	The	new	
president	sought	unity	and	calm.	“The	peace	we	seek	to	win,”	Nixon	proclaimed,	“is	not	
victory	over	any	other	people,	but	the	peace	that	comes	‘with	healing	in	its	wings’;	with	
compassion	for	those	who	have	suffered;	with	understanding	for	those	who	have	
opposed	us;	with	the	opportunity	for	all	the	peoples	of	this	earth	to	choose	their	own	
destiny.”1			
	 On	the	same	day	in	Colorado,	a	group	of	leftist	radicals	used	stolen	dynamite	to	
blow	up	a	transmission	tower	outside	of	Denver.	The	explosion	temporarily	disrupted	
power	at	a	Coors	Porcelain	plant	that	manufactured	missile	and	helicopter	components	
for	the	U.S.	military’s	use	in	Vietnam,	where	over	30,000	Americans	and	two	million	
Vietnamese	had	died	since	1964	as	a	result	of	the	war.2	Back	in	Washington	D.C.,	Nixon	
faced	a	direct	assault	from	antiwar	militants.	Before	he	could	even	move	into	the	White	
House,	city	police,	National	Guardsmen,	and	members	of	the	Army’s	82nd	Airborne	
Division	lined	Pennsylvania	Avenue	to	protect	the	armored	presidential	limousine	from	
																																																								
1	Richard	Nixon,	inaugural	address,	January	20,	1969,	Joint	Congressional	Committee	on	Inaugural	
Ceremonies	website,	http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-richard-m-
nixon-1969	(accessed	June	1,	2015).	
2	UPI,	“Grand	Jury	Indicts	Man	for	Bombing,”	Lodi	News-Sentinel,	February	15,	1969,	3.		
	 	 	41	
several	hundred	angry	young	protesters.	The	demonstrators,	led	by	a	militant	faction	of	
the	predominantly	white	New	Left	organization	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	
(SDS),	broke	away	from	the	thousands	of	other	nonviolent	protesters	who	had	
descended	on	Washington	for	the	day’s	“counterinaugural”	events.	The	militants	hurled	
stones,	bottles,	smoke	bombs,	firecrackers,	and	paint-filled	light	bulbs	at	Nixon’s	
procession.	One	protester,	SDS	leader	Mark	Rudd,	took	satisfaction	in	flipping	Nixon	the	
finger	as	the	President	happened	to	glance	at	him	from	less	than	twenty	feet	away	while	
speeding	by	in	his	limo.3	Afterwards,	the	militants	rampaging	through	a	nearby	
business	district,	blocking	traffic	while	smashing	bank	windows	and	police	windshields.	
Cheering	on	Vietnam’s	Communist	guerrilla	resistance	to	America’s	military	onslaught,	
the	crowd	chanted	“Ho,	Ho,	Ho	Chi	Minh,	the	NLF	is	going	to	win!”4	Police	clubbed	
protesters	with	their	batons	and	made	one	hundred	and	nineteen	arrests.	The	New	York	
Times	noted	that	the	disruptions	were	“the	first	at	an	inaugural	ceremony	in	the	180	
years	of	the	Presidency.”5	A	week	later,	on	January	28,	Denver-area	bombers	blew	up	
two	more	transmission	towers.6	
	 Nixon	narrowly	won	the	1968	election	on	a	campaign	to	end	the	war	in	Vietnam	
and	restore	“law	and	order”	to	American	society.	The	latter	pledge	appealed	to	a	large	
constituency	of	working	and	middle	class	white	Americans—a	group	Nixon	soon	
referred	to	as	the	“Silent	Majority”—who	felt	threatened	by	increasing	Black	radicalism,	
																																																								
3	Rudd,	Underground,	131.	
4	The	chant	referred	to	North	Vietnamese	president	Ho	Chi	Minh	and	the	South	Vietnamese	National	
Liberation	Front	(NLF).	Ben	A.	Franklin,	“Young	Demonstrators	at	Parade	Throw	Smoke	Bombs	and	
Stones	at	Nixon’s	Car,”	New	York	Times,	January	21,	1969.	
5	Franklin,	“Young	Demonstrators	at	Parade	Throw	Smoke	Bombs.”	For	further	accounts	of	the	1969	
counterinaugural	protests,	see	Gloria	Emerson,	Winners	&	Losers:	Battles,	Retreats,	Gains,	Losses	and	Ruins	
from	the	Vietnam	War,	5th	ed.	(New	York:	Harcourt	Brace	Jovanovich,	1976),	314-317;	and	Perlstein,	
Nixonland,	357-359.	
6	UPI,	“Grand	Jury	Indicts	Man	for	Bombing.”	
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white	youth	counterculture,	and	violent	civil	disorder	on	America’s	college	campuses	
and	city	streets.	Despite	calling	for	“healing,”	“peace,”	and	“compassion”	in	his	inaugural	
address,	Nixon	had	no	intentions	of	eliminating	the	root	causes	of	violent	social	conflict,	
problems	that	social	scientists	of	the	day	and	peace	activists	such	as	the	late	Dr.	Martin	
Luther	King	Jr.	had	identified	as	racism,	economic	inequality,	and	militarism.	On	the	
contrary,	Nixon	came	to	power	determined	to	clamp	down	on	rioters,	protesters,	
bombers,	and	other	political	dissidents	through	punitive	law-and-order	policing.	
	 Nixon’s	inauguration	marked	a	new	phase	in	a	cycle	of	state	and	insurgent	
violence	that	had	escalated	over	the	previous	five	years	of	the	Johnson	administration.	
1969	was	a	particularly	tumultuous	year	for	the	FBI,	the	Black	Panther	Party	(BPP),	and	
SDS.	During	Nixon’s	first	year	in	office,	federal	and	state	officials	indicted	dozens	of	
Black	Panthers	and	New	Left	radicals	on	various	felony	charges.	Nixon’s	Department	of	
Justice,	for	example,	indicted	SDS	organizer	Cameron	David	Bishop	on	charges	related	
to	the	Denver	transmission	tower	bombings.	When	Bishop	went	underground,	Director	
J.	Edgar	Hoover	placed	the	young	man	on	the	FBI’s	list	of	Ten	Most	Wanted	Fugitives,	
making	him	the	first	leftist	radical	to	ever	earn	such	a	distinction.	Several	groups	of	
other	indicted	radicals	became	well	known	in	leftist	shorthand	as	symbols	of	state	
repression:	the	“Chicago	Eight,”	the	New	York	“Panther	Twenty-One,”	the	“New	Haven	
Nine.”	As	the	Nixon	administration	implored	Director	Hoover	to	intensify	operations	
against	political	radicals,	the	FBI	expanded	its	secret	surveillance	of	American	leftists	
and	escalated	its	covert	counterintelligence	programs	(COINTELPROs)	designed	to	
destroy	the	Black	Power	movement	and	New	Left,	with	the	BPP	and	SDS	being	its	
primary	targets.	Both	BPP	and	SDS	members	also	endured	regular	harassment	from	
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local	police,	though	the	Panthers	bore	the	brunt	of	direct	police	violence.	In	the	first	half	
of	1969,	while	imprisoned	Panther	co-founder	Huey	P.	Newton	awaited	trial	on	murder	
charges	for	the	1967	death	of	an	Oakland	cop	and	fellow	Panther	leader	Eldridge	
Cleaver	adjusted	to	a	life	of	foreign	exile,	local	police	staged	at	least	ten	armed	raids	on	
BPP	offices	and	homes	throughout	the	country,	and	arrested	hundreds	of	the	group’s	
members.7		
	 Despite	heightened	law-and-order	policing,	domestic	upheaval	remained	on	the	
rise	during	Nixon’s	first	year	in	office.	The	Black	Panther	Party,	for	example,	remained	
visible	advocates	of	revolution	throughout	1969,	buoyed	by	international	television	
coverage	of	its	black-leather-clad	male	leaders	and	their	calls	for	armed	resistance,	as	
well	as	wide	distribution	of	the	Black	Panther	newspaper.	Amid	heightened	police	
attacks,	the	Party	shifted	its	political	organizing	efforts	towards	developing	local	
“survival	programs,”	such	as	the	popular	Free	Breakfast	for	Children	Program,	though	
leaders	continued	to	promote	armed	violence	against	the	state	officials.8	Black	
Panthers’	advocacy	of	armed	revolution	was	not	just	talk.	In	several	instances,	Panthers	
responded	to	police	violence	with	violence	of	their	own,	injuring	officers	in	the	process.	
Looking	up	to	the	Panthers	as	the	“vanguard”	of	America’s	coming	revolution,	members	
of	SDS	also	stepped	up	their	confrontational	tactics.	After	the	January	1969	
																																																								
7	Scholars	have	estimated	the	number	of	Panthers	killed	by	police	over	the	course	of	the	Party’s	existence	
at	between	twenty-four	and	twenty-eight.	See	Murch,	Living	for	the	City,	162,	262	fn209.	On	police	raids,	
see	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	212-215;	and	Frank	J.	Donner,	Protectors	of	Privilege:	Red	
Squads	and	Police	Repression	in	Urban	America	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1990),	180.			
8	Bloom	and	Martin	argued	that	the	Black	Panther	Party	grew	significantly	over	the	course	of	1969,	
expanding	its	chapters	from	approximately	twenty	cities,	to	sixty-eight.	The	evidence	casts	doubt	on	this	
assertion,	however,	since	as	Bloom	and	Martin	acknowledge,	and	as	I	further	analyze	later	in	this	chapter,	
Bobby	Seale	froze	the	Party’s	membership	in	January	1969,	at	which	time	he	claimed	that	the	Party	
already	had	over	forty	chapters.	It	appears	that	the	fall	of	1968	was	actually	the	Party’s	greatest	period	of	
national	growth,	though	it	was	also	a	time	of	increasing	factionalism	amid	increasing	violent	
confrontations	with	police.	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	2,	179-198,	344-345.	
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“counterinaugural”	melee,	SDS	militants	clashed	violently	with	police	on	several	other	
occassions.	Bombings,	moreover,	became	an	increasingly	popular	expression	of	political	
dissent	after	Nixon	took	office.	A	small	number	of	young	radicals	first	adopted	bombing	
as	a	political	tactic	in	1968.	By	year’s	end,	they	had	launched	over	fifty	such	attacks,	
mostly	targeting	campus	Reserve	Officers’	Training	Corps	(ROTC)	offices	and	urban	
police	stations.	Over	the	course	of	1969,	as	Nixon	escalated	the	U.S.	air	war	on	Vietnam	
and	police	amplified	attacks	on	radicals,	incidents	of	revolutionary	violence	surged.	
Between	January	1969	and	April	1970,	leftist	militants	carried	out	over	four	hundred	
bombings	and	arsons	in	the	United	States.9		
	 While	historians	have	done	a	fine	job	examining	how	Nixon	era	FBI	and	police	
operations	influenced	the	Black	Panthers	and	SDS,	they	have	not	adequately	explained	
how	leftist	violence	and	violent	rhetoric	influenced	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	
administration.	Indeed,	much	of	the	literature	seems	to	imply	that	while	police	violence	
radicalized	the	Black	Panthers	and	their	supporters,	leftist	violence	had	little	influence	
upon	police	agencies	and	American	politics.10	Conflict	between	America’s	militant	left	
and	the	various	agencies	of	the	state	flowed	both	ways,	however,	and	must	be	
understood	as	inter-relational.		
	 Over	the	course	of	Nixon’s	first	five	months	in	office,	the	FBI	and	the	militant	left	
reshaped	one	another	through	a	mutually	constitutive	“violent	dialectic”	of	insurgent	
and	state	violence.11	Insurgent	violence	included	rioting,	street	fighting,	gun-battles	
																																																								
9	Sale,	SDS,	632.	For	a	discussion	on	bombing	statistics,	see	footnote	1	in	my	introduction.	
10	Recent	prominent	examples	include	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire;	and	Berger,	Captive	
Nation.	
11	I	base	this	concept	from	Mikkel	Thorup’s	notion	that	“one	has	to	write	the	history	of	terrorism	as	a	
dialectics	or	‘dialogue’	between	the	state	and	its	violent	challengers.”	Thorup,	An	Intellectual	History	of	
Terrorism,	2.	
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with	police,	armed	ambushes	of	police	officers,	bombings,	and	violent	rhetoric	calling	
for	“revolutionary”	urban	guerrilla	warfare.	State	violence	included	normalized	violence	
commonly	understood	as	legitimate	“force,”	namely	arrests,	incarceration,	and	any	sort	
of	physical	violence	carried	out	in	order	to	overcome	resistance	to	police	apprehension,	
as	well	as	illegal	activity,	like	harassment,	beatings,	and	killings.12	These	distinctions	
often	blurred,	however,	as	in	the	cases	of	warrantless	police	raids,	unauthorized	
surveillance,	police	brutality,	police	shootings	in	the	name	of	“self-defense,”	and	arrests	
on	trumped-up	charges.	State	violence	was	not	a	conspiracy.	Local	police	carried	out	
their	operations	autonomously	or	in	response	to	local	rebellion,	though	the	FBI	often	
provided	local	police	agencies	with	intelligence	that	emphasized	or	exaggerated	
radicals’	violent	rhetoric	and	actions.	Moreover,	through	their	promotion	of	“law	and	
order”	and	dismissal	of	African	Americans’	and	leftists’	complaints	of	police	brutality,	
the	Nixon	White	House,	Attorney	General	John	Mitchell’s	Department	of	Justice,	and	
Hoover’s	FBI	gave	local	police	forces	a	green	light	to	suppress	leftist	militants	with	
impunity	through	heavy-handed	tactics.	
	 During	the	first	half	of	1969,	conflict	between	state	authorities	and	American	
political	dissidents	wrought	important	changes	in	the	Nixon	administration,	the	FBI,	
and	the	militant	left.	Leftist	violence	contributed	to	tensions	between	Nixon,	who	
sought	the	FBI’s	assistance	in	implementing	a	punitive	response	to	law-breaking	
political	dissidents,	and	Hoover,	who	resisted	White	House	requests	for	FBI	
surveillance	measures	that	he	believed	risked	making	the	Bureau	vulnerable	to	public	
criticism.	Unaware	of	friction	between	Nixon	and	Hoover,	members	of	the	BPP	and	SDS	
																																																								
12	Charles	Tilley,	The	Politics	of	Collective	Violence	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	27.	
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mistakenly	viewed	federal	and	state-level	indictments,	local	police	attacks,	and	FBI	
operations	as	facets	of	a	creeping	fascism,	part	of	a	centralized	conspiracy	to	crush	the	
U.S.	left.	They	responded	with	increased	militancy,	inciting	further	police	attention,	
while	also	heightening	factionalism	and	paranoia	within	their	own	organizations.	The	
FBI,	in	turn,	endeavored	to	further	destabilize	the	left	though	its	covert	
counterintelligence	programs.	Ironically,	though	the	FBI	targeted	the	BPP	and	SDS	in	
order	to	“neutralize”	the	groups’	capacities	to	engage	in	violent	disorder,	the	Bureau’s	
covert	operations	and	encouragement	of	police	attacks	on	the	organizations	prompted	
a	significant	number	of	militant	leftists	to	embrace	urban	guerrilla	warfare	as	a	
revolutionary	strategy	for	combating	state	violence.	
	
	“State	of	Emergency”		
Nixon’s	“law-and-order”	policing	was	not	the	only	available	state	response	to	America’s	
violent	domestic	social	conflict.	In	mid-1968,	the	National	Advisory	Commission	on	Civil	
Disorders	(better	known	as	the	Kerner	Commission)	issued	a	511-page	report	on	civil	
disorders	commissioned	by	the	Johnson	administration	following	the	massive	1967	
riots	in	Newark,	Detroit,	and	dozens	of	other	cities.	The	Kerner	Report	explained	
America’s	urban	uprisings	as	byproducts	of	longstanding	poverty,	segregation,	lack	of	
opportunity,	and	police	brutality	in	African	American	ghettos.	“Our	society	is	moving	
toward	two	societies,”	it’s	authors	warned,	“one	black,	one	white—separate	and	
unequal.”	“The	alternative,”	the	report	concluded,		
…is	not	blind	repression	or	capitulation	to	lawlessness.	It	is	the	realization	of	
common	opportunities	for	all	within	a	single	society.		
	 This	alternative	will	require	a	commitment	to	national	action—
compassionate,	massive	and	sustained,	backed	by	the	resources	of	the	most	
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powerful	and	the	richest	nation	on	this	earth.	From	every	American	it	will	
require	new	attitudes,	new	understanding,	and,	above	all,	new	will.13	
	
In	other	words,	the	Kerner	Report	called	for	massive	federal	spending	on	programs	to	
eliminate	the	conditions	of	economic	and	racial	inequality	that	gave	rise	to	violent	
unrest.	In	its	call	for	a	large	scale	transformation	of	American	society,	the	report’s	
recommendations	echoed	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.’s	appeal	the	previous	year	for	a	
nonviolent	“radical	revolution	of	values”	to	eliminate	from	the	United	States	the	“triple	
evils	of	racism,	economic	exploitation,	and	militarism.”14		
	 President	Richard	Nixon	never	intended	to	address	the	root	causes	of	violent	
social	conflict.	Indeed,	by	1968,	even	President	Johnson	had	given	up	on	the	ambitious	
plan	to	eliminate	poverty	in	America	that	he	had	announced	upon	taking	office	four	
years	earlier.	Amid	repeated	“long	hot	summers”	of	urban	rioting	and	the	escalating	
war	in	Vietnam,	the	Johnson	administration	and	Congress	increasingly	directed	federal	
funds	away	from	the	“War	on	Poverty”	towards	urban	policing	and	overseas	military	
expenditures.15	Published	two	months	after	Martin	Luther	King’s	April	4,	1968	
assassination	triggered	uprisings	in	over	one	hundred	and	fifty	American	cities,	the	
Kerner	Report	had	zero	impact	on	federal	policy.	
	 Nixon	came	into	office	determined	to	deliver	on	his	promise	to	establish	“law	
and	order”	in	American	society	through	aggressive	policing	and	punishment	of	law-
breaking	political	dissidents.	During	its	first	five	months	in	office,	his	administration	
																																																								
13	National	Advisory	Commission	on	Civil	Disorders,	The	Kerner	Report:	The	1968	Report	of	the	National	
Commission	on	Civil	Disorders,	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	Pantheon,	1988),	1-2.	
14	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.,	“Why	I	am	Opposed	to	the	War	in	Vietnam,”	sermon	at	the	Ebeneezer	Baptist	
Church,	Atlanta,	Georgia,	April	30,	1967,	Real	News	Network,	
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=47
31	(accessed	June	1,	2016).	
15	Hinton,	“‘A	War	within	Our	Own	Boundaries.’”	
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responded	to	domestic	social	conflict	with	federal	indictments	of	leftist	radicals	and	
demands	that	J.	Edgar	Hoover’s	FBI	accelerate	its	efforts	to	prevent	revolutionary	
bombings,	civil	disturbances,	and	leaks	of	classified	state	secrets.	Nixon	did	not	
comprehend	the	scope	or	scale	of	the	FBI’s	domestic	surveillance	and	
counterintelligence	operations,	however.	Furthermore,	Hoover	was	unwilling	to	obey	
all	of	the	new	President’s	orders—the	Director	would	comply	only	with	directives	that	
he	did	not	perceive	as	potentially	damaging	to	the	FBI’s	public	image	and	institutional	
autonomy.	Disagreements	over	the	FBI’s	operations	against	American	dissidents	led	to	
growing	tensions	between	Hoover	and	the	Nixon	administration.	
	 The	first	target	of	the	Nixon	White	House’s	efforts	was	the	leader	of	Denver’s	
transmission	tower	bombers.	On	February	14,	1969,	within	a	month	of	Nixon’s	
inauguration,	the	new	Attorney	General	John	Mitchell	indicted	twenty-six-year-old	SDS	
organizer	Cameron	David	Bishop	for	his	alleged	role	in	the	Denver	bombings.	Mitchell	
charged	Bishop	under	an	amendment	to	the	Federal	Sabotage	Act	of	1918	that	made	it	a	
federal	crime	to	sabotage	“war	utilities…	when	the	United	States	is	at	war,	or	in	times	of	
national	emergency	as	declared	by	the	President.”16	It	was	only	the	second	such	
indictment	since	World	War	II.	Two	months	earlier,	President	Johnson’s	outgoing	
Attorney	General	Ramsey	Clark	launched	the	first	one	against	Michael	Siskind,	a	
twenty-one-year-old	SDS	member	who	firebombed	an	ROTC	building	on	the	St.	Louis	
campus	of	Washington	University	in	December	1968.	Siskind	pled	guilty	four	days	prior	
to	the	Bishop	indictment.17		
																																																								
16	United	States	v.	Bishop,	555	F.	2d	771	-	Court	of	Appeals,	10th	Circuit	1977,	773.	
17	UPI,	“Grand	Jury	Indicts	Man	for	Bombing”;	Department	of	Justice,	United	States	Attorneys	Bulletin	17,	
no.	9.,	February	28,	1969,	210.		
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	 It	is	unclear	what	legal	basis	determined	the	“state	of	emergency”	cited	in	the	
Bishop	indictment.	Was	Mitchell’s	Justice	Department	referring	to	President	Franklin	
Roosevelt’s	1933	“state	of	emergency”	declared	as	a	means	to	assert	executive	
intervention	in	the	American	economy	amidst	the	Great	Depression?	Or	President	
Harry	Truman’s	1950	“state	of	emergency”	declared	during	the	Korean	War?18	Or	had	
Nixon	declared	his	own	state	of	emergency?19	Eight	years	later,	in	1977,	as	the	nation	
continued	to	reel	from	the	Watergate	Scandal	and	Nixon’s	resignation,	a	federal	judge	
dismissed	the	charges	against	Bishop	after	determining	that	there	was	no	legal	basis	for	
the	“state	of	emergency”	declared	in	the	indictment.20	In	the	meantime,	however,	the	
Bishop	indictment	conveyed	the	Nixon	administration’s	view	on	domestic	revolutionary	
bombings:	America	was	at	war	not	only	in	Vietnam,	but	also	at	home.		
	 The	Justice	Department’s	indictment	of	Cameron	Bishop	also	put	pressure	on	
Hoover’s	FBI.	Denver-based	FBI	agents	had	detained	Bishop	after	discovering	stolen	
dynamite	and	blasting	caps	similar	to	those	used	in	the	transmission	tower	bombings	
hidden	in	a	mineshaft	near	a	mountain	cabin	in	Idaho	Springs	where	the	young	radical	
lived	with	three	of	his	alleged	accomplices.	The	agents	questioned	Bishop	for	five-and-
																																																								
18	In	1973,	a	special	Senate	committee	led	by	Frank	Church	(D,	ID)	and	Charles	Mathias	(R,	MD)	
determined	that	a	series	of	vaguely	defined	“states	of	emergency”	declared	since	the	Roosevelt	
administration	remained	in	effect	during	the	Nixon	presidency.	See	James	N.	Naughton,	“Wartime	Powers	
Studied	by	Panel,”	New	York	Times,	January	14,	1973,	8;	and	New	York	Times,	“National	Emergency,”	April	
19,	1973,	42.	
19	A	February	1969	Justice	Department	memo	noted	that	the	section	of	the	Federal	War	Sabotage	Act	of	
1918	used	to	indict	Bishop	had	been	“extended	to	cover	a	period	of	national	emergency	declared	by	the	
President.”	It	is	unclear,	however,	if	this	statement	refers	to	Eisenhower,	whose	administration	amended	
the	Act,	or	Nixon.	Department	of	Justice,	United	States	Attorneys	Bulletin	17,	no.	9.,	February	28,	1969,	
210.	
20	United	States	v.	Bishop,	555	F.	2d	771	-	Court	of	Appeals,	10th	Circuit	1977,	774.	
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a-half	hours,	but	released	him	after	determining	they	lacked	enough	evidence	to	press	
charges.	Almost	immediately	after	leaving	FBI	custody,	Bishop	went	into	hiding.21		
	 Because	Bishop’s	FBI	file	remains	classified	today,	it	is	impossible	to	determine	
exactly	how	FBI	and	White	House	officials	felt	about	the	Denver	bombing	suspect’s	
flight	from	federal	authorities.	But	Bishop’s	escape	must	have	been	embarrassing	to	
Hoover,	who	placed	a	high	premium	on	the	FBI’s	reputation	as	a	force	that	always	
captured	its	suspects.	Such	embarrassment	must	have	been	particularly	acute	during	
the	first	months	of	Nixon’s	presidency,	as	Mitchell’s	decision	to	indict	Bishop	under	the	
Federal	Sabotage	Act	underscored	the	White	House’s	determination	to	clamp	down	on	
domestic	bombings.	Soon	after	the	Justice	Department’s	indictment,	Hoover	publicly	
signaled	that	the	FBI	too	was	committed	to	thwarting	revolutionary	bombings.	On	April	
15,	1969,	the	Director	added	Bishop	to	the	FBI’s	list	of	Ten	Most	Wanted	Fugitives.	
Nearly	three	hundred	others	had	appeared	on	the	list	since	1950,	when	the	FBI	
established	it	in	order	to	attract	public	assistance	in	capturing	America’s	most	violent	
and	elusive	criminals.	The	Ten	Most	Wanted	typically	included	gangsters,	bank	robbers,	
and	others	sought	on	murder	or	kidnapping	charges.	Bishop,	however,	was	the	first	
leftist	revolutionary	to	appear	on	the	list.22			
	 Shortly	after	pressing	charges	against	Cameron	Bishop,	Nixon’s	Justice	
Department	launched	conspiracy	indictments	against	other	leftwing	radicals.	On	March	
																																																								
21	Ibid,	773;	Cameron	Bishop	interview,	June	5,	1975,	audio	recording,	Freedom	Archives,	San	Francisco,	
CA,	Call	number	PM	197A.	
22	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation,	“FBI’s	Ten	Most	Wanted	Fugitives,	1950-2010,”	FBI	website,	
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/ten-most-wanted-fugitives-60th-anniversary-1950-
2010/ten-most-wanted-fugitives-60th-anniversary-1950-2010-pdf	(accessed	June	1,	2016);	UPI,	“Radical	
Leftists	Dot	Most	Wanted	List,”	Hartford	Courant,	October	21,	1971,	35.	Bishop’s	three	alleged	co-
conspirators	were	Steven	Knowles,	Susan	Parker,	and	Linda	Goebel.	Parker	and	Goebel	testified	against	
Bishop	in	exchange	for	immunity.	Knowles	also	went	underground.	The	FBI	targeted	Bishop	on	their	
Most	Wanted	list	because	they	considered	him	to	be	the	group’s	leader.	
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20,	1969	Attorney	General	Mitchell	charged	the	“Chicago	Eight”—peace	activist	David	
Dellinger,	SDS	leaders	Tom	Hayden	and	Rennie	Davies,	Yippie	leaders	Jerry	Rubin	and	
Abbie	Hoffman,	antiwar	activist	professors	Lee	Weiner	and	John	Froines,	and	Black	
Panther	chairman	Bobby	Seale—on	a	number	of	charges,	including	conspiracy	to	cross	
state	lines	with	intent	to	incite	a	riot.23	With	flimsy	evidence,	Nixon’s	Justice	
Department	charged	the	Chicago	Eight	for	their	alleged	role	in	the	massive	antiwar	
protests	at	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention,	which	generated	live	television	
coverage	of	Chicago	police	teargasing	and	brutally	beating	young	antiwar	activists.24	
President	Johnson’s	Attorney	General	Ramsey	Clark	had	refused	to	prosecute	
demonstrators	after	the	Convention,	siding	with	a	federally	funded	report	that	
determined	Chicago	police	had	been	the	main	perpetrators	of	the	violence.25	In	
contrast,	Mitchell’s	decision	to	charge	the	Chicago	Eight	reflected	the	Nixon	
administration’s	view	that	the	protesters	were	primarily	responsible	for	the	violence,	
and	that	state	punishment,	rather	than	federal	programing	to	address	the	root	causes	of	
violent	conflict,	was	the	appropriate	response	to	disruptive	political	protest.	Mitchell	
																																																								
23	The	Chicago	Eight	also	faced	charges	of	conspiring	to	cross	state	lines	to	teach	the	making	of	incendiary	
devices	and	commit	acts	to	impede	police	officers	from	their	lawful	duties.	Dellinger,	Davis,	Hayden,	
Hoffman,	Rubin,	and	Seale	also	faced	charges	of	crossing	state	lines	to	incite	a	riot,	and	Froines	and	
Weiner	faced	charges	of	instructing	other	persons	how	to	make	incendiary	devices.	The	indictment	
named	sixteen	unindicted	conspirators	from	various	segments	of	the	antiwar	movement.	“Indictment	in	
the	Chicago	Seven	Conspiracy	Trial,”	in	Famous	Trials	online	exhibit	and	database,	Douglas	O.	Linder,	ed.,	
University	of	Missouri	-	Kansas	City	School	of	Law,	
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/indictment.html	(accessed	June	1,	2016);	
Geoffrey	R.	Stone,	Perilous	Times:	Free	Speech	in	Wartime	from	the	Sedition	Act	of	1798	to	the	War	on	
Terrorism	(New	York:	W.	W.	Norton	and	Company,	2004),	484.	
24	The	Justice	Department	charged	the	Chicago	Eight	under	provisions	of	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1968	that	
Congress	had	passed	in	response	to	militant	SNCC	leaders	Stokely	Carmichael	and	H.	Rap	Brown,	whom	
the	FBI	inaccurately	accused	of	inciting	the	hundreds	of	urban	riots	that	disrupted	American	cities	in	
1967	and	1968.	See	David	Farber,	Chicago	’68	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1997),	147.	
25	Ibid,	205;	Stone,	Perilous	Times,	484.	
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conveyed	this	view	in	regards	to	the	Chicago	Eight	when	he	quipped	to	reporters,	“The	
Justice	Department	is	an	institution	for	law	enforcement,	not	social	improvement.”26	
	 Another	way	Nixon	responded	to	political	dissent	was	by	pressuring	J.	Edgar	
Hoover’s	FBI	to	expand	its	surveillance	of	radical	activists	and	other	opponents	of	his	
policies.	Hoover	was	reluctant	to	comply,	however.	Understanding	why	requires	an	
examination	of	the	Bureau’s	changing	relationship	to	domestic	social	conflict	and	
political	violence	during	the	previous	two	decades.		
	 Since	World	War	II,	the	FBI	had	maintained	extensive	surveillance	files	on	
African	American	activists	and	other	leftists,	especially	those	associated	with	the	
Communist	Party	(CPUSA).	Carried	out	during	the	height	of	Cold	War	anticommunist	
paranoia,	the	ostensible	purpose	of	this	surveillance	was	to	prevent	radicals	from	
“subverting”	the	United	States	by	infiltrating	the	labor	and	civil	rights	movements	and	
organizing	a	Communist	revolution	backed	by	the	Soviet	Union.	The	FBI	began	
employing	widespread	“preventative”	intelligence	measures	in	1939,	when	President	
Roosevelt	issued	a	wartime	directive	granting	the	Bureau	exclusive	jurisdiction	over	
domestic	“espionage,	counterespionage,	and	sabotage	matters.”27	Hoover	used	
Roosevelt’s	directive	as	a	license	to	establish	the	FBI	as	an	autonomous	police	
institution	with	minimal	government	oversight,	and	to	carry	out	a	range	of	secret	
																																																								
26	Milton	Viorst,	“Attorney	General	Mitchell’s	Philosophy	is	‘The	Justice	Department	is	an	Institution	for	
Law	Enforcement,	not	Social	Improvement,’”	New	York	Times	Magazine	10	(August	10,	1969).	
27	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	403.	In	1924,	after	the	Palmer	Raids	of	1919-1920	and	the	Teapot	Dome	
Scandal	of	1921-1922—a	bribery	scandal	involving	the	Department	of	Justice	that	ruined	the	reputation	
of	President	Warren	Harding	and	was	widely	considered	the	greatest	political	scandal	in	U.S.	history	
prior	to	Watergate—Attorney	General	Harlan	Fiske	Stone	banned	the	Bureau	of	Investigation	from	
engaging	in	political	surveillance	as	President	Calvin	Coolidge	appointed	the	young	J.	Edgar	Hoover	to	
serve	as	the	Bureau’s	Acting	Director	(he	was	promoted	to	permanent	Director	the	following	year).	See	
Schmidt,	Red	Scare,	324-326.	
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operations	unknown	to	presidents,	lawmakers,	or	the	American	public.28	To	this	end,	
Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	oversaw	the	FBI’s	creation	of	its	“Security	Index,”	a	secret	list	
containing	names	of	thousands	of	Americans	with	suspected	Communist	sympathies	to	
be	rounded	up	and	detained	in	a	“time	of	war	or	national	emergency.”29	The	FBI	
gathered	intelligence	on	suspected	Communists	with	the	help	of	thousands	of	paid	
informants	and	“confidential	sources,”	including	bankers,	landlords,	and	telephone	
operators.30	The	FBI	also	targeted	CPUSA	with	a	range	of	illegal	surveillance	tactics,	
including	break-ins	(known	in	Bureau	parlance	as	“surreptitious	entries”	or	“black	bag	
jobs”),	safe-breaking,	“mail	covers”	(surveillance	of	addresses	on	the	envelopes	of	a	
target’s	mail),	mail-opening,	“trash	covers”	(surveillance	of	a	target’s	curbside	garbage	
bins),	warrantless	electronic	telephone	wiretaps,	and	hidden	microphones	(also	known	
as	“bugs”).31		
	 During	the	early	1950s,	Hoover’s	FBI	played	a	critical	role	in	the	postwar	Red	
Scare	typically	associated	with	anticommunist	crusader	Senator	Joe	McCarthy	(R,	WI).	
Indeed,	historian	Ellen	Schrecker	argued,	“had	observers	known	in	the	1950s	what	they	
have	learned	since	the	1970s,	when	the	Freedom	of	Information	Acted	open	the	
Bureau’s	files,	‘McCarthyism’	would	probably	be	called	‘Hooverism.’”32	Hoover’s	FBI	
provided	intelligence	on	American	leftists	to	the	anticommunist	House	Un-American	
Activities	Committee	(HUAC)	and	Senate	Internal	Security	Committee,	and	gathered	
																																																								
28	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	403.	
29	Ibid,	412-413.	
30	Church	Committee	Book	II,	60-65,	and	Book	III,	228-229.	
31	FBI	personnel	officially	referred	to	break-ins	as	“surreptitious	entries”	while	colloquially	using	the	
term	“black	bag	jobs”	in	reference	to	the	black	bags	containing	lock-picking	tools	agents	would	bring	with	
them	on	such	operations.	For	an	overview	of	the	FBI’s	extralegal	surveillance	techniques	directed	at	the	
CPUSA,	see	Senate	Select	Committee,	Book	II,	60-65,	and	Book	III,	228-229.	
32	Ellen	Schrecker,	Many	Are	the	Crimes:	McCarthyism	in	America	(New	York:	Little,	Brown	and	Company,	
1998),	203.	
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evidence	used	to	convict	Eugene	Dennis,	Gus	Hall,	Henry	Winston,	and	other	CPUSA	
leaders	on	shaky	conspiracy	charges.33	Hoover’s	FBI	also	gathered	evidence	used	to	try,	
convict,	and	execute	CPUSA	members	Julius	and	Ethel	Rosenberg.34	In	1956,	after	the	
Supreme	Court	curtailed	the	government’s	ability	to	prosecute	suspected	Communists,	
Hoover	launched	a	secret	counterintelligence	program	(COINTELPRO),	designed	to	
covertly	destroy	the	CPUSA,	whose	membership	had	already	diminished	from	an	all-
time	high	of	over	75,000	at	the	close	of	World	War	II	to	only	a	few	thousand,	many	of	
them	FBI	informants.35	Tactics	included	mailing	anonymous,	inflammatory	materials	
																																																								
33	Ibid,	192.	
34	Julius	Rosenberg	led	a	spy	ring	that	transferred	information	about	the	U.S.	military	and	weapons	
technology	to	the	Soviet	Union,	but	he	was	not,	as	the	government	claimed,	responsible	for	passing	the	
secrets	of	America’s	nuclear	bomb	to	the	USSR	or	for	starting	the	Korean	War.	The	2015	declassification	
of	the	1950	grand	jury	testimony	of	David	Greenglass,	Ellen’s	brother	and	a	member	of	Julius’s	spy	ring	
who	worked	in	Los	Alamos	labs,	confirms	the	long-held	suspicion	of	Rosenberg	supporters	that	
Greenglass	fabricated	a	story	of	Ethel’s	involvement	in	the	espionage	that	the	government	used	in	an	
effort	to	compel	Julius	to	confess.	Schrecker,	Many	Are	the	Crimes,	176-178;	Michael	Meeropol	and	Robert	
Meeropol,	“The	Meeropol	Brothers:	Exonerate	Our	Mother,	Ethel	Rosenberg,”	New	York	Times,	August	10,	
2015.	
35	Schrecker,	Many	Are	the	Crimes,	19-20,	227.	The	FBI	first	developed	counterintelligence	tactics	during	
World	War	II	as	a	means	to	undermine	German,	Japanese,	and	Soviet	spies	operating	inside	the	United	
States.	Hoover	launched	COINTELPRO	in	response	to	a	Supreme	Court	ruling	on	the	Smith	Act	of	1940	
that	limited	the	state’s	power	to	investigate	and	prosecute	individuals	deemed	“subversives.”	While	the	
Smith	Act	made	it	a	crime	to	advocate	“the	overthrow	of	any	government	in	the	United	States	by	force	of	
violence,”	the	Court’s	new	interpretation	pronounced	that	promotion	of	ideas	alone	was	not	punishable.	
The	Director	continued	to	emphasize	the	CPUSA’s	supposed	threat	to	U.S.	internal	security	to	American	
officials	after	the	ruling,	despite	the	Party’s	greatly	diminished	stature	and	his	knowledge	that	the	Soviet	
Union	had	ceased	using	the	organization	for	espionage	since	Nikita	Khrushev	replaced	Joseph	Stalin	as	
the	country’s	leader	in	1953,	in	part,	as	an	effort	to	secure	Congressional	appropriations.	Hoover	gained	
President	Dwight	Eisenhower’s	approval	for	a	covert	effort	to	defeat	the	CPUSA	during	a	March	8,	1956	
National	Security	Council	meeting.	During	the	early	1960s,	the	FBI	initiated	two	more	COINTELPROs	
targeting	leftist	movements	deemed	“subversive”	threats	to	U.S.	national	security:	the	Socialist	Workers	
Party	and	the	Puerto	Rican	independence	movement.	For	more	on	COINTELPRO-CPUSA,	see	James	Davis,	
Spying	on	America,	31-32.	On	the	FBI’s	development	of	COINTELPRO	operations	against	Axis	and	Soviet	
spies,	see	Raymond	J.	Batvinis,	Hoover’s	Secret	War	against	Axis	Spies:	FBI	Counterespionage	during	World	
War	II	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2014),	and	The	Origins	of	FBI	Counterintelligence	
(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2007).	On	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	program	against	the	
Socialist	Workers	Party	(SWP),	see	Nelson	Blackstock,	COINTELPRO:	The	FBI’s	Secret	War	on	Political	
Freedom,	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	Pathfinder	Press,	1988).	More	research	is	needed	on	the	FBI’s	1960s	
COINTELPRO	against	“Groups	Seeking	Independence	for	Puerto	Rico,”	which	was	not	covered	in	the	
Church	Committee	reports	because	the	FBI	did	not	make	the	program’s	existence	known	to	the	public	
until	after	the	Committee’s	hearings.	Declassified	documents	from	this	operation	available	in	the	FBI’s	
online	archive	suggest	that	the	program’s	purported	mission	shifted	over	the	course	of	the	1960s	from	
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intended	to	sow	distrust	and	discord	within	the	Party;	providing	true	or	falsified	
derogatory	information	about	the	organization	to	the	news	media;	informing	local	
police	about	members’	criminal	or	civil	violations;	and	notifying	employers	of	
individuals’	membership	in	the	group.36	By	1971,	the	FBI	had	carried	out	1,388	
separate	COINTELPRO	operations	against	the	CPUSA.37	
	 During	the	Johnson	years,	two	changes	in	the	FBI’s	operations	against	the	U.S.	
left	set	the	stage	for	the	Bureau’s	Nixon-era	war	with	leftist	guerrillas.	First,	amid	the	
decline	of	the	CPUSA	and	the	growing	problem	of	urban	riots,	the	FBI’s	Domestic	
Security	Division	increasingly	shifted	its	investigative	priorities	from	preventing	
Communist	“subversion”	to	preventing	violent	“civil	disorder.”	Between	1964	and	1967,	
urban	riots	prompted	a	severe	crisis	for	the	President	Johnson,	who	repeatedly	
implored	Hoover	to	investigate	and	contain	violent	civil	disturbances.	In	response,	the	
FBI	expanded	its	surveillance	of	African	American	communities	in	hopes	of	detecting	
urban	riots	in	advance.	The	Bureau	initially	focused	its	efforts	on	black	activists,	tapping	
the	phones	of	prominent	Black	Nationalist	leaders	Malcolm	X,	Elijah	Muhammad,	and	
Maxwell	Stanford	between	1964	and	1966,	and	maintaining	surveillance	notes	on	
thousands	of	civil	rights	demonstrations.38	After	the	Newark	and	Detroit	riots	of	1967,	
however,	the	FBI	widened	surveillance	beyond	black	radicals	to	entire	African	
American	communities.	Through	the	“Ghetto	Informant	Program,”	thousands	of	
informants	provided	FBI	agents	with	information	used	to	gauge	the	potential	for	violent	
																																																																																																																																																																												
one	of	countering	“subversion”	to	preventing	revolutionary	anticolonial	violence.	See	FBI	Vault	online	
archive,	COINTELPRO	Puerto	Rican	Groups	Files,	https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/puerto-rican-groups	
(accessed	June	1,	2016).	
36	Davis,	Spying	on	America,	33-34.	
37	James	Kirkpatrick	Davis,	Assault	on	the	Left:	The	FBI	and	the	Sixties	Antiwar	Movement	(Westport,	CT:	
Praeger,	1997),	6.	
38	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	319	and	476.	
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civil	disturbance.39	Under	the	rubric	of	violence	prevention,	the	FBI	also	expanded	
surveillance	of	the	antiwar	movement.	In	1966,	hoping	to	gain	foreknowledge	of	
“potentialities	for	violence	outbreaks,”	Hoover	ordered	his	agents	to	develop	
“awareness	and	alertness”	of	antiwar	demonstrations,	though	he	provided	no	specific	
evidence	of	impending	violence.40	“I	want	to	stress	to	you,”	he	wrote,	“that	the	emphasis	
in	these	matters	must	be	on	advance	detection…	We	are	an	intelligence	agency	and	as	
such	are	expected	to	know	what	is	going	to	or	is	likely	to	happen.	National,	state,	and	
local	authorities	rely	upon	us	to	obtain	this	information	so	they	can	take	appropriate	
action	to	avert	disastrous	outbreaks.”41	For	the	most	part,	however,	the	FBI’s	
surveillance	operations	were	unsuccessful	in	preventing	the	riots,	street	protests,	and	
other	disruptive	social	conflict	that	rattled	American	society	during	the	1960s.	
	 While	Hoover	expanded	the	FBI’s	surveillance	of	African	Americans	and	antiwar	
protesters	during	the	Johnson	years,	the	Director	also	reigned	in	the	Bureau’s	use	of	
illegal	surveillance	techniques.	Throughout	his	four-decade	career	as	Director,	Hoover	
had	carefully	crafted	the	FBI’s	public	image	as	trusted	crime-fighters	and	defenders	of	
national	security,	knowing	that	this	perception	played	a	key	role	in	enabling	the	Bureau	
to	maintain	powerful	institutional	autonomy	from	Congress	and	the	White	House.	But	
during	the	mid-1960s,	dissident	activists	and	politicians	began	to	challenge	U.S.	
intelligence	agencies’	authority.	This	made	Hoover	nervous.	A	Senate	subcommittee’s	
investigation	of	IRS	surveillance	in	1965	and	1966,	for	example,	caused	Hoover	to	
worry	that	legislators	would	launch	a	similar	investigation	of	FBI	practices,	and	from	
																																																								
39	Ibid,	253-255;	O’Reilly,	“Racial	Matters,”	267-268.	
40	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	490	
41	Ibid,	491.	Emphasis	in	original.	
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1965	to	1967	Attorneys	General	Nicholas	Katzenbach	and	Ramsey	Clark	implemented	
formal	restrictions	on	the	Bureau’s	wiretapping	and	microphone	surveillance	powers.42	
Hoover	also	turned	seventy	in	1965,	the	FBI’s	mandatory	retirement	age,	but	President	
Johnson	passed	an	executive	order	allowing	him	to	stay	on	as	Director.43	In	an	effort	to	
safeguard	the	FBI’s	institutional	autonomy	growing	political	dissent	and	public	scrutiny	
of	his	age,	between	1965	and	1967	Hoover	restricted	the	Bureau’s	use	of	break-ins,	
mail-opening,	warrantless	wiretapping,	and	teenaged	informants.44	After	1965,	the	FBI	
also	cut	back	its	surveillance	and	counterintelligence	operations	against	Martin	Luther	
King	and	other	civil	rights	leaders,	whom	the	Bureau	had	targeted	in	conjunction	with	
its	war	on	Communists.45	
	 Hoover	did	not	restrict	all	of	the	FBI’s	illegal	operations	during	the	Johnson	
administration,	however.	In	efforts	to	meet	the	Johnson	administration’s	repeated	
demands	that	the	FBI	prevent	violence,	the	Director	established	new	top-secret	
counterintelligence	programs.	The	first	one,	code-named	COINTELPRO-White	Hate	
Groups,	targeted	violent	rightwing	organizations,	particularly	the	Ku	Klux	Klan.	For	
decades	Hoover	had	tacitly	supported	Klan	violence.	A	conservative	supporter	of	“states	
rights”	who	had	come	of	age	as	a	white	man	in	segregated	Washington	D.C.,	Hoover	
considering	the	Klan	a	problem	to	be	solved	by	local	authorities—the	very	same	
Southern	white	leaders	who	maintained	the	racist	Jim	Crow	regime	with	the	aid	of	the	
vigilante	organization’s	violence.	When	the	June	1964	disappearance	of	three	young	
																																																								
42	Theoharis,	Spying	on	Americans,	17.	
43	According	to	one	of	Hoover’s	biographers,	Johnson	did	this	because	Hoover	had	ingratiated	himself	to	
the	president	after	John	F.	Kennedy’s	death,	and	LBJ	sought	the	FBI	Director’s	alliance	in	a	power	struggle	
with	Attorney	General	Robert	F.	Kennedy.	See	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power,	392.	
44	Theoharis,	Spying	on	Americans,	18.	
45	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	180.	
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civil	rights	workers	in	Neshoba	County,	Mississippi	prompted	international	outcry,	
however,	Johnson	demanded	that	Hoover	take	swift	action	to	take	down	the	Klan.	
Flooding	the	organization	with	paid	informants,	and	utilizing	covert	tactics	similar	to	
those	employed	against	the	Communist	Party,	the	FBI	succeeded	within	five	years	in	
destroying	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	as	a	functional	national	organization.46		
	 Towards	the	end	of	Johnson’s	term,	Hoover	established	counterintelligence	
programs	targeting	the	Black	Power	and	student	antiwar	movements.	Though	more	
research	on	these	programs	is	needed,	critical	review	of	key	documents	reveals	that	the	
Director	established	both	of	these	COINTELPROs	in	response	to	violent	civil	disorder,	a	
problem	Johnson	implored	Hoover	to	crack	down	on	throughout	his	presidency.	After	
the	Newark	and	Detroit	riots	of	1967,	the	FBI	established	COINTELPRO-Black	
Nationalist-Hate	Groups,	designed	to	“to	expose,	disrupt,	misdirect,	discredit,	or	
otherwise	neutralize”	Black	freedom	organizations	who	allegedly	threatened	America’s	
“internal	security”	due	to	their	“propensity	for	violence	and	civil	disorder.”47	The	
founding	memo	for	COINTELPRO-BNHG	inaccurately	characterized	a	wide	spectrum	of	
African	American	groups	as	“black	nationalist,	hate-type	organizations,”	including	
Martin	Luther	King	Jr.’s	nonviolent	Southern	Christian	Leadership	Conference	(SCLC),	
Elijah	Muhammad’s	separatist	Nation	of	Islam	(NOI),	and	a	number	of	groups	
advocating	philosophies	of	Black	Power	and	armed	self-defense:	the	Student	Nonviolent	
Coordinating	Committee	(SNCC),	Congress	for	Racial	Equality	(CORE),	Revolutionary	
Action	Movement	(RAM),	and	Deacons	for	Defense	and	Justice.	Prior	to	Nixon’s	election,	
																																																								
46	O’Reilly,	“Racial	Matters,”	199,	225-226.	
47	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SAC	Albany,	“Counterintelligence	Program,	Black	Nationalist	–	Hate	Groups,	
Internal	Security,”	August	25,	1967,	1-2,	FBI	Vault	online	archive,	COINTELPRO-Black	Extremist	Files	
(hereafter	COINTELPRO-Black	Extremist),	Section	1.	
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however,	the	program	focused	primarily	on	SNCC,	whose	leaders	Stokely	Carmichael	
and	H.	Rap	Brown	had	become	the	Black	Power	movement’s	most	visible	spokesmen	
and	critics	of	nonviolence.48	Violence	prevention	also	informed	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	
against	SDS	and	the	student	antiwar	movement.	Hoover	authorized	COINTELPRO-New	
Left	in	April	1968,	after	a	disruptive	weeklong	student	strike	at	Columbia	University	
gained	international	media	coverage,	including	images	of	university	administrators’	
offices	ransacked	by	student	protesters.	Officials	in	the	FBI’s	Domestic	Security	Division	
explained	that	the	objective	of	the	new	COINTELPRO	was	to	“expose,	disrupt,	or	
otherwise	neutralize”	the	vaguely	defined	“New	Left.”	The	program	focused	on	SDS,	
seeking	to	prevent	its	members	from	engaging	in	“violent	and	illegal	activities,”	though	
agents	were	concerned	about	the	group’s	“subversive”	potential	as	well.49	In	the	cases	
of	both	COINTELPRO-BNHG	and	COINTELPRO-New	Left,	the	FBI	sought	to	prevent	
disruptive	civil	disturbances	by	“neutralizing”	leftist	radicals	and	organizations	whose	
members	promoted	militant	protest	tactics	and	violent	revolution.		
	 Though	officials’	biases	alone	do	not	explain	the	FBI’s	domestic	security	
operations	during	the	Nixon	administration,	the	Bureau’s	war	on	the	Black	Power	
movement	and	student	New	Left	was	certainly	political.	The	FBI	targeted	insurgent	
violence	while	overlooking	or	even	encouraging	state	violence.	In	both	the	1967	riots	
and	the	1968	Columbia	University	student	strike,	for	example,	police	engaged	in	far	
more	violence	than	did	protesters;	during	the	Detroit	riots,	police	and	National	
																																																								
48	For	more	on	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	operations	against	SNCC,	see	Clayborne	Carson,	“White	
Repression,”	Chapter	16	in	In	Struggle.	
49	FBI	memo,	C.	D.	Brennan	to	W.	C.	Sullivan,	“Counterintelligence	Program,	Internal	Security,	Disruption	
of	the	New	Left,”	May	9,	1968;	FBI	memo,	Director	to	SAC	Albany,	“Counterintelligence	Program,	Internal	
Security,	Disruption	of	the	New	Left,”	May	10,	1968,	FBI	COINTELPRO-New	Left	Files,	Headquarters	file,	
Number	1,	FBI	Vault	online	archive.	
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Guardsmen	were	responsible	for	the	deaths	of	at	least	twenty-seven	people	(most	of	
them	African	American),	and	in	New	York	police	brutally	beat	student	occupiers	while	
clearing	out	Columbia’s	administrative	buildings.50	Yet	throughout	the	1960s,	indeed,	
throughout	his	forty-eight-year	career	as	FBI	Director,	Hoover	disregarded	the	problem	
of	police	violence,	dismissing	African	Americans’	and	student	protesters’	complaints	of	
police	brutality	as	“wild	charges”	or	“false	allegations”	lodged	to	justify	violent	criminal	
activity.51	African	American	Chicago	policeman	Howard	Saffold	observed	that	Hoover’s	
stance	communicated	to	local	police	that	“it	was	open	season”;	officers	would	not	“have	
to	worry	about	the	law”	when	inflicting	violence	upon	blacks	and	political	radicals.52	
And,	of	course,	the	FBI	did	nothing	to	prosecute	American	leaders	who	violated	
international	law	by	waging	a	war	of	aggression	in	Vietnam.	On	the	contrary,	FBI	
officials	saw	SDS’s	attempts	to	disrupt	the	U.S.	war	effort	as	one	of	the	reasons	the	
organization	needed	to	be	“neutralized.”53	The	FBI	helped	uphold	a	consensus	among	
America’s	political	leadership	and	much	of	its	population,	who	in	the	words	of	war	
correspondent	Gloria	Emerson,	perceived	U.S.	state	violence	in	Vietnam	as	“normal—
war	normal.”54			
	 Nixon,	meanwhile,	did	not	understand	the	scope	of	the	FBI’s	secret	domestic	
security	operations.	The	new	president	knew	of	Hoover’s	longstanding	commitment	to	
fighting	Communist	“subversion.”	Indeed,	Nixon	had	first	risen	to	national	prominence	
																																																								
50	On	the	Detroit	violence,	see	Kerner	Report,	107.	On	the	police	attacks	on	Columbia’s	students	
protesters,	see	Davis,	Assault	on	the	Left,	41.	
51	New	York	Times,	“Text	of	F.B.I.	Report	to	President	on	Summer	Riots	in	9	Cities	Over	Country,”	
September	27,	1964,	82;	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	25.	
52	Howard	Saffold	quoted	in	A	Nation	of	Law?	1968-1971:	Eyes	on	the	Prize,	America’s	Civil	Rights	
Movement	1954-1985,	directed	by	Henry	Hampton,	Films	Media	Group,	1994.	
53	FBI	memo,	C.	D.	Brennan	to	W.	C.	Sullivan,	May	9,	1968.	
54	Emerson,	Winners	&	Losers,	314.	
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in	1948,	with	the	FBI	Director’s	assistance,	by	leading	the	House	Un-American	Activities	
Committee’s	investigation	of	accused	Soviet	spy	Alger	Hiss.	Nixon	was	also	well	aware	
of	the	incredible	power	Hoover	wielded	as	gatekeeper	of	the	FBI’s	vast	catalog	of	
information	on	thousands	of	Americans,	including	the	personal	secrets	of	U.S.	political	
leaders.	Shortly	before	Nixon	took	office,	outgoing	President	Johnson	advised	him	that	
Hoover	was	“a	pillar	of	strength	in	a	city	of	weak	men.”	“You	will	rely	on	him	time	and	
time	again	to	maintain	security,”	Johnson	said;	“He’s	the	only	one	you	can	put	your	
complete	trust	in.”55	But	Nixon	was	not	privy	to	the	changes	Hoover	had	implemented	
during	the	Johnson	administration,	changes	that	even	LBJ	did	not	completely	
comprehend—the	expansion	of	domestic	security	priorities	to	include	violence	
prevention	in	addition	to	countersubversion,	the	restrictions	on	illegal	surveillance	
practices,	and	the	secret	counterintelligence	programs	against	the	Black	Power	
movement	and	New	Left.	Upon	taking	office,	President	Nixon	expected	his	old	friend	
Hoover	to	faithfully	execute	his	administration’s	domestic	security	agenda.	The	
Director,	however,	was	determined	to	do	things	his	own	way,	balancing	the	President’s	
demands	with	his	personal	efforts	to	safeguard	the	FBI’s	image,	autonomy,	and	
historical	legacy.	
	 One	of	Nixon’s	concerns,	informed	by	his	anticommunist	paranoia,	was	that	
foreign	Communist	regimes	like	the	USSR,	China,	and	Cuba	were	secretly	calling	the	
shots	behind	the	scenes	of	the	United	States’	Black	Power	and	antiwar	movements.	He	
inherited	several	surveillance-reporting	programs	designed	to	inform	him	of	such	
activity.	The	FBI,	for	example,	issued	regular	reports	to	the	White	House	on	the	
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activities	of	dissident	political	organizations	and	leaders,	and	on	Congress	members’	
and	congressional	staffers’	contacts	with	foreign	embassies.	The	Internal	Revenue	
Service	(IRS)	also	provided	reports	on	tax	investigations	of	select	American	activists,	
while	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA)	reported	on	antiwar	and	civil	rights	
activists’	foreign	contacts,	and	the	National	Security	Agency	provided	information	
gleaned	from	domestic	dissidents’	international	telecommunications.56	The	President	
and	his	staff	were	not	satisfied	with	the	quality	of	this	surveillance,	however.	Nixon’s	
counsel	John	Ehrlichman	was	especially	dissatisfied	with	the	FBI’s	surveillance	reports.	
“In	general	the	FBI	investigative	work	I	saw	was	of	poor	quality,”	he	complained.57	
Indeed,	while	Nixon	was	a	longtime	friend	of	Hoover	from	their	time	working	together	
on	the	Hiss	case,	and	felt	compelled	to	keep	him	employed	as	FBI	Director,	Ehrlichman	
and	other	Cabinet	members	resented	the	aging	bureaucrat’s	power	and	political	
autonomy,	and	wished	to	see	him	replaced.58	Nonetheless,	in	April	1969,	at	Nixon’s	
request,	Ehrlichman	ordered	the	FBI	and	other	U.S.	intelligence	agencies	to	produce	
evidence	tying	domestic	dissidents	to	foreign	Communist	governments.59		
	 Nixon’s	Justice	Department,	like	Johnson’s,	also	pressured	Hoover’s	FBI	to	
thwart	insurgent	violence	through	the	use	of	preventative	intelligence.	Immediately	
upon	taking	office,	Attorney	General	Mitchell	strengthened	the	Department’s	
Interdivisional	Information	Unit	(IDIU),	which	Attorney	General	Clark	had	established	
in	order	to	coordinate	intelligence	from	the	FBI	and	other	agencies	with	the	aim	of	
																																																								
56	Theoharis,	Spying	on	Americans,	15.	
57	John	Ehrlichman,	Witness	to	Power:	The	Nixon	Years	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster,	1982),	159.	
58	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power,	443.	
59	Theoharis,	Spying	on	Americans,	16.	
	 	 	63	
obtaining	advance	warning	of	urban	riots.60	Mitchell	expanded	the	unit’s	mission	to	
encompass	forecasting	campus	antiwar	demonstrations.	Writing	on	behalf	of	the	IDIU,	
Assistant	Attorney	General	J.	Walter	Yeagley	instructed	Hoover	on	February	18,	1969	
“to	determine	whether	there	is	any	underlying	subversive	group	giving	illegal	
directions	and	guidance	to	the	numerous	campus	disorders	throughout	the	country.”	A	
few	weeks	later,	on	March	3,	Yeagley	asked	the	FBI	to	furnish	“the	names	of	any	
individuals	who	appear	at	more	than	one	campus	either	before,	during,	or	after	any	
active	disorder	or	riot	and	the	identities	of	those	persons	from	outside	the	campus	who	
might	be	instigators	of	these	incidents.”61	
	 In	addition,	Nixon	enlisted	the	FBI’s	assistance	in	investigating	a	series	of	leaks	
that	exposed	his	administration’s	secret	war	efforts	in	Indochina.	On	May	9,	1969,	the	
New	York	Times	published	a	front-page	story	announcing	that	the	United	States	had	
secretly	expanded	its	aerial	bombing	efforts	from	Vietnam	to	Cambodia,	a	move	that	
directly	contradicted	Nixon’s	campaign	promise	to	end	the	war	in	Indochina.	The	article	
claimed	its	information	came	from	anonymous	“Nixon	Administration	sources.”62	This	
was	the	most	serious	of	the	more	than	a	dozen	leaks	Nixon	faced	during	his	first	year	in	
office.63	At	the	requests	of	Secretary	of	State	Henry	Kissinger,	Attorney	General	Mitchell,	
and	White	House	Chief	of	Staff	H.	R.	Haldeman,	the	FBI	subsequently	established	
seventeen	warrantless	wiretaps	in	hopes	of	finding	the	leakers,	targeting	the	phones	of	
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National	Security	Council	staffers,	news	journalists,	and	personnel	in	the	White	House,	
Department	of	Defense,	State	Department,	and	Justice	Department.64	These	illegal	
wiretaps	would	later	become	known	as	the	“Kissinger	wiretaps”	after	their	existence	
became	known	during	the	Watergate	hearings.	
	 Hoover,	however,	did	not	passively	comply	with	the	Nixon	administration’s	
requests	for	expanded	domestic	surveillance.	Although	he	agreed	with	Nixon	that	
revolutionary	bombings,	disruptive	protests,	and	leaks	of	classified	state	secrets	posed	
serious	threats	to	the	United	States’	national	security,	Hoover	remained	reluctant	to	
authorize	illegal	FBI	operations.	The	seventy-four-year-old	longtime	FBI	Director	
continued	to	worry	that	amid	the	United	States’	tumultuous	political	climate,	public	
discovery	of	FBI	involvement	in	such	tactics	would	undermine	the	Bureau’s	upstanding	
reputation	and	lead	to	calls	for	government	oversight	and	reform.		
	 Accordingly,	Hoover	resisted	the	Nixon	administration’s	demands,	and	complied	
with	surveillance	requests	only	when	he	could	ensure	that	in	the	case	of	public	
exposure,	the	White	House,	rather	than	the	FBI,	would	be	held	responsible	for	
authorizing	the	measures.	For	instance,	Hoover	rejected	Assistant	Attorney	General	
Yeagley’s	March	1969	request	for	expanded	FBI	surveillance	of	American	university	
campus	radicals.	Though	he	instructed	his	field	offices	to	maintain	“student	informant	
coverage,”	Hoover	insisted	that	“additional	student	informants	cannot	be	developed.”65	
Hoover	also	sought	to	protect	the	FBI	by	acquiring	White	House	approval	for	the	
seventeen	Kissinger	wiretaps.	Though	Nixon	wanted	no	written	record	of	the	wiretaps,	
Hoover	maintained	logs	of	the	secret	recordings,	and	obtained	Attorney	General	
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Mitchell’s	written	authorization	for	the	operations.	The	Director	kept	these	records	
hidden	outside	of	the	FBI’s	normal	filing	system,	storing	them	within	the	top-secret	
“Official	and	Confidential”	files	he	kept	inside	his	personal	inner	office.66	Meanwhile,	the	
FBI’s	reports	to	the	Nixon	administration	consistently	demonstrated	that	New	Left	and	
Black	Power	radicalism	grew	largely	from	domestic	conditions;	there	was	little	
evidence,	if	any,	that	America’s	new	generation	of	leftists	was	directly	supported	by	
foreign	Communist	governments.67	Unbeknownst	to	Nixon,	Hoover	also	continued	to	
authorize	the	FBI’s	COINTELPROs	against	the	dwindling	Communist	Party,	the	Socialist	
Workers	Party,	the	Ku	Klux	Klan,	the	Black	Power	movement,	and	the	New	Left.	Hoover	
was	serious	about	defending	the	nation’s	status	quo	from	foreign	and	domestic	
revolutionary	movements,	even	if	the	threats	posed	by	such	movements	were	remote	
and	the	FBI’s	actions	violated	law-abiding	Americans’	civil	liberties.	But	he	was	
determined	to	go	about	this	on	his	own	terms,	regardless	of	who	was	in	control	of	the	
White	House.	
	
“Cult	of	the	Gun”	
While	Richard	Nixon	and	FBI	officials	worried	about	the	growing	rate	of	revolutionary	
bombings,	American	leftists	feared	the	rise	of	Nixon.	Most	leftists	correctly	recognized	
Nixon’s	pledge	to	achieve	an	“honorable	victory”	in	Vietnam	through	an	unspecified	
“secret	plan”	to	end	the	war	as	a	subterfuge	designed	to	conceal	his	plans	for	an	
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escalation	in	U.S.	hostilities.68	Moreover,	to	many	on	the	U.S.	left,	Nixon’s	election	on	a	
“law-and-order”	platform—one	that	scapegoated	rioters,	protesters,	and	political	
radicals	as	the	main	source	of	the	country’s	problems—portended	the	rise	of	fascism	in	
the	United	States.	This	analysis	was	not	accurate.	It	is	true	that	Nixon	escalated	the	war,	
that	police	violence	continued	unabated,	and	that	leftist	movements	had	yet	to	change	
these	problems.	But	the	United	States	was	not	a	dictatorship.	Nonetheless,	with	options	
for	achieving	social	change	through	the	normal	channels	of	the	U.S.	political	system	
seeming	increasingly	limited,	some	American	radicals	looked	to	import	revolutionary	
guerrilla	war	strategies	from	Asia,	Africa,	and	Latin	America.	The	most	vocal	
proponents	of	guerrilla	warfare	came	from	the	ranks	of	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	
SDS.	Influential	factions	within	each	organization	embraced	Ché	Guevara’s	foco	theory	
of	guerrilla	warfare	as	a	strategy	for	achieving	socialist	revolution	in	the	United	States.	
Ultra-leftists’	increasing	militancy,	in	turn,	enflamed	tension	with	police	and	heightened	
factionalism	within	the	left,	which	the	FBI	eagerly	sought	to	exacerbate	through	its	
counterintelligence	programs.	
	 Insurgent	violence	was	nothing	new	to	U.S.	history.	From	Indian	wars	and	slave	
revolts	since	the	seventeenth	century	to	anarchist	bombings	and	other	forms	of	labor	
revolt	during	the	Gilded	Age	and	Progressive	Era,	America’s	oppressed	had	periodically	
taken	up	arms	to	resist	colonialism,	slavery,	economic	exploitation,	and	other	forms	of	
violence	sanctioned	or	carried	out	by	the	state.	After	World	War	II,	however,	worldwide	
anticolonial	movements	inspired	a	new	form	of	insurgent	violence	in	the	United	States,	
as	revolutionary	regimes	in	countries	such	as	China,	Cuba,	Algeria,	and	Tanzania	
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endeavored	to	build	socialist	societies,	and	as	armed	national	liberation	struggles	
against	U.S.-backed	dictatorships	and	allied	European	colonial	powers	raged	
throughout	Africa,	Latin	America,	and	Southeast	Asia.	In	this	context,	a	handful	of	
influential	African	American	leaders	began	to	question	the	civil	rights	movement’s	
strategy	of	nonviolent	direct	action	and	promote	revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare	in	the	
United	States.	African	American	and	Third	World	revolutionaries’	ideas	on	guerrilla	
warfare,	developed	amidst	the	global	uprisings	of	the	mid-1960s,	would	later	inform	
militant	Black	Panther	and	SDS	responses	to	the	Nixon	administration.	
	 The	black	freedom	struggle’s	most	visible	critic	of	nonviolence	was	Malcolm	X.	
Born	in	Malcolm	Little	in	Omaha,	Nebraska	in	1925,	Malcolm	X	gained	prominence	
during	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s	as	a	spokesperson	for	the	Nation	of	Islam	(NOI),	
the	black	separatist	religious	sect	led	by	Elijah	Muhammad.	In	1964,	amid	a	fallout	with	
Muhammad	and	his	growing	interest	in	Black	Nationalism	and	Pan-African	socialism,	
Malcolm	X	parted	NOI	to	found	the	Organization	for	Afro-American	Unity.69	Malcolm	X	
spoke	before	audiences	throughout	the	United	States,	critiquing	nonviolence	on	both	
moral	and	practical	grounds.	He	affirmed	African	Americans’	right	to	self-defense,	
calling	upon	blacks	to	form	rifle	clubs	to	protect	themselves	from	racist	white	
vigilantes,	while	presciently	warning	that	growing	numbers	of	black	youth	would	
embrace	armed	revolt	if	denied	the	opportunity	to	gain	self-determination	for	their	
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communities	through	the	electoral	process.	“Just	as	guerrilla	warfare	is	prevailing	in	
Asia	and	in	parts	of	Africa	and	in	parts	of	Latin	America,”	he	declared	before	a	Cleveland	
audience	on	April	3,	1964,	“you’ve	got	to	be	mighty	naïve,	or	you’ve	got	to	play	the	black	
man	cheap,	if	you	don’t	think	that	some	day	he’s	going	to	wake	up	and	find	that	it’s	got	
to	be	the	ballot	or	the	bullet.”70	Malcolm	X	again	predicted	the	coming	of	guerrilla	
warfare	to	America	six	days	later	in	New	York.	Referring	to	a	recent	incident	in	which	
black	youth	in	Jacksonville,	Florida	fought	police	with	homemade	gasoline	bombs,	
Malcolm	X	observed,	“There’s	a	new	strategy	coming	in.	It’ll	be	Molotov	cocktails	this	
month,	hand	grenades	next	month,	and	something	else	the	next	month.”71	“You	should	
not	feel	that	I	am	inciting	someone	to	violence,”	he	explained.	“I’m	only	warning	of	a	
powder	keg	situation.”72	
	 While	Malcolm	X	prophesized	about	guerrilla	warfare,	a	lesser-known	militant	
named	Robert	F.	Williams	directly	called	upon	African	Americans	to	adopt	the	tactic.	As	
leader	of	the	Monroe,	North	Carolina	chapter	of	the	National	Association	for	the	
Advancement	of	Colored	People	(NAACP),	Williams	gained	international	notoriety	as	an	
advocate	for	armed	self-defense	after	his	group	employed	gunfire	to	fend	off	an	attack	
by	local	Klansmen	in	October	1957.73	Later,	as	a	political	exile	in	Cuba	and	China,	where	
he	fled	to	escape	an	FBI	manhunt	predicated	upon	false	kidnapping	charges,	Williams	
gained	attention	as	an	apostle	of	armed	revolution.	In	the	spring	1964	issue	of	his	
newsletter,	The	Crusader,	Williams	published	an	article	entitled	“The	USA:	The	Potential	
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of	a	Minority	Revolution,”	in	which	he	insisted	that	nonviolence	was	ineffective,	and	
asserted	that	black	Americans	“must	prepare	to	wage	an	urban	guerrilla	war	of	self-
defense.”74	He	called	upon	“Afroamerican	freedom	fighters”	to	learn	the	art	of	building	
Molotov	cocktails,	homemade	acid	bombs,	and	booby	traps	for	use	against	racist	
police,”	and	to	clandestinely	purchase	“hand	grenades,	bazookas,	light	mortars,	rocket	
launchers,	machine	guns	and	ammunition”	from	American	servicemen.75	
	 Williams’	outlook	differed	from	that	of	Malcolm	X,	who	prior	to	his	death	at	the	
hands	of	NOI	gunmen	on	February	21,	1965,	maintained	openness	to	the	possibility	that	
African	Americans	could	gain	self-determination	for	their	communities	by	voting	black	
political	leaders	into	office.76	Chased	into	exile	by	the	Ku	Klux	Klan,	North	Carolina	
police,	and	the	FBI,	Williams	believed	that	America’s	racist	whites	were	responding	to	
the	civil	rights	movement	with	an	organized	effort	to	physically	exterminate	black	
people.	“The	fascist	elements	are	arming,”	he	argued,	“not	to	liberate	our	brutally	
oppressed	people,	but	to	liquidate	us.”77	In	Williams’	view,	the	rise	of	American	fascism	
precluded	the	possibility	of	African	American	electoral	organizing	and	necessitated	
guerrilla	warfare.	“What	is	integration,”	he	asked,	“when	the	law	says	yes	and	the	police	
and	howling	mob	say	no?	Our	only	logical	and	successful	answer	is	to	meet	organized	
and	massive	violence	with	organized	and	massive	violence.”78	Williams	argued	that	
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African	American	guerrilla	violence	was	a	form	of	self-defense	because	its	aim	was	to	
eliminate	“the	source	of	evil	and	terror.”79	
	 During	the	middle	and	late	1960s	several	African	American	political	
organizations	inspired	by	Malcolm	X	and	Robert	F.	Williams	sought	to	channel	urban	
black	rage	into	a	national	movement.	These	included	the	semi-clandestine	
Revolutionary	Action	Movement	(RAM)	and	SNCC,	whose	leaders	Stokely	Carmichael	
and	H.	Rap	Brown	became	outspoken	critics	of	nonviolence	and	advocates	of	Black	
Power	at	the	same	time	that	their	organization	began	to	crumble	amidst	internal	
conflict.80	By	the	time	Nixon	won	the	November	1968	presidential	election,	however,	
leaders	of	the	Black	Panther	Party	had	become	the	most	visible	African	American	
proponents	of	revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare	in	the	United	States.		
	 Merritt	College	students	Huey	P.	Newton	and	Bobby	Seale	founded	the	Black	
Panther	Party	in	Oakland	in	1966.	Frustrated	with	pervasive	police	brutality	in	their	
community,	Newton,	Seale,	and	their	recruits	dedicated	much	of	their	initial	energy	
towards	patrolling	the	Oakland	police.	When	police	stopped	African	American	
motorists,	Black	Panthers	would	emerge	on	the	scene	displaying	loaded	guns	and	law	
books,	stating	their	intent	to	lawfully	observe	police	behavior	and	ensure	that	the	
officers	were	not	violating	the	rights	of	community	members.81	Newton	and	Seale	also	
drafted	the	group’s	influential	“Ten	Point	Program,”	an	ideological	hybrid	of	Black	
Nationalism,	Third	World	Marxism,	and	social	democratic	liberalism	that	called	for	full	
employment,	public	housing,	culturally	relevant	education,	reparations,	an	end	to	police	
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brutality,	freedom	for	black	prisoners,	and	black	men’s	exemption	from	U.S.	military	
service.82	The	Black	Panthers	became	a	national	sensation	after	staging	a	dramatic	
armed	protest	at	California’s	State	House.	On	May	2	1967,	thirty	Black	Panthers,	armed	
with	rifles	and	decked	out	in	black	berets	and	leather	jackets,	stormed	the	state	capitol	
to	protest	the	Mulford	Act,	a	new	gun	control	bill	outlawing	public	display	of	firearms	
that	lawmakers	had	intentionally	drafted	to	outlaw	the	Panthers’	police	patrols.	As	the	
Panthers	hoped,	the	specter	of	young	black	men	with	guns	attracted	widespread	
television	coverage	and	interest	in	their	organization.83	
	 The	Black	Panthers’	confrontations	with	police	entered	a	new	phase	after	
October	27,	1967,	when	Oakland	police	arrested	Huey	Newton	at	a	traffic	stop	following	
a	shootout	that	left	Officer	John	Frey	dead	and	Newton	and	another	officer	wounded.	
The	arrest	turned	Newton	into	a	leftist	cause	célèbre,	as	mass	media	attention	on	his	
case	and	efforts	to	battle	murder	charges	and	the	death	penalty	buoyed	national	
interest	in	the	Panthers.84	Newton’s	imprisonment	also	created	an	opening	in	the	
Party’s	leadership,	into	which	stepped	Eldridge	Cleaver.	An	ex-convict	in	the	California	
prison	system	whose	bestselling	memoir	Soul	on	Ice	(1968)	became	notorious	for	its	
assertion	that	raping	white	women	was	an	“insurrectionary	act,”	Cleaver	had	gained	
prominence	in	Bay	Area	radical	circles	after	taking	a	position	as	a	writer	for	Ramparts,	a	
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magazine	published	by	white	New	Leftists.85	As	the	Black	Panthers’	Minister	of	
Communication,	Cleaver	edited	and	expanded	production	of	the	Black	Panther	
newspaper	and	led	the	“Free	Huey”	campaign.	He	also	became	well	known	for	his	vocal	
calls	for	urban	guerrilla	warfare,	assassination	of	police	officers,	and	other	violence,	
threatening	to	burn	down	the	White	House	on	one	occasion	and	to	beat	Governor	
Ronald	Reagan	(“the	punk”)	to	death	with	a	marshmallow	on	another.86		
	 Militant	rhetoric	was	not	confined	to	Cleaver.	A	popular	Panther	slogan,	often	
chanted	as	members	of	the	group	marched	in	military	formation,	was	a	call-and-
response:	“Revolution	has	come!	Off	the	pigs!	Time	to	pick	up	the	gun!	Off	the	pigs!”	In	
Sixties	street	slang,	“off”	meant	kill	and	“pigs”	referred	to	the	police	and	anyone	whom	
ultra-left	militants	believed	to	be	collaborating	with	them.87	Huey	Newton	had	
intentionally	directed	the	Panthers	to	use	the	term	“pigs”	in	order	to	“stigmatize”	police,	
giving	them	a	“label	other	than	that	fear	image	they	carried	in	the	[black]	community.”88	
Meanwhile,	the	weekly	Black	Panther	newspaper	regularly	published	illustrations	of	
young	blacks	posing	with	guns	or	using	various	weapons	to	kill	police	officers	
portrayed	as	pigs.	The	paper’s	headlines	and	graphics	incited	violent	retaliation	for	
police	attacks	against	Panthers	and	African	American	communities:	“Free	Huey	or	the	
Sky’s	the	Limit”;	“Blow	Oink	Oink	Away”;	“Snipe	the	Hogs.”89	
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	 The	Black	Panthers	broadcast	violent	revolutionary	rhetoric	as	the	organization	
rapidly	expanded,	opening	offices	in	more	than	forty	cities	across	the	country	over	the	
course	of	1968	and	1969,	while	also	enduring	in	heightened	violent	conflict	with	local	
police	agencies.90	Police	in	the	Bay	Area,	Los	Angeles,	Chicago,	New	York,	and	other	
cities	regularly	harassed	Black	Panthers	and	their	supporters,	sometimes	arresting	
them	on	trumped-up	charges.	Violent	confrontations	between	police	and	Panthers	
during	1968	included:	a	February	25	Berkeley	police	raid	on	the	home	of	Bobby	Seale	
and	his	wife;	a	March	police	shooting	that	left	Black	Panther	Glen	Carter	dead;	an	April	
3	police	raid	on	a	black	Episcopal	Church	in	West	Oakland	whose	pastor	loaned	the	
Panthers	space	for	community	meetings;	an	April	6	shootout	at	a	West	Oakland	house	
that	resulted	in	the	death	of	Black	Panther	Bobby	Hutton	and	the	wounding	of	Eldridge	
Cleaver	and	two	officers;	the	August	1	police	beating	of	New	York	Panther	Gordon	
Cooke;	an	August	5	gunfight	at	a	traffic	stop	in	Los	Angeles	that	ended	with	the	deaths	
of	three	Panthers	and	the	wounding	of	two	police	officers;	the	shooting	up	of	the	
storefront	windows	at	the	Oakland	Panther	headquarters	by	two	on-duty	cops;	and	the	
October	15	police	shooting	death	of	Seattle	Panther	Welton	Armstead.91		
	 The	Panthers	publicly	portrayed	most	of	these	incidents	as	unprovoked	police	
attacks.	In	many	cases,	however,	the	Panthers	antagonized	police	with	confrontational	
rhetoric	or	open	displays	of	firearms—activities	that	were	legal,	and	responses	to	past	
experiences	with	state	violence,	but	nonetheless	prompted	violent	police	reactions.	
Moreover,	as	historian	Jama	Lazerow,	has	pointed	out,	with	many	of	BPP’s	recruits	
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drawn	from	the	urban	underclass	whom	Party	leaders	sought	to	politicize,	there	was	
often	a	“porous	boundary”	between	some	members’	criminal	and	political	activity.92	At	
least	one	of	these	deadly	incidents	came	about	a	result	of	a	Panther	attempt	at	anti-
police	violence.	The	April	6	firefight	in	West	Oakland	that	resulted	in	the	police	killing	of	
Bobby	Hutton	erupted	after	Eldridge	Cleaver	bungled	an	attempt	to	ambush	a	group	of	
police	officers.	By	putting	his	advocacy	of	guerrilla	warfare	into	practice,	Cleaver	had	
hoped	to	establish	the	Black	Panther	Party’s	position	as	the	“vanguard”	of	America’s	
coming	revolution	amid	the	nationwide	urban	riots	that	had	erupted	following	Martin	
Luther	King’s	assassination	two	days	earlier.93	In	November	1968,	Cleaver	fled	the	
country	after	jumping	bail	on	murder	changes.	He	made	his	way	to	Cuba	before	
surfacing	in	Algeria	in	July	1969,	where	his	wife	Elaine	Cleaver	and	several	other	
Panthers	joined	him	in	establishing	the	Black	Panther	Party’s	“International	Section”	
headquartered	in	a	downtown	Algiers	“Panther	Embassy”	provided	by	the	country’s	
socialist	government.94		
	 In	the	years	leading	up	to	Nixon’s	election,	a	large	portion	of	SDS	had	also	come	
to	philosophically	embrace	revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare.	This	was	a	far	cry	from	the	
principles	outlined	in	the	group’s	foundational	1962	Port	Huron	Statement.	Drafted	by	
Tom	Hayden	and	inspired	by	the	nonviolent	civil	rights	movement,	the	Port	Huron	
Statement	had	laid	out	an	idealistic	vision	for	“participatory	democracy,”	in	which	
Americans	of	all	races	would	contribute	equally	and	directly	in	the	political	processes	
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and	Yohuru	Williams,	In	Search	of	the	Black	Panther	Party:	New	Perspectives	on	a	Revolutionary	Movement	
(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006),	134.	On	the	need	for	further	exploration	of	this	concept	in	Black	
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that	governed	the	nation	and	their	everyday	lives.95	During	the	mid-1960s,	SDS	
chapters	organized	civil	rights	campaigns	in	solidarity	with	SNCC	and	the	civil	rights	
movement,	a	series	of	grassroots	Economic	Research	and	Action	Project	social	justice	
initiatives	in	Midwestern	cities,	and	several	large	demonstrations	against	the	U.S.	war	in	
Vietnam.96	By	1966,	however,	amid	President	Johnson’s	escalation	of	the	war	and	
ongoing	police	attacks	on	protesters,	SDS	had	joined	the	larger	antiwar	movement	in	
moving,	in	organizer	Greg	Calvert’s	words,	“from	protest	to	resistance.”97	To	most	
antiwar	activists,	resistance	meant	draft	refusal	or	other	forms	of	nonviolent	direct	
action.	But	in	the	fall	of	1967,	antiwar	militants	in	Berkeley	and	New	York	resisted	
police	batons	and	teargas	grenades	with	helmets,	shields,	sticks,	bottles,	and	rocks.98	
Such	tactics	expanded	during	1968,	as	groups	of	participants	in	the	Columbia	University	
student	strike,	protests	outside	Chicago’s	Democratic	National	Convention,	and	other	
mass	demonstrations	incorporated	vandalism	and	street	fighting	into	their	protest	
repertoires,	and	as	SDS	membership	surged	from	approximately	five	thousand	in	1965	
into	the	tens	of	thousands.	Militant	protests	in	the	United	States	were	part	of	the	much	
larger	global	uprising	of	1968.	The	year’s	rebellions	began	when	Vietnamese	
Communist	guerrillas	carried	out	a	devastating	nationwide	ground	attack	on	U.S.	and	
South	Vietnamese	forces	during	the	January	“Tet	Offensive,”	and	continued	with	youth-
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led	revolts	on	both	sides	of	the	Cold	War’s	“Iron	Curtain,”	from	France,	West	Germany,	
and	Czechoslovakia	to	Mexico,	China,	and	Japan.99		
	 American	leftist	militants	championed	guerrilla	warfare	not	only	in	response	to	
U.S.	state	violence,	but	also	as	part	of	a	global	trend	in	the	revolutionary	left.	Guerrilla	
warfare	became	increasingly	popular	among	revolutionaries	throughout	the	world	
following	the	January	1966	First	Solidarity	Conference	of	the	Peoples	of	Africa,	Asia,	
and	Latin	America	(popularly	known	as	the	Tricontinental	Conference)	in	Havana,	
Cuba.	As	historian	Vijay	Prashad	explained,	the	Tricontinental	Conference	inaugurated	
a	period	in	which	growing	sectors	of	the	international	left	embraced	the	“cult	of	the	
gun,”	reviving	armed	struggle	“not	only	as	a	tactic	of	anticolonialism	but	significantly	as	
a	strategy	in	itself.”100	The	Tricontinental	Conference	was	one	in	a	series	of	meetings	of	
Third	World	leaders	convened	in	the	decades	following	World	War	II	for	the	purpose	of	
advancing	anticolonial	struggles	for	land,	peace,	and	freedom	among	the	peoples	of	
Asia,	Africa,	and	Latin	America.	Earlier	meetings	of	the	Non-Aligned	Movement	had	
emphasized	cooperative	efforts	to	promote	political	independence	and	nonviolent	
international	relations	within	the	United	Nations.101	By	1966,	however,	the	war	in	
Vietnam	had	driven	an	ideological	wedge	into	the	Third	World	movement.	While	some	
leaders	sought	to	continue	efforts	at	building	UN	institutions	while	maintaining	
peaceful	co-existence	with	the	U.S.	and	its	allies,	increasing	numbers	of	revolutionaries	
drew	inspiration	from	the	Vietnamese	people’s	success	using	guerrilla	warfare	to	bog	
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down	the	mighty	U.S.	military—since	March	1965,	the	U.S.	had	deployed	over	200,000	
troops	to	South	Vietnam	and	dropped	millions	of	tons	of	bombs	on	the	North	and	South,	
yet	had	gained	neither	new	territorial	control	nor	support	from	the	Vietnamese	people.	
Nguyen	Van	Tien	of	the	National	Liberation	Front	of	South	Vietnam	and	Tran	Danh	
Tuyen	of	the	government	of	North	Vietnam	provided	some	of	the	Tricontinental’s	most	
popular	presentations,	while	the	conference’s	host	President	Fidel	Castro	hailed	the	
Vietnamese	guerrillas’	efforts.	Guinea-Bissauan	anticolonial	leader	Amilcar	Cabral	also	
extolled	the	necessity	of	revolutionary	violence.	“We	do	not	think	we	will	shock	this	
assembly,”	he	declared,	“by	stating	that	the	only	effective	way	of	definitively	fulfilling	
the	aspirations	of	the	peoples,	that	is	to	say	of	attaining	national	liberation,	is	by	armed	
struggle.”102	
	 The	most	influential	statement	on	revolutionary	violence	to	come	out	of	the	
Tricontinental	was	from	Argentine	hero	of	the	1959	Cuban	revolution,	Ernesto	Ché	
Guevara.	Guevara	did	not	attend	the	conference,	but	he	sent	a	letter	to	the	delegates	
from	Tanzania,	where	he	had	recently	gone	into	hiding	after	retreating	from	a	failed	
mission	to	spark	revolutionary	insurgency	in	the	Congo.	In	his	“Message	to	the	
Tricontinental,”	Guevara	outlined	a	strategy	for	global	socialist	revolution	centered	on	
guerrilla	warfare.	He	argued	that	defeat	of	U.S.	imperialism	in	the	Third	World—
manifested	in	military	interventions,	economic	domination,	and	backing	of	dictators	
friendly	towards	American	business	interests—necessitated	that	“two,	three,	many	
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Vietnams	flourish	throughout	the	world	with	their	share	of	deaths	and	their	immense	
tragedies,	their	everyday	heroism	and	blows	against	imperialism,	impelled	to	disperse	
its	forces	under	the	sudden	attack	and	the	increasing	hatred	of	all	the	peoples	of	the	
world.”103	Guevara	called	upon	revolutionaries	to	pick	up	the	gun,	arguing	that	a	
proliferation	of	armed	insurgencies	across	Africa,	Asia,	and	Latin	America	would	
overextend	U.S.	military	capacities,	foment	dissent	and	class	struggle	within	the	U.S.,	
and	ultimately	result	in	the	overthrow	of	U.S.	imperialism	and	the	liberation	of	Third	
World	nations.104	
	 While	a	“people’s	army”	was	a	model	of	anti-imperialist	resistance	in	places	like	
Vietnam	and	the	Portuguese	colonies	of	Africa,	in	countries	where	a	mass	movement	
was	less	developed,	armed	struggle,	according	to	Guevara,	could	still	play	an	important	
role	in	the	form	of	the	“foco.”	French	Marxist	Regis	Debray	further	popularized	
Guevara’s	revolutionary	strategy	in	his	1967	book,	Revolution	in	the	Revolution?,	
published	the	same	year	that	he	participated	in	Guevara’s	failed	guerrilla	campaign	in	
Bolivia.	Debray,	argued	that	focos—small,	mobile	cells	of	disciplined	guerrillas—could	
quickly	strike	enemy	targets	with	spectacular	attacks	before	retreating	into	hiding,	and	
in	the	process,	recruit	and	train	other	focos	that	could	eventually	unite	as	a	people’s	
army	capable	of	bringing	about	general	insurrection	and	the	ultimate	overthrow	of	
capitalist	regimes.105		
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		 Amidst	the	global	and	domestic	turmoil	of	1968,	young	American	leftists	eagerly	
circulated	the	writings	of	Guevara	and	Debray,	often	reading	them	in	conjunction	with	
Mao	Zedong’s	Little	Red	Book,	Franz	Fanon’s	Wretched	of	the	Earth,	works	by	Vladimir	
Lenin	and	Karl	Marx,	and	Robert	F.	Williams’	writings	on	guerrilla	warfare,	which	
prescribed	a	formula	for	foco	revolution	in	the	United	States.106	Manuals	for	
manufacturing	bombs	and	other	homemade	weapons	also	made	the	rounds	through	
leftist	circles—titles	included	the	English	translation	of	the	1963	Cuban	booklet	“150	
Questions	for	a	Guerrilla,”	an	article	entitled	“Grenades	and	Bombs:	Anti-Property	and	
Anti-Personnel”	published	in	the	November	16,	1968	issue	of	the	Black	Panther	
newspaper,	and	U.S.	Army	field	guides	on	guerrilla	warfare	and	explosives	
manufacture.107	According	to	observers,	copies	of	a	bomb-making	guide	called	
“Mechanical	Methods	of	Sabotage”	“were	scooped	up	with	unabashed	enthusiasm”	at	
the	October	1968	national	SDS	convention	held	in	Boulder,	Colorado,	not	far	from	
where	Cameron	Bishop	and	his	friends	were	in	the	process	of	refining	their	skills	in	
explosives	manufacture.108	Meanwhile,	images	of	Ché	Guevara,	along	with	the	NLF	flag,	
became	fixtures	at	U.S.	antiwar	protests,	in	Black	Panther	offices,	and	on	the	walls	of	
American	college	dormitories.109	The	New	Left	newspaper	the	Berkeley	Barb	reported	
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that	entreaties	to	“kill	a	white	cop”	drew	enthusiastic	applause	at	radical	student	
gatherings.110		
	 The	“cult	of	the	gun”	had	arrived	in	the	United	States.	On	August	1,	1968,	a	
surprise	armed	attack	on	Cleveland	police	officers	by	a	group	calling	itself	the	Black	
Nationalists	of	New	Libya	resulted	in	the	deaths	of	three	cops	and	four	militants.	
Eldridge	Cleaver	praised	the	assault,	saying	it	demonstrated	“that	psychologically	
blacks	are	not	only	prepared	to	die	but	kill.”111	During	the	fall	of	1968,	New	Left	radicals	
carried	out	approximately	forty	bombings	and	arsons,	including	attacks	on	a	CIA	office	
in	Ann	Arbor	and	ROTC	facilities	at	UC	Berkeley,	University	of	Delaware,	Oregon	State	
University,	Texas	State	University,	Washington	University,	and	the	University	of	
Washington.112	The	Michigan-based	White	Panther	Party,	comprised	of	working-class	
white	radicals	who	emulated	the	Black	Panthers,	issued	a	statement	reading,	“Get	a	gun,	
brother,	and	learn	how	to	use	it.	You’ll	need	it	pretty	soon.”113	
	 Writing	from	jail	in	1968,	Black	Panther	Minister	of	Defense	Huey	Newton	
outlined	his	vision	of	developing	a	focoist	clandestine	revolutionary	guerrilla	
organization.	“When	the	people	learn	that	it	is	no	longer	advantageous	for	them	to	
resist	by	going	into	the	streets	in	large	numbers;	and	when	they	see	the	advantage	in	
the	activities	of	the	guerrilla	warfare	method,	they	will	quickly	follow	this	example,”	he	
																																																								
110	February	9-15,	1968	Berkeley	Barb	quoted	in	Jeremi	Suri,	Power	and	Protest:	Global	Revolution	and	the	
Rise	of	Détente,	2nd	ed.	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2005),	171.	
111	Perlstein,	Nixonland,	294.	
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wrote.	“When	the	vanguard	group	destroys	the	machinery	of	the	oppressor	by	dealing	
with	him	in	small	groups	of	three	and	four,	and	then	escapes	the	might	of	the	
oppressor,”	Newton	contended,	“the	masses	will	be	overjoyed	and	will	adhere	to	this	
correct	strategy.”114	During	the	same	year,	the	BPP	started	to	secretly	build	a	
clandestine	underground	infrastructure.	Los	Angeles	Panther	Geronimo	Pratt,	a	
decorated	Vietnam	veteran	and	former	Green	Beret,	helped	organize	the	Panther	
underground	while	travelling	the	country	in	1968,	simultaneously	facilitating	the	
formation	of	new	BPP	chapters	in	Atlanta,	Dallas,	New	Orleans,	and	other	Southern	
cities.115	Panther	leadership	passed	a	rule	that	“no	party	member	can	join	any	other	
army	force	other	than	the	Black	Liberation	Army.”116	Little	is	known	about	the	activities	
of	the	Panther	underground,	though	its	members	have	been	suspected	of	engaging	in	
illegal,	armed	fundraising	activities.	Not	until	May	1971,	however,	after	the	BPP	
formally	split	into	two	rival	factions,	would	the	Black	Liberation	Army	begin	to	publicly	
take	credit	for	police	ambushes	and	other	guerrilla	attacks.	
	 Nixon’s	narrow	triumph	in	the	1968	presidential	election	was	a	key	moment	in	
the	violent	dialectic	of	state	and	insurgent	violence	that	escalated	over	the	course	of	the	
Johnson	administration.	On	one	hand,	the	riots	and	bombings	had	helped	Nixon,	who	
coopted	the	language	of	civil	rights	to	advance	his	law-and-order	policing	agenda;	upon	
accepting	his	nomination	as	the	Republican	Party’s	presidential	candidate	he	
proclaimed	that	the	“first	civil	right	of	every	American	is	to	be	free	from	domestic	
																																																								
114	Newton	quoted	in	Umoja,	“The	Black	Liberation	Army	and	the	Radical	Legacy	of	the	Black	Panther	
Party,”	227.	
115	Ibid,	228.	
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violence.”117	On	the	other	hand,	to	many	radicals	already	inclined	towards	supporting	
revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare,	Nixon’s	electoral	victory	was	further	confirmation	that	
U.S.	policies	could	not	be	changed	through	normal	political	mechanisms	or	through	
traditional	leftist	strategies	of	grassroots	organizing	and	party-building.	Throughout	the	
first	half	of	1969,	the	Black	Panther	newspaper	warned	of	emerging	“fascism”	in	the	
United	States,	attributing	mounting	police	attacks	on	its	members	to	the	“pig	power	
structure’s”	nationwide	conspiracy	to	“suppress	the	will	of	the	black	community.”118		
	 State	and	municipal-level	actions	against	the	Black	Panther	Party,	carried	out	as	
the	Justice	Department	indicted	Cameron	Bishop	and	the	Chicago	8,	also	gave	leftists	
the	impression	that	U.S.	authorities	would	stop	at	nothing	to	crush	domestic	dissent.	On	
April	2,	1969,	using	information	provided	by	three	paid	police	informants,	a	New	York	
grand	jury	indicted	twenty-one	members	of	the	New	York	BPP	for	conspiring	to	
assassinate	police	officers	and	bomb	police	precincts,	department	stores,	and	the	Bronx	
Botanical	Garden.	In	early	morning	raids,	New	York	City	police	arrested	ten	of	the	
accused.	Two	of	the	suspects	were	already	in	police	custody	on	robbery	charges,	while	a	
few	managed	dodge	the	police	raid	and	join	Eldridge	Cleaver	in	Algeria.	Police	caught	
up	with	the	rest	over	the	next	weeks	and	months.	A	judge	set	bail	at	$100,000	for	each	
of	the	detained	defendants.	Two	years	later—after	an	eight-month	trial,	then	the	
longest	in	New	York	history—a	jury	acquitted	all	members	of	the	Panther	21.	Most	of	
																																																								
117	Richard	Nixon,	Address	Accepting	the	Presidential	Nomination	at	the	Republican	National	Convention	
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118	Black	Panther	Black	Community	News	Service	2,	no.	20	(January	15,	1969),	1;	3,	no.	8	(June	14,	1969),	
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the	defendants	remained	incarcerated	in	the	meantime,	however,	leaving	the	New	York	
Panthers	without	most	of	its	core	leaders	and	organizers.119	
	 Did	the	New	York	authorities	indict	the	Panther	21	because	they	viewed	the	BPP	
as	a	threat	to	the	state’s	political	order?	Or	did	they	act	to	prevent	what	they	believed	to	
be	an	impending	deadly	guerrilla	attack	on	New	York	police	officers?	The	Black	
Panthers	and	their	supporters	portrayed	the	Panther	21	indictments	as	trumped-up	
charges	similar	to	those	Nixon’s	Justice	Department	had	lodged	against	the	Chicago	8	a	
month	earlier,	part	of	a	broader	campaign	of	state	repression	that	made	no	distinction	
between	state	agencies	and	denied	any	Panther	involvement	in	illegal	activity.	The	
Black	Panther	newspaper,	for	example,	called	the	Panther	21	raids	part	of	a	“Pig	
Conspiracy”	to	“Destroy	the	Panthers.”120	Over	the	course	of	1969	and	1970,	many	on	
the	militant	left,	particularly	white	supporters	of	the	Panthers,	came	to	see	the	Panther	
21	as	the	prime	symbol	of	U.S.	political	repression.	In	his	now	famous	article	that	coined	
the	term	“radical	chic,”	journalist	Tom	Wolfe	wrote	about	a	fundraiser	for	the	Panther	
21	held	in	composer	Leonard	Bernstein’s	swanky	Park	Avenue	penthouse.	In	the	article,	
Wolfe	recalled	the	Panther	21’s	young	white	leftist	attorney	Gerald	P.	Lefcourt	speaking	
before	Bernstein’s	crowd	of	celebrity	guests	and	comparing	his	defendants’	case	to	the	
Reichstag	fire,	the	1933	arson	at	Germany’s	parliament	building	that	precipitated	Adolf	
Hitler’s	mass	arrest	of	the	country’s	communists.	“I	believe	this	odious	situation	can	be	
compared	to	the	Reichstag	Fire,”	Lefcourt	said,	warning	that	a	Gestapo-like	round-up	of	
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U.S.	leftists	“could	be	an	outcome	of	this	case.”121	“The	only	thing	that	can	stop	it,”	he	
insisted,	“is	for	people	like	ourselves	to	make	a	noise	and	make	a	noise	now.”122	
	 The	NYPD’s	arrests	of	the	Panther	21	were	preemptive,	yes.	But	it	is	plausible	
that	least	some	members	in	the	group	may	have	been	involved	in	a	plan	to	launch	a	
guerrilla	attack	on	police	officers.	After	all,	the	Oakland	Panthers’	promotion	of	
revolutionary	violence	had	been	a	central	factor	inspiring	many	of	the	young	radicals	
who	formed	the	New	York	BPP	chapter	in	the	spring	of	1968	after	Martin	Luther	King’s	
assassination.	Panther	21	defendant	Kuwasi	Balagoon	(formerly	Donald	Weems),	a	
tenants’	rights	organizer	who	had	previously	endured	a	police	beating	during	a	protest	
inside	the	House	of	Representatives,	later	recalled	that	one	reason	he	joined	the	Party	
was	because	he	appreciated	“that	the	cadre	believed	that	political	power	stems	from	the	
barrel	of	a	gun.”123	Fellow	Panther	21	defendant	Afeni	Shakur	similarly	recollected	
joining	the	BPP	after	being	impressed	with	the	California	Panthers’	armed	1967	protest	
in	Sacramento.124	Panthers	and	city	police	had	also	participated	in	a	series	of	violent	
exchanges	since	the	BPP	set	up	shop	in	New	York	City.	On	August	1,	1968,	a	protest	
outside	the	Brooklyn	BPP	office	in	which	twenty-year-old	Panther	Gordon	Cooke	used	a	
bullhorn	to	deride	police	as	“racist,”	“pigs,”	and	“crackers”	ended	with	police	severely	
beating	and	arresting	Cooke	and	seventeen-year-old	fellow	Panther	Darrell	Baines.125	
The	next	morning	two	men	wielding	a	shotgun	ambushed	two	cops	in	Brooklyn’s	
Crown	Heights	neighborhood,	wounding	the	officers	with	birdshot;	some	police	blamed	
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the	Panthers	despite	New	York	Party	captain	Joudon	Ford’s	denial.	A	few	weeks	later,	
Brooklyn	Panthers	participated	in	a	rebellion	with	other	African	American	youths	in	
which	protesters	attacked	police	and	firefighters	with	projectiles,	smashed	shop	
windows,	and	looted	stores.	During	the	next	day’s	arraignment	for	seven	rebels	
arrested	during	the	mayhem,	150	white	men,	including	off-duty	police	officers	wearing	
pins	supporting	white	supremacist	presidential	candidate	George	Wallace,	shouted	
racial	epithets	while	beating	a	small	group	of	New	York	Panthers	and	white	SDS	
members	in	a	sixth	floor	lobby	of	the	Brooklyn	Criminal	Court.	The	following	week,	in	
the	early	morning	hours	of	September	12,	gunmen	carried	out	another	police	ambush	
near	the	site	of	the	previous	month’s	shotgun	attack,	wounding	two	officers	with	.308	
rifle	blasts	fired	through	their	patrol	car	window.126	
	 Amid	escalating	violence	between	the	New	York	Panthers	and	city	police,	some	
soon-to-be	members	of	the	Panther	21	studied	the	art	of	guerrilla	combat.	Kwando	
Kinshasa	(formerly	William	King),	a	former	marine	sergeant,	authored	a	mimeographed	
guide	entitled	“Urban	Guerrilla	Warfare.”	Police	seized	a	copy	of	the	handbook	upon	
arresting	fellow	Panther	21	defendant	Dhoruba	bin	Wahad	(formerly	Richard	Moore),	
along	with	a	map	of	the	Bronx	annotated	with	pencil	marks	noting	the	locations	of	train	
stations.	From	the	apartment	of	Curtis	Powell,	a	research	chemist,	police	seized	bottles	
of	hydrochloric	and	nitric	acid	in	addition	to	a	book	entitled	High	Explosives	and	
Propellants.	Police	also	confiscated	five	pistols,	two	rifles,	and	three	shotguns	during	the	
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Panther	21	raids.127	Following	their	acquittals	in	February	1971,	members	of	the	
Panther	21	would	go	on	to	form	the	nucleus	of	the	Black	Liberation	Army.		
	 The	truth	of	whether	or	not	the	members	of	the	Panther	21	were	planning	an	
assault	on	police	officers	prior	to	their	arrest	may	never	be	known.	Details	of	Panther	
involvement	in	various	attacks	on	police,	such	as	the	December	1968	machine-gunning	
of	a	Newark	police	station,	may	likewise	remain	a	mystery.128	It	is	clear,	however,	that	
violence	flowed	both	ways	between	the	Panthers	and	police,	and	that	elements	of	each	
understandably	saw	the	other	as	a	threat	to	its	existence.	Hoover’s	FBI,	encouraged	
local	police	agencies	to	target	members	of	the	Black	Panthers	and	SDS	with	arrest,	while	
carrying	out	its	own	covert	counterintelligence	programs	against	both	groups.	
		 Historians	have	repeatedly	highlighted	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	operations	
against	the	Panthers,	arguing	the	officials	carried	them	out	because	they	viewed	the	
BPP	as	a	threat	to	America’s	political	order,	and	in	some	cases	pointing	to	the	
counterintelligence	programs	as	the	primary	reason	for	the	Party’s	downfall.129	A	brief	
review	of	the	FBI’s	COINTELPROs	against	the	BPP,	however,	reveals	that	the	Bureau’s	
main	intention	was	to	preempt	the	Party’s	capacity	to	carry	out	insurgent	violence.	To	
the	extent	that	the	FBI	was	successful	in	undermining	the	Black	Panther	Party,	it	was	
because	COINTELPRO	agents	exploited	the	Party’s	factionalism,	violent	tendencies,	and	
undemocratic	paramilitary	structure,	traits	that	had	ironically	developed	within	the	
BPP	in	the	context	of	its	members’	ongoing	struggles	to	confront	police	violence.	During	
the	first	half	of	1969,	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	operations	exacerbated	factionalism	and	
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paranoia	within	the	BPP,	leading	to	more	violence	and	criminal	charges	that	Panthers	
and	their	supporters	in	SDS	attributed	to	a	government	conspiracy	to	crush	the	left.	
	 After	launching	COINTELPRO-Black	Nationalist-Hate	Groups	in	August	27,	1967,	
Hoover	expanded	the	program	from	twenty-three	to	forty-one	of	the	FBI’s	fifty-one	field	
offices	on	March	4,	1968,	explaining	that	the	primary	goal	was	to	“prevent	violence	on	
the	part	of	black	nationalist	groups.”130	In	a	reference	to	the	previous	decade’s	Kenyan	
armed	revolt	against	British	colonial	rule,	Hoover	called	on	agents	to	preempt	a	“‘Mau	
Mau’	in	America.”	He	directed	his	men	to	prevent	“coalition	of	militant	black	nationalist	
groups”	and	“the	rise	of	a	‘messiah’	who	could	unify	…	the	black	nationalist	movement,”	
in	part,	by	“pinpoint[ing]	potential	trouble-makers	and	neutraliz[ing]	them	before	they	
exercise	their	potential	for	violence.”131	The	FBI	did	not	begin	to	direct	COINTELPRO-
BNHG	operations	against	the	Black	Panther	Party,	however,	until	the	summer	of	1968.	
On	September	27,	1968—six	weeks	prior	to	Nixon’s	election	victory—Headquarters	
ordered	agents	to	make	the	BPP	the	main	focus	of	COINTELPRO-BNHG.	In	the	memo	
approving	this	shift	in	COINTELPRO-BNHG’s	priorities,	FBI	Domestic	Security	Division	
official	G.	C.	Moore	described	the	BPP	as	“the	most	violence-prone	organization	of	all	
the	extremist	groups	now	operating	in	the	United	States,”	one	that	“puts	particular	
emphasis	on	not	only	verbal	attacks	but	also	physical	attacks	on	police.”132	Warning,	
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“more	violence	can	be	expected	from	this	organization	in	the	immediate	future,”	FBI	
officials	ordered	agents	to	“accelerate”	investigations	of	the	BPP,	increase	informants	
within	the	organization,	and	launch	counterintelligence	operations	that	“may	bring	
about	results	which	could	lead	to	prosecution	of	these	violence-prone	leaders	and	
active	members,	thereby	thwarting	their	efforts	to	perpetrate	violence	in	the	United	
States.”133	
	 By	time	the	BPP	became	the	focus	of	COINTELPRO-BNHG,	the	Party	had	been	
active	for	two	years;	Huey	Newton	had	been	in	prison	for	nearly	one	year;	and	the	BPP	
had	established	chapters	in	New	York,	Los	Angeles,	Chicago,	and	Seattle.	Why	had	the	
FBI	not	targeted	the	BPP	with	its	COINTELPRO	operations	sooner?	According	to	Joshua	
Bloom	and	Waldo	Martin,	the	BPP	gained	the	FBI’s	attention	due	to	its	“growing	
national	scope,	and	the	political	challenge	it	now	posed	to	the	status	quo.”134	FBI	
officials	indeed	observed	in	September	1968	that	the	BPP	was	“rapidly	expanding”—in	
the	fall	of	1968	the	BPP	formed	new	chapters	in	De	Moines,	Baltimore,	Denver,	and	
other	cities.135	However,	a	more	probable	explanation	is	that	Charles	Bates,	Special	
Agent	in	Charge	of	the	FBI’s	San	Francisco	office	(which	held	jurisdiction	over	Oakland)	
was	resistant	to	implementing	the	program.	On	several	occasions	Hoover	reprimanded	
Bates	for	his	failure	to	develop	effective	COINTELPRO	operations	against	the	BPP.136	
According	to	former	San	Francisco	Special	Agent	William	Cohendet,	the	office	was	also	
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unsuccessful	in	developing	reliable	informants	within	the	Oakland	Black	Panthers.137	
Moreover,	the	COINTELPRO	documents	clearly	stated	that	the	FBI	was	targeting	the	
Panthers	not	because	of	the	group’s	political	ideology	or	program,	but	because	of	its	
“violence	prone”	nature.138	
	 COINTELPRO-BNHG	documents	also	reveal	that	by	the	time	the	BPP	attracted	
the	FBI’s	attention,	the	Party	was	already	beset	with	violent	factionalism.	In	an	August	
8,	1968	memo	to	Headquarters,	the	FBI’s	New	York	office	reported	information,	likely	
gleaned	from	informants,	that	a	“break	between	SNCC	and	the	Black	Panthers	appears	
severe	and	perhaps	final.”139	SNCC	leaders	Stokely	Carmichael,	H.	Rap	Brown,	and	
James	Forman	had	entered	an	alliance	with	the	Panthers	the	previous	February	in	an	
attempt	to	unite	a	national	Black	Power	movement,	but	the	seasoned	civil	rights	
activists	remained	critical	of	the	Panthers	on	several	grounds,	including	their	heavy	
reliance	on	whites	for	fundraising	and	media	access.140	According	to	the	New	York	FBI	
memo,	Forman	and	Brown	had	“resigned	their	BPP	membership	because	they	find	it	
difficult	to	go	along	with	BPP	violent	schemes.”141	The	incident	that	precipitated	this	
split	may	have	been	one	that	Carmichael	recalled	in	his	memoir,	when	“a	group	of	‘West	
Coast	Panthers’…	invaded	the	[New	York	SNCC]	office,	held	Jim	Forman	at	gunpoint,	and	
threatened	his	life.”142		
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	 Similarly,	a	September	25,	1968	memo	from	the	Los	Angeles	FBI	office	reported	
“friction”	between	the	local	BPP	chapter	and	most	of	the	city’s	other	radical	groups,	
including	SNCC,	the	Black	Congress,	and	the	Brown	Berets	(a	militant	Chicano	
organization).	Tensions	were	especially	high	between	the	Panthers	and	Ron	Karenga’s	
black	cultural	nationalist	US	organization.	Citing	information	likely	gained	from	
informants,	the	LA	office	reported	that	the	BPP	“has	‘let	out	a	contract’	on	Karenga	
because	they	feel	that	he	has	sold	out	to	the	establishment.”143	On	November	25,	1968,	
Hoover	observed	that	“the	struggle”	between	the	BPP	and	US	was	“taking	an	aura	of	
gang	warfare	with	attendant	threats	of	murders	and	reprisals.”144		
	 It	was	only	after	observing	the	Panthers’	violent	internal	factionalism	and	
friction	with	other	groups	that	the	FBI	began	to	employ	COINTELPRO	operations	
designed	to	further	exacerbate	such	tensions.	For	example,	FBI	agents	posing	as	Black	
Nationalists	telephoned	the	homes	of	SNCC	members	to	inform	them	that	Panthers	
intended	to	kill	them	(one	of	these	calls	reached	the	terrified	mother	of	Stokely	
Carmichael),	and	sent	fake	letters	and	cartoon	drawings	to	leaders	of	both	the	BPP	and	
the	US	organization	designed	to	agitate	conflict	between	the	groups,	exacerbating	fears	
that	each	side	wanted	to	kill	the	other.145	In	Chicago,	FBI	agents	sent	Blackstone	
Rangers	gang	leader	Jeff	Fort	anonymous	messages	quoting	local	Black	Panther	leaders	
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who	had	criticized	his	lack	of	support	for	the	political	struggles	in	the	city’s	black	
communities,	hoping	to	provoke	violence	between	the	two	groups.146	
	 By	the	time	Nixon	came	into	office,	tensions	within	the	BPP—and	between	the	
Panthers	and	other	militant	groups—had	already	reached	a	boiling	point.	These	
tensions	increased	even	further	amid	Eldridge	Cleaver’s	flight	from	the	country,	local	
police	attacks	on	the	organization,	FBI	COINTELPRO	operations,	and	the	Party’s	rapid	
growth.	On	January	12,	1969,	less	than	four	months	after	the	FBI	shifted	the	focus	of	
COINTELPRO-BNHG	to	the	BPP,	Bobby	Seale	closed	the	Party’s	membership,	fearful	that	
the	organization’s	rapid	expansion	was	creating	too	many	opportunities	for	infiltration	
by	police	informants.	“We	now	have	45	[chapters],”	he	told	the	press,	“We	aren’t	taking	
in	any	new	members	for	the	next	three	to	six	months	…	We	are	turning	inward	to	
tighten	security,	[to]	get	rid	of	agents	and	provocateurs	and	the	promote	political	
education	among	those	who	have	joined	the	Panthers	but	still	don’t	understand	what	
we’re	all	about.”147	Amidst	his	tightening	of	Party	security,	Seale	decided	to	make	
“survival	programs,”	such	as	free	breakfast	programs	for	children	and	community	
medical	clinics,	a	prime	focus	of	the	organization’s	activities.148	
	 Violence	continued	nonetheless.	Five	days	later,	conflict	between	the	LA	
Panthers	and	the	US	organization	resulted	in	bloodshed.	On	January	17,	US	gunmen	
shot	dead	local	Panther	leaders	John	Huggins	and	Alprentice	“Bunchy”	Carter	on	the	
University	of	California	Los	Angeles	campus,	were	members	of	both	groups	had	
participated	in	a	contentious	meeting	over	control	of	the	university’s	black	student	
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group.	Local	police	initially	responded	by	arresting	seventeen	local	Panthers	while	the	
US	assailants	went	free.149	After	the	death	of	her	husband	John,	Los	Angeles	Panther	
Ericka	Huggins,	moved	to	his	hometown	of	New	Haven,	Connecticut,	where	she	soon	
became	the	target	of	a	conspiracy	indictment	resulting	from	the	torture	and	murder	of	
BPP	member	and	accused	police	informant,	Alex	Rackley.		
	 Details	around	the	Rackley	torture-murder	remain	contested,	but	most	agree	on	
the	key	facts.	In	May	1969,	a	traveling	Panther	named	George	Sams—who	many	later	
accused	of	being	an	FBI	informant—joined	New	Haven	Panthers	Warren	Kimbro	and	
Lonnie	McLucas	in	tying	Rackley	to	a	chair.	In	a	farcical	“trial”	that	Huggins	tape-
recorded,	fellow	Panthers	accused	Rackley	of	working	as	a	police	informant	and	
tortured	him	with	beatings,	death	threats,	a	coat-hanger	twisted	around	his	neck,	and	
boiling	water	dumped	on	his	body.	On	May	20,	Sams,	Kimbro,	and	McLucas	drove	
Rackley	to	the	nearby	town	of	Middletown,	where	they	shot	him	to	death	and	left	his	
body	in	a	swamp.	The	next	evening,	after	recovering	Rackley’s	body,	police	arrested	
Kimbro,	McLucas,	Huggins,	and	four	other	local	Panthers.	In	August,	authorities	
extradited	Sams	from	Canada,	where	he	had	been	arrested	on	weapons	charges	while	
trying	to	start	up	a	BPP	chapter	in	Halifax.150	Police	arrested	Bobby	Seale	in	Berkeley	
during	the	same	month,	and	transported	him	to	Connecticut	on	charges	that	he	had	
ordered	the	Rackley’s	execution	amid	his	ongoing	efforts	to	purge	the	Party	of	
suspected	police	infiltrators.151	The	defendants	became	known	as	the	New	Haven	Nine.	
Their	trials	in	1970	became	rallying	points	for	the	militant	left,	though	revelations	of	
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Panther	involvement	in	torture	and	murder	contributed	to	a	decline	in	support	for	the	
Party.	Charges	were	eventually	dropped	against	Seale	and	Huggins.	
	 Like	the	case	of	the	Panther	21,	details	of	state	involvement	in	the	assassinations	
of	LA	Panthers	and	the	events	leading	to	charges	against	the	New	Haven	9	will	likely	
remain	unknown	and	debated	for	years	to	come.	Panther	sympathizers	and	some	
scholars,	for	example,	have	alleged	that	police	informants	played	critical	roles	in	both	
the	Huggins-Carter	killings	and	Rackley	killings.	There	is	no	documentary	evidence	of	
direct	state	involvement	in	either	of	these	incidents,	however.	What	is	clear,	is	that	
these	killings	occurred	as	Panther	militancy,	cultivated	as	a	response	to	police	violence	
and	inspired	by	Third	World	guerrilla	revolutionaries,	contributed	to	a	cycle	of	further	
police	violence	and	deadly	factionalism	within	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	the	broader	
Black	Power	movement.		
	 The	BPP’s	new	focus	on	developing	community	“survival	programs”	did	not	
dampen	this	violent	escalation,	as	Panther	leaders	continued	to	romanticize	violence	
against	police	and	other	authority	figures.	Speaking	before	a	San	Francisco	antiwar	rally	
on	November	15,	1969,	for	example,	Black	Panther	chief	of	staff	David	Hilliard	called	for	
President	Nixon’s	assassination.	“We	say	down	with	the	American	fascist	society!”	he	
proclaimed;	“Later	for	Richard	Milhous	Nixon,	the	motherfucker!	…	We	will	kill	Richard	
Nixon	…	We	will	kill	any	motherfucker	that	stands	in	the	way	of	our	freedom!”152	Black	
Panther	historians	have	pointed	to	the	FBI’s	efforts	to	undermine	the	BPP’s	breakfast	
programs	as	evidence	that	Hoover	viewed	the	initiatives	as	a	threat	to	America’s	
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political	order.153	But	the	FBI	documents	show	that	it	was	not	the	act	of	feeding	children	
that	bothered	Bureau	officials,	but	their	view	that	the	breakfast	programs	were	a	
vehicle	through	which	the	Party	promoted	the	“insidious	poison”	of	anti-police	violence	
among	children	and	the	wider	community.	In	a	May	27,	1969	message	to	the	San	
Francisco	FBI	office,	Hoover	provided	an	example	from	a	Panther	wedding	at	an	
Oakland	church	that	hosted	BPP	breakfast	programs.	Citing	a	recent	article	on	the	
wedding	in	the	Black	Panther	newspaper,	Hoover	described	how	Seale	and	other	
Panthers	led	children	in	a	song	with	the	refrain	“We	Want	a	Pork	Chop	Off	the	Pig.”154		
	 Panther-related	violence	continued	over	the	summer	of	1969.	A	prominent	
incident	occurred	on	August	15,	1969,	amid	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	operations	designed	
to	enflame	the	violent	US-Panther	conflict,	when	US	gunmen	murdered	Black	Panther	
Sylvester	Bell	in	a	San	Diego	parking	lot.	Three	days	later,	the	San	Diego	FBI	office	
expressed	satisfaction	with	Bell’s	slaying.	“Shootings,	beatings,	and	a	high	degree	of	
unrest	continues	to	prevail	in	the	ghetto	area	of	Southeast	San	Diego,”	the	San	Diego	
Special	Agent	in	Charge	wrote	in	a	memo	to	Headquarters.	“Although	no	specific	
counterintelligence	action	can	be	credited	with	contributing	to	this	situation,	it	is	felt	
that	a	substantial	amount	of	the	unrest	is	directly	attributable	to	this	program.”155	
	 When	Nixon	came	to	office,	SDS	was	also	fraught	with	internal	disagreement,	
though	in	a	form	less	deadly	than	that	of	the	Black	Panthers.	The	key	points	of	
contention	were	whether	or	not	to	support	the	Panthers,	the	NLF,	and	the	concept	of	
guerrilla	warfare.	An	“action	faction”	led	by	Bernadine	Dohrn	and	other	future	Weather	
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Underground	leaders	had	gained	a	strong	presence	in	the	organization’s	Chicago	
National	Office	the	previous	summer,	as	well	as	predominance	among	SDS	chapters	in	
Michigan,	Ohio,	and	New	York.	Action	faction	leaders	sought	to	develop	a	Marxist-
Leninist	cadre	organization	while	calling	for	increasingly	militant	tactics	to	support	the	
Black	Panthers,	confront	police,	and	end	the	war	in	Vietnam.	Action	faction	leaders	Bill	
Ayers	and	Jim	Mellen,	who	would	both	also	go	on	to	join	the	Weathermen,	wrote	a	
paper	in	the	spring	of	1969	calling	for	armed	revolution.	“The	reactionary	nature	of	
pacifism,	the	need	for	armed	struggle	as	the	only	road	to	revolution	[are]	essential	
truths,”	they	wrote;	“We	[must]	recognize	the	urgency	of	fighting	white	supremacy	by	
building	the	material	strength	of	the	white	movement	to	be	a	conscious,	organized,	
mobilized	fighting	force	capable	of	giving	real	support	to	the	black	liberation	
struggle.”156	In	addition	to	organizing	the	disruptions	at	Nixon’s	inauguration,	Mark	
Rudd	and	other	SDS	action	faction	militants	went	on	a	window	and	limousine-smashing	
spree	on	Wall	Street	in	April	after	a	New	York	judge	refused	bail	for	imprisoned	
members	of	the	Panther	21.157	
	 The	main	organized	opposition	to	the	action	faction	within	SDS	was	the	Boston-
based	“praxis-axis”	faction,	a	group	of	activists	associated	with	the	Maoist	Progressive	
Labor	Party	(PLP),	well	known	for	their	members’	clean-cut	appearances	and	
denunciation	of	the	counterculture,	revolutionary	violence,	the	Black	Panthers,	and	
anything	else	they	perceived	as	alienating	to	the	American	working	class	they	claimed	
to	represent.	Members	of	PLP	were	highly	doctrinaire,	and	spent	much	of	their	time	
attempting	to	take	over	SDS	policies	through	bloc-voting,	long	meetings,	and	a	barrage	
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of	sectarian	articles	submitted	to	New	Left	Notes	and	other	SDS	publications.	One	PLP	
article	criticizing	the	BPP	alleged	that	the	Panthers	“ignore	the	working-class	demands	
…	don’t	attempt	to	organize	Black	workers	…	have	not	stressed	political	study	and	
development	…	have	no	class	outlook	and	believe	they	are	out	to	fight	a	war	against	
white	people	in	general.”158		
	 Amid	the	SDS’s	factionalism,	historian-activist	Staughton	Lynd	warned,	“both	
PLP	and	the	national	collective	are	working	to	recruit	a	revolutionary	cadre	out	of	SDS	
no	matter	what	the	cost	to	SDS	as	an	organically	evolving	revolutionary	movement.”159	
Factionalism	turned	many	young	radicals	away	from	SDS	just	as	local	campus	rebellions	
and	bombings	skyrocketed	in	response	to	Nixon’s	escalation	of	the	war	in	Indochina,	as	
a	new	movement	of	GI	resistance	against	the	war	took	hold,	as	Catholic	leftists	carried	
out	nonviolent	raids	on	draft	boards,	and	as	the	women’s	liberation	movement	soared,	
with	many	women	leaving	mix-gender	groups	like	SDS	to	form	their	own	feminist	
organizations.	Kirkpatrick	Sale	noted	the	irony:		
At	precisely	the	time	of	the	greatest	explosion	of	the	American	left	in	all	of	the	
decade,	SDS,	its	leading	organization	by	every	index—size,	fame,	geographical	
scope,	energy—was	gradually	but	unmistakably	isolating	and	diminishing	itself,	
losing	its	student	constituency,	its	women,	its	alumni,	failing	to	connect	with	the	
high	schools,	the	soldiers,	the	workers.	The	SDS	revolutionaries	were	on	the	
barricades,	but	they	had	forgotten	to	look	behind:	their	troops	were	no	longer	
following.160	
	
	 Amid	SDS’s	increasing	factionalism,	the	FBI	endeavored	to	destroy	the	
organization	by	exacerbating	the	growing	feud	between	the	National	Office	and	the	PLP.	
In	January	1969,	the	Bureau	conducted	a	series	of	covert	counterintelligence	operations	
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against	Bernadine	Dohrn.	Agents	distributed	several	cartoons	designed	to	defame	the	
twenty-five-year-old	National	Office	organizer	among	SDS	activists	throughout	the	
country.	Portraying	Dohrn	holding	a	bag	of	cash	in	one	instance,	and	sunbathing	in	a	
bikini	on	a	Malibu	beach	in	another,	the	FBI’s	sexist	graphics	sought	to	depict	the	
charismatic	female	SDS	leader	as	someone	squandering	the	organization’s	funds	for	
personal	benefit.161	Local	police	harassed	SDS	members	as	well.	On	May	12,	1969,	
police	and	firemen	showed	up	at	SDS’s	Chicago	National	Office	in	response	to	
anonymous	reports	of	gunshots	and	fire	in	the	office.	Though	National	Office	staffers	
refused	to	let	the	police	inside,	the	cops	barged	in	anyway,	and	some	of	the	SDSers	
pushed	back.	The	police	arrested	Mike	Klonsky,	Les	Coleman,	Tim	McCarthy,	Ed	
Jennings,	and	Dave	Slavin,	and	held	them	on	$12,000	bail	for	“battery	of	an	officer,”	
“interfering	with	a	fireman,	“	and	“inciting	mob	action.”162	SDS	militants	interpreted	the	
police	raid	as	yet	another	example	of	a	Nixon-backed	campaign	to	destroy	the	left.	New	
Left	Notes	responded:	
It	is	clear	that	until	the	power	to	control	the	institutions	of	this	society	is	in	the	
hands	of	the	people,	the	people	will	never	have	justice	or	freedom.	
Power	to	the	People!	
DEATH	TO	THE	PIG!163	
	
Conclusion	
There	is	little	evidence	that	FBI	COINTELPRO	operations	against	the	Black	Panther	
Party	and	SDS	succeeded	in	their	objective	of	preventing	leftist	violence.	G.	C.	Moore,	a	
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Domestic	Security	official	at	FBI	Headquarters,	acknowledged	this	in	his	1975	Church	
Committee	testimony:	
It	is	not	easy	to	measure	effectiveness	…	There	were	policemen	killed	in	those	
days.	There	were	bombs	thrown.	There	were	establishments	burned	with	
Molotov	cocktails	…	We	can	measure	that	damage.	You	cannot	measure	over	on	
the	other	side,	what	lives	were	saved	because	…	suspicion	was	sown	on	
[someone’s]	leadership	and	this	organization	gradually	declined	…	or	this	
organization	did	not	join	with	[that]	organization	as	a	result	of	a	black	power	
conference	which	was	aimed	towards	consolidation	efforts.164	
	
Moore	acknowledged	that	the	“ineptitude”	of	groups	such	as	the	Black	Panthers	and	
SDS	could	have	been	the	main	reason	for	their	decline.	But	Moore	also	stated	that	he	
and	other	FBI	personnel	hoped	that	counterintelligence	“did	play	a	part”	in	
undermining	these	organizations	and	their	capacity	to	carry	out	political	violence.	
“Maybe	we	just	gave	it	a	nudge,”	he	said.165	
	 While	it	is	unclear	weather	or	not	the	FBI	prevented	leftist	violence,	the	Bureau	
clearly	provoked	deadly	violence	against	members	of	the	Black	Panther	Party.	Citing	
COINTELPRO	operations	designed	to	enflame	violent	tensions	with	US	in	Southern	
California	and	the	Blackstone	Rangers	in	Chicago,	the	Church	Committee	found	that	
“some	of	the	FBI’s	tactics	against	the	BPP	were	clearly	intended	to	foster	violence,	and	
many	others	could	reasonably	have	been	expected	to	cause	violence.”166	But	this	was	
not	the	only	violence	the	FBI	was	responsible	for	provoking.	Hoover’s	FBI	also	actively	
encouraged	police	attacks	on	radicals,	and	collaborated	with	federal,	state,	and	
municipal	efforts	to	criminally	indict	and	arrest	leftist	militants.	These	combined	
efforts,	carried	out	amid	Nixon’s	call	for	“law	and	order,”	helped	encourage	the	very	sort	
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of	violence	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	programs	sought	to	prevent,	as	more	and	more	
leftists—unaware	of	growing	tensions	between	Hoover	and	Nixon—felt	the	need	to	
fight	back	against	what	they	interpreted	as	a	concerted	government	effort	to	repress	
the	Black	Power	movement	and	the	New	Left.	
	 It	would	be	disingenuous,	however,	to	blame	the	militant	left’s	turn	to	violence	
completely	on	the	state.	American	radicals’	decisions	to	embrace	the	“cult	of	the	gun”	
were	conscious	and	deliberate,	part	of	an	international	(though	almost	completely	
ineffective)	revolutionary	strategy.	Plenty	of	people	within	the	U.S.	left	disagreed	with	
the	ultraleft	militants	in	their	midst.	It	was	common	within	the	New	Left,	for	example,	to	
refer	to	members	of	SDS’s	“action	faction”	and	others	who	promoted	violence	as	
“crazies.”167	Feeling	disempowered,	alienated,	or	afraid,	many	leftists	turned	away	from	
politics	altogether	as	violent	“revolutionary”	rhetoric	increased.168	Nonetheless,	the	
“violent	dialectic”	of	state	and	insurgent	violence	continued.	During	the	second	half	of	
1969,	such	violence	would	lead	to	increased	divisions	within	both	the	movements	of	the	
left	and	the	state,	and	push	some	radicals	further	down	the	path	towards	clandestine	
urban	guerrilla	warfare.	
	
																																																								
167	Rudd,	Underground,	131.	
168	Ibid,	168-169.	
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CHAPTER	2	
INTERNAL	WARS:	FACTIONALISM	AND	THE	TURN	TO	CLANDESTINITY	
	
Two	months	after	J.	Edgar	Hoover	placed	Denver	transmission	tower	bomber	Cameron	
Bishop	on	the	FBI’s	list	of	Ten	Most	Wanted	Fugitives,	a	top	Bureau	official	participated	
in	a	fateful	meeting	with	a	representative	of	the	Nixon	administration.	On	June	19,	1969	
in	Washington	D.C.,	the	FBI’s	Assistant	Director	for	Domestic	Intelligence	William	C.	
Sullivan	met	for	the	first	time	with	Nixon	aide	Tom	Huston.	Huston	went	to	see	Bill	
Sullivan	under	orders	from	President	Richard	Nixon.	Although	the	FBI	had	reiterated	to	
White	House	Council	John	Ehrlichman	in	April	that	their	was	no	direct	foreign	influence	
upon	America’s	Black	Power	movement	and	New	Left,	the	President	remained	
convinced	that	the	mass	street	protests	and	growing	number	of	revolutionary	
bombings	sweeping	the	country	were	not	merely	expressions	of	domestic	anger	over	
the	war	in	Vietnam	and	entrenched	racism,	but	part	of	a	foreign-funded	Communist	
conspiracy.	When	Ehrlichman	and	his	assistant	Egil	“Bud”	Krogh	were	unable	to	find	
evidence	of	such	funding,	Nixon	was	unsatisfied.	Allegedly,	the	President	turned	to	
Ehrlichman	and	said,	“Get	Huston	on	this.”1		
	 Huston	was	a	twenty-eight-year-old	self-described	“conservative	hard-liner.”2	In	
1966	and	1967,	while	completing	his	law	degree	at	Indiana	University,	he	served	as	
president	of	Young	Americans	for	Freedom,	the	nation’s	leading	conservative	student	
organization.	In	1968	he	campaigned	for	Nixon	while	working	at	the	Pentagon	as	an	
																																																								
1	Thomas	Charles	Huston,	oral	history	interview	with	Timothy	Naftali,	April	30,	2008,	Richard	Nixon	
Presidential	Library	online	archive,	16-17.	
2	Ibid,	2.	
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analyst	for	the	Army’s	Defense	Intelligence	Agency,	building	crucial	support	for	the	
Republican	candidate	among	grassroots	conservatives	who	had	backed	Barry	
Goldwater	in	1964.	After	the	election,	Huston	took	a	position	in	the	Nixon	
administration,	working	under	Ehrlichman	and	speechwriter	Pat	Buchannan.3		
	 Sullivan	was	happy	to	meet	with	Huston.	One	of	the	Bureau’s	top	officials,	
Sullivan	had	worked	his	way	up	the	FBI	hierarchy	since	1941,	when	at	the	age	of	
nineteen,	the	Massachusetts	native	first	took	a	position	as	special	agent	in	the	
Milwaukee	field	office.	In	1961,	after	working	a	number	of	other	positions,	Sullivan	was	
promoted	to	Assistant	Director	of	the	Domestic	Intelligence	Division.	In	this	capacity,	
Sullivan	oversaw	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	programs,	including	one	of	the	most	
notorious	COINTELPRO	operations:	the	mailing	of	an	anonymous	letter	to	Martin	
Luther	King	Jr.	in	November	1964,	urging	the	civil	rights	leader	to	commit	suicide	or	
else	the	sender	would	leak	tape	recordings	of	his	extramarital	affairs	to	the	press.4	The	
reason	Sullivan	was	glad	to	meet	with	Huston	is	because	he	immediately	recognized	the	
young	White	House	aide	as	a	potential	ally	in	a	growing	dispute	with	his	boss,	Director	
Hoover,	over	the	problem	of	revolutionary	violence.	As	militant	street	protests	
expanded	along	with	violent	revolutionary	rhetoric	and	increased	incidents	of	political	
																																																								
3	Ibid,	2-4.	
4	Agents	had	secretly	taped	King’s	illicit	encounters	using	hidden	microphones	(known	as	“bugs”	in	FBI	
parlance)	in	his	hotel	rooms.	“There	is	only	one	way	out	for	you,”	the	letter	threatened.	“You	better	take	it	
before	your	filthy,	abnormal	fraudulent	self	is	bared	to	the	nation.”	Sullivan	wrote	the	letter	and	ordered	
an	agent	in	Miami	to	mail	it	to	King	from	Atlanta.	The	FBI	carried	out	this	operation	prior	to	King’s	
acceptance	of	the	prestigious	Nobel	Peace	Prize,	amid	officials’	anger	over	his	association	with	
Communists	and	public	criticism	of	the	Bureau	for	not	protecting	civil	workers	from	violent	white	racists.	
The	American	public	first	learned	of	the	FBI’s	“suicide	letter”	to	King	during	the	Church	Commission	
hearings.	The	Church	Commission	based	its	reporting	on	a	heavily	redacted	version	of	the	letter	the	FBI	
had	released	to	them.	In	2014,	however,	researchers	discovered	the	original	letter	in	Hoover’s	“Official	
and	Confidential”	files	at	the	National	Archives.	See	Beverly	Gage,	“What	an	Uncensored	Letter	to	M.L.K.	
Reveals,”	New	York	Times	Magazine,	November	11,	2014.	The	online	version	of	the	article	includes	a	
digital	copy	of	the	uncensored	letter.	
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bombings,	Sullivan	wished	to	revive	the	FBI’s	use	of	illegal	surveillance	techniques	such	
as	break-ins,	mail-opening,	warrantless	wiretapping,	and	use	of	teenaged	informants.		
	 During	the	first	months	of	Nixon’s	presidency,	the	Colorado	transmission	tower	
bombings	and	Hoover’s	wrangling	with	Cabinet	officials	over	domestic	surveillance	had	
caused	friction	between	the	FBI	and	Nixon	administration.	Now	this	friction	was	
worsening,	causing	a	split	within	the	top	of	the	FBI	hierarchy.	Without	Hoover’s	
knowledge,	Sullivan	used	his	meeting	with	Huston	as	an	opportunity	to	advance	secret	
plans	to	reinstitute	illegal	FBI	surveillance	practices	in	order	to	combat	leftist	violence.	
Over	the	next	year,	Sullivan	and	Huston	would	meet	on	several	more	occasions	to	
discuss	strategies	for	combating	revolutionary	violence,	setting	the	stage	for	what	
would	soon	become	a	full	scale	bureaucratic	conflict	between	Hoover	and	the	Nixon	
administration.	
	 Escalating	violence	between	the	state	and	revolutionary	insurgents	kindled	
internal	wars	not	only	within	the	Executive	Branch	of	the	federal	government,	but	also	
within	the	U.S.	left.	Coincidentally,	the	debates	over	the	strategic	merits	of	urban	
guerrilla	warfare	that	had	given	rise	to	cleavages	within	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	
SDS	reached	a	critical	turning	point	on	the	very	same	weekend	in	June	1969	when	
Sullivan	first	met	with	Huston.	On	June	21,	at	the	organization’s	National	Convention	in	
Chicago,	the	Weatherman	faction	took	over	SDS	and	announced	plans	to	build	
America’s	first	revolutionary	urban	guerrilla	army.	Over	the	next	six	months,	ongoing	
violence	between	leftist	radicals	and	the	state	accelerated	Weatherman’s	transition	
towards	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	warfare.	This	development,	in	turn,	confirmed	
	 103	
Sullivan	and	Huston’s	belief	that	the	FBI	was	not	adequately	equipped	to	respond	to	
leftist	violence.	
	 	
“A	Position	of	Militant	Extremism”	
According	to	Sullivan,	Hoover’s	restrictions	on	illegal	surveillance	tactics	caused	
widespread	frustration	within	the	FBI	and	among	officials	in	the	Central	Intelligence	
Agency	ad	other	intelligence	agencies,	who	complained	that	the	Bureau	“seemed	
incapable	of	dealing	with	the	domestic	turmoil—the	bombings,	murders,	and	riots—of	
the	1960s.”5	Remembering	his	own	frustrations,	Sullivan	recollected	feeling	that	
“Hoover	in	effect	put	the	Domestic	Intelligence	Division	of	the	FBI	out	of	business.”	“Our	
hands	were	tied,”	he	recalled;	“it	became	virtually	impossible	to	do	our	job.”6	Charles	D.	
Brennan,	the	Domestic	Intelligence	Division’s	Internal	Security	Chief,	who	joined	
Sullivan	in	his	first	meeting	with	Huston,	shared	these	sentiments.	Brennan	later	
reflected	that	Hoover’s	limitations	on	investigative	practices	during	the	1960s,	coupled	
with	a	shift	of	FBI	manpower	towards	organized	crime	and	civil	rights	cases,	“provided	
a	drain	which	materially	affected	those	of	us	who	were	involved	in	security	and	
intelligence	investigations.”7	Sullivan	and	Brennan	found	a	sympathetic	and	earnest	ally	
in	Huston.	In	his	1978	memoir,	Sullivan	recalled	his	first	time	meeting	the	young	White	
House	aide.	“As	far	as	I	was	able	to	tell,”	Sullivan	remembered,	Huston’s	“only	interest	
was	in	doing	a	good	job	for	his	country…	The	fact	that	I,	a	liberal	Democrat,	could	find	
																																																								
5	William	C.	Sullivan,	The	Bureau:	My	Thirty	Year’s	in	Hoover’s	FBI,	with	Bill	Brown	(New	York:	W.	W.	
Norton	&	Company,	1979),	206.	
6	Ibid.	
7	Charles	D.	Brennan	testimony,	Senate	Select	Committee	to	Study	Governmental	Operations	with	Respect	
to	Intelligence	Activities,	Hearings	on	Intelligence	Activities,	Vol.	2,	The	Huston	Plan,	94th	Cong.,	1st	sess.,	
1975	(hereafter	Huston	Plan),	101.	
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so	much	to	admire	in	Huston	only	proved	to	me	that	a	man’s	politics	have	little	bearing	
on	his	true	worth.”8		
	 During	their	meeting,	Sullivan	and	Brennan	confirmed	what	Ehrlichman	had	
already	established	in	his	earlier	report	to	Nixon:	there	was	no	evidence	that	Cuba,	
China,	or	any	other	foreign	Communist	power	was	financing	U.S.	leftist	organizations.	
However,	Sullivan	did	see	domestic	radicals	as	a	serious	threat,	one	that	he	believed	
Hoover	was	failing	to	take	seriously.	Sullivan	used	his	meeting	with	Huston	to	convey	
his	frustrations	with	the	FBI	Director.	Hoover,	he	argued,	placed	too	much	of	the	
Bureau’s	emphasis	on	fighting	Communist	subversion,	when	the	main	threat	to	internal	
security	came	from	domestic	groups	that	preached	violent	revolution	and	engaged	in	
bombings	and	other	violent	acts.	According	to	Huston,	the	Colorado	transmission	tower	
bombings	were	among	those	Sullivan	cited	as	examples.9			
	 Sullivan	and	Brennan	argued	that	Hoover’s	restrictions	on	illegal	surveillance	
tactics	were	severely	limiting	the	Bureau’s	capacity	to	prevent	revolutionary	violence.	
Moreover,	Sullivan	argued	that	Hoover,	in	his	personal	desire	to	maintain	the	FBI’s	
hegemony	over	domestic	intelligence	operations,	regularly	withheld	information	from	
the	CIA	and	other	U.S.	intelligence	agencies.	According	to	Sullivan,	this	practice	
infuriated	the	other	intelligence	agencies’	directors,	and	further	undermined	the	fight	
against	leftist	violence.	Sullivan	believed	that	in	order	to	prevent	bombings	and	other	
revolutionary	attacks,	the	FBI	needed	to	work	with	other	intelligence	agencies	to	learn	
about	radicals’	plans	for	violence	before	they	had	a	chance	to	carry	them	out.	If	the	
greater	good	of	defending	America’s	national	security	required	breaking	a	few	laws,	so	
																																																								
8	Sullivan,	The	Bureau,	207.	
9	Huston	oral	history	interview,	19.	
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be	it.	In	their	subsequent	meetings	over	the	next	year,	Sullivan	and	Huston	would	hatch	
a	plan	to	overcome	Hoover’s	restrictions	on	extralegal	surveillance	practices	and	his	
stonewalling	of	coordination	with	other	U.S.	intelligence	agencies.		
	 Meanwhile,	leftist	violence	in	America	was	on	the	rise.	At	the	very	same	moment	
that	Sullivan	and	Huston	were	meeting	for	the	first	time	in	Washington	D.C.,	SDS	was	
holding	their	annual	meeting	in	Chicago.	Bitter	sectarian	debates—over	the	best	
approaches	for	ending	the	war	in	Vietnam,	challenging	police	attacks	on	the	Black	
Panthers,	and	creating	a	revolutionary	movement	among	America’s	youth—were	
tearing	the	organization	apart.	Though	the	1969	National	Conference	resulted	in	the	
collapse	of	SDS	as	a	national	organization	cable	of	uniting	student	opposition	to	the	war,	
it	gave	birth	to	something	new.	Emerging	from	the	wreckage	of	SDS	came	the	
Weathermen,	which	within	seven	months	would	become	the	Weather	Underground,	
America’s	first	homegrown	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	organization,	and	the	central	
source	of	a	major	crisis	for	both	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	administration.	
	 SDS	met	from	June	19	to	21.	By	the	third	long	day	of	agonizing	debate,	SDS	split	
into	two	rival	factions.	The	losing	faction	was	the	Worker-Student	Alliance	(WSA),	a	
group	of	activists	associated	with	the	earlier	“action-praxis”	faction	and	the	Progressive	
Labor	Party	(PLP).	Coming	out	on	top	was	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	(RYM)	
faction,	an	outgrowth	of	the	“action	faction”	which	was	itself	made	up	of	two	sub-
factions	united	in	their	hatred	of	the	PLP	and	their	support	for	the	Black	Panther	Party	
and	Vietnam’s	National	Liberation	Front.	Leading	RYM	was	the	Weatherman	sub-
faction,	named	after	its	position	paper,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman	to	Know	which	
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Way	the	Wind	Blows,”	the	title	taken	from	a	line	in	a	hit	Bob	Dylan	song.10		
	 Drawing	on	foco	theory	and	hailing	the	martyrdom	of	Ché	Guevara,	the	
Weatherman	statement	called	for	the	development	of	a	revolutionary	anti-racist	
movement	among	America’s	working-class	white	youth,	which	it’s	signatories	sought	to	
mold	into	“one	division	of	the	International	Peoples’	Army”	they	hoped	would	
“dismember	and	dispose	of	U.S.	imperialism.”11	Like	the	Black	Panthers,	Weatherman	
saw	no	possibilities	for	creating	social	change	through	nonviolent	direct	action	or	
normal	avenues	of	the	U.S.	political	process.	They	also	did	not	acknowledge	that	leftist	
violence	and	militant	rhetoric	informed	police	responses	to	radicals.	In	the	context	of	
violent	U.S.	imperialism	and	Nixon’s	“law	and	order”	agenda,	Weatherman	generalized	
“pigs”	as	the	domestic	military	arm	of	the	“repressive	imperialist	State.”	Acting	on	
behalf	of	the	“ruling	class,”	police	would	“inevitably”	escalate	their	“repression”	of	the	
left,	not	in	response	to	perceived	threats	of	violence,	but	according	to	“how	threatening	
the	Movement	is	to	their	power.”12	The	analysis	was	self-serving.	It	enabled	
Weatherman	to	plot	a	course	towards	armed	guerrilla	struggle	while	shirking	
responsibility	for	their	own	role	in	shaping	police	actions	against	the	movements	of	the	
U.S.	left.	
	 In	their	manifesto,	Weatherman	held	on	to	movement-building	as	part	of	their	
																																																								
10	Karen	Ashley,	Bill	Ayers,	Bernadine	Dohrn,	John	Jacobs,	Jeff	Jones,	Gerry	Long,	Howie	Machtinger,	Jim	
Mellon,	Terry	Robbins,	Mark	Rudd,	and	Steve	Tappis,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman	to	Know	which	
Way	the	Wind	Blows,”	New	Left	Notes,	June	18,	1969,	Internet	Archive,	
https://archive.org/details/YouDontNeedAWeathermanToKnowWhichWayTheWindBlows_925	
(accessed	June	1,	2016).	A	brief	excerpt	of	this	wordy	manifesto	is	available	in	Dorhn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	
Song,	67-68.	For	further	analysis	of	this	document	and	the	1969	SDS	national	conference,	see	Varon,	
Bringing	the	War	Home,	49-51;	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	82-89;	and	Sale,	SDS,	559-579.	The	
statement’s	title	came	from	Bob	Dylan’s	1965	song	“Subterranean	Homesick	Blues.”			
11	Ashley,	et	al.,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman	to	Know	which	Way	the	Wind	Blows.”	
12	Ibid.	
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revolutionary	strategy.	Ultimately,	however,	Weatherman	asserted	that	armed	struggle	
would	be	necessary	to	counter	a	forthcoming	wave	of	“all-out	military	repression.”13	
Over	the	next	six	months,	the	group	would	abandon	movement-building	while	
preparing	for	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	war,	training	in	martial	arts	and	bomb-
making,	and	studying	the	focoist	texts	of	Guevara	and	Debray.14	The	move	to	foco-
inspired	clandestinity	set	Weatherman	apart	from	Cameron	Bishop	and	other	late	
1960s	radical	bombers,	as	well	as	from	anarchist	insurgents	of	the	late	nineteenth	and	
early	twentieth	century.	Previous	revolutionary	bombers	and	saboteurs	had	maintained	
public	activist	lives	while	occasionally	engaging	in	secretive	acts	of	political	violence.	
Weatherman,	in	contrast,	set	out	to	construct	an	underground	infrastructure	into	which	
they	could	escape	completely	from	state	surveillance.15	From	the	underground,	they	
hoped	to	launch	a	protracted	campaign	of	urban	guerrilla	warfare,	one	that	could	divert	
the	state’s	resources	away	from	its	attack	on	the	Black	Liberation	movement,	and,	
according	to	their	interpretation	of	foco	theory,	ignite	a	broader	revolutionary	uprising	
among	America’s	youth.			
	 Though	the	Columbia	strike	and	concerns	over	disruptive	student	unrest	had	
been	the	impetus	behind	COINTELPRO-New	Left,	prior	to	the	June	1969	National	
Convention	FBI	officials	also	worried	that	a	revolutionary	movement	led	by	a	united	
and	powerful	SDS	could	also	threaten	American	society.	In	the	view	of	FBI	domestic	
security	officials,	the	threat	of	New	Left	“subversion”	was	distinct	from	the	supposed	
foreign-backed	threat	posed	by	the	Communist	Party.	As	R.	L.	Shackelford	explained	to	
																																																								
13	Ibid.	
14	Rudd,	Underground,	180-183.	
15	For	a	sociological	analysis	of	late	1960s	radicals’	turn	to	clandestinity,	see	Zwerman,	et	al.,	
“Disappearing	Social	Movements.”	
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his	supervisors	Charles	Brennan	and	William	Sullivan	in	November	1968:		
It	appears	the	New	Left	is	gravitating	towards	establishing	a	power	base	within	
the	structure	of	higher	education.	It	is	well	established	the	basic	ideological	
difference	between	the	New	Left	and	the	Communist	Party,	USA	(CPUSA)	rests	
on	this	point.	The	CPUSA	believes	revolution	must	come	from	the	laboring	class,	
the	New	Left	believes	from	the	intelligentsia.		
	 The	Latin	American	version	of	universities	being	corrupted	into	power	
bases	for	revolution	is	well	known.	The	evolution	of	their	universities,	as	
sacrosanct	places,	off	limits	to	their	governments,	is	not	something	we	can	afford	
to	sit	by	and	see	followed	here.16	
	
	 In	the	year	leading	up	to	the	1969	National	Convention,	the	FBI’s	dual	
objectives—of	preventing	both	subversion	and	violence—each	informed	COINTELPRO	
operations	against	SDS,	sometimes	in	conflicting	ways.	Indeed,	shortly	before	the	
National	Convention,	the	FBI	worried	that	the	PLP’s	“praxis	action”	faction	could	
transform	SDS	from	“a	shapeless	and	fractionalized	group	into	a	militant	and	
disciplined	organization”	capable	of	consolidating	a	revolutionary	student	movement.17	
With	these	fears	taking	immediate	precedent	over	violence	prevention,	the	FBI	
undertook	several	COINTELPRO	actions	designed	to	prevent	PLP	from	dominating	
SDS.18	In	one	instance,	FBI	officials	directed	their	numerous	informants	inside	SDS	to	
vote	for	the	National	Office	faction	(which	would	soon	become	known	as	the	
Weatherman	faction)	in	the	vote	for	officers	during	the	National	Convention.	The	
Special	Agent	in	Charge	of	the	Cleveland	Field	Office	later	reported	that	although	the	
“precise	effect”	of	this	initiative	could	not	be	measured,	the	FBI’s	preferred	outcome	
materialized	nonetheless,	as	Weatherleaders	Mark	Rudd,	Bernadine	Dorhn,	Bill	Ayers,	
																																																								
16	FBI	memo,	R.	L.	Shackelford	to	C.	D.	Brennan,	November	5,	1968,	COINTELPRO	New	Left,	Headquarters	
file,	section	1.	
17	FBI	memo,	SAC	Cleveland	to	Director,	August	1,	1969,	FBI	COINTELPRO-New	Left,	Cleveland	File.	
18	Aaron	Leonard,	“The	FBI	and	the	Shattering	of	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society,”	Truthout,	October	2,	
2014,	http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/26558-the-fbi-and-the-shattering-of-students-for-a-
democratic-society	(accessed	June	1,	2016);	Cunningham,	There’s	Something	Happening	Here,	62-64.	
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and	Jeff	Jones	assumed	their	new	positions	as	SDS	national	officers.	“The	SDS	as	the	
mainstay	of	the	national	New	Left	Movement	is	now	seriously	divided	and,	to	this	
extent,	weakened,”	he	reported,	noting,	“the	National	Office	faction	is	gradually	being	
forced	into	a	position	of	militant	extremism	which	hopefully	will	isolate	it	from	other	
elements	of	the	libertarian	community	and	eventuate	its	complete	discrediting	in	the	
eyes	of	the	American	public.”19		
	 	After	the	National	Convention,	however,	the	FBI	shifted	the	focus	of	its	New	Left	
surveillance	and	counterintelligence	operations	towards	the	Weatherman	faction,	
hoping	to	prevent	the	group	from	carrying	out	disruptive	or	lethal	violence.	On	July	25,	
1969,	a	few	days	after	Weatherman	took	over	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS),	
FBI	Internal	Security	Chief	Charles	D.	Brennan	warned	Assistant	Director	William	C.	
Sullivan	about	the	faction’s	embrace	of	clandestine	guerrilla	violence.	Weatherman,	he	
explained,	sought	to	move	SDS	“into	the	position	of	a	clandestine	organization	of	
Marxist-Leninist	revolutionists	which	will	support	similar	groups	throughout	the	world	
and	use	force	and	violence	to	achieve	their	objectives	in	this	country.”20	Indeed,	the	
emergence	of	Weatherman,	a	development	the	FBI	had	ironically	encouraged,	now	
served	as	confirmation	of	Sullivan	and	Brennan’s	view	that	leftist	violence	presented	a	
new	urgent	threat	to	U.S.	national	security,	one	that	the	FBI	was	not	fully	prepared	to	
confront.	
	 	
Clandestinity	
Although	Charles	Brennan	observed	a	significant	shift	in	SDS’s	strategy,	the	FBI	had	no	
																																																								
19	SAC	Cleveland	to	Director,	August	1,	1969,	4.		
20	FBI	memo,	C.	D.	Brennan	to	W.	C.	Sullivan,	July	25,	1969,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	5,	Section	52.	
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specific	knowledge	of	Weatherman	plans	for	violence.	Brennan	and	other	FBI	Domestic	
Security	officials	also	had	no	new	counterstrategy	for	undermining	Weatherman	or	
clandestine	urban	guerrilla	groups.	In	the	absence	of	such	a	new	strategy,	Brennan	
responded	to	Weatherman	with	a	counterintelligence	operation	similar	to	those	the	FBI	
had	been	directing	against	SDS	since	April	1968.	Brennan	recommended	furnishing	
information	on	SDS’s	factionalism	to	“friendly	news	services”	with	the	aim	of	promoting	
“a	wider	split	in	this	revolutionary	youth	group.”21	The	FBI	would	carry	out	many	
COINTELPRO	operations	aimed	to	undermine	Weatherman	before	the	group’s	
membership	went	fully	underground	in	March	1970;	agents’	pressure	on	landlords,	for	
example,	managed	to	get	a	two	Weatherman	collectives	kicked	out	of	their	apartments	
in	Cambridge,	Massachusetts.22		
	 In	addition	to	precipitating	new	counterintelligence	operations,	the	June	1969	
SDS	National	Convention	marked	the	beginning	of	a	dramatic	expansion	in	the	FBI’s	
surveillance	of	American	leftist	organizations.	In	July,	replicating	programs	targeting	
the	CPUSA,	SNCC,	and	the	Black	Panthers,	the	Bureau	initiated	a	program	to	develop	
“top	level	informants”	within	SDS’s	National	Office,	whom	they	hoped	could	provide	
daily	reports	on	the	activities	of	the	organization’s	leadership.	In	a	message	to	FBI	
Headquarters,	the	Chicago	Field	Office	affirmed	their	support	for	such	efforts,	
expressing	dismay	with	their	lack	of	informants	inside	the	Weatherman	faction,	whom	
they	described	as	“extremely	security	conscious	permitting	very	few	individuals,	even	
																																																								
21	Ibid.		
22	FBI	airtel,	SAC	Boston	to	Director,	February	26,	1970;	FBI	memo,	SAC	Boston	to	Director,	May	15,	1970,	
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though	known	members	of	the	SDS,	to	visit	the	National	Office.”23	After	this	initiative	
the	FBI	continued	to	expand	its	domestic	surveillance	operations.	Between	July	1969	
and	July	1972,	the	FBI	increased	new	domestic	surveillance	by	over	fifty	percent,	as	
agents	initiated	over	1,000	new	investigations	of	“subversives”	and	“extremists.”24	A	
1976	federal	government	report	on	FBI	practices	attributed	this	development	to	“the	
increasing	number	of	radical	new	left	groups	associated	with	militant	demonstrations	
and	either	involved	or	suspected	of	involvement	in	arson,	bombings,	and	destruction	of	
Government	property.”25	According	to	the	report,	the	FBI	was	especially	concerned	
with	Weatherman	as	well	as	“black	militant	groups,	particularly	the	Black	Panther	
Party.”26	
	 The	FBI	tracked	Weatherman	with	growing	alarm	during	the	summer	of	1969,	a	
period	of	surging	popular	protest	against	the	U.S.	war	in	Vietnam.	Gleaning	information	
from	informants	and	SDS	publications	such	as	New	Left	Notes,	the	FBI	watched	as	
Weatherman	planned	their	“SDS	National	Action,”	otherwise	known	as	the	“Days	of	
Rage,”	in	which	organizers	sought	to	deliver	tens	of	thousands	of	militant	protestors	to	
downtown	Chicago	from	October	8-11	to	“bring	the	war	home”	and	engage	police	in	
hand-to-hand	combat.27		
	 Weatherman	conceived	the	Days	of	Rage	as	a	means	to	achieve	their	goal	of	
sparking	a	white	working-class	youth	revolt	and	opening	a	front	against	U.S.	
imperialism	in	the	heart	of	America.	Organizers	extolled	violence,	pronouncing	their	
																																																								
23	FBI	airtel,	SAC	Chicago	to	Director,	“Top	Level	Informant	Development	(TOPLEV),”	July	28,	1969,	WUO	
FBI,	Roll	5,	Section	53.	
24	GAO,	FBI	Domestic	Intelligence	Operations,	133.			
25	Ibid.	
26	Ibid,	133-135.	
27	Cunningham,	There’s	Something	Happening	Here,	64;	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	61-62.	
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intentions	to	“tear	up	pig	city”	and	“kick	ass”	in	confrontations	with	the	police,	as	they	
attempted	to	recruit	participants	at	high	schools,	community	colleges,	and	youth	
hangouts.28	Weatherwoman	Cathy	Wilkerson	later	recalled	that	such	activities	“gave	
voice	to	the	frustration,	anger,	and	growing	abandon	that	so	many	young	activists	felt,”	
and	“seemed	to	electrify	the	imagination	of	a	new	constituency	of	young	people,	
especially	teenagers.”29	“Some	of	the	leaders	of	Weatherman,	however,	mistook	these	
youthful	expressions	of	alienation	for	political	consciousness,”	Wilkerson	wrote;	“Many	
wanted	to	be	convinced”	of	the	erroneous	notion	“that	if	a	few	threw	up	the	barricades,	
hundreds	of	thousands	would	follow.”30	
	 Upon	observing	an	escalation	in	Weatherman’s	militant	rhetoric	and	plans	for	
violence,	FBI	Field	Offices	in	Chicago	and	other	cities	shifted	the	“major	thrust	of	[New	
Left]	counterintelligence	activity”	towards	the	group.31	One	way	the	FBI	sought	to	
undermine	Weatherman	was	by	discrediting	them	in	the	eyes	of	the	public.	Achieving	
this	objective	was	not	difficult,	given	the	group’s	nearly	non-existent	popular	support.	
To	further	tarnish	Weatherman’s	image,	the	FBI	simply	helped	to	publicize	its	leaders’	
outrageous	violent	rhetoric.	In	one	August	1969	counterintelligence	operation,	for	
example,	Cleveland	agents	tipped	off	a	local	television	news	station	that	SDS	was	
holding	a	regional	conference	in	the	city,	and	suggested	reporters	seek	interviews	with	
the	organization’s	leaders.	As	a	result,	Station	WJW	televised	an	interview	in	which	
Mark	Rudd	and	two	other	Weatherleaders,	in	the	FBI’s	words,	“exhibited	an	insolent,	
arrogant	attitude	and	openly	proclaimed	their	communistic	philosophy	and	intent	to	
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	 113	
‘smash’	the	United	States	Government.”	Cleveland’s	Special	Agent	in	Charge	reported	
with	satisfaction	that	“Rudd’s	statements	have	served	to	alarm	and	alert	citizens	of	this	
area	and	have	convinced	many	who	were	previously	indifferent	to	this	problem	posed	
by	the	SDS.”32	In	another	instance,	Chicago	agents	distributed	among	“moderate	
groups”	a	twenty-seven-page	cartoon	book	designed	to	lampoon	Weatherman’s	
“revolutionary	ideals”	and	advocacy	of	violent	street-fighting	tactics.33	According	to	
Chicago’s	Special	Agent	in	Charge,	the	book	“caused	concern	over	SDS	activities”	and	
“appeared	to	be	especially	successful	among	high	school	students	where	SDS	was	
attempting	to	organize.”34		
	 The	FBI	also	endeavored	to	promote	fissures	between	Weatherman	and	other	
radical	groups.	Spreading	rumors	through	informants	and	anonymously	mailed	letters,	
FBI	agents	sought	to	sow	divisions	between	the	SDS	National	Office	and	the	Chicago	
Black	Panthers,	deepen	animosity	between	Weatherman	and	the	PLP,	and	promote	
distrust	between	Weatherman	and	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	II,	the	anti-PLP	
faction	that	split	from	Weatherman	after	the	SDS	National	Convention.35	Factionalism	
ran	so	high	in	SDS	after	the	June	1969	National	Conference,	however,	that	such	FBI	
operations	were	barely	needed	to	undermine	the	crumbling	SDS.	Observing	in	August	
1969	that	the	Weatherman	faction	had	“expelled”	several	members	who	“expressed	
opinions	differing	from	the	‘line’	established	by	the	current	leaders,”	the	Special	Agent	
in	Charge	of	Cleveland’s	field	office	warned	FBI	Headquarters	that	attempting	to	disrupt	
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SDS	through	the	use	of	paid	informants	was	not	worth	the	risk.36	“At	present,”	he	wrote,	
“it	does	not	seem	wise	to	risk	valuable	informants	by	engaging	them	in	the	delicate	task	
of	injecting	disruptive	opinions	into	SDS	policy-making	decisions.”37	
	 While	carrying	out	COINTELPRO	operations	against	Weatherman,	the	FBI	also	
conducted	surveillance	in	an	effort	to	ascertain	the	group’s	plans	for	the	Days	of	Rage	
and	other	potentially	violent	actions.	The	FBI	started	tapping	the	phones	in	SDS’s	
Chicago	National	Office	in	May	1969,	a	month	before	Weatherman	coalesced	during	the	
organization’s	June	National	Convention.38	William	Dyson	was	one	of	four	Special	
Agents	who	logged	more	than	160	hours	per	week	listening	in	on	SDS	phone	
conversations,	as	the	organization’s	activists	began	to	consider	the	merits	of	guerrilla	
warfare.	He	later	remembered	the	excitement	he	felt	while	monitoring	SDS	activities	on	
a	recording	machine	in	the	“Central	Tesur	Plant,”	a	locked,	windowless	room	located	in	
“the	bowels	of	the	Chicago	Office.”39	“I	watched	them	become	the	Weathermen!	I	was	
with	them	when	they	became	the	Weathermen!”	he	recalled,	claiming,	“I	knew	more	
about	these	people	than	they	knew	about	themselves.”40		
	 With	the	Attorney	General’s	approval,	the	FBI	also	installed	a	hidden	
microphone	in	SDS’s	Chicago	Regional	Office	in	September	1969.41	FBI	Headquarters	
wished	to	“bug”	SDS’s	National	Office	as	well,	but	Chicago	agents	were	unable	to	
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conduct	the	break-in	required	for	microphone	installation	due	to	the	presence	of	
Weatherman	security	volunteers	stationed	outside	the	office’s	steel-plated	door	
twenty-four	hours	a	day.42	Weatherman’s	“guard	watch”	was	only	one	of	several	
security	measures	the	group	took	to	counter	FBI	and	police	surveillance.	Having	
become	radicalized	amid	a	political	counterculture	in	which	activists	were	accustomed	
to	police	surveillance,	harassment,	and	brutality,	Weatherman	militants	correctly	
assumed	that	their	phones	were	tapped	and	that	police	informants	sought	to	infiltrate	
their	meetings	and	organization.43	An	August	1969	Chicago	FBI	report	noted	that	
activists	in	the	SDS	National	office	had	adopted	an	“extreme	concern	for	security”	after	
Chicago	police	arrested	five	leaders	on	the	premises	the	previous	May.	“Since	then	and	
particularly	after	the	new	[Weatherman]	leadership	took	over	the	[National	Office],”	the	
report	noted,	“their	security	procedures	increased	to	the	extent	that	at	the	present	no	
one	not	known	personally	to	one	of	the	three	national	secretaries	may	be	admitted.”44		
	 Despite	Weatherman’s	counter-surveillance	measures,	the	FBI	managed	to	
obtain	a	great	deal	of	information	from	its	wiretaps	on	the	SDS	National	Office	phones	
and	its	microphone	inside	the	Chicago	Regional	Office.	William	Dyson	and	other	
eavesdropping	agents	compiled	extensive	notes	on	Weatherpeople’s	plans	and	other	
activities,	taking	particular	interest	in	members’	travels	to	Cuba,	conversations	with	
Black	Panthers,	and	communications	with	activists	in	local	SDS	chapters.45	In	a	report	
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to	Director	Hoover,	Chicago’s	Special	Agent	in	Charge	summarized	that	the	electronic	
surveillance	had	“furnished	numerous	identities	of	SDS	leaders	in	other	parts	of	the	
United	States,	plus	information	concerning	aims	and	purposes	and	future	plans	as	well	
as	information	concerning	finances	of	SDS.”46		
	 The	Days	of	Rage	fell	far	short	of	the	white	revolutionary	urban	insurrection	
Weatherman	leaders	had	envisioned.	Only	a	few	hundred	activists	showed	up	in	
Chicago	for	the	pre-planned	riot,	a	fraction	of	the	fifteen	thousand	that	organizers	had	
hoped	for.47	Although	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	efforts	likely	enhanced	the	
alienating	effects	of	the	militants’	factionalism	and	lurid	rhetoric,	Weatherman	had	
largely	succeeded	in	turning-off	would-be	recruits	on	their	own.	Mark	Rudd	had	a	point	
when	he	reflected	decades	later,	with	heavy	self-criticism,	that	Weatherman	had	
“played	into	the	hands	of	the	FBI.”	“We	might	as	well	have	been	on	their	payroll,”	he	
said.48	The	FBI	was	unable,	however,	to	prevent	Weatherman	violence	on	Chicago’s	
streets.	Indeed,	by	disrupting	the	New	Left	and	Black	Panthers,	and	giving	local	police	a	
green	light	to	harass,	arrest,	and	beat	radical	activists,	the	FBI	had	helped	inspire	
Weatherman’s	turn	to	“revolutionary”	violence.			
	 On	October	6,	in	an	attempt	to	inspire	revolutionary	militancy	at	the	“Days	of	
Rage,”	Weatherman	activists	carried	out	their	first	bombing.	The	blast	demolished	a	
statue	commemorating	Chicago	police	killed	during	the	1886	Haymarket	riots	(radicals	
despised	the	monument	because	it	neglected	to	memorialize	the	four	anarchist	labor	
																																																								
46	Ibid,	5.	Chicago	police	also	regularly	followed	and	harassed	Weatherman	militants	throughout	the	
summer	and	fall	of	1969.	See	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,106-107;	and	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	
153.	
47	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	74;	Rudd,	Underground,	181.	
48	Rudd,	Underground,	ix.	
	 117	
activists	authorities	hanged	in	1887	in	retaliation	for	the	officers’	deaths).49	Days	later,	
Weatherman	militants	who	showed	up	for	the	demonstrations	provoked	clashes	with	
the	police,	and	smashed	hundreds	of	residential,	store,	and	car	windows.	Sixty-four	
police	officers	sustained	injuries	during	the	confrontations,	as	did	many	of	the	rioters,	
who	suffered	brutal	police	baton	beatings.	Police	also	shot	six	protesters,	and	arrested	
287,	utilizing	FBI	intelligence	to	identify	Weathermen.50	Chicago	Assistant	Corporation	
Council	Richard	Elrod	became	paralyzed	during	the	street	fights	after	hitting	his	neck	
against	a	concrete	wall	while	trying	to	tackle	Weatherman	Brian	Flanagan.51	Utilizing	
language	that	the	FBI	would	soon	regularly	use	to	characterize	Weatherman,	the	
Chicago	Tribune	echoed	the	feelings	of	many	Americans	who	watched	footage	of	the	
violence	on	television,	describing	the	rioters’	actions	as	a	“carnival	of	mindless	terror.”		
In	a	statement	legitimizing	the	FBI’s	efforts	to	destroy	the	Weatherman	organization,	
the	Tribune	called	on	police	to	stamp	out	the	“New	Barbarians.”52	Chicago	FBI	agents,	in	
turn,	seized	on	the	fact	that	the	Days	of	Rage	had	“resulted	in	wide	spread	publicity	
unfavorable	to	the	Weatherman	faction	of	SDS,”	and	proposed	new	counterintelligence	
actions	designed	to	eliminate	any	remaining	popular	support	for	the	group.53		
	 The	FBI	accurately	foresaw	the	“Days	of	Rage”	as	a	prelude	to	Weatherman’s	
involvement	in	a	new	form	of	violence:	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	warfare.	In	an	airtel	
sent	to	thirteen	major	Field	Offices	on	October	23,	1969,	Director	Hoover	reported	
receiving	intelligence,	likely	gleaned	from	informants,	“that	the	New	York	City	area	
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‘Weatherman’	faction	of	SDS	is	going	underground	and	forming	commando-type	units	
which	will	engage	in	terroristic	acts,	including	bombings,	arsons	and	assassinations.”54	
Hoover	still	had	no	clear	strategy	for	combatting	clandestine	leftist	guerrillas,	however.	
Lacking	such	a	strategy,	Hoover	and	his	men	drew	upon	time-tested	investigative	and	
“preventative”	surveillance	techniques	the	FBI	had	developed	in	its	previous	
investigations	of	criminals,	Communists,	and	Klansmen.	Noting	that	members	of	the	
Ohio	SDS	Regional	Office	organized	weekly	karate	and	firearms	training	courses	during	
the	summer	of	1969,	Hoover	directed	recipient	offices	to	“thoroughly	review	pertinent	
files”	and	consult	“logical	knowledgeable	sources”	in	order	to	“determine	whether	any	
indications	of	such	activity	exists	in	those	territories”	and	if	“the	‘Weatherman’	faction	
intends	to	follow	this	pattern	on	a	national	basis.”55	In	late	November,	under	Hoover’s	
direction,	FBI	offices	throughout	the	country	began	compiling	biographies	of	all	known	
members	of	SDS’s	Weatherman	faction,	gathering	approximately	270	in	under	a	month,	
and	adding	most	names	to	the	Bureau’s	Security	Index.56	Hoover	also	ordered	over	a	
dozen	Field	Offices	to	develop	informants	capable	of	infiltrating	local	Weatherman	
collectives.57			
	 In	spite	of	these	efforts,	FBI	investigators	felt	frustrated	with	their	limited	
knowledge	of	Weatherman’s	plans	and	activities.	On	December	19,	1969,	Internal	
Security	Chief	Charles	Brennan	conveyed	such	feelings	to	Assistant	Director	William	
Sullivan,	lamenting	that	because	of	the	Weatherman’s	secrecy,	the	Bureau	had	been	
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“unable	to	obtain	the	penetrative	coverage	we	desire.”58	In	addition	to	revealing	the	
challenges	Weatherman’s	turn	to	clandestinity	posed	to	FBI	surveillance	efforts,	
Brennan’s	memo	conveyed	the	accumulating	frustration	he	and	Sullivan	felt	over	
Hoover’s	ban	on	illegal	surveillance	techniques.	Brennan	and	Sullivan	had	something	
important	in	common	with	the	Director,	however:	an	ongoing	failure	to	acknowledge	
that	police	violence	and	FBI	counterintelligence	operations—particularly	those	directed	
against	the	Black	Panther	Party—helped	strengthen	Weatherman’s	resolve	to	prepare	
for	guerrilla	warfare.	
	 A	critical	deadly	police	attack	on	the	Black	Panthers	occurred	in	Chicago	during	
the	predawn	hours	of	December	4,	1969.	At	4:00	A.M.,	in	an	alleged	effort	to	seize	illegal	
weapons	on	behalf	of	the	Illinois	State’s	Attorney,	fourteen	Chicago	police	armed	with	
five	shotguns,	a	submachine	gun,	and	twenty-one	other	firearms	raided	the	Monroe	
Street	apartment	of	the	city’s	Black	Panther	leader,	twenty-year-old	Fred	Hampton.	
When	the	occupants	of	the	apartment	refused	to	let	them	in,	the	police	opened	fire	
through	the	door,	and	continued	shooting	as	they	barged	their	way	inside,	unloading	
over	90	rounds	in	a	matter	of	minutes.	When	the	shooting	stopped,	Fred	Hampton	laid	
dead	on	his	blood-soaked	mattress,	having	been	killed	in	his	sleep.	The	police	had	also	
taken	the	life	of	Mark	Clark,	leader	of	the	Peoria	BPP	chapter,	who	had	decided	to	spend	
the	night	in	the	apartment.	Fellow	Panther	Deborah	Johnson,	who	was	also	Hampton’s	
fiancé,	pregnant,	and	sleeping	in	the	same	bed,	miraculously	survived	the	attack.	She	
was	immediately	arrested,	along	with	six	other	surviving	Panthers,	most	of	them	
teenagers,	four	with	serious	wounds.	The	police	initially	asserted	that	they	had	opened	
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fire	in	response	to	shots	coming	from	inside	the	apartment,	a	claim	reprinted	without	
question	in	the	next	day’s	newspaper.	A	few	months	later,	however,	an	FBI	investigation	
carried	out	on	behalf	of	the	Justice	Department’s	Civil	Rights	Division	determined	that	
all	of	the	bullets	fired	in	the	raid	had	come	from	police	guns	with	the	exception	of	one,	
which	Mark	Clark	shot	into	the	floor	after	a	police	round	pierced	his	heart.59				
	 Like	other	police	killings	of	Black	Panthers,	the	deaths	of	Fred	Hampton	and	
Mark	Clark	occurred	amid	escalating	violence	between	local	police	and	Panthers.	
Tensions	in	Chicago	had	been	building	since	the	previous	summer,	when	Hampton	was	
serving	a	jail	sentence	for	“appropriating”	$71	worth	of	ice	bars	from	an	ice	cream	truck	
and	distributing	them	to	neighborhood	children.	FBI	agents	and	Chicago	carried	out	
several	raids	on	the	local	Panther	office	during	the	summer	and	fall,	resulting	in	arrests	
and	shots	fired.	Panthers	and	Chicago	police	engaged	in	firefights	in	July	and	October.	
This	violence	occurred	among	broader	tensions	between	African	Americans	and	
Chicago	police;	fifty-nine	blacks	died	at	the	hands	of	Chicago	police	in	1969	and	1970.	
On	November	13,	nineteen-year-old	former	Panther	Spurgeon	Jake	Winters	initiated	a	
spontaneous	police	ambush	and	prolonged	firefight	that	resulted	in	his	own	death,	the	
death	of	two	officers,	and	the	wounding	of	seven	more.60		
	 Many	in	the	law	enforcement	community	blamed	Panther	violence	on	Hampton,	
who	led	the	Party’s	Chicago	chapter,	even	though	he	had	been	out	of	town	during	the	
November	13	incident.	Hampton	had	been	one	of	the	most	successful	Panther	
organizers	in	the	country,	overseeing	a	successful	Free	Breakfast	Program	and	Free	
Health	Clinic,	and	forging	alliances—albeit	sometimes	strained	ones—with	local	
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chapters	of	SDS,	the	radical	Puerto	Rican	Young	Lords	Organization,	and	the	Blackstone	
Rangers	street	gang.61	Amid	escalating	police	violence	against	the	Panthers	in	Chicago	
and	beyond,	Hampton,	like	Bobby	Seale,	opposed	immediate	offensive	armed	attacks	on	
police	officers.	Instead	he	saw	Panther	“survival	programs”	as	means	to	unite	
oppressed	communities	into	a	social	movement	capable	of	overthrowing	U.S.	capitalism	
and	imperialism	through	future	organized	popular	revolutionary	violence.	“We	not	
gonna	fight	reactionary	pigs	…	with	any	reaction	on	our	part,”	he	told	a	large	multiracial	
audience	in	1969,	“We	gonna	fight	their	reaction	when	all	of	us	get	together	and	have	an	
international	proletarian	revolution.”62	During	the	same	gathering,	Seale,	then	on	trial	
in	the	Chicago	Eight	case,	exclaimed	to	the	crowd,	“We’re	going	to	stand	together.	We’re	
going	to	have	a	Black	Army,	a	Mexican	American	Army,	and	alliance	in	solidarity	with	
progressive	Whites,	All	of	us.	And	we’re	going	to	march	on	this	pig	power	structure.	And	
we’re	going	to	say:	‘Stick	‘em	up	motherfucker.	We	Come	for	what’s	ours.’”63	
Unconcerned	with	the	nuances	of	violent	Panther	rhetoric,	police	and	other	officials	
saw	Hampton	as	a	threat.	After	the	bloody	November	13	gun	battle,	rumors	began	to	
spread	on	Chicago’s	streets	that	the	police	wanted	Hampton	dead,	and	some	activists	
urged	him	to	leave	the	city.64	
	 The	Black	Panthers	portrayed	the	Hampton	and	Clark	killings	as	premeditated	
murder,	and	as	part	of	the	state’s	larger	campaign	of	repression	against	their	
organization.	Given	the	facts	of	the	raid,	their	argument	was	convincing.	For	several	
days	after	the	killings,	Chicago	Panthers	kept	Hampton’s	apartment	open	to	the	public.	
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Taking	careful	precautions	to	ensure	that	nobody	disturbed	the	crime	scene,	Panthers	
toured	neighbors,	activists,	and	journalists	through	the	apartment	to	view	Hampton’s	
bloody	mattress	and	the	dozens	of	bullet	holes	that	riddled	the	apartment’s	walls.	
Media	coverage	of	the	apartment	generated	international	outrage	and	forced	the	Justice	
Department	mandate	the	FBI’s	investigation	of	the	killings.	For	nearly	a	decade,	
however,	the	FBI	concealed	the	fact	that	their	own	paid	informant	William	O’Neal,	who	
served	as	Fred	Hampton’s	bodyguard,	had	provided	his	handler	Special	Agent	Roy	
Mitchell	with	a	hand-drawn	floor	plan	of	the	apartment	featuring	the	location	of	
Hampton’s	bed	that	police	had	used	in	the	raid.65		
	 As	with	other	incidents	of	deadly	conflict	between	radicals	and	police	during	the	
Nixon	era,	critical	facts	surrounding	the	Hampton-Clark	killings	remain	unknown	and	
hotly	debated.	In	particular,	the	belief	persists	that	Hoover’s	FBI	ordered	the	killings	as	
part	of	its	counterintelligence	program	against	the	Black	Panthers.66	There	is	no	
documentary	evidence	to	support	this	assertion,	however.	FBI	Special	Agent	Mitchell	
certainly	did	provide	Chicago	police	with	O’Neal’s	sketch	of	the	Hampton	apartment’s	
floor	plan.	But	did	he	do	so	under	orders	from	FBI	Headquarters	or	the	Chicago	Special	
Agent	in	Charge	Marlin	C.	Johnson?	Or	did	he	do	so	on	his	own?	And	did	he	know	how	
the	Chicago	police	were	going	to	use	it?	Did	he	care?67	Why	did	Hoover	conceal	the	FBI’s	
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connection	to	the	raid?	To	cover-up	an	FBI	plot?	To	cover-up	other	illegal	FBI	activity?	
To	preserve	the	Bureau’s	public	image?	Although	it	is	unlikely	that	we	will	ever	have	
definitive	answers	to	these	questions,	one	critical	fact	is	clear:	the	Hampton-Clark	
killings	served	to	confirm	militant	leftists’	suspicions	that	the	government	would	stop	at	
nothing,	including	murder,	to	crush	America’s	radical	left.		
	 The	Hampton-Clark	killings	were	a	critical	factor	guiding	Weatherman’s	path	
toward	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	warfare.	As	historian	Jeremy	Varon	explained,	
“Hampton’s	murder	deeply	affected	the	Weathermen,	underscoring	a	basic	premise	of	
theirs	and	the	New	Left	as	a	whole:	that	race	constituted	a	primary	basis	of	oppression	
and	vastly	separated	the	experiences	of	black	and	white	activists.”68	Weatherman	David	
Gilbert	recalled,	“it	was	the	murder	of	Fred	Hampton	more	than	any	other	factor	that	
compelled	us	to	take	up	armed	struggle.”69	Similarly,	Cathy	Wilkerson	remembered,	
“the	murders	[of	Hampton	and	Clark]	seemed	to	call	for	yet	a	greater	escalation,	so	that	
at	least	this	kind	of	police	behavior	would	not	silently	become	the	accepted	norm…	The	
rules	had	changed,	and	whatever	Weatherman	was	planning,	I	wanted	to	be	part	of	it.”70		
	 Three	weeks	after	the	Hampton-Clark	killings,	on	December	27-30,	1969,	the	
Weathermen	(and	women)	engaged	in	a	frenzied,	final	call	for	armed	revolution	during	
their	National	Council	in	Flint,	Michigan.	The	meeting	of	about	300	people,	dubbed	the	
“National	War	Council”	by	organizers,	was	Weatherman’s	last	public	gathering.	At	the	
Flint	War	Council,	Weatherleaders	engaged	in	some	of	the	most	flamboyantly	violent	
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rhetoric	to	ever	come	out	of	the	New	Left	as	they	engaged	in	their	last	open	recruitment	
effort	before	going	underground.	Organizers	of	the	event	couched	their	exhortations	to	
armed	revolution	in	counterculture	imagery	and	parlance,	decorating	their	meeting	
area	with	images	of	Ché	Guevara	and	Fred	Hampton,	and	posters	featuring	hand	drawn	
gun	sights	and	the	words	“P-I-E-C-E	N-O-W.”71	One	of	the	most	widely	publicized	
statements	to	come	out	of	the	gathering	was	one	that	Bernadine	Dorhn	and	other	
Weatherpeople	later	deeply	regretted.	Romanticizing	the	Charles	Manson	cult’s	murder	
of	actress	Sharon	Tate	and	six	other	individuals	the	previous	summer,	Dohrn	exclaimed,	
“Dig	it;	first	they	killed	those	pigs,	then	they	ate	dinner	in	the	room	with	them,	then	they	
even	shoved	a	fork	into	pig	Tate’s	stomach.	Wild!”72	Weatherleaders	made	such	
proclamations	as	they	announced	their	plans	to	go	underground,	and	worked	to	psych	
each	other	up	for	the	task	of	building	a	clandestine	urban	guerrilla	organization.73	At	
the	War	Council,	Weather	militants	also	conducted	martial	arts	classes	and	discussed	
plans	for	securing	weapons,	choosing	targets,	and	building	a	secure	underground	
infrastructure.74		
	 Discouraged	with	the	shortcomings	of	their	intelligence	gathering,	FBI	officials	
looked	to	the	Flint	War	Council	as	an	opportunity	to	widen	their	surveillance	on	
Weatherman.	The	FBI	compiled	an	annotated	list	of	over	a	hundred	core	activists	who	
attended	the	War	Council,	drawing	on	information	provided	by	their	own	informants	in	
the	crowd,	as	well	as	by	the	Flint	Police	Department,	whose	officers	pulled	over	at	least	
																																																								
71	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	159.	
72	Dorhn	quoted	in	ibid,	160.	
73	Ibid,	158-159.	
74	Ibid,	159.	
	 125	
twenty	cars	containing	suspected	Weatherman	militants	en	route	to	the	gathering.75	In	
their	reports	on	the	conference,	FBI	officials	underscored	some	of	the	Weatherleaders’	
most	inflammatory	comments,	including	Bill	Ayers’	remarks	on	the	“necessity	to	take	
on	arms	and	off	the	pigs.”76	Director	Hoover	forwarded	information	on	Weatherman	
obtained	at	the	War	Council	to	President	Richard	Nixon,	Attorney	General	John	Mitchell,	
National	Security	Advisor	Henry	Kissinger,	the	State	Department,	the	Central	
Intelligence	Agency	(CIA),	the	Secret	Service,	and	three	different	military	intelligence	
agencies.	The	contents	of	Hoover’s	declassified	correspondence	with	these	officials	are	
heavily	redacted,	but	the	letters	probably	contained	warnings	of	Weatherman’s	plans	to	
carry	out	guerilla	violence.77	President	Nixon	later	recalled	reading	Hoover’s	reports	on	
Weatherman’s	War	Council	with	grave	unease	over	the	organization’s	plans	to	“begin	a	
new	campaign	of	underground	warfare,	police	murder,	and	bombing.”78			
	 The	FBI	gained	a	great	deal	of	information	about	those	who	attended	the	War	
Council,	but	they	gained	no	specific	knowledge	about	Weatherman’s	plans	for	urban	
guerrilla	warfare.	Though	vocal	in	their	advocacy	of	armed	revolution,	Weatherman	
militants,	maintaining	their	usual	security	precautions,	intentionally	kept	the	specific	
details	of	their	plans	secret.	Immediately	following	the	conference,	Weatherman	
members	commenced	their	process	of	going	“underground”	to	build	a	clandestine	
revolutionary	organization	committed	to	sustained	urban	guerrilla	warfare.		
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	 To	this	end,	Weatherman	initiated	a	process	of	“consolidation.”	After	closing	
down	the	SDS	National	Office	in	Chicago	in	January	1970,	the	organization	orchestrated	
a	series	of	“purges”	designed	to	eliminate	police	informants	and	individuals	deemed	
lacking	in	commitment.	One	FBI	informant	managed	to	survive	Weatherman’s	purges:	
Larry	Grathwohl,	a	Vietnam	veteran	who	infiltrated	the	group	the	previous	summer,	
and	survived	an	“acid	test”	in	which	members	of	the	group	consumed	LSD	while	
Weather	leaders	taunted	and	interrogated	them.79	Weatherman’s	remaining	members,	
numbering	approximately	150,	also	commenced	a	painful	process	of	breaking	ties	with	
family	members	and	aboveground	acquaintances	in	order	to	establish	new,	assumed	
identities	based	on	fake	IDs.	In	the	San	Francisco	Bay	area,	Chicago,	Detroit,	and	New	
York	City,	Weatherman	established	collectives	where	members	lived	clandestinely	in	
rented	“safe	houses”	in	counter-culture	enclaves	or	urban	white	working-class	
neighborhoods.	They	accumulated	skills	with	explosives,	document	forgery,	and	
disguise,	financing	their	activities	with	inherited	family	money,	stolen	checks,	and	
shoplifting.	Reinventing	themselves	as	a	paramilitary	organization,	Weatherman	also	
fortified	a	rigidly	hierarchical	command	structure,	with	a	Weatherbureau	comprised	of	
Bernadine	Dohrn,	Jeff	Jones,	John	Jacobs,	and	Terry	Robbins,	making	most	of	the	group’s	
major	decisions.80	After	a	decade	of	escalating	political	violence,	the	1960s	had	birthed	
America’s	first	clandestine	revolutionary	urban	guerrilla	organization.	
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Conclusion	
As	Weatherman	formed	an	underground	infrastructure	and	hatched	secret	plans	for	
revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare	inside	the	United	States,	the	FBI	faced	a	challenge	
unlike	any	other	it	had	confronted	in	its	forty-five	year	history.	The	threat	of	
Weatherman	violence	likely	informed	Hoover’s	proclamation	during	a	February	1970	
Congressional	hearing	that	“Weatherman	is	the	most	violent,	persistent	and	pernicious	
of	revolutionary	groups,”	a	statement	that	suggested	the	organization	had	replaced	the	
Black	Panthers	as	the	FBI’s	public	enemy	number	one.81	The	FBI	suspected	
Weatherman	involvement	in	two	February	1970	bombings	of	Bay	Area	police	stations,	
one	of	which	mangled	the	arm	of	Berkeley	policeman	Paul	Morgan,	and	another	that	
killed	San	Francisco	police	officer	Brian	McDonnell.	Forty-five	years	later,	it	would	turn	
out	that	their	hunch	was	correct,	after	an	anonymous	former	Weather	militant	
confessed	to	a	journalist	that	the	group	had	staged	the	attacks.82	Weatherman	did	not	
publicly	take	credit	for	the	bombings,	however.	As	far	as	the	FBI	and	other	law	
enforcement	agencies	knew	at	the	time,	these	attacks	could	have	been	carried	out	by	
any	number	of	the	anonymous	radicals	then	involved	in	nighttime	bombing	and	
sabotage	activities;	at	least	seventeen	other	leftist	bombings	occurred	throughout	the	
United	States	in	February	1970.83	Weatherman’s	future	violent	attacks,	and	the	
consequences	of	such	actions,	remained	impossible	to	foresee.	
	 As	Weatherman	transitioned	into	the	underground,	the	group’s	leadership	had	
no	qualms	with	killing	police	officers.	The	FBI	was	well	aware	of	this,	thanks	to	their	
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surveillance	of	the	December	1969	Flint	War	Council.	An	influential	faction	of	the	
organization,	led	by	John	Jacobs	and	Terry	Robbins,	also	advocated	deadly	attacks	with	
serious	casualties	as	a	means	to	give	Americans	a	taste	of	the	violence	their	government	
inflicted	daily	upon	the	people	of	Vietnam.	Fatefully,	a	Weather	Underground	anti-
personnel	bomb	would	take	the	lives	of	Robbins	and	fellow	Weather	militants	Ted	Gold	
and	Diana	Oughton	before	the	group	had	a	chance	to	inflict	a	mass-casualties	bloodbath.	
The	death	of	three	Weatherpeople	in	an	accidental	explosion	on	March	6,	1970	would	
nonetheless	have	far-reaching	consequences	for	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	administration.	
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CHAPTER	3	
COUNTERING	A	NEW	THREAT:	THE	WEATHER	UNDERGROUND,	“TERRORISM,”	
AND	THE	HUSTON	PLAN	
	
A	key	turning	point	in	the	FBI’s	Weather	Underground	investigation	occurred	after	
twenty-three-year-old	militant	Terry	Robbins	made	a	fatal	mistake.	On	March	6,	1970,	
while	preparing	antipersonnel	nail-bombs	intended	for	a	dance	at	New	Jersey’s	Fort	Dix	
Army	base,	he	crossed	live	wires.	Within	an	instant,	a	series	of	explosions	leveled	the	
upscale	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	that	he	and	other	Weather	Underground	
members	were	using	as	a	bomb-making	laboratory.	The	blast	killed	Robbins	and	fellow	
Weatherpeople	Diana	Oughton	and	Ted	Gold,	mangling	their	bodies	beyond	
recognition.		The	explosion	could	have	been	much	worse.	More	than	eighty	sticks	of	
dynamite	stored	within	the	house	failed	to	detonate,	thereby	saving	the	surrounding	
city	block	from	destruction,	and	sparing	the	lives	of	Weather	radicals	Cathy	Wilkerson	
(whose	father	and	stepmother	owned	the	townhouse)	and	Kathy	Boudin.	Escaping	the	
wreckage,	the	pair	briefly	sought	shelter	in	the	home	of	a	neighbor	before	disappearing	
into	the	revolutionary	underground.1	
	 Occurring	amid	a	steep	increase	in	leftist	bombing	incidents	in	the	U.S.	and	
around	the	world,	the	townhouse	explosion	demonstrated	to	the	FBI	that	the	Weather	
Underground	was	serious	about	its	plans	to	form	America’s	first	clandestine	
revolutionary	urban	guerrilla	organization.	Indeed,	immediately	after	the	blast,	a	
																																																								
1	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	127-129;	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,173-174.	Wilkerson’s	father	and	
stepmother	were	on	vacation	at	the	time.	For	Wilkerson’s	account,	see	Flying	too	Close	to	the	Sun:	My	Life	
and	Time	as	a	Weatherman,	345-348.	
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nationwide	FBI-led	manhunt	forced	the	group’s	members	to	immediately	go	
underground.	Remaking	themselves	as	urban	guerrillas	living	under	assumed	identities	
in	secret	safe	houses	throughout	the	country,	the	group’s	young	members	adopted	
clandestinity	as	a	means	to	carry	out	a	sustained	campaign	of	armed	revolutionary	
struggle	while	deliberately	avoiding	state	surveillance	and	repression.	This	reality,	
along	with	the	Weather	Underground’s	plans	for	further	violence,	presented	the	FBI	
with	an	urgent	dilemma:	How	could	agents	preempt	and	capture	violent	revolutionaries	
whose	guerrilla	organization	was	impermeable	to	surveillance	and	informant	
infiltration?			
	 The	FBI	responded	to	this	dilemma,	in	part,	by	framing	leftist	guerrilla	violence	
as	“terrorism.”	On	March	31,	1970,	FBI	officials	held	a	secret	conference	to	“coordinate	
guidelines	for	recommendations	concerning	bombing	matters	and	extremist	terroristic	
activities.”	During	the	meeting,	Internal	Security	Chief	Charles	Brennan	and	his	
colleagues	identified	“leftist	terrorist	activity”	as	an	unprecedented	new	national	
security	threat,	and	proposed	several	new	measures	designed	to	address	this	problem.2	
It	was	the	first	time	in	FBI	history	in	which	officials	strategized	around	a	problem	they	
explicitly	defined	as	“terrorism.”			
	 President	Richard	Nixon	also	initiated	new	efforts	to	combat	leftist	guerrilla	
“terrorism.”	On	June	5,	1970	Nixon	and	a	few	of	his	aides	met	with	leaders	of	the	FBI,	
Central	Intelligence	Agency,	National	Security	Agency,	and	the	Defense	Intelligence	
																																																								
2	FBI	memo,	C.	D.	Brennan	to	W.	C.	Sullivan,	April	1,	1970,	1,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	6.	This	chapter	is	
the	first	thorough	historical	analysis	of	the	FBI’s	early	Weather	Underground	investigation.	It	builds	upon	
the	work	of	David	Cunningham	and	Jeremy	Varon,	who	each	provide	partial	coverage	of	this	topic	as	
corollaries	to	their	studies	on	COINTLEPRO-New	Left	and	the	Weather	Underground,	respectively.	
Cunningham,	There’s	Something	Happening	Here;	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home.	
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Agency,	ordering	the	men	to	devise	a	plan	to	counter	the	growing	threat	of	what	he	
called	domestic	“revolutionary	terrorism.”3	Three	weeks	later,	Nixon	approved	a	plan	
drafted	by	FBI	Assistant	Director	William	C.	Sullivan	and	White	House	aide	Tom	Huston	
for	what	was	then	the	greatest	consolidation	of	federal	surveillance	power	in	U.S.	
history.	The	initiative,	which	later	became	known	as	the	“Huston	Plan,”	coordinated	all	
federal	intelligence	agencies’	activities	under	the	direct	command	of	the	White	House.	
The	plan	also	lifted	FBI	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover’s	mid-1960s	restrictions	on	
warrantless	electronic	surveillance,	break-ins,	mail-opening,	and	use	of	informants	
under	the	age	of	twenty-one.	Designed	to	preempt	revolutionary	violence	with	
expansive	“preventative”	surveillance	measures,	the	Huston	Plan	outlined	the	United	
States’	first	state	institution	dedicated	to	combating	the	new	problem	of	“terrorism.”	
Nixon	backed	out	of	the	agreement	five	days	later,	however,	under	pressure	from	
Hoover.	Determined	to	preserve	the	institutional	autonomy	he	had	carefully	cultivated	
throughout	his	forty-six-year	career,	Hoover	blocked	the	Huston	Plan	in	an	effort	to	
defend	the	FBI’s	jurisdiction	over	domestic	surveillance	and	shield	the	Bureau	from	the	
public	outcry	he	knew	would	occur	if	the	American	people	ever	learned	about	the	
secret	project.			
	 Constituting	“terrorism”	as	a	“governable	problem,”	distinct	from	other	forms	of	
violence,	criminality,	and	“subversive”	activity,	enabled	officials	to	devise	new	tactics	
and	strategies	to	counter	this	novel	threat.4	As	FBI	Weather	Underground	investigator	
Special	Agent	William	E.	Dyson	recalled,	prior	to	officials’	framing	insurgent	violence	as	
																																																								
3	Richard	Nixon,	“Presidential	Talking	Paper,”	June	5,	1970,	in	Huston	Plan,	396.	
4	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror,	4,	106.	
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“terrorism,”	“it	was	difficult	to	develop	a	common	strategy	to	deal	with	the	problem.”5	
In	1970,	fighting	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	leftist	guerrillas	became	a	top	FBI	
priority	as	the	Bureau	shifted	its	focus	from	battling	Communist	“subversion”	to	
preventing	leftist	“terrorism.”	As	the	aborted	Huston	Plan	indicated,	however,	Nixon	
and	other	officials	were	far	from	satisfied	with	Hoover’s	efforts	to	thwart	revolutionary	
guerrilla	violence.	
	 Most	historical	scholarship	on	the	Huston	Plan	mirrors	public	criticism	that	
emerged	after	its	initial	disclosure	during	a	June	1973	Senate	Watergate	hearing,	
viewing	the	secret	initiative	primarily	as	evidence	of	President	Nixon’s	paranoia	and	
utilization	of	U.S.	intelligence	agencies	to	advance	his	personal	political	agenda.6	But	
																																																								
5	William	E.	Dyson,	Terrorism:	An	Investigator’s	Handbook,	4th	ed.	(Waltham,	MA:	Anderson	Publishing,	
2014),	20.	
6	An	exception	is	Ron	Hughes,	Chasing	Shadows,	71-73,	which	offered	a	brief	explanation	of	how	the	
Weather	Underground’s	townhouse	explosion	and	Nixon’s	concerns	over	leftist	violence	informed	the	
Huston	Plan.	The	key	detailed	scholarly	work	on	the	history	of	the	Huston	Plan	is	Athan	Theoharis,	
Chapter	1,	“The	Huston	Plan,”	in	Spying	on	Americans.	Theoharis,	a	leading	historian	of	the	FBI	who	
worked	as	a	staffer	for	the	Church	Commission,	focused	on	how	Nixon’s	personality	and	Cold	War	
concerns	of	foreign	subversion	informed	the	Huston	Plan,	arguing	that	the	effort	was	a	product	of	
“secrecy	shrouding	Cold	War	‘national	security’	policy”	and	Nixon’s	personal	desire	for	information	he	
could	use	to	discredit	his	adversaries,	particularly	those	in	the	antiwar	movement,	13-14.	Fellow	Church	
Commission	staffer	and	political	scientist	Loch	K.	Johnson	offered	a	similar	analysis,	though	he	briefly	
mentioned	leftist	violence	as	a	motivation	for	the	plan.	See	Loch	K.	Johnson,	Chapter	7,	“The	Huston	Plan,”	
in	America’s	Secret	Power:	The	CIA	in	a	Democratic	Society	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1989),	
140.	Theoharis	and	Johnson	both	made	arguments	similar	to	those	articulated	by	the	Church	Committee.	
See	Church	Committee,	Book	II,	111-115;	and	“National	Security,	Civil	Liberties,	and	the	Collection	of	
Intelligence,”	in	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	921-986.	Other	works	by	FBI	experts	that	overlook	how	the	
Weather	Underground	and	other	violent	revolutionaries	informed	the	Huston	Plan	include	Jeffreys-Jones,	
The	FBI,	180;	and	Poveda,	Lawlessness	and	Reform,	39-40.	Cunningham	mentions	the	Weather	
Underground’s	influence	on	the	Huston	Plan	only	in	passing;	Cunningham,	There’s	Something	Happening	
Here,	300,	footnote	87.	Beverly	Gage	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	Huston	Plan,	arguing	that	it	was	
“the	most	significant	episode”	in	a	“six-year	conflict”	between	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	administration	prior	
to	the	Watergate	scandal.	While	Gage	acknowledges	that	“concern	over	the	rise	in	domestic	bombings	
stemming	from	a	radicalized	antiwar	left”	motivated	the	Huston	Plan,	her	article	does	not	fully	explore	
how	leftist	guerrilla	attacks	and	officials’	framing	of	such	violence	as	“terrorism”	informed	the	secret	
initiative.	See	Gage,	“Deep	Throat,	Watergate,	and	the	Bureaucratic	Politics	of	the	FBI,”	169-170.	For	a	
brief	journalistic	account	of	how	New	Left	violence	influenced	the	Huston	Plan,	see	Weiner,	Enemies,	
290-292.	Journalist	Bryan	Burrough’s	short	account	of	the	Huston	Plan,	based	largely	on	Weiner’s,	
explains	the	plan	in	relation	to	the	Weather	Underground	townhouse	bombing,	but	with	a	number	of	
factual	inaccuracies.	See	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	132-135.	
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clandestine	leftist	guerrilla	“terrorism”	and	the	FBI’s	inability	to	prevent	it	were	the	
primary	concerns	driving	Nixon	and	the	plan’s	architects.	The	Huston	Plan	was	an	
attempt	by	the	Nixon	administration	and	FBI	Assistant	Director	William	C.	Sullivan	to	
override	Director	Hoover’s	longstanding	semi-autonomous	authority,	which	they	
viewed	as	an	impediment	to	their	war	against	domestic	“revolutionary	terrorism.”	A	
product	of	Sullivan’s	secret	meetings	with	Tom	Huston	on	the	problem	of	revolutionary	
bombings	during	the	second	half	of	1969,	the	Huston	Plan	was	also	the	first	major	
showdown	in	what	was	now	a	full-scale	institutional	conflict	over	guerrilla	violence	and	
FBI	autonomy,	a	bureaucratic	struggle	that	would	later	culminate	in	the	Watergate	
Scandal.	
	
“Large-Scale	Shift	to	Terrorism”	
Despite	watching	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society’s	(SDS)	Weatherman	faction	with	
growing	alarm	since	June	1969,	it	was	not	until	the	March	6,	1970	Greenwich	Village	
townhouse	bombing	that	FBI	officials	began	to	fully	reckon	with	the	new	challenge	the	
Weather	Underground	presented	to	police	agencies.	Though	accidental,	the	deadly	
explosion	demonstrated	the	seriousness	of	the	organization’s	plans	to	carry	out	
revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare	inside	the	United	States,	and	signaled	the	likelihood	of	
more	violence	in	the	near	future.	The	detonation	of	anti-personnel	devices	also	seemed	
to	indicate	that	the	group	had	no	qualms	killing	civilians	in	their	quest	for	revolutionary	
change.	Moreover,	the	townhouse	blast	shined	a	spotlight	on	the	group’s	evasion	of	the	
FBI’s	vast	intelligence	infrastructure.	In	response,	and	under	mounting	pressure	from	
the	Nixon	administration,	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	and	other	FBI	officials	both	
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intensified	and	reevaluated	their	Weatherman	investigation,	instituting	several	new	
investigative	measures	designed	to	combat	what	they	called	leftist	“terrorism.”	
	 The	townhouse	bombing	accompanied	other	developments	that	raised	FBI	
officials’	alarm	over	Weather	Underground	plans	for	future	violence.	On	the	same	day	
as	the	townhouse	blast,	Detroit	police	located	two	undetonated	dynamite	bombs,	one	in	
a	women’s	bathroom	in	their	Department’s	13th	precinct,	and	a	second	inside	the	offices	
of	the	Detroit	Police	Officers	Association.	Faulty	ignition	devices,	crudely	constructed	
from	cigarettes	and	firecracker	fuses,	had	prevented	the	explosives	from	detonating.	
Like	those	in	the	townhouse,	the	Detroit	bombs	were	designed	to	inflict	casualties,	and	
they	probably	would	have	had	they	exploded	as	intended.	Though	they	lacked	hard	
evidence,	the	FBI	strongly	suspected	Weather	Underground	involvement.7	Bureau	
investigators	also	traced	dynamite	recovered	from	the	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	to	
Keene,	New	Hampshire,	where	a	man	identifying	himself	as	David	Bellar	had	purchased	
it	from	the	New	England	Explosives	Company	four	days	prior	to	the	explosion.	In	an	
urgent	teletype,	Hoover	ordered	agents	in	Boston,	Albany,	and	other	Field	Offices	to	
immediately	investigate	the	incident,	as	well	as	a	second	dynamite	purchase	in	Barre,	
Vermont,	on	March	6,	the	day	of	the	townhouse	explosion,	by	suspected	Weatherman	
Ronald	Fliegalman.8	In	another	lead,	agents	uncovered	stolen	student	ID	cards	and	
checkbooks	from	the	townhouse	wreckage,	items	they	believed	Weather	militants	had	
used	“to	fraudulently	purchase	quantities	of	firearms.”9			
	 Further	distress	ensued	on	March	12,	when	a	group	calling	itself	Revolutionary	
																																																								
7	FBI	memo,	“Students	for	a	Democratic	Society,”	March	11,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	60.	
8	FBI	teletype,	Director	to	SAC	Albany,	March	19,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	61.	
9	FBI	memo,	C.	D.	Brennan	to	W.	C.	Sullivan,	March	20,	1970,	FBU	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	61.	
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Force	9	bombed	three	Manhattan	skyscrapers.	Security	forces	avoided	casualties	by	
heeding	the	bombers’	evacuation	instructions	and	shepherding	thousands	of	workers	
from	the	buildings.	More	than	600	additional	bomb	threats	issued	over	the	following	
three	days	wrought	havoc	in	the	city,	as	police	scrambled	to	investigate	false	leads	and	
evacuate	thousands	of	additional	people.10	Three	days	later,	a	car	in	Maryland	carrying	
black	activists	Ralph	Featherstone	and	William	“Ché”	Payne	exploded,	killing	both	men.	
Police	contended	that	Featherstone	and	Payne	were	on	their	way	to	carry	out	a	
bombing	when	the	explosive	in	their	vehicle	prematurely	detonated,	though	rumors	of	
a	covert	FBI	or	police	assassination	circulated	within	the	Left.11	Two	days	after	that,	
another	bomb	tore	through	the	corner	of	a	nearby	courthouse	where	SNCC	leader	H.	
Rap	Brown	was	to	be	tried	on	charges	of	inciting	a	riot	in	the	town	of	Cambridge	in	
1967.	After	the	bombings,	Brown	immediately	went	underground.12	The	explosions	
prompted	Hoover	to	warn	his	agents	of	the	likelihood	“terrorist	acts”	by	“black	
extremists,”	in	addition	to	those	carried	out	by	Weatherman	militants,	would	“increase	
in	frequency	and	violence	unless	aggressive	investigation	is	undertaken	to	bring	about	
																																																								
10	Murray	Schumach,	“Fewer	Bomb	Calls	are	Made	in	City,”	New	York	Times,	March	15,	1970,	40.	
11	In	a	1988	article,	SNCC	veteran	Ekwueme	Michael	Thelwell	briefly	recalled	Ralph	Featherstone’s	
political	evolution.	Featherstone,	affectionately	known	to	his	friends	as	“Feather,”	was	a	Washington	D.C.	
native	who	volunteered	in	the	1964	Mississippi	Freedom	Project,	gaining	a	great	deal	of	respect	among	
locals	and	fellow	activists	for	his	organizing	skills.	Within	a	year,	however,	escalating	police	and	vigilante	
violence	against	the	Black	freedom	movement	seemed	to	have	pushed	Feather	to	embrace	revolutionary	
violence.	Thelwell	recalled	a	visit	to	Featherstone’s	small	Washington	D.C.	apartment	in	1965:	“Before	I	
left	he	reached	under	the	narrow	bed.	‘I	wanna	show	you	something,’	he	said	with	suppressed	
excitement.	The	‘something,’	he	said,	was	an	AK47	attack	rifle,	ugly,	ominous,	lethal,	cradled	like	a	baby	
on	his	lap.	I	begged	my	brother	to	get	rid	of	it.	I	don’t	know	if	he	did.	Not	long	after	he	was	blown	to	pieces	
by	a	car	bomb	in	ambiguous	circumstances	the	truth	of	which	has	never	been	satisfactorily	explained.”	
Michael	Thelwell,	“1968:	A	Score-Settling,	Ass-Kicking,	Head-Whipping,	Dues-Taking,	Hypocrisy-
Exposing,	Innocence-Destroying,	Delusion-Ending	Year,”	VOICE	Magazine,	March	1988,	34	(copy	in	
author’s	possession	courtesy	of	Ekwueme	Michael	Thelwell).	
12	Carl	Oglesby,	Ravens	in	the	Storm:	A	Personal	History	of	the	1960s	Anti-War	Movement	(New	York:	
Simon	and	Schuster,	2008),	289-290;	Ekwueme	Michael	Thelwell,	“H.	Rap	Brown/Jamil	Al-Amin:	A	
Profoundly	American	Story,”	forward	to	Die	Nigger	Die!	A	Political	Autobiography,	by	H.	Rap	Brown	(Jamil	
Abdullah	Al-Amin),	2nd	ed.	(Chicago:	Lawrence	Hill,	2002),	xx,	xxii.			
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successful	prosecution…	of	guilty	parties.”13			
The	townhouse	explosion	and	the	March	12th	bombings	prompted	the	Nixon	
administration	to	put	pressure	on	the	FBI.	President	Nixon	conveyed	his	concern	over	
the	violence	to	Attorney	General	John	N.	Mitchell.	Through	his	three	Assistant	Attorney	
Generals,	Mitchell	recommended	to	Hoover	that	the	FBI,	rather	than	local	police,	lead	
investigations	of	all	future	political	bombings.14	The	Weather	Underground	
investigation	took	on	further	urgency	after	April	1,	when	police	discovered	a	large	
cache	of	dynamite	and	guns	in	a	Chicago	apartment.	Again,	the	FBI	suspected	the	
Weather	Underground	as	the	culprits.15	
	 Hoover	felt	certain	that	the	Weather	Underground	was	stockpiling	explosives	
and	firearms	for	imminent	use.	He	therefore	commanded	his	agents	to	“intensify”	their	
investigation	of	the	organization,	capture	its	members,	and	preempt	their	plans	for	
revolutionary	violence.16	Hoover	directed	agents	to	“identify	Weatherman	members,	
ascertain	their	whereabouts	and	determine	their	plans	to	direct	‘strategic	sabotage’	
against	the	‘establishment.’”17	More	specifically,	he	called	on	investigators	to	locate	
Weather	militants	in	local	“communes,”	in	which	collectives	of	young	radicals	lived	
together	with	shared	food	and	living	expenses,	and	to	infiltrate	such	groups	with	
informants.	He	also	instructed	agents	to	work	with	local	police	to	locate	Weather	
Underground	fugitives,	using	photo	albums	containing	detailed	descriptions	of	the	
group’s	members.18	In	order	to	coordinate	the	FBI’s	stepped-up	pursuit	of	the	
																																																								
13	Director	to	SAC	Boston,	March	24,	1970.	
14	FBI	memo,	C.	D.	Brennan	to	W.	C.	Sullivan,	April	1,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	60.	
15	WUR,	25.		
16	Brennan	to	Sullivan,	March	20,	1970.	
17	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SAC	Boston,	March	12,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	60.	
18	Ibid.	
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guerrillas,	the	Director	ordered	Special	Agents	In	Charge	of	sixteen	major	Field	Offices	
to	form	“special	squads,”	dedicated	to	investigating	the	Weather	Underground	and	
other	violent	leftist	groups,	comprised	of	agents	with	experience	apprehending	
fugitives.19	Under	heavy	pressure	from	Director	Hoover,	special	agents	investigating	the	
Weather	Underground	worked	tirelessly	to	find	the	group’s	clandestine	members.	In	
some	cases,	they	resorted	to	lies	and	emotional	manipulation.	After	the	townhouse	
bombing,	FBI	agents	visited	the	parents	of	several	Weather	Underground	members	and,	
in	an	effort	to	secure	interviews	leading	to	information	on	wanted	radicals’	
whereabouts,	told	some	of	them	erroneously	that	their	child	had	died	in	the	
explosion.20	
	 Now	that	the	Weather	Underground	had	gone	underground,	the	FBI	determined	
that	counterintelligence	programs	were	no	longer	effective	means	by	which	to	combat	
the	organization.	Because	they	had	only	one	informant	within	the	group,	the	FBI	was	
unable	to	sow	internal	conflict.	And	because	the	townhouse	blast	had	already	
diminished	the	organization’s	little	remaining	public	support,	it	was	hardly	necessary	
for	the	Bureau	to	expend	energy	discrediting	the	Weather	Underground.	Instead,	the	
Bureau	focused	on	destroying	the	Weather	Underground	through	traditional	criminal	
investigations	of	its	members.	Throughout	March	1970,	Hoover	urged	the	Department	
of	Justice	to	promptly	indict	Weather	Underground	members	on	charges	of	violating	the	
																																																								
19	Ibid;	M.	Wesley	Swearingen,	FBI	Secrets:	An	Agent’s	Exposé	(Boston:	South	End	Press,	1995),	70.	
20	Thai	Jones,	whose	parents	Eleanor	Raskin	and	Jeff	Jones	were	Weather	Underground	guerrillas,	wrote	
that	FBI	agents	visited	his	grandmother	Anne	Stein	after	the	townhouse	blast	and	informed	her	that	her	
daughter	Eleanor	had	died	in	the	explosion.	An	old	left	radical	with	previous	experience	resisting	the	FBI,	
Stein	refused	to	speak	with	the	agents.	Jones	notes	that	FBI	agents	attempted	the	same	trick	with	parents	
of	other	Weather	Underground	fugitives,	though	it	is	unknown	what	information	the	agents	gleaned	from	
these	efforts.	Thai	Jones,	A	Radical	Line:	From	the	Labor	Movement	to	the	Weather	Underground:	One	
Family’s	Century	of	Conscience	(New	York:	Free	Press,	2004),	14.	
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Smith	Act	of	1940	or	other	federal	laws.21	FBI	agents	in	Chicago	worked	tirelessly	to	
provide	the	Department	with	evidence	to	support	indictments,	believing	that	capturing	
fugitives	was	“the	most	effective	method	to	disrupt	the	activities	of	this	dangerous	
group.”22	Attorney	General	Mitchell	followed	through	on	April	2,	announcing	a	15-count	
indictment	charging	twelve	Weatherman	leaders	with	conspiracy	and	interstate	travel	
to	incite	a	riot	during	Chicago’s	October	1969	“Days	of	Rage.”	The	indictment	also	
named	twenty-eight	other	Weather	militants	as	co-conspirators.	Now	that	a	large	
number	of	the	Weather	Underground’s	members	were	federal	fugitives,	the	FBI	had	
jurisdiction	to	apprehend	them.23			
	 Weather	Underground	fugitives,	however,	were	nowhere	to	be	found.	By	
attracting	unexpected	police	attention,	the	townhouse	bombing	forced	Weather	
militants	to	either	leave	the	organization	or	go	underground	immediately.24	As	Bill	
Ayers	recalled	the	days	following	the	deadly	blast,	“We	took	new	names	and	fashioned	
clumsy	disguises	and	kept	our	living	spaces	hidden	even	from	each	other.	We	met	up	
mostly	at	night	in	elaborately	guarded	ways,	and	then	usually	only	briefly.”25	Similarly,	
David	Gilbert	remembered	rapidly	altering	his	personal	appearance:		
																																																								
21	Director	to	SAC	Boston,	March	12,	1970;	FBI	memo,	W.C.	Sullivan	to	C.D.	Brennan,	April	3,	1970,	FBI	
WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	61.	
22	FBI	memo,	SAC	Chicago	to	Director,	March	31,	1970,	FBI	COINTELPRO-New	Left,	Chicago	File.	
23	WUR,	131.	The	April	2,	1970	Chicago	indictments	built	upon	two	earlier	ones.	On	December	19,	1969,	a	
Cook	Country	grand	jury	indicted	sixty-four	Weather	Underground	defendants	for	alleged	violations	of	
Illinois	law	stemming	from	the	Days	of	Rage.	The	first	federal	indictments	against	Weather	Underground	
guerrillas	came	on	March	17,	1970,	when	a	Cook	County	judge	issued	Unlawful	Flight	to	Avoid	
Prosecution	warrants	for	Kathy	Boudin,	Cathy	Wilkerson,	Bernadine	Dohrn,	and	three	other	Weather	
women	who	failed	to	show	up	for	court	hearings	stemming	from	the	Days	of	Rage.	Brennan	to	Sullivan,	
March	20,	1970;	FBI	Memo,	A.	Jones	to	Mr.	Bishop,	April	7,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	61.	These	
charges	were	similar	to	those	Attorney	General	Mitchell	lodged	against	the	Chicago	Eight	a	year	earlier,	
on	March	20,	1969,	for	their	involvement	in	the	August	1968	demonstrations	against	the	Chicago	
Democratic	National	Convention.	
24	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	128-129;	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	179.	
25	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	205.		
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I’d	gone	from	clean-shaven	to	a	bushy	beard,	from	short	dark	hair	to	long	and	
light,	from	horn	rimmed	to	rimless	glasses,	from	an	informal	version	of	collegiate	
dress	to	tie-dyed	shirts	and	bell-bottoms.	One	day	I	walked	right	past	an	old	
college	friend,	who	didn’t	recognize	me…	We	learned	to	play	close	attention	to	
gait,	carriage,	and	style,	which	could	be	more	revealing	than	glasses	and	hair,	
especially	for	women,	who	didn’t	have	the	advantage	of	beards.26	
	
The	FBI	had	no	way	of	knowing	it,	but	the	loss	of	three	comrades	in	the	townhouse	blast	
had	also	dealt	a	severe	emotional	blow	to	the	Weather	Underground’s	membership,	and	
prompted	the	group	to	forgo	violent	attacks,	such	as	the	planned	Fort	Dix	action,	that	
would	physically	harm	human	beings.	At	a	secret	May	meeting	in	northern	California,	
Weather	leaders	Bernadine	Dohrn,	Jeff	Jones,	and	Bill	Ayers	renounced	murder	as	a	
revolutionary	tactic,	and	formulated	a	new	policy	of	consciously	avoiding	casualties	in	
future	actions.27		
	 As	far	as	Hoover	and	his	men	were	concerned,	however,	the	Weather	
Underground	remained	a	deadly	and	imminent	threat	to	American	lives.	Moreover,	the	
FBI	had	no	idea	when	or	where	the	Weather	Underground	would	strike	next.	This	
reality	troubled	Hoover	deeply.	Would	the	next	Weather	Underground	attack	result	in	
casualties?	Would	it	take	President	Nixon	by	surprise	and	diminish	the	Executive	
Branch’s	faith	in	his	competency	as	FBI	Director?	A	desire	to	demonstrate	the	FBI’s	
thoroughness	likely	informed	Hoover’s	decision	in	late	March	to	write	Nixon’s	assistant	
John	D.	Ehrlichman	and	other	officials,	citing	information	from	an	unnamed	source	who	
claimed	that	his	daughter,	a	supposed	Weather	Underground	member,	had	disclosed	
																																																								
26	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	157.	Gilbert	recalled	learning	to	change	his	gait	by	reading	a	story	about	
Harriet	Tubman,	in	which	the	Underground	Railroad	leader	disguised	herself	from	authorities	by	
hunching	over	and	hobbling.	For	another	account	of	Weather	Underground	members’	security	
precautions,	see	Jones,	A	Radical	Line,	7-13.	
27	Rudd,	Underground,	213-215;	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	181-182;	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	
130.	During	this	meeting	Dohrn,	Jones,	and	Ayers	expelled	John	Jacobs,	who	had	been	a	vocal	advocate	for	
lethal	attacks.	They	also	demoted	Rudd	from	the	organization’s	leadership	circle.	
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the	group’s	plans	to	bomb	U.S.	passenger	airliners.28	White	House	pressure	to	
demonstrate	progress	in	the	investigation	also	prompted	Hoover	to	expose	the	FBI’s	
lone	informant	in	the	Weather	Underground.	In	mid	April,	agents	blew	Larry	
Grathwohl’s	cover	by	arresting	Weather	militants	Linda	Evans	and	Dianne	Donghi	in	
New	York	City.	In	his	1976	memoir,	Grathwohl	claimed	that	he	had	urged	his	FBI	
handlers	to	hold	off	on	the	arrest	until	they	could	also	nab	Weather	leaders	Bill	Ayers,	
Mark	Rudd,	Bernadine	Dohrn,	or	Jeff	Jones.	According	to	Grathwohl,	New	York	Special	
Agent	Terry	Roberts	stated,	“we	need	an	arrest,”	and	acknowledged,	“You	may	be	right,	
Larry,	but	…	this	decision	came	from	the	man	in	Washington.”29	
	 As	agents	hunted	for	fugitives,	Bureau	officials	concluded	that	the	Weather	
Underground,	along	with	other,	autonomous	guerrilla	cells,	presented	a	new	kind	of	
challenge	to	law	enforcement,	one	that	compelled	reevaluation	of	FBI	investigative	
procedures.	On	March	31,	leaders	of	the	FBI’s	Domestic	Intelligence,	General	
Investigative,	and	Special	Investigative	Divisions	held	a	conference	to	“coordinate	
guidelines	for	recommendations	concerning	bombing	matters	and	extremist	terroristic	
activities.”30	The	FBI’s	Assistant	Directors	held	a	separate	meeting	on	the	topic	the	
following	day.31	The	meetings	were	the	first	time	in	the	Bureau’s	history	when	
administrators	officially	acknowledged	the	new,	unique	problem	of	domestic	urban	
guerrilla	insurgency.	Moreover,	it	was	the	first	time	that	FBI	officials	formally	defined	
guerrilla	warfare	as	“terrorism”	and	devised	specific	suggestions	for	combatting	this	
																																																								
28	FBI	letter,	Director	Hoover	to	John	D.	Ehrlichman,	March	24,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	60.	Hoover	
presented	no	hard	evidence	and	the	threat	never	materialized.	
29	Grathwohl,	Bringing	Down	America,	175-179.	
30	Brennan	to	Sullivan,	April	1,	1970,	1.	
31	Ibid.	
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particular	form	of	political	violence.			
	 Reporting	on	the	conference,	Internal	Security	Chief	Charles	D.	Brennan	
conveyed	to	Assistant	Director	Sullivan	his	perception	that	leftist	guerrilla	violence	had	
arisen	in	the	U.S.	rather	suddenly,	catching	the	FBI	off-guard.	In	reference	to	the	
Weather	Underground,	he	explained,	“a	group	which	emerged	only	as	an	ideology	in	
June,	1969,	which	we	obtained	authority	to	conduct	individual	investigations	on	in	late	
November,	1969,	has	erupted	into	a	menace	of	national	proportions	in	March	1970.”32	
Admitting	to	the	Weather	Underground’s	success	in	concealing	its	specific	plans	for	
guerrilla	warfare	from	the	state,	he	noted,	“our	current	investigations	connected	with	
the	New	York	bombings	have	shown	how	little	we	have	seen	of	the	iceberg	–	just	the	
exposed	tip	at	Chicago	in	October	and	at	Flint	in	December.”	Brennan	identified	
Weatherman	violence	as	new	type	of	threat,	one	that	the	FBI	was	not	fully	prepared	to	
confront.	“It	has	become	increasingly	clear,”	he	warned,	“we	are	attempting	to	cope	
with	a	large-scale	shift	to	terrorism	by	New	Left	extremists.”33	
	 During	their	conference,	Brennan	and	his	colleagues	determined	that	the	FBI	
lacked	sufficient	resources	to	pursue	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	leftist	
guerrilla	groups.	“Despite	our	voluminous	instructions	to	the	field	to	cope	with	the	
emerging	Weatherman	terrorism,”	he	explained,	“the	scope	of	the	problem	clearly	
exceeds	our	existing	manpower	limitations.”34	Brennan	also	believed	that	
inconsistencies	in	Department	of	Justice	policies	were	hindering	the	FBI’s	“bombing	
matters”	investigations.	According	to	Brennan,	the	Department	had	maintained	a	
																																																								
32	Ibid,	3.	
33	Ibid.	
34	Ibid,	4.	
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“palliative	attitude”	towards	“extremists”	prior	to	the	bombings	of	March	1970,	when	
President	Nixon	expressed	his	alarm	over	the	violence	to	Attorney	General	Mitchell.	
Mitchell’s	suggestion	that	the	FBI	lead	investigations	of	all	future	political	bombings	
prompted	frustration	and	resentment	among	FBI	officials,	including	Hoover,	who	had	
responded	by	noting	the	occurrence	of	multiple	bomb	threats	in	New	York	City	on	
March	13	following	the	previous	day’s	blasts.	“Apparently,”	the	Director	remarked	in	a	
memo	to	his	top	administrators,	“this	trio	of	Asst.	AGs	would	have	us	go	into	each.”35	
Citing	the	Justice	Department’s	“procrastination”	in	indicting	Weather	Underground	
leaders,	Brennan	sounded	a	similarly	bitter	note.	He	referred	to	the	Attorney	General’s	
suggestion	as	a	“cover-up	attempt	to	obfuscate”	earlier	inaction	regarding	FBI	warnings	
of	potential	Weather	Underground	violence.36	
	 Thus,	Brennan	sought	new,	explicit	measures	to	address	the	guerrilla	violence.		
He	recommended	that	FBI	Headquarters	implement	a	“special	school	for	field	
personnel	handling	these	matters,”	and	issue	a	“letter	to	all	Special	Agents	in	Charge	
defining	our	investigative	responsibilities	…	in	these	matters.”37	Moreover,	he	advised	
Headquarters	to	conduct	a	survey	of	all	FBI	Field	Offices	in	order	to	establish	the	“cost	
and	manpower	requirements	expected	to	be	incurred	in	these	intensive	intelligence	
investigations.”38	Brennan	asserted	that	by	establishing	“hard,	specific	cost	factors,”	the	
results	of	such	a	survey	would	provide	the	Bureau	with	leverage	to	petition	the	
Department	of	Justice	for	the	resources	needed	for	their	expanded	investigations	of	
																																																								
35	Hoover	quoted	in	ibid,	4.	
36	Brennan	to	Sullivan,	April	1,	1970,	4.	
37	Ibid,	2.	
38	Ibid,	6.	
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leftist	guerrilla	violence.39	Hoover	followed	through	with	Brennan’s	recommendations	
two	weeks	later,	issuing	an	airtel	directing	all	SACs	to	“prepare	a	cost	estimate	survey	of	
known	and	anticipated	costs”	associated	with	his	proposal	for	further	intensified	
investigations	of	“leftist	terrorist	activity.”40	The	FBI’s	extensive	survey	resulted	in	no	
immediate	new	funding	from	the	Justice	Department,	but	facilitated	the	Bureau’s	
internal	reorganization,	as	officials	transferred	personnel	from	other	areas	into	
domestic	intelligence	in	order	to	expand	their	investigation	of	the	Weather	
Underground	and	other	leftist	groups	deemed	ideologically	prone	to	violence.41	The	
effort	was	also	likely	one	of	Hoover’s	regular	attempts	to	obtain	increased	
Congressional	funding	for	the	FBI’s	portion	of	the	Justice	Department	budget.			
	 By	the	time	of	their	“bombing	matters	and	extremist	terrorist	activities”	
conference,	investigations	of	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	leftist	guerrilla	
“terrorists”	had	become	Hoover’s	top	priority.	In	May,	a	Bureau	spokesperson	
announced	that	the	Weather	Underground	investigation	amounted	to	“one	of	the	most	
intense	manhunts	in	FBI	history.”42	But	despite	their	“intensified”	investigation	and	
surveillance	operations,	the	FBI	enjoyed	few	successes	in	their	hunt	for	Weather	
Underground	fugitives.			
	 Indeed,	both	guerrilla	resistance	and	youth	protest	more	generally	were	rapidly	
expanding.	For	example,	after	President	Nixon	announced	that	the	U.S.	Army	was	
launching	a	ground	invasion	of	Cambodia	on	April	30,	1970,	mass	protests	erupted	on	
college	campuses	across	the	country,	and	dozens	of	ROTC	buildings	went	up	in	flames.	
																																																								
39	Ibid.	
40	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	all	SACs,	April	17,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	61.	
41	GAO,	FBI	Domestic	Operations,	134.	
42	WUR,	132.	
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The	Governor	of	Ohio	called	in	the	National	Guard	after	students	from	Kent	State	
University	smashed	downtown	shop	windows	during	a	spontaneous	late	night	street	
gathering.	Confrontation	with	student	demonstrators	at	Kent	State	turned	bloody	when	
Guard	troops	opened	fire	on	a	crowd	of	protesters	on	May	4,	killing	four,	and	sparking	
more	than	500	additional	protests,	walk-outs,	and	strikes	on	other	American	university	
campuses,	many	of	which	shut	down	classes	for	the	remainder	of	the	semester.43	So	
widespread	was	campus	unrest,	that	Nixon	canceled	plans	to	attend	his	daughter	Julie’s	
commencement	ceremonies	at	Smith	College	in	Northampton,	Massachusetts,	due	to	
Secret	Service	warnings	of	planned	student	protests	and	“the	possibility	of	an	ugly	
incident	that	would	mar	the	graduation.”44	The	Cambodia	invasion	and	campus	
uprisings	also	forced	Nixon	to	postpone	his	meeting	on	the	problem	of	“revolutionary	
terrorism”	with	U.S.	intelligence	officials,	which	he	had	originally	scheduled	for	April.45	
Meanwhile,	in	early	May	the	FBI	added	two	underground	revolutionaries	to	its	Ten	
Most	Wanted	Fugitives	list:	White	Panther	Party	co-founder	Lawrence	“Pun”	
Plamondon,	wanted	for	his	alleged	involvement	in	a	September	1968	bombing	of	a	
Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA)	office	in	Ann	Arbor,	Michigan;	and	H.	Rap	Brown,	
sought	on	interstate	flight	and	riot	conspiracy	charges.46	Later	that	month,	on	May	21,	
the	Weather	Underground	flaunted	their	evasion	of	the	FBI	in	front	of	the	world.	In	a	
tape-recorded	communiqué	issued	on	the	third	anniversary	of	Ché	Guevara’s	death,	
Weatherleader	Bernadine	Dohrn	announced	a	“Declaration	of	a	State	of	War”	against	
																																																								
43	Appy,	American	Reckoning,	186-189;	Sale,	SDS,	636-637.	
44	Nixon,	RN,	448.	
45	Huston	oral	history	interview,	9.	
46	FBI,	“FBI’s	Ten	Most	Wanted	Fugitives,	1950-2010”;	Lawrence	Robert	“Pun”	Plamondon	and	Anne	
Larabee,	“Interview	with	Lawrence	Robert	‘Pun’	Plamondon,”	Journal	for	the	Study	of	Radicalism	1,	no.	1	
(2007),	117.	
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“Amerikan	imperialism.”	Within	fourteen	days,	she	warned,	the	Weather	Underground	
would	“attack	a	symbol	or	institution	of	Amerikan	(sic)	injustice.”47	Twenty	days	later,	
on	June	10,	the	group	claimed	responsibility	for	an	explosion	at	New	York	City’s	Police	
Headquarters.48		
	 The	Bureau’s	inability	to	locate	Weather	Underground	fugitives	was	not	just,	as	
Internal	Security	Chief	Brennan	suggested,	a	result	of	limited	manpower	and	
inconsistent	support	from	the	Justice	Department.	The	FBI	was	also	hampered	by	its	
own	inefficiency.	An	audit	of	FBI	domestic	security	investigations	published	by	the	U.S.	
General	Accounting	Office	(GAO)	in	1976	determined	that	the	FBI	had	wasted	valuable	
time	and	resources	with	its	1960s	and	early	1970s	investigations	of	hundreds	of	groups	
and	individuals	deemed,	under	unclear	criteria,	to	be	“subversive”	or	“extremist.”49	
While	the	FBI	added	personnel	to	its	Weather	Underground	investigation	following	its	
April	1970	staff	survey,	it	also	maintained	extensive	surveillance	on	hundreds	of	leftist	
groups	and	individuals	unrelated	to	the	urban	guerrillas,	including	rival	SDS	factions	
PLP	and	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	II,	both	of	which	had	officially	denounced	the	
Weather	Underground.50	The	GAO	report	concluded	that	“rather	than	concentrating	on	
the	most	violence-prone	groups	the	FBI	has	diffused	its	domestic	intelligence	
investigative	coverage	to	the	point	where	many	investigations	do	not	lead	to	positive	
results.”51	The	study	affirmed	that	“violent	groups,	such	as	the	present-day	
																																																								
47	Weather	Underground,	“A	Declaration	of	a	State	of	War,”	May	21,	1970,	in	Dohrn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	
Song,	149-151.	
48	Dohrn	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	Song,	151;	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	137.			
49	GAO,	FBI	Domestic	Operations,	iv,	42-43.	
50	Ibid,	133.	
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Weatherman,”	“warrant	the	FBI’s	full	attention.”52	The	FBI’s	widespread	surveillance	of	
the	U.S.	left	reflected	officials’	ongoing	concern	with	leftwing	political	dissent	in	general,	
as	well	as	Hoover’s	inability	to	develop	effective	techniques	for	apprehending	
clandestine	guerrilla	fugitives.	
	 Internal	bureaucratic	conflicts	also	hindered	the	FBI’s	Weatherman	
investigation.		M.	Wesley	Swearingen	investigated	the	Weather	Underground	in	Los	
Angeles	during	the	early	1970s	following	a	transfer	from	New	York	two	months	after	
the	townhouse	explosion.	In	his	1995	memoir	FBI	Secrets,	he	recalled	that	an	
administrative	power	struggle	in	the	L.A.	Field	Office	had	severely	undermined	his	
work.	According	to	Swearingen,	Bill	Nolan,	Coordinator	of	LA’s	Security	Section,	
rejected	Hoover’s	March	1970	instructions	to	establish	a	special	Weather	Underground	
Squad,	assuring	the	Director	that	the	guerrilla	organization	was	not	active	in	Los	
Angeles.53	This	became	a	problem	a	few	months	later	when	Swearingen	identified	
Weatherman	John	Fuerst	as	his	top	suspect	in	a	case	involving	the	purchase	of	fifty	
pounds	of	dynamite	and	blasting	caps	from	a	store	in	Tucson,	Arizona.	When	
Swearingen	informed	his	boss	that	Fuerst	was	living	with	other	Weather	Underground	
fugitives	in	a	communal	house	in	L.A.’s	Venice	neighborhood,	Nolan	refused	to	support	
the	investigation,	and	Fuerst	managed	to	slip	out	of	Los	Angeles	with	the	explosives.	
Swearingen	asserted	that	Nolan	did	not	want	to	believe	him	because	he	“had	put	his	
career	on	the	line	when	[Nolan]	told	Hoover	there	were	no	Weathermen	in	Los	
Angeles.”54		
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	 The	FBI’s	Weather	Underground	investigation	also	faced	another	problem,	one	
even	more	profound	than	inefficiency	and	corruption.	The	Bureau	lacked	informants	
inside	the	Weather	Underground.	The	FBI’s	network	of	informants	on	college	campuses	
was	useful	for	keeping	tabs	on	the	aboveground	student	left,	but	it	was	of	no	use	in	
tracking	down	Weather	Underground	guerrillas,	who	had	gone	underground	to	
deliberately	avoid	such	surveillance.	Hoover	addressed	this	problem	in	an	airtel	he	sent	
to	field	offices	in	ten	major	cities	on	March	12,	1970,	six	days	after	the	townhouse	blast.		
Because	of	the	Weather	Underground’s	clandestine	status	and	“use	of	drugs	and	
extremely	immoral	conduct,”	he	noted,	“it	will	be	extremely	difficult	to	obtain	security	
informants	of	the	type	used	in	the	past.”	In	order	to	infiltrate	the	underground	
organization,	Hoover	proposed	a	new	kind	of	informant.	“The	type	of	informant	now	
needed,”	he	continued,	“may,	of	necessity,	be	the	street-type,	ghetto	informant…	
Accordingly,	you	should	look	to	these	groups	for	possible	infiltration	into	the	ranks	of	
the	collectives,	communes,	units,	or	whatever	name	they	might	go	by.”55	In	other	words,	
because	FBI	intelligence	informed	him	that	Weather	Underground	guerrillas	took	
shelter	within	the	counter-culture,	spurned	the	student	left,	and	romanticized	illegal	
behavior,	Hoover	deduced	that	the	best	source	for	informants	capable	of	infiltrating	the	
organization	was	the	criminal	community.		
	 Hoover	was	correct	that	student	informants	would	be	useless	for	infiltrating	the	
Weather	Underground,	but	he	still	underestimated	the	clandestine	organization’s	
ability	to	evade	state	surveillance.	The	FBI	could	not	gain	access	to	the	inner	workings	
of	the	Weather	Underground	by	simply	replacing	its	student	informants	with	criminal	
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ones.	Experienced	with	police	informants	and	increasingly	versed	in	the	techniques	of	
guerrilla	warfare,	Weather	Underground	militants	had	consciously	adopted	practices	
designed	to	conceal	their	identities	and	prevent	infiltration.	Consequently,	for	the	first	
time	in	his	forty-six	year	career	as	the	Bureau’s	Director,	Hoover	confronted	a	
revolutionary	organization	that	the	FBI	was	unable	to	infiltrate.	This	reality	prompted	
growing	crises	within	both	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	Administration.	
	 	
The	Huston	Plan	
Hoover	was	not	the	only	U.S.	official	alarmed	by	leftist	guerrilla	violence.		President	
Nixon	was	deeply	concerned	as	well.	Nixon	was	also	dissatisfied	with	Hoover’s	job	
performance.	The	President,	goaded	by	FBI	Assistant	Director	William	Sullivan	and	
White	House	aide	Tom	Huston,	believed	that	Hoover’s	decision	to	cease	Bureau	
involvement	in	illegal	break-ins	and	secret	mail-opening	in	1966	now	impeded	the	FBI’s	
investigations	of	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	leftist	guerrillas.56	In	addition,	
Huston’s	reports	and	increasing	bombings	had	convinced	Nixon	that	domestic	
revolutionary	guerrillas	now	posed	more	of	a	threat	to	U.S.	national	security	than	
Communist	“subversion”	of	American	politics.	Nonetheless,	like	Lyndon	Johnson	before	
him,	Nixon	remained	determined	to	find	evidence	that	foreign	Communist	governments	
directly	supported	the	Black	Panthers	and	the	Weather	Underground,	evidence	that	FBI	
reports	had	repeatedly	indicated	did	not	exist.57	Consequently,	the	President	called	an	
Oval	Office	meeting	on	June	5,	1970	with	the	leaders	of	all	of	the	United	States’	federal	
intelligence	agencies.	Hoover	joined	CIA	Director	Richard	Helms,	Admiral	Noel	Gayler	of	
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the	National	Security	Agency,	and	Lieutenant	General	Donald	Bennett	of	the	Defense	
Intelligence	Agency,	as	well	as	Nixon	Cabinet	members	H.	R.	Haldeman,	John	
Ehrlichman,	Bob	Finch,	and,	of	course,	Huston.	Nixon	defined	the	meeting’s	topic:	
“revolutionary	terrorism.”58	
	 Like	Hoover	and	other	FBI	officials,	Nixon	identified	leftist	urban	guerrilla	
warfare	as	a	new	type	of	threat	to	U.S.	national	security.	Reading	from	a	“talking	paper”	
that	Huston	had	drafted	for	him,	Nixon	declared	that	America’s	“internal	security	
problem”	had	moved	from	the	“student	activism”	and	“protest	movements”	of	the	
1960s	to	“revolutionary	terrorism	being	perpetrated	today	by	determined	
professionals.”	He	warned:	
We	are	now	confronted	with	a	grave	crisis	in	our	country,	one	which	we	know	
too	little	about.		Certainly	hundreds,	perhaps	thousands,	of	Americans—mostly	
under	30—are	determined	to	destroy	our	society	...	They	are	reaching	out	for	
the	support—ideological	or	otherwise—of	foreign	powers,	and	they	are	
developing	their	own	brand	of	indigenous	revolutionary	activism	which	is	as	
dangerous	as	anything	which	they	could	import	from	Cuba,	China,	or	the	Soviet	
Union.59			
	
Reiterating	what	Hoover	already	knew,	Nixon	pointed	out	that	the	leftist	guerrilla	
groups	were	more	difficult	to	thwart	than	the	Bureau’s	earlier	arch-nemesis,	the	
Communist	Party.	“The	new	revolutionary	groups,”	he	asserted,	were	“less	susceptible	
to	penetration	and	surveillance”	and	geographically	dispersed,	requiring	“far	broader	
coverage”	than	previous	targets.	Moreover,	he	stated,	these	organizations	“place	a	high	
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premium	on	violence.”60	The	President	ordered	the	country’s	top	intelligence	officials	to	
“develop	a	plan”	to	thwart	revolutionary	guerrilla	warfare.	“Terrorism	has	replaced	
subversion	as	the	immediate	threat,”	he	stated.	“This	must	be	halted	before	innocent	
people	are	killed.”61	
	 Just	as	President	Johnson	sought	preventative	intelligence	to	preempt	urban	
riots	in	1967,	Nixon	now	sought	advance	warning	of	leftist	guerrilla	violence.		Instead	of	
leaving	this	task	up	to	the	FBI,	however,	for	the	first	time	in	U.S.	history,	Nixon	sought	
direct	White	House	control	over	America’s	intelligence	agencies,	whose	powers	he	
sought	to	consolidate	under	a	single	command.		On	several	occasions	over	the	following	
two	weeks,	representatives	of	the	FBI,	CIA,	NSA,	DIA,	and	the	Army,	Navy,	and	Air	Force	
intelligence	divisions	met	to	fulfill	Nixon’s	orders	to	“review	the	collection	efforts	of	the	
intelligence	community	in	the	area	of	internal	security	and	to	recommend	…	additional	
steps	which	can	be	taken	to	strengthen	our	capabilities	in	this	regard.”62	Under	Nixon’s	
orders,	Huston	oversaw	the	project,	working	closely	with	Sullivan	and	FBI	Internal	
Security	Chief	Charles	Brennan.	Together,	this	trio	drafted	the	final	“Interagency	
Committee	on	Intelligence	(Ad	Hoc)”	report	to	the	President.			
	 The	committee’s	report	provided	an	overview	of	state	surveillance	on	the	
student	New	Left,	the	Black	Power	movement,	Marxist-Leninist	parties,	and	the	Puerto	
Rican	independence	movement.	According	to	the	report,	the	greatest	threats	these	
movements	posed	to	U.S.	internal	security	were	violence	and	foreign	espionage.	In	
terms	of	violence,	the	report	identified	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	“New	Left	
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terrorist	groups”	as	“a	major	threat	to	the	internal	security	of	the	United	States,”	while	
also	noting	an	increase	in	political	bombings	carried	out	by	Puerto	Rican	“extremist	
groups,”	and	the	“probability”	of	future	“terrorist	activities”	carried	out	by	“black	
extremists”	associated	with	the	Black	Panther	Party.63	The	report	identified	both	the	
student	New	Left	and	the	Black	Panther	Party	as	potential	recruits	for	foreign	
intelligence	agencies	given	members’	travels	to	Communist	countries	like	Cuba,	China,	
North	Vietnam,	Algeria,	and	the	Soviet	Union,	but	admitted	that	U.S.	intelligence	
agencies	possessed	no	current	evidence	of	such	activity.64	It	also	noted	numerous	
“gaps”	in	surveillance	of	radical	leftist	groups,	attributing	most	of	them	to	“restraints	on	
intelligence,”	namely	Hoover’s	limits	on	FBI	electronic	wiretapping,	and	prohibition	of	
Bureau	involvement	in	break-ins,	mail-opening,	trash	covers,	and	use	of	informants	
under	age	twenty-one.65	Though	officially	titled	simply,	“Special	Report,”	the	document	
established	the	foundation	for	the	Huston	Plan.66	
	 The	Huston	Plan	was	a	joint	effort	by	the	Nixon	Administration,	Sullivan	and	
Brennan,	and	the	heads	of	the	CIA,	NSA,	and	DIA	to	bypass	what	they	perceived	as	
Hoover’s	stonewalling	of	effective	initiatives	to	combat	“terrorism.”	The	interagency	
committee	also	prioritized	preventing	foreign	espionage	and	infiltration	of	New	Left	
social	movements,	but	the	majority	of	the	report	addressed	concerns	of	homegrown	
revolutionary	violence.	The	plan’s	architects	sought	to	coordinate	the	efforts	of	all	U.S.	
intelligence	agencies	under	the	direct	supervision	of	the	White	House	and	expand	
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federal	surveillance	capacities	by	eliminating	FBI	restrictions	on	break-ins,	mail-
opening,	electronic	surveillance,	and	utilization	of	informants	under	the	age	of	twenty-
one.	Through	careful	bureaucratic	maneuvering,	Sullivan	and	Huston	strategically	
plotted	to	force	Hoover’s	compliance	with	the	plan.	For	one,	the	pair	convinced	Nixon	to	
appoint	Hoover	as	the	ad	hoc	interagency	committee’s	chair.	Sullivan	believed	that	such	
a	gesture	would	demonstrate	the	President’s	respect	for	the	FBI’s	jurisdiction	over	
internal	security	matters,	but	also	accurately	calculated	that	Hoover	would	not	want	the	
responsibility,	and	would	instead	hand	the	project	over	to	him.67	Sullivan	also	
concealed	from	Hoover	his	role	in	drafting	the	report,	knowing	that	his	boss	would	fire	
him	if	he	found	out.	Instead,	he	gave	the	impression	that	Huston	was	the	primary	
author.	In	addition,	Sullivan	strategically	crafted	the	report	in	a	manner	designed	to	
secure	Hoover’s	signature.	Instead	of	making	direct	policy	recommendations,	the	report	
offered	a	series	of	options,	outlined	next	to	boxes	for	the	President	to	check	off,	which	
ranged	from	making	no	changes	to	existing	intelligence	procedures	to	implementing	the	
various	measures	Sullivan,	Huston,	and	others	on	the	committee	hoped	to	enact.	
Therefore,	by	signing	the	document,	Hoover	would	not	have	to	explicitly	endorse	any	
particular	policies.68	Sullivan	and	Huston	also	gathered	the	CIA,	NSA,	and	DIA	directors’	
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signatures	on	the	report	before	soliciting	Hoover’s,	hoping	that	doing	so	would	compel	
the	Director	to	sign	as	well.69	
		 Sullivan	and	Huston’s	scheme	did	not	go	as	planned,	however.	Hoover	was	livid	
after	he	read	the	report’s	first	draft.	“That	hippie	is	behind	this,”	he	reportedly	
exclaimed	upon	calling	Sullivan	into	his	office,	refusing	to	call	Huston	by	name,	instead	
using	a	pejorative	inspired	by	the	young	White	House	aide’s	two-inch	sideburns.70	
According	to	Sullivan,	Hoover	stated	“I’ll	only	accept	the	recommendations	outlined	in	
this	draft	if	the	president	orders	me	to.	And	I’ll	only	carry	them	out	if	someone	else—
the	president,	the	attorney	general,	anyone	else—takes	the	responsibility.”71	In	a	
bureaucratic	power	play,	Hoover	ordered	Sullivan	to	draft	footnotes	into	the	report,	
formally	indicating	the	FBI	Director’s	opposition	to	a	permanent	interagency	
intelligence	committee	and	all	efforts	to	relax	the	Bureau’s	restrictions	on	illegal	
domestic	surveillance	practices.	Sullivan	complied,	and	Hoover	signed	the	final,	revised	
version	of	the	report.72	
			 Huston	then	responded	with	another	attempt	to	override	Hoover.	In	early	July,	
following	the	secret	report’s	finalization,	Huston	penned	a	memorandum	to	Nixon	
entitled	“Operational	Restraints	on	Intelligence	Collection.”	The	memo	reiterated	the	
“ad-hoc”	report’s	recommendations.	Though	he	acknowledged	that	tactics	such	as	
break-ins	and	mail-opening	were	“clearly	illegal,”	Huston	emphasized	that	Hoover	was	
the	only	U.S.	intelligence	official	who	opposed	the	measures,	objecting	on	the	grounds	
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that	“the	civil	liberties	people	may	become	upset.”73	Moreover,	Huston	pointed	out	that	
“surreptitious	entries”	and	“mail	covers”	(FBI	parlance	for	break-ins	and	surveillance	of	
mail	correspondence)	were	not	new	tactics,	but	ones	that	“the	FBI,	in	Hoover’s	younger	
years,	used	…	with	great	success	and	with	no	exposure.”74	Huston	urged	Nixon’s	
approval	of	the	measures,	asserting	their	necessity	in	order	to	combat	“the	
Weathermen	and	the	Black	Panthers”	and	“forestall	widespread	violence”	on	American	
university	campuses	during	the	upcoming	fall	semester.75			
	 Nixon	approved	Huston’s	plan.	But	he	did	so	indirectly,	through	White	House	
Chief	of	Staff	H.	R.	Haldeman,	who	sent	Huston	a	memo	stating,	“the	recommendations	
you	have	proposed	as	a	result	of	the	review	have	been	approved	by	the	President.”76	
Nixon	avoided	approving	the	plan	in	writing	because,	like	Hoover,	he	sought	to	avoid	
responsibility	for	any	political	fallout	that	he	believed	would	result	should	news	of	its	
existence	reach	the	American	public.	Nixon’s	unwillingness	to	attach	his	name	to	the	
plan	ultimately	resulted	in	its	demise.	Immediately	after	Huston	issued	a	memorandum	
instituting	the	plan,	Hoover	approached	Attorney	General	Mitchell,	who	had	no	prior	
knowledge	of	the	secret	interagency	committee.	In	yet	another	strategic	bureaucratic	
maneuver,	Hoover	indicated	in	writing	that	he	intended	to	seek	written	presidential	
approval	prior	to	directing	his	agents	to	engage	in	any	of	the	illegal	tactics	authorized	in	
the	plan.77	Conveying	Hoover’s	intentions,	Mitchell	convinced	the	President	that	“risk	of	
disclosure	of	the	possible	illegal	actions	…	was	greater	than	the	possible	benefit	to	be	
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derived.”78	Nixon	backed	out	of	the	Huston	Plan	on	July	28,	1970,	five	days	after	Huston	
instituted	it.	For	now,	bureaucratic	conflict	and	fears	of	public	disclosure	trumped	the	
Nixon	Administration’s	efforts	to	combat	domestic	“terrorism”	through	interagency	
coordination	and	the	reinstatement	of	illegal	surveillance	measures.		
	 	
Conclusion	
The	Huston	Plan	was	the	United	States’	Executive	Branch’s	first	attempt	to	confront	a	
problem	it	defined	as	“terrorism.”	Sullivan,	Brennan,	Huston,	and	Nixon	sought	to	
revive	illegal	surveillance	tactics	widely	utilized	in	the	Hoover	FBI’s	war	on	Communist	
“subversives”	during	the	1950s	and	early	1960s,	but	in	response	to	a	new,	distinct	
threat.	The	Nixon	administration	proposed	the	Huston	Plan	in	direct	response	to	
increased	revolutionary	violence	on	America’s	university	campuses	and	city	streets,	in	
the	form	of	arsons,	bombings,	and	the	killings	of	police	officers.	White	House	and	
intelligence	officials	were	especially	concerned	with	the	unprecedented	threat	of	
revolutionary	urban	guerrilla	warfare,	particularly	as	posed	by	the	Black	Panthers	and	
the	clandestine	Weather	Underground.	The	Huston	Plan’s	architects	sought	to	halt	and	
preempt	this	threat	with	the	use	of	illegal	surveillance	tactics.	
	 Nixon	made	this	clear	in	his	1978	memoir.	Reflecting	on	the	Huston	Plan,	the	
former	President	wrote,	“in	view	of	the	crisis	of	terrorism	and	violence	visited	upon	
countless	innocent	people,	the	recommendations	made	to	me	by	the	interagency	
intelligence	group	in	its	1970	report	were	justified	and	responsible.”79	According	to	
Nixon,	extralegal	state	action	was	sometimes	necessary	to	defend	America’s	citizens	
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and	national	security	from	“terrorist”	violence.	He	compared	the	Huston	Plan	to	
President	Abraham	Lincoln’s	suspension	of	habeas	corpus	during	the	Civil	War	and	
President	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt’s	internment	of	Japanese-Americans	during	World	War	
II,	other	wartime	Executive	decisions	he	contended	“will	always	be	debated.”80	Nixon	
asked,	“did	the	threatened	and	actual	bombings	of	the	Weathermen,	and	the	brutal	
assaults	of	the	Black	Panthers,	justify	an	intrusion	of	their	liberties?”81	“When	the	issue	
juxtaposes	the	lives	of	innocent	citizens	against	the	possible	curtailment	of	personal	
liberties	we	all	cherish,”	he	continued,	“the	answers	are	never	easy.”82	Ultimately,	
however,	Nixon	believed	that	American	Presidents	were	required	to	implement	
“emergency	measures	to	meet	emergency	situations”	when	needed	“to	defend	the	
nation	and	to	protect	innocent	people.”83	
	 Nixon’s	reflections	on	the	Huston	Plan	were,	of	course,	part	of	the	former	
President’s	efforts	at	self-redemption	following	Watergate.	Nixon’s	memoir	
downplayed	his	use	of	domestic	surveillance	for	personal	political	gain,	and	offered	a	
one-sided	perspective	on	domestic	revolutionary	violence,	one	that	ignored	the	reality	
of	police	violence	against	the	Black	Panthers	and	other	U.S.	radicals	as	well	as	the	
military	violence	he	was	personally	responsible	for	inflicting	upon	the	people	of	
Southeast	Asia.	Nonetheless,	his	account	sheds	light	on	the	origins	of	a	debate	on	
“revolutionary	terrorism”	that	came	to	the	forefront	of	American	politics	in	the	post-
Watergate	era,	as	intelligence	and	White	House	officials	grappled	with	both	ongoing	
																																																								
80	Ibid,	476.			
81	Ibid.	Nixon’s	statement	on	the	Black	Panthers	is	misleading,	since	although	Panther	rhetoric	often	
glorified	violence	against	police	officers,	most	police	who	died	from	Panther	bullets	prior	to	1971	did	so	
during	incidents	in	which	both	sides	exchanged	fire	and	suffered	casualties.	
82	Ibid.	
83	Ibid.	
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domestic	guerrilla	violence	and	public	controversy	over	domestic	surveillance	and	
intelligence	agencies’	violations	of	Americans’	civil	liberties.	The	Huston	Plan	did	not	
resolve	the	FBI’s	terrorism	dilemma.	On	the	contrary,	the	plan’s	failure	deepened	a	
crisis	within	both	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	administration,	as	leftist	guerrilla	violence	in	
America’s	cities	increased	over	the	course	of	the	next	two	years.	
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CHAPTER	4	
LOSING	FACE:	THE	WAR	AT	HOME	AND	THE	FBI’S	PUBLIC	IMAGE	
	
On	August	7,	1970,	seventeen-year-old	African	American	militant	Jonathan	Jackson	
smuggled	several	guns	into	a	courtroom	in	California’s	Marin	County	Civic	Center.	The	
young	man	sat	quietly	in	the	gallery	for	several	minutes	while	the	Black	revolutionary	
and	prisoner	James	McClain	stood	trial	for	assaulting	a	white	guard	in	San	Quentin	
Prison.	Then	Jackson	rose	to	his	feet	brandishing	an	assault	rifle.	“All	right,	gentlemen,	
I’m	taking	over	now,”	he	proclaimed.	Jackson	then	distributed	firearms	to	McClain	and	
defense	witnesses	Ruchell	Magee	and	William	A.	Christmas,	also	radical	Black	
prisoners.	The	four	men	seized	Judge	Harold	Haley,	District	Attorney	Gary	Thomas,	and	
three	female	jurors	as	hostages,	and	then	fled	to	a	nearby	getaway	van.	District	
Attorney	Thomas	later	stated	that	the	men	hoped	to	trade	their	captives	for	the	release	
of	the	“Soledad	Brothers”—Fleeta	Drumgo,	John	Clutchette,	and	Jonathan’s	older	
brother	George	Jackson—three	radical	Black	prisoners	indicted	on	capital	charges	for	
killing	another	white	prison	guard	amid	escalating	violence	between	guards	and	Black	
revolutionary	convicts	inside	California’s	prisons.	Jonathan	Jackson,	however,	never	had	
an	opportunity	to	explain	his	aims.	He	died	alongside	McClain,	Christmas,	and	Judge	
Haley	after	police	and	prison	guards	surrounded	the	van,	a	firefight	erupted,	and	a	
shooting	melee	broke	out	inside	the	vehicle.1			
																																																								
1	Accounts	of	the	shoot-out	vary,	but	most	indicate	that	gunfire	broke	out	between	police	and	the	
revolutionaries	as	the	van	approached	a	roadblock	set	up	by	police	and	San	Quentin	guards,	and	as	
Thomas	wrested	a	gun	from	one	of	his	captors	and	began	shooting	at	them	inside	the	van.	Those	
sympathetic	with	the	revolutionaries’	causes	claimed	that	police	and	guards	fired	into	the	van	
indiscriminately	under	the	protocol	of	San	Quentin’s	“no	hostage”	policy.	Police	asserted	that	McClain	
fired	at	the	roadblock	from	the	van’s	passenger	seat.	Haley	died	of	a	blast	from	a	shotgun	that	the	
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	 Jonathan	Jackson	was	a	high	school	student	from	Pasadena	tormented	by	the	
incarceration	of	his	beloved	older	brother.	Through	regular	written	correspondence	
from	prison,	George	had	tutored	his	younger	sibling	in	foco	theory	and	political	
economy,	and	like	many	other	young	radicals	of	his	time,	Jonathan	came	to	believe	that	
revolutionary	violence	offered	humanity’s	best	hope	for	overcoming	the	racist	state	
violence	of	U.S.	imperialism.2	Jonathan	Jackson	died	in	an	effort	to	advance	socialist	
revolution.	He	knew	nothing	about	the	Huston	Plan,	but	his	bloody	attack	prompted	a	
chain	of	unintended	consequences.			
	 Jackson	carried	out	his	raid	two	weeks	after	FBI	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	
pressured	President	Richard	Nixon	to	abandon	the	Huston	Plan’s	secret	consolidation	
of	America’s	intelligence	agencies,	and	two	days	after	Tupamaros	guerrillas	in	
Montevideo,	Uruguay	executed	American	hostage	Dan	Mitrione,	a	former	FBI	operative	
working	in	their	country	under	the	auspices	of	the	U.S.	Agency	for	International	
Development	(USAID).	Jackson’s	raid	elicited	shock	and	alarm	among	American	political	
leaders,	who	nervously	viewed	the	attack	as	a	portent	of	further	political	kidnappings	
on	United	States	soil.	After	the	Marin	County	courthouse	incident,	President	Nixon	and	
his	aides,	still	frustrated	by	Hoover’s	sabotage	of	the	Huston	Plan,	ratcheted	up	their	
insistence	that	the	FBI	expand	its	efforts	to	thwart	leftist	guerrilla	violence	and	prevent	
																																																																																																																																																																												
revolutionaries	had	taped	to	his	head.		Gunshot	wounds	permanently	paralyzed	Thomas;	Magee	also	
endured	critical	wounds.	One	of	the	jurors	was	injured	by	gunfire	as	well.	For	accounts,	see	Berger,	
Captive	Nation,	122-124;	Cummins,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	California’s	Racial	Prison	Movement,	182-183;	Min	
S.	Yee,	The	Melancholy	History	of	Soledad	Prison	(New	York:	Harper’s	Magazine	Press,	1973),	157-165.	
According	to	Berger,	Magee	later	asserted	that	the	group	planned	to	take	over	a	radio	station	in	“an	effort	
to	reach	the	people	and	dramatically	awaken	them	to	the	plight	of	all	prisoners,	particularly	Blacks,”	by	
describing	the	“torturous	prison	conditions”	endured	by	California	prisoners.		
2	For	more	on	how	George	Jackson	and	his	incarceration	influenced	Jonathan	Jackson’s	life	and	politics,	
see	the	former’s	letters	to	the	latter	in	George	Jackson,	Blood	in	my	Eye,	2nd	ed.	(Baltimore:	Black	Classic	
Press,	1990),	11-25.	For	Angela	Davis’s	recollections	on	this	matter,	see	Angela	Davis,	Angela	Davis:	An	
Autobiography,	3rd	ed.	(New	York:	International	Publishers,	1998),	266-267.	Also	see	Berger,	Captive	
Nation,	120-121.	
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further	kidnappings.	Dozens	of	bombings	and	other	guerrilla	attacks	over	the	
remainder	of	1970,	several	of	them	deadly,	only	increased	the	urgency	of	the	Nixon	
Administration’s	demands.		Consequently,	Jackson’s	raid	was	the	first	of	several	leftist	
guerrilla	actions	that	prompted	Hoover	to	expand	dramatically	the	FBI’s	surveillance	of	
Black	Power	and	New	Left	activists	and	secretly	revive	illegal	surveillance	techniques	
outlined	in	the	Huston	Plan.	The	FBI	fought	what	it	increasingly	referred	to	as	
“terrorism”	by	seeking	advanced,	“preventative”	knowledge	of	guerrilla	attacks,	and	by	
utilizing	restricted	tactics	to	search	for	leftist	guerrilla	fugitives.	Hoover	authorized	FBI	
use	of	informants	under	the	age	of	twenty-one	and	the	expansion	of	warrantless	
wiretaps	targeting	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	suspected	Weather	Underground	
associates.	Furthermore,	in	an	effort	to	expand	the	FBI’s	domestic	surveillance	
capabilities	while	avoiding	liability	for	illegal	spy	tactics,	Hoover	used	euphemistic	
threats	and	suggestions	to	pressure	local	Field	Offices	to	informally	utilize	mail	tracking,	
mail-opening,	and	break-ins	in	conjunction	with	the	Bureau’s	Weather	Underground	
investigation.		
	 Leftist	guerrilla	violence,	and	the	specter	of	political	kidnapping,	also	drove	
Hoover	to	inadvertently	provoke	intense	public	criticism	of	the	FBI.	On	November	27,	
1970,	while	requesting	funds	from	the	Senate	Appropriations	Committee	for	the	FBI’s	
war	on	domestic	leftist	guerrillas,	Hoover	claimed	to	have	intelligence	that	suggested	a	
group	of	activists	associated	with	the	Catholic	pacifist	organization	East	Coast	
Conspiracy	to	Save	Lives	planned	to	blow	up	underground	electrical	conduits	and	
steam	pipes	in	Washington	D.C.	and	kidnap	a	top	U.S.	official,	later	revealed	to	be	
Secretary	of	State	Henry	Kissinger.	Hoover’s	far-fetched	accusations	backfired,	
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prompting	unprecedented	criticism	of	the	FBI	and	its	Director	in	Congress	and	the	
press.	In	addition,	a	federal	grand	jury’s	indictment	of	the	“Harrisburg	Eight”	the	
following	month	turned	the	antiwar	activists	accused	of	the	Washington	bombing	and	
Kissinger	kidnapping	plot	into	cause	célèbres,	and	prompted	renewed	concern	within	
the	U.S.	Left	of	an	escalating	government	conspiracy	to	repress	political	dissent.	The	
charges	also	motivated	one	of	the	indicted,	Philadelphia	physics	professor	and	peace	
activist	William	Davidon,	to	lead	a	group	of	pacifist	radicals	in	a	burglary	of	a	local	FBI	
office	with	the	goal	of	acquiring	documentary	evidence	of	political	repression.	On	March	
8,	1971,	Davidon	and	his	secret	group,	the	Citizens	Commission	to	Investigate	the	FBI,	
followed	through	on	his	plans,	stealing	thousands	of	classified	FBI	documents	from	a	
Resident	Agency	in	Media,	Pennsylvania.	
	 The	Media	burglary	was	disastrous	for	the	FBI	because	it	undermined	that	which	
Hoover	had	sought	to	preserve	when	he	blocked	the	Huston	Plan	in	July	1970:	the	FBI’s	
longstanding	public	image	as	trusted	crime-fighters	and	defenders	of	national	security.	
In	her	2014	book	The	Burglary,	journalist	Betty	Medsger	described	in	detail	how	the	
Media	burglars	carried	out	their	heist	and	uncovered	documents	revealing	the	FBI’s	
involvement	in	widespread	domestic	surveillance.	Medsger,	who	reported	on	the	stolen	
documents	in	the	Washington	Post	in	1971	after	receiving	anonymously-sent	copies	in	
the	mail,	also	explained	in	her	book	how	news	coverage	of	the	disclosures	elicited	
unprecedented	calls	in	Congress	and	the	press	for	Hoover’s	dismissal	and	for	official	
investigations	of	FBI	practices.	Medsger’s	book	also	illustrates	how	the	heist	uncovered	
the	first	documentary	evidence	of	the	Bureau’s	COINTELPROs	against	dissident	social	
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movements,	operations	the	Church	Committee	would	later	document	in	its	1976	report	
on	FBI	activities.3		
	 However,	despite	casting	new,	important	light	on	the	Media	burglary	and	
publicly	revealing	the	burglars’	identities	for	the	first	time,	Medsger’s	book	suffers	from	
a	key	omission.	Like	other	literature	on	the	history	of	FBI	operations	against	political	
dissidents,	Medsger’s	book	does	not	provide	a	sufficient	explanation	for	why	the	Bureau	
instituted	the	mass	domestic	surveillance	uncovered	by	the	Media	burglars.	Instead,	she	
falls	back	on	a	conspiratorial	explanation	for	the	Bureau’s	motivations,	asserting	that	
the	FBI	carried	out	its	secret	surveillance	and	counterintelligence	operations	against	
American	dissidents	merely	to	“silence	people	whose	political	opinions	the	director	
[Hoover]	opposed.”4	Medsger’s	book	makes	virtually	no	mention	of	leftist	guerrilla	
violence.		
	 In	contrast,	this	chapter	illustrates	for	the	first	time	that	in	the	fall	of	1970	the	
FBI	introduced	most	of	its	surveillance	of	New	Left	and	African	American	campus	
activists	uncovered	through	the	Media	burglary,	as	well	as	the	illegal	spy	tactics	later	
exposed	after	the	Watergate	Scandal,	in	a	desperate	and	ineffective	attempt	to	thwart	
leftist	guerrilla	violence.	In	analyzing	the	unintended	consequences	of	Hoover’s	false	
accusation	that	the	“Harrisburg	Eight”	were	plotting	to	kidnap	Henry	Kissinger,	this	
chapter	also	reveals	that	the	Media	burglary	was	itself	an	indirect	product	of	the	FBI’s	
war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas.		
	
																																																								
3	Medsger,	The	Burglary.	For	a	documentary	film	account	of	the	stories	in	Medsger’s	book,	see	1971,	
directed	by	Johanna	Hamilton,	Maximum	Pictures	and	Fork	Films,	2014.	
4	Medsger,	The	Burglary,	7.	
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August	1970	
Approximately	one	week	after	the	Marin	County	courthouse	attack,	FBI	Director	Hoover	
spoke	on	the	phone	with	President	Nixon.	The	details	of	their	conversation	are	
unknown,	but	a	pair	of	letters	Hoover	wrote	on	August	17,	1970	shed	light	on	the	topics	
discussed.	The	letters—one	issued	to	the	FBI’s	fifty-nine	Field	Offices	and	twenty	
overseas	Legal	Attaches,	and	the	second	to	Nixon—indicate	that	the	President	
instructed	Hoover	to	intensify	Bureau	investigations	of	leftist	guerrillas	in	the	
aftermath	of	Jonathan	Jackson’s	August	7	raid.	Nixon	was	already	furious	with	Hoover	
over	the	collapse	of	the	Huston	Plan.	The	Marin	County	courthouse	incident	had	only	
increased	the	President’s	frustration	with	Hoover,	as	the	FBI	remained	unable	to	thwart	
leftist	guerrilla	attacks.			
	 Nixon’s	concerns	over	revolutionary	violence	had	been	further	amplified	by	
recent	events	in	South	America.	In	an	incident	reported	throughout	the	world,	
Uruguay’s	Tupamaros	guerrillas	kidnapped	USAID	advisor	and	former	FBI	agent	Dan	
Mitrione	on	July	31,	and	executed	him	on	August	6	after	the	Uruguayan	government	
refused	the	revolutionaries’	demands	for	the	release	of	150	leftist	political	prisoners.5	
Nixon	feared	that	revolutionary	guerrillas	inspired	by	the	Tupamaros	would	attempt	
additional	political	kidnappings	in	the	United	States.6	Consequently,	not	only	did	the	
																																																								
5	Churchill,	Becoming	the	Tupamaros,	50.	The	Tupamaros	accused	Mitrione	of	covertly	training	
Uruguayan	police	in	the	use	of	torture	techniques.	See	page	56	for	Churchill’s	summary	of	the	debate	over	
the	validity	of	these	claims.	The	Mitrione	kidnapping	became	the	inspiration	for	Costa-Gavras’	1973	film,	
State	of	Siege,	which	later	helped	inspire	the	Symbionese	Liberation	Army’s	1974	kidnapping	of	
newspaper	heiress	Patricia	Hearst.	
6	No	documentary	evidence	proves	that	the	Tupamaros	directly	influenced	Jonathan	Jackson’s	raid,	but	
circumstantial	evidence,	such	as	the	timing	of	his	raid,	romanticization	of	the	Tupamaros	by	many	in	the	
militant	U.S.	left,	and	Jackson’s	extensive	readings	on	guerrilla	warfare,	suggest	that	such	influence	was	
likely.	For	more	on	the	Tupamaros’	influence	on	the	U.S.	left,	see	ibid.	For	Jonathan	Jackson’s	thoughts	on	
revolution	and	guerrilla	violence,	see	Jackson,	Blood	in	my	Eye,	11-25.	
	 	 	164	
President	want	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	apprehended	and	prosecuted,	but	he	also	
wanted	Hoover	to	obtain	advance	warning	of	revolutionaries’	violent	plans.		
	 The	urgency	of	Nixon’s	demands	came	across	in	Hoover’s	letter	to	his	Special	
Agents	in	Charge	and	Legal	Attaches.	“Recent	activities	in	Latin	America	as	well	as	in	
California	on	the	part	of	revolutionary	extremists	in	the	kidnapping	of	public	officials	
and	diplomats	for	hostage	purposes,”	he	wrote,	“dictate	the	need	for	intensification	of	
investigation	of	such	extremist	organizations	as	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	the	
Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	including	the	Weatherman	faction,	and	similar	
violence-prone	groups.”7	Hoover	passed	the	pressure	from	Nixon	down	the	FBI	
hierarchy.	Referring	to	leftist	guerrilla	investigations	as	a	“matter	of	greatest	
importance,”	Hoover	warned	the	supervisors	of	regional	FBI	offices	that	he	would	hold	
them	“personally	responsible	for	the	development	of	informant	coverage	in	these	
organizations	whereby	the	Bureau	is	in	a	position	to	ascertain	the	plans	of	extremist	
elements.”8	Referring	to	the	periodic	reviews	of	Field	Office	investigations	carried	out	
by	the	FBI’s	Chief	Inspector	W.	Mark	Felt,	Hoover	emphasized	to	field	supervisors,	
“Your	efforts	in	this	regard	will	be	the	subject	of	close	scrutiny	during	future	
inspections.”9		
	 In	his	second	letter,	Hoover	informed	President	Nixon	of	these	initiatives.	“In	
line	with	our	conversation	the	other	evening,”	the	Director	wrote,	“I	have	had	
instructions	issued	to	every	one	of	our	field	offices	and	to	our	Legal	Attaches	abroad	to	
intensify	investigation	of	such	extremist	organizations	…	whose	members	may	make	an	
																																																								
7	J.	Edgar	Hoover	to	all	SACs,	August	17,	1970,	in	L.	Patrick	Gray	Director’s	File	(hereafter	LPG	FBI),	
acquired	by	the	author	through	a	Freedom	of	Information	Act	request.	
8	Ibid.	
9	Ibid.	
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effort	to	kidnap	high-ranking	government	officials,	members	of	the	diplomatic	corps	
and	members	of	their	families.”10	
	 Hoover’s	latest	order	for	the	“intensification”	of	FBI	leftist	guerrilla	
investigations	was	different	from	others	he	had	issued	since	late	1969.	Not	only	did	
Hoover	seek	advance	knowledge	of	violent	leftist	attacks,	a	nearly	impossible	task	given	
the	guerrillas’	deliberate	use	of	secrecy	and	clandestinity,	but	he	also	shifted	the	onus	of	
responsibility	for	this	effort	from	himself	to	the	Special	Agents	in	Charge	of	local	field	
offices,	a	move	likely	motivated	by	both	his	and	the	Nixon	administration’s	
unwillingness	to	shoulder	the	burden	of	any	future	exposure	of	FBI	impropriety.	While	
providing	no	specific	instructions	on	how	to	obtain	preventative	intelligence,	Hoover	
strongly	implied	that	a	field	office’s	success	or	failure	in	preempting	revolutionary	
violence	would	prove	pivotal	in	determining	the	career	prospects	of	its	Special	Agent	in	
Charge.	Consequently,	the	order	placed	tremendous	pressure	upon	local	FBI	officials.	
Was	the	Director	expecting	field	offices	to	reinstitute	break-ins	and	other	illegal	
surveillance	tactics	he	had	discontinued	in	the	mid-1960s?	Should	their	involvement	in	
such	activities	become	known,	would	local	supervisors	and	field	agents	face	sanctions?	
In	such	a	scenario,	would	Hoover	support	local	FBI	personnel,	or	disavow	responsibility	
and	blame	illegal	surveillance	techniques	on	a	lone	rogue	field	office?	
	 The	FBI’s	lack	of	rules	or	regulations	for	bombing	investigations	troubled	field	
agents.	Special	Agent	William	Dyson,	who	investigated	SDS	and	the	Weather	
Underground	in	Chicago,	later	recalled	his	frustration:	“Obviously	if	there’s	a	bombing,	I	
can	do	a	crime	scene.	But	what	else	can	I	do?	Can	I	infiltrate	a	college	classroom?	Can	I	
																																																								
10	J	Edgar	Hoover	to	Richard	Nixon,	August	17,	1970,	in	LPG	FBI.	
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go	and	listen	to	a	professor?		Can	I	talk	to	a	professor	in	a	college	classroom?	Can	I	go	to	
his	office?		Can	I	put	an	informant	in	the	college	classroom?	Or	even	on	the	campus.	Can	
I	penetrate	any	college	organization?	What	can	I	do?”11	The	answers	were	uncertain,	
and	clarification	from	Headquarters	was	not	forthcoming.			
	 Meanwhile,	the	FBI	investigated	the	Marin	County	courthouse	attack.	
Investigators	quickly	traced	Jonathan	Jackson’s	guns	to	their	owner,	Angela	Davis,	a	
prominent	African	American	Communist	and	doctoral	student	who	worked	as	a	lecturer	
in	philosophy	at	the	University	of	California	Los	Angeles	(UCLA).	During	the	previous	
year,	Davis	had	been	the	target	of	an	anticommunist	smear	campaign	led	by	Governor	
Ronald	Reagan,	who	tried	to	force	UCLA	to	fire	her.12	Davis	had	purchased	the	guns	
after	receiving	multiple	death	threats,	and	stored	them	at	the	San	Francisco	Soledad	
House	commune,	where	she	lived	for	several	months	while	working	on	a	campaign	to	
exonerate	the	Soledad	Brothers.	Jackson	worked	as	Davis’s	bodyguard,	and	had	access	
to	the	guns,	but	Davis	had	no	prior	knowledge	of	his	plans	for	the	courthouse	attack.	
Nonetheless,	fearing	an	indictment,	she	went	into	hiding	two	days	after	the	raid.	Hoover	
put	Davis	on	the	FBI’s	Ten	Most	Wanted	Fugitive	list	on	August	18	as	agents	searched	
for	her	throughout	the	country.13				
	 Six	days	later,	on	August	24,	a	fatal	guerrilla	attack	in	Madison,	Wisconsin	drew	
additional	FBI	attention	to	leftist	violence.	At	3:42	in	the	morning,	a	group	calling	itself	
the	New	Years	Gang	detonated	a	massive	car	bomb	next	to	the	University	of	Wisconsin’s	
																																																								
11	Dyson	oral	history,	25-26.	
12	The	controversy	surrounding	Davis	at	UCLA	began	in	July	1969	after	FBI	informant	William	Divale	
outed	her	as	a	member	of	the	Communist	Party	in	the	university	newspaper.	See	Berger,	Captive	Nation,	
108.	
13	Berger,	Captive	Nation,	108;	Cummins,	The	Rise	and	Fall,	184-185;	Davis,	Autobiography,	3-12,	278-279.			
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Sterling	Hall,	home	to	the	Army	Math	Research	Center,	a	facility	involved	in	research	
related	to	the	U.S.	war	effort	in	Vietnam.	The	blast,	produced	from	ammonium	nitrate	
fertilizer	and	fuel	oil	packed	into	a	stolen	van,	sent	flames	and	a	mushroom	cloud	
hundreds	of	feet	into	the	air,	and	startled	people	awake	throughout	the	sleeping	city.	
The	bombers	carried	out	their	attack	before	dawn	in	an	attempt	to	avoid	casualties	but	
their	precautions	were	inadequate.	The	explosion	killed	Robert	Fassnacht,	a	post-
doctoral	physicist	who	was	conducting	research	in	the	basement.		
	 A	few	hours	after	the	bombing,	police	in	Sauk	County,	forty	miles	north	of	
Madison,	pulled	over	a	car	that	matched	the	description	of	a	vehicle	seen	fleeing	the	
scene	of	the	attack.	Inside	were	four	young	white	radicals	involved	in	the	Madison-area	
antiwar	movement:	Dwight	Armstrong,	his	older	brother	Karleton	Armstrong,	Leo	Burt,	
and	David	Fine.	After	a	couple	hours	of	detainment,	however,	the	police	released	the	
men	because	they	lacked	evidence	permitting	them	to	hold	the	suspects	under	state	
law.	The	four	men	seized	the	opportunity	to	flee	the	area	and	disappear	into	the	
revolutionary	underground.	The	FBI	identified	them	as	the	bombers	a	few	days	later.	
After	initiating	yet	another	nationwide	manhunt	for	revolutionary	fugitives,	Hoover	
added	all	four	suspects	to	the	FBI’s	Most	Wanted	list	on	September	4,	1970.14			
	 The	Sterling	Hall	bombing,	coming	on	the	heels	of	the	Marin	Country	courthouse	
attack,	prompted	the	FBI	to	reinstitute	banned	surveillance	practices	outlined	in	the	
Huston	Plan.	On	September	2,	FBI	Chief	Inspector	W.	Mark	Felt	urged	Headquarters	to	
																																																								
14	Tom	Bates,	RADS	(New	York:	HarperCollins,	1992),	8-10,	26,	36.	Also	see	Scott	Bauer,	“FBI	Releases	
1970	UW	Bombing	Documents,”	Milwaukee	Journal	Sentinel,	April	6,	2011.	Dwight	Armstrong	was	
eighteen,	Karlton	was	twenty-three,	Fine	was	eighteen,	and	Burt	was	twenty-two.	After	the	bombing,	the	
four	fled	north,	and	lived	in	Canada	under	assumed	identities	for	several	years	before	FBI	agents	caught	
up	with	Fine	and	the	Armstrong	brothers.	Burt	remains	at	large	today.	He	is	rumored	to	have	fought	in	
Latin	American	guerrilla	movements	during	the	1970s.	
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lower	its	minimum	age	limit	for	university	student	informants	from	twenty-one	to	
eighteen.	“Never	in	our	history	have	we	been	confronted	with	as	critical	a	need	for	
informant	coverage,”	he	explained	in	a	memo	to	Associate	Director	Clyde	Tolson,	the	
FBI’s	long-time	number	two	official	under	J.	Edgar	Hoover.	Reinstituting	the	FBI’s	pre-
1967	standard	of	eighteen	as	the	minimum	informant	age	was	necessary,	Felt	argued,	in	
order	to	prevent	“terrorist	violence,”	including	“bombings,	assassination	of	police	
officers,	kidnapping	and	torture	murder”	by	“Weatherman	fanatics”	and	other	
“violence-oriented	black	and	white	savages	…	at	war	with	the	Government	and	
American	people.”15	In	his	memo,	Felt	indicated	that	he	based	his	recommendations	on	
feedback	from	special	agents	throughout	the	country	whom	he	spoke	with	while	
inspecting	their	investigations	of	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	violent	leftist	
groups.16		
	 Felt’s	recommendation	received	a	key	endorsement.	In	a	brief	addendum	typed	
onto	the	bottom	of	the	memo,	Assistant	to	the	Director	William	C.	Sullivan	affirmed	his	
support.	Sullivan	was	the	third	most	powerful	man	in	the	FBI.	He	was	also	the	architect	
of	the	recently	aborted	Huston	Plan.	“No	one	can	predict	with	accuracy	the	outcome	of	
the	revolutionary	struggle	going	on	in	this	country	at	this	time,”	he	cautioned.	“Those	
under	20	years	of	age	are	playing	a	predominant	role	in	campus	violence,”	Sullivan	
affirmed,	noting,	“two	of	the	subjects	in	the	University	of	Wisconsin	case	are	under	
20.”17		
																																																								
15	FBI	memo,	W.	M.	Felt	to	Tolson,	September	2,	1970,	Huston	Plan,	328.	
16	Ibid.	
17	Ibid,	329.	
	 	 	169	
	 In	their	joint	plea	to	Hoover,	Felt	and	Sullivan	forged	an	unlikely	alliance.	Felt	
had	detested	Sullivan	since	the	mid	1960s.	After	his	promotion	to	Chief	Inspector	in	
1965,	Felt	clashed	repeatedly	with	Sullivan	over	Hoover’s	new	restrictions	on	
warrantless	wiretaps,	break-ins,	use	of	informants	under	age	twenty-one,	and	other	
illegal	and	controversial	FBI	surveillance	practices.	Like	many	others	in	the	FBI,	Felt	
shared	Sullivan’s	disagreement	with	Hoover’s	new	policies,	viewing	the	restricted	
techniques	as	essential	tools	in	the	Bureau’s	fight	against	Communist	subversion.	Felt,	
however,	was	also	an	ardent	Hoover	loyalist	who	believed	that	backing	the	Director’s	
orders	took	precedent	over	such	disagreement.	This	is	where	he	differed	from	Sullivan,	
who	had	spent	much	of	1969	and	1970	secretly	plotting	to	undermine	Hoover	and	
reinstate	the	Bureau’s	old	investigative	tactics,	efforts	that	eventually	culminated	in	the	
Huston	Plan.	In	his	1979	memoir,	Felt	asserted	that	Sullivan	tried	many	times	to	
convince	him	to	collaborate	in	disregarding	Hoover’s	orders.	Felt	claimed	to	have	
responded	to	one	of	Sullivan’s	entreaties	by	replying,	“Bill,	we’ve	talked	about	this	
before.	I	understand	your	problems	but	we	are	going	to	get	the	job	done	in	spite	of	the	
restrictions—not	in	spite	of	the	Boss.	I	am	not	against	you—I	am	for	you	but	I	am	also	
for	the	Director.”	18		
	 The	fact	that	Felt	would	ally	with	Sullivan	in	an	attempt	to	reverse	Hoover’s	
restrictions	on	teenaged	informants	points	to	the	tremendous	frustration	these	top	FBI	
officials	experienced	as	they	worked,	under	enormous	pressure	but	with	little	success,	
to	prevent	revolutionary	violence	and	apprehend	leftist	guerrilla	fugitives.	Felt	and	
Sullivan	sought	to	lower	the	minimum	age	for	campus	informants,	in	part,	because	they	
																																																								
18	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	112.	Felt’s	quote	may	be	fictional,	but	it	nonetheless	testifies	to	
his	differences	with	Sullivan.	
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believed	that	doing	so	would	improve	their	chances	of	preventing	guerrilla	attacks.	
However,	this	was	not	the	only	driving	force	behind	the	memo;	it	is	likely	that	an	
internal	bureaucratic	struggle	influenced	Felt	and	Sullivan	as	well.	Both	men	were	
probably	partially	driven	by	their	long-time	rivalry	and	their	separate,	individual	
desires	to	manipulate	the	FBI	bureaucracy	according	to	their	personal	ambitions	and	
ideals.			
	 For	Sullivan,	Felt’s	memo	was	yet	another	opportunity	to	press	Hoover	for	the	
reinstatement	of	FBI	surveillance	tactics	he	had	unsuccessfully	sought	to	implement	
through	the	Huston	Plan.	Sullivan	had	managed	to	shield	his	involvement	in	the	Huston	
Plan	from	Hoover,	projecting	the	appearance	that	Huston	was	the	driving	force	behind	
the	initiative.	Indeed,	Sullivan	was	so	successful	in	maintaining	the	facade	of	loyalty	to	
his	boss	that	Hoover	promoted	him	to	Assistant	to	the	Director	on	June	10,	1970,	and	
promoted	Charles	Brennan	to	his	former	post	as	Assistant	Director	for	Domestic	
Security.19	Sullivan	remained	convinced	of	the	need	to	expand	the	FBI’s	surveillance	
capacities	in	order	to	combat	leftist	guerrilla	violence,	however,	and	seized	Felt’s	memo	
as	an	opportunity	to	advance	this	agenda.	
	 Sullivan’s	efforts	paralleled	those	of	White	House	officials.	A	month	earlier,	Tom	
Huston	had	urged	H.	R.	Haldeman	to	convince	Nixon	and	Attorney	General	Mitchell	to	
reinstate	his	eponymous	Plan.	“At	some	point,”	Huston	insisted	with	disdain	for	the	FBI	
																																																								
19	J.	Edgar	Hoover	letter	to	all	Special	Agents	in	Charge,	“Assistant	to	the	Director—Investigative,”	June	
10,	1971,	and	FBI	memo,	M.	A.	Jones	to	Mr.	Bishop,	“DeLoach	Retirement;	Sullivan	and	Brennan	
Promoted,”	June	19,	1970,	in	William	C.	Sullivan	FBI	Personnel	File	(hereafter	WCS	FBI),	Section	7,	
available	online	in	the	Internet	Archive’s	Ernie	Lazar	FOIA	Collection,	
https://archive.org/details/ernie1241_fbiemployees?&sort=-downloads&page=3.		
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Director’s	power	and	autonomy,	“Hoover	needs	to	be	told	who	is	President.”20	On	
September	18,	1970,	John	Dean—who	had	taken	over	Huston’s	role	as	the	primary	
Nixon	administration	official	in	charge	of	“internal	security”	matters	following	his	July	
1970	promotion	to	White	House	Council—offered	a	modified	version	of	Huston’s	
suggestion.	Dean	issued	a	memo	to	Mitchell	recommending	the	formation	of	an	
interagency	domestic	intelligence	unit,	but	without	a	“blanket	removal	of	restrictions.”	
21	Instead,	Dean	proposed	entrusting	the	unit	to	determine	“the	type	of	intelligence	we	
need	…	and	then	to	proceed	to	remove	the	restraints	as	necessary	to	obtain	such	
intelligence.”22	
	 It	is	uncertain	whether	or	not	Felt	knew	about	the	Huston	Plan,	but	if	he	did,	it	is	
highly	unlikely	that	he	would	have	worked	to	reinstate	the	program	behind	Hoover’s	
back.	Instead,	Felt	probably	wrote	the	memo	in	an	effort	to	obtain	Hoover’s	written	
approval	for	lifting	restrictions	on	student	informants	following	the	Director’s	
ambiguous	August	17	memo	instructing	all	field	offices	to	“intensify”	leftist	guerrilla	
investigations.	As	the	FBI’s	Chief	Inspector,	Felt	was	the	administrator	tasked	with	
holding	local	Special	Agents	in	Charge	“personally	responsible”	for	obtaining	advance	
notice	of	revolutionary	violence.	Felt,	who	regularly	travelled	around	the	country	to	
inspect	field	offices,	indicated	in	his	memo	that	many	local	FBI	officials	“informally	
indicated	…	that	their	productivity	would	be	greatly	enhanced	by	a	lowering	of	the	age	
requirements”	for	informants.23	Felt’s	request	revealed	the	stress	and	uncertainty	FBI	
																																																								
20	Tom	Charles	Huston	memo	to	H.	R.	Haldeman,	“Domestic	Intelligence,”	August	5,	1970,	Huston	Plan,	
249.	
21	John	Dean	memo	to	John	Mitchell,	September	18,	1970,	Huston	Plan,	249.	
255.	
22	Ibid.	
23	Felt	to	Tolson,	September	2,	1970,	Huston	Plan,	328.	
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agents	in	the	field	experienced	in	the	face	of	increased	pressure	to	combat	guerrilla	
violence	and	unclear	guidelines	for	how	to	do	so.	In	partnering	with	Sullivan	to	petition	
Hoover	for	a	lowering	of	the	informant	age	limit,	Felt	forged	a	convenient	temporary	
alliance	in	order	to	bolster	his	own	efforts.	His	endeavor	ultimately	panned	out,	as	
Hoover	approved	the	measure.24	Six	weeks	after	Hoover	compelled	Nixon	to	abandon	
the	Huston	Plan,	Felt	and	Sullivan	convinced	Hoover	to	implement	one	of	the	Plan’s	key	
elements.			
	 	
“Fall	Offensive”	
While	Sullivan	and	White	House	staff	worked	to	revive	the	Huston	Plan,	and	Felt	sought	
clarification	on	Hoover’s	guidelines	for	domestic	security	investigations,	leftist	
guerrillas	carried	out	more	attacks.	On	September	15,	1970,	the	Weather	Underground	
executed	its	next	major	operation,	helping	Dr.	Timothy	Leary	escape	from	California’s	
minimum	security	San	Luis	Obispo	Prison,	where	the	counter-culture	icon	and	LSD	
advocate	was	serving	a	ten-year	sentence	for	marijuana	possession.	In	a	communiqué	
released	to	the	media,	the	Weather	Underground	referred	to	Leary	as	a	“prisoner	of	
war”	and	pledged	to	continue	their	efforts	to	destroy	U.S.	imperialism.25	In	an	
accompanying	letter,	Leary	thanked	the	Weather	Underground	for	helping	him	escape,	
and	vowed	to	“stay	high	and	wage	the	revolutionary	war.”	Leary	also	warned	
authorities	that	he	was	armed	and	“should	be	considered	dangerous	to	anyone	who	
																																																								
24	Ibid,	329.	
25	Bernadine	Dohrn,	“Dr.	Timothy	Leary,”	September	15,	1970,	in	Dohrn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	Song,	154.	
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threatens	my	life	or	freedom.”26	Robert	L.	Shackelford,	the	new	head	of	the	FBI’s	
Internal	Security	Division,	duly	noted	Leary’s	statement	in	his	September	22,	1970	
report	on	the	escape.27		
	 A	week	after	Leary’s	escape,	guerrillas	in	Massachusetts	killed	a	police	officer.	
The	group	of	white	revolutionaries	consisted	of	ex-convicts	Stanley	Bond,	William	
Gilday,	and	Robert	Valeri,	and	student	radicals	Katherine	Power	and	Susan	Saxe.	On	
September	23,	Gilday	fired	fatal	submachine	rounds	at	Walter	Schroeder,	the	first	cop	
to	arrive	on	the	scene	as	the	group	held	up	a	bank	in	the	Boston	suburb	of	Brighton.	The	
group	then	escaped	with	$26,000	they	hoped	to	give	to	the	Black	Panthers.	Three	days	
earlier,	the	group	raided	a	National	Guard	Armory	in	nearby	Newburyport,	where	they	
stole	a	truck,	military	files,	and	400	rounds	of	ammunition,	and	then	firebombed	the	
facility,	causing	over	$120,000	in	damage.	Working	on	a	tip	from	an	FBI	informant,	
police	caught	up	with	Bond,	Gilday,	and	Valeri	a	few	days	after	the	bank	robbery.	Saxe	
and	Power,	however,	vanished	into	the	revolutionary	underground.28		
	 Another	leftist	guerrilla	attack	occurred	on	October	6,	when	the	Weather	
Underground	blew	up	Chicago’s	Haymarket	police	statue	for	the	second	time	(the	city	
had	rebuilt	it	after	the	group’s	first	bombing	a	year	earlier).	Later	that	day	in	New	York	
City,	Jerry	Ruben,	“Chicago	8”	defendant	and	leader	of	the	Youth	International	Party	
																																																								
26	Timothy	Leary	letter	quoted	in	FBI	memo,	R.	L.	Shackelford	to	C.	D.	Brennan,	September	22,	1970,	FBI	
WUO	File,	Roll	6,	Section	63.	
27	Ibid.	
28	Andrew	F.	Blake,	“4	Campus	‘Radicals’	Hunted	in	Boston	Police	Slaying,”	Washington	Post,	September	
26,	1970,	A5;	Arthur	Jones,	“Blast	Rips	Newburyport	Armory,”	Boston	Globe,	September	21,	1970,	1;	
Andrew	F.	Blake,	“Informant	was	Talking	to	FBI	Men	during	Brighton	Murder-Robbery,”	Boston	Globe,	
October	6,	1970,	1;	Boston	Globe,	“Ex-Brandeis	Coeds	Added	to	FBI	Most	Wanted	List,”	October	18,	1970,	
1;	Pam	Lambert,	“Alice	Doesn’t	Live	Here	Anymore,”	People	40,	No.	14	(April	1993),	61-62.	Daniel	Burton-
Rose,	“Amazon	Underground?	Female	Antiwar	Fugitives	and	Fissures	of	Solidarity	in	the	Women’s	
Community”	(unpublished	paper,	May	2009).	The	informant	was	an	acquaintance	of	some	of	the	groups’	
members	who	voluntarily	approached	the	FBI	to	warn	them	that	members	of	the	group	planned	to	kill	
police	after	hearing	one	of	them	bragging	in	a	New	Hampshire	bar.			
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(otherwise	known	as	the	Yippies)	held	a	press	conference	along	with	Jennifer	Dohrn,	
fellow	Yippie	and	younger	sister	of	Bernadine	Dohrn,	the	notorious	Weather	
Underground	fugitive.	The	pair	played	a	tape	recording	of	Bernadine	Dohrn	announcing	
the	start	of	“a	fall	offensive	of	youth	resistance	that	will	spread	from	Santa	Barbara	to	
Boston,	back	to	Kent	and	Kansas.”29	Bernadine	flaunted	the	Weather	Underground’s	
evasion	of	the	FBI,	boasting,	“J.	Edgar	himself	admitted	that	‘underground	radicals’	were	
the	hardest	group	to	infiltrate.”	Furthermore,	she	warned,	“next	week	families	and	tribes	
will	attack	the	enemy	around	the	country.”30	The	Weather	Underground	followed-up	two	
days	later	with	a	bomb	that	destroyed	a	courtroom	and	restroom	in	the	Marin	County	
Civic	Center,	where	Jonathan	Jackson	and	three	others	had	died	two	months	previously.	
A	pair	of	additional	bombings	by	separate,	unaffiliated	groups	also	took	place	on	
October	8,	one	inside	the	University	of	Washington’s	ROTC	building,	and	another	
outside	a	National	Guard	Armory	in	Santa	Barbara.31	The	Weather	Underground	carried	
out	another	bombing	the	next	day,	blasting	a	hole	in	a	Long	Island	City	courthouse	in	
solidarity	with	a	prisoner	revolt	in	the	Queens	House	of	Detention	recently	quashed	by	
New	York	police.32	On	October	12,	five	unclaimed	bombings	took	place	in	Rochester,	
along	with	two	in	New	York	City	and	one	in	Orlando.33			
	 The	FBI	scored	a	brief	public	relations	victory	in	the	midst	of	the	bombings.	On	
October	13	agents	captured	Angela	Davis	in	a	New	York	motel	room.34	Two	days	later,	
																																																								
29	Bernadine	Dohrn,	Jeff	Jones,	and	Bill	Ayers,	“Fall	Offensive,”	October	8,	1970,	in	Dohrn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	
Battle	Song,	156-157.	
30	Ibid,	italics	in	original.	
31	Dohrn,	et	al.,	158;	Cril	Payne,	Deep	Cover:	An	FBI	Agent	Infiltrates	the	Radical	Underground	(New	York:	
Newsweek	Books,	1979),	11.	
32	Weatherman,	“Criminal	Courthouse,”	October	9,	1970,	in	Dohrn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	Song,	160.	
33	WUR,	35.	
34	Free	Angela	Davis	and	All	Political	Prisoners,	directed	by	Shola	Lynch,	Codeblack	Films/Lionsgate,	2013.	
	 	 	175	
President	Nixon	congratulated	the	FBI	for	capturing	“the	dangerous	terrorist,	Angela	
Davis,”	as	he	signed	the	Omnibus	Crime	Bill	of	1970,	which	expanded	the	Bureau’s	
jurisdiction	over	bombings	on	college	campuses.35	But	the	bombs	kept	exploding.	On	
October	14,	the	Weather	Underground’s	all	female	“Proud	Eagle	Tribe”	bombed	the	
Harvard	Center	for	International	Affairs	to	protest	the	institution’s	complicity	in	the	
Vietnam	War,	claiming	their	attack	in	solidarity	with	Davis,	whom	leftists	throughout	
the	world	viewed	as	the	target	of	a	government	frame-up.36	Two	days	later,	fake	bomb	
threats,	some	of	them	attributed	to	the	Weather	Underground,	forced	“the	evacuation	of	
hospitals	in	Boston,	of	airports	in	New	York	and	St.	Louis,	and	of	a	subway	station	in	
Harvard	Square	in	Cambridge,	Mass.”37		
	 According	to	Los	Angeles	Special	Agent	Cril	Payne,	Director	Hoover	“was	in	a	
rage”	after	the	Weather	Underground’s	“Fall	Offensive”	communiqué	and	subsequent	
bombings.	Payne	recalled	that	FBI	agents	around	the	country	“were	aware	of	[Hoover’s]	
displeasure,”	as	Field	Office	phones	rang	“off	the	wall	with	calls	from	Washington	
demanding	a	thorough	and	aggressive	investigation	with	plenty	of	manpower.”38	“It	
was	bad	enough	for	these	‘revolutionary-guerrillas,’	as	the	Director	called	them,	to	set	
off	a	few	bombs,”	Payne	wrote	in	his	1979	memoir,	“but	to	announce	their	intentions	to	
the	American	people	in	advance,	and	then	fulfill	them,	was	unthinkable	to	Mr.	Hoover.”	
																																																								
35	Ibid;	Carroll	Kirkpatrick,	“Nixon	Vows	‘Total	War’	Against	Crime,”	Washington	Post,	October	16,	1970,	
A2.	
36	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	142-143;	Dayo	F.	Gore,	introduction	to	Free	Angela	Davis	and	All	Political	
Prisoners!	A	Transnational	Campaign	for	Liberation,	edited	by	Dayo	F.	Gore	and	Bettina	Aptheker	
(Alexandria,	VA:	Alexander	Street	Press,	2014),	E-Book.	A	jury	acquitted	Davis	of	all	charges	on	June	2,	
1972.	
37	WUR,	35.	
38	Payne,	Deep	Cover,	12.	
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The	Director,	Payne	attested,	worried	dearly	that	“the	public	might	decide	the	FBI	had	
lost	control	of	the	situation.”39			
	 Hoover’s	actions	seem	to	corroborate	Payne’s	statements.	Immediately	following	
Dohrn’s	“Fall	Offensive”	communiqué,	Hoover	sent	urgent	teletypes	warning	the	
President,	the	Vice	President,	the	Secretary	of	State,	the	Attorney	General,	the	Army,	the	
Air	Force,	the	Secret	Service,	the	Directors	of	the	CIA,	DIA,	and	the	Naval	Intelligence	
Agency,	and	all	FBI	Field	Offices	of	impending	revolutionary	“terrorism.”40	On	October	
14,	the	day	of	the	Proud	Eagle	Tribe’s	Harvard	bombing,	Hoover	placed	Bernadine	
Dohrn	on	the	FBI’s	Ten	Most	Wanted	list.	He	added	Power	and	Saxe	a	few	days	later,	on	
October	17.41	The	total	new	additions	to	the	Most	Wanted	list	for	1970	now	numbered	
twelve,	ten	of	them	leftist	revolutionaries,	seven	of	whom	remained	on	the	lam.42	In	
addition,	Hoover	circulated	a	notice	warning	U.S.	government	officials	to	take	
precautions	against	potential	political	kidnapping	and	assassination	by	the	Weather	
Underground,	“black	extremists,”	and	other	guerrillas.	Among	other	things,	the	October	
23	bulletin	cautioned	officials	to	travel	only	on	main	thoroughfares	during	daylight	
hours,	to	speak	only	before	friendly	audiences,	to	keep	their	home	office	notified	of	
their	whereabouts	at	all	times,	and	to	“vary	the	pattern	of	living”	in	respect	to	business	
																																																								
39	Ibid.	
40	FBI	teletype,	Director	to	all	SACs,	October	7,	1970;	and	FBI	coded	teletype,	Director,	FBI	to	President,	
Vice	President,	Secretary	of	State,	Director,	CIA,	Director,	Defense	Intelligence	Agency,	Department	of	the	
Army,	Department	of	the	Air	Force,	Naval	Investigative	Service,	U.S.	Secret	Service,	and	Attorney	General,	
October	6,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	64.	
41	WUR,	36.	
42	Hartford	Courant,	“More	Women	on	Top	Ten,”	October	18,	1970,	23A.	
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and	social	activities	in	order	to	make	it	difficult	for	potential	kidnappers	or	assassins	to	
predict	their	daily	routine.43	
	 Increasing	leftist	violence,	and	officials’	incessant	desire	for	preventative	
intelligence,	also	prompted	the	FBI	to	dramatically	expand	its	surveillance	of	the	
aboveground	student	antiwar	and	Black	Power	movements.	On	November	5,	Acting	
upon	recommendations	from	the	FBI’s	Executive	Council	(which	included	Felt	and	
Sullivan),	Hoover	ordered	his	Field	Offices	to	open	files	on	“all	members	of	Students	for	
a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	members	of	procommunist,	militant	New	Left-type	
campus	organizations	who	follow	SDS	advocacy	of	revolution	and	violence.”44	Hoover’s	
order	covered	autonomous,	unaffiliated	campus	activist	groups	as	well	as	SDS	factions	
opposed	to	the	Weather	Underground,	including	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	II	
(RYM	II),	which	split	from	Weatherman	shortly	after	the	June	1969	SDS	National	
Convention,	and	the	Boston-based	Progressive	Labor	Party-affiliated	Worker-Student	
Alliance	(WSA)	faction,	which	claimed	the	mantle	of	SDS	after	the	Weatherman	faction	
disbanded	the	organization	following	the	December	1969	Flint	War	Council.	Despite	
their	fervent	ideological	differences,	and	the	fact	that	both	the	WSA	and	RYM	II	opposed	
urban	guerrilla	warfare,	Hoover	warned	that	these	groups	collectively	constituted	“a	
breeding	ground	for	revolutionaries,	extremists,	and	terrorists.”45	Hoover	also	
mandated	surveillance	of	all	members	of	“Black	Student	Unions”	and	other	African	
American	campus	groups,	as	well	as	members	of	pro-Independence	Puerto	Rican	
																																																								
43	FBI	bulletin,	“Kidnapping	and	Assaults	of	United	States	Government	Officials,”	October	23,	1970,	Gale	
Cengage	Learning	Declassified	Documents	Reference	System	online	database	(hereafter	DDRS	database).	
44	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SAC	Albany,	“Security	Investigations	of	Individuals	who	are	Members	of	the	
Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	and	Militant	New	Left	Campus	Organizations,”	November	5,	1970,	FBI	
WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	64.	
45	Ibid.	
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student	groups.	Viewing	right-wing	nationalist	bombers	as	an	additional	threat	to	
internal	security,	Hoover	also	order	surveillance	of	the	anticommunist	Jewish	Defense	
League,	whom	the	FBI	suspected	of	involvement	in	a	series	of	attacks	on	Soviet	
embassies	and	consulates.46			
	 Expanding	domestic	surveillance	was	no	easy	task.		Hoover’s	measures	required	
field	agents	to	reopen	over	10,000	files	on	student	activists	that	had	been	frozen	since	a	
February	1969	moratorium.47	Agents	were	to	do	so	incrementally,	completing	the	task	
by	June	1971.48	The	efforts	were	Hoover’s	latest	to	obtain	preventative	intelligence,	or	
advanced	knowledge	of	revolutionary	violence.	The	goal,	he	explained,	was	to	“identify	
potential	and	actual	extremists,	revolutionaries	and	terrorists	and	to	assess	their	threat	
to	the	internal	security	of	the	Government.”49		
	 Leftist	guerrilla	violence	also	encouraged	the	FBI	to	reinstate	mail-covers—
illegal	and	previously	restricted	surveillance	of	addresses	and	return	addresses	on	
individuals’	mail.	Like	the	use	of	teenaged	informants,	mail-covers	had	been	a	critical	
tactic	outline	in	the	Huston	Plan.	In	October	1970,	Hoover	approved	a	recommendation	
from	Internal	Security	Division	Chief	Robert	L.	Shackelford	to	his	supervisor	Charles	
Brennan,	granting	permission	to	initiate	mail	covers	in	the	FBI’s	Weather	Underground	
investigation.	The	FBI	targeted	Yippie	leaders	Jerry	Rubin	and	Jennifer	Dohrn,	who	had	
exposed	themselves	as	potential	aboveground	contacts	for	the	Weather	Underground	
																																																								
46	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SAC	Albany,	“Black	Student	Groups	on	College	Campuses,”	November	4,	1970;	
and	FBI	memo,	Executives	Conference	to	Tolson,	“Proposed	Intensification	of	Certain	Investigations	in	
the	Security	Field,”	October	29,	1970,	Huston	Plan,	323-324	and	317-320.	The	FBI	suspected	the	JDL’s	
involvement	in	a	series	of	bombings	of	Soviet	embassies	and	consulates.	
47	FBI	memo,	Executives	Conference	to	Tolson,	“Proposed	Intensification	of	Certain	Investigations	in	the	
Security	Field,”	October	29,	1970,	FBI	WUO,	Roll	6,	Section	64.			
48	Ibid.	
49	Ibid.	
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with	their	October	6	press	release	publicizing	Bernadine	Dohrn’s	“Fall	Offensive”	
statement.	In	an	October	16	memo,	Shackelford	expressed	his	view	that	the	FBI	“should	
undertake	every	investigative	technique	possible	to	locate	…	Weatherman	fugitives	
[emphasis	added].”50	Shackelford’s	colleagues	would	have	clearly	understood	this	
statement	as	a	reference	to	mail-covers	and	other	restricted	tactics.	Specifically,	in	
response	to	Rubin	and	Dohrn’s	public	acknowledgement	of	having	received	the	
Weather	Underground’s	tape-recorded	communiqué	in	the	mail	at	the	New	York’s	
Yippie	headquarters,	Shackelford	suggested	the	FBI	“make	confidential	arrangements	
through	the	Old	Chelsea	Station	Post	Office	to	get	the	lists	of	postmarks	and	return	
addresses	on	mail	sent	to	individuals	at	YIP	headquarters	as	well	as	to	the	organization	
itself.”51	Hoover	approved	the	recommendation	with	his	characteristic	handwritten	
initials	and	a	scribbled	“OK.”52	
	 The	FBI	began	expanding	its	warrantless	electronic	surveillance	of	the	
aboveground	left	in	its	efforts	to	thwart	guerrilla	violence	as	well,	though	it	did	so	with	
Attorney	General	Mitchell’s	approval.	In	late	October,	for	example,	the	FBI	began	to	
wiretap	the	telephone	in	the	Boston	WSA-affiliated	SDS	Headquarters,	and	the	phones	
of	suspected	aboveground	Weather	Underground	contacts	Nancy	Kurshan	in	Cleveland	
and	Nancy	Frappier	in	San	Francisco.53	The	FBI	directed	the	greatest	share	of	its	
electronic	surveillance	towards	the	Black	Panther	Party.	The	FBI	suspected	that	
members	of	the	Party	planned	to	carry	out	guerrilla	violence	due	to	the	frequent	
																																																								
50	FBI	memo,	R.	L.	Shackelford	to	C.	D.	Brennan,	October,	16,	1970,	FBI	WUO	File,	Roll	6,	Section	64.	
51	Ibid.	
52	Ibid.		
53	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	320;	FBI	memo,	C.	D.	Brennan	to	W.	R.	Wannall,	March	29,	1971,	Huston	
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glorification	of	killing	police	officers	in	their	newspaper,	and	based	on	information	they	
received	from	informants.54	Moreover,	because	the	Black	Panther	Party	remained	an	
aboveground	organization,	they	were	an	easier	surveillance	target	than	the	clandestine	
Weather	Underground.	By	March	29,	1971,	the	FBI	maintained	telephone	surveillance	
on	BPP	offices	in	Chicago,	Los	Angeles,	San	Francisco,	Oakland,	New	Haven,	and	the	
Bronx,	and	microphone	surveillance	inside	the	San	Francisco	penthouse	suite	of	the	
organization’s	leader,	Huey	Newton.55	The	FBI	now	maintained	the	most	extensive	
electronic	surveillance	of	the	U.S.	Left	since	Hoover	limited	the	practice	in	1965.56	
		 Ironically,	the	FBI’s	surveillance	of	the	U.S.	Left	expanded	just	as	mass	radical	
protest	declined.	Antiwar	demonstrations	continued	on	university	campuses	during	the	
fall	1970	semester,	but	not	on	the	scale	of	the	previous	spring,	when	students	shut	
down	campuses	across	the	country	in	the	wake	of	Nixon’s	Cambodia	invasion	and	the	
Kent	State	killings.	The	disintegration	of	SDS	after	June	1969	had	left	the	movement	
without	a	national	organization	capable	of	maintaining	such	momentum.	The	FBI’s	
annual	report	for	fiscal	year	1971	nonetheless	emphasized	that	“New	Left	extremism	
posed	a	serious	danger	to	the	Nation’s	internal	security,”	and	that	“one	of	the	key	
extremist	groups	was	the	Weatherman,	the	violence-prone	wing	of	the	pre-June	1969	
																																																								
54	For	example,	in	September	1970	the	FBI	noted	in	a	series	of	bulletins	to	other	police	agencies	that	a	
recent	issue	of	“The	Black	Panther”	newspaper	included	a	cartoon	“showing	a	Panther	leaving	a	police	
station,	gun	in	hand,	with	a	dead	police	officer	behind	him,”	and	that	an	informant	had	indicated	that	a	
leader	of	the	New	York	Panthers	expressed	support	for	kidnapping	American	political	leaders	in	order	to	
negotiate	the	release	of	Chairman	Bobby	Seal	from	prison.	FBI	bulletin,	“Racial	Summary,	Week	of	
September	21-27,	1970,”	September	29,	1970,	and	FBI	bulletin,	“Racial	Summary,	Week	of	September	14-
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Students	for	a	Democratic	Society.57	The	Black	Panther	Party	was	also	in	disarray.	In	
January	and	February	1971,	Huey	Newton	expelled	Geronimo	Pratt	and	most	members	
of	New	York’s	Panther	Twenty-One	from	the	Party	after	members	aligned	with	exiled	
Minister	of	Communication	Eldridge	Cleaver	publicly	criticized	their	leader	for	moving	
away	from	guerrilla	warfare	as	a	revolutionary	strategy.58	The	FBI	noted	in	their	annual	
report	that	the	Black	Panther	Party’s	membership	had	“dwindled”	during	the	first	half	
of	1971	amid	the	Newton-Cleaver	split,	which	the	Bureau	had	actively	encouraged	
through	its	counterintelligence	program	against	the	organization.	Nonetheless,	the	
Bureau	maintained	that	“black	extremists	groups,”	particularly	the	BPP’s	Cleaver	
faction,	“continue	as	dangers	to	national	security.”59		
	 The	FBI	expanded	its	surveillance	of	the	U.S.	left	in	the	fall	of	1970	not	in	
response	to	mass	protest	or	fears	of	Communist	subversion,	but	in	a	desperate	attempt	
to	thwart	leftist	guerrilla	violence.60	As	in	the	past,	however,	mass	surveillance	would	
not	help	the	FBI	reach	its	intended	objectives.	Instead,	it	damaged	the	FBI,	as	Hoover’s	
zealous	efforts	to	combat	revolutionary	guerrillas	led	him	to	overstate	the	threat	posed	
by	leftist	violence.	In	doing	so,	the	Director	set	off	a	series	of	events	that	would	
irreparably	tarnish	the	Bureau’s	public	image	and	popular	legitimacy.	
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Overreach	
The	FBI’s	expanding	war	on	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	was	expensive.	On	November	27,	
1970,	Hoover	appeared	before	the	Senate	Appropriations	Committee	to	request	over	
fourteen	million	dollars	in	supplemental	funding	for	its	operations	against	organized	
crime,	airplane	hijackers,	and	“black	militants	and	New	Left	extremists”	involved	in	
“violent	and	terroristic	tactics,	including	bombings.”61	Citing	a	twenty-five	percent	
increase	in	the	FBI’s	workload	over	the	past	year	due	to	the	expansion	of	such	illegal	
activity,	Hoover	sought	the	funds	to	employ	1,000	new	agents	and	702	new	clerks,	and	
to	purchase	500	new	automobiles.62	Hoover	provided	a	detailed	account	of	recent	
domestic	leftist	guerrilla	violence	in	his	testimony,	referencing	Weather	Underground	
assaults,	the	Marin	County	courthouse	raid,	and	the	Sterling	Hall	bombing	as	prominent	
examples	of	the	thousands	of	politically	motivated	attacks,	most	of	them	bombings	and	
arsons,	that	had	occurred	over	the	past	year,	and	which	he	imagined	would	continue	
into	the	next.63	As	usual,	the	Director	succeeded	in	acquiring	his	requested	funds.64	But	
a	portion	of	Hoover’s	testimony	provoked	a	firestorm	of	controversy.			
	 In	an	effort	to	underscore	the	danger	leftist	violence	posed	to	national	security,	
Hoover	alleged	that	the	East	Coast	Conspiracy	to	Save	Lives,	a	direct	action-oriented	
pacifist	group	led	by	Catholic	priests	and	nuns,	“planned	to	blow	up	underground	
conduits	and	steam	pipes	serving	the	Washington	D.C.	area”	and	“kidnap	a	highly	placed	
Government	official.”65	Leaks	to	the	press	following	the	testimony	named	Secretary	of	
																																																								
61	J.	Edgar	Hoover	testimony,	Subcommittee	of	the	Committee	on	Appropriations,	“Supplemental	
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62	Ibid.	
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State	Henry	Kissinger	as	the	official	slated	for	kidnapping.	The	leaders	of	this	plot,	
Hoover	claimed,	were	Philip	and	Daniel	Berrigan,	a	pair	of	brothers	and	pacifist	Roman	
Catholic	priests	then	serving	federal	prison	sentences	in	Danbury,	Connecticut	for	
helping	destroy	Selective	Services	records	in	Maryland	in	a	nonviolent	act	of	resistance	
to	the	Vietnam	War	in	1968.66	Hoover’s	accusations	were	not	completely	unfounded.	
Pakistani-American	scholar	Eqbal	Ahmad	had	indeed	floated	the	idea	of	a	“citizens’	
arrest”	of	Kissinger	over	dinner	with	some	of	his	Catholic	pacifist	comrades	in	late	
1970,	but	the	“conspiracy”	ended	that	night	after	the	activists	determined	that	the	
action	posed	too	much	risk	of	bloodshed.	The	FBI	learned	of	this	“plot”	after	Danbury	
prison	officials	intercepted	a	letter	from	Sister	Elizabeth	McAlister	to	her	husband	
Philip	Berrigan	that	described	the	dinner	conversation.67	
	 Hoover’s	accusation	prompted	what	he	feared	most:	negative	media	attention	
and	charges	of	FBI	wrongdoing.	The	Berrigan	brothers	and	members	of	the	East	Coast	
Conspiracy	to	Save	Lives	publicly	denied	the	charges,	while	prominent	leftist	attorney	
William	Kuntsler	warned	that	Hoover’s	testimony	was	part	of	an	effort	to	scare	the	
American	people	into	accepting	increased	FBI	repression	of	the	American	Left.68	In	a	
reference	to	the	Grand	Inquisitor	of	late	fifteenth	century	Spain,	Kunstler	referred	to	
Hoover	as	“America’s	Torquemada.”69	Kunstler	made	the	statement	during	a	speech	at	
Yale	University,	where	leftist	students	were	then	hosting	thousands	of	activists	from	
around	the	country	who	had	come	to	New	Haven	to	protest	the	trial	of	Black	Panthers	
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Bobby	Seale	and	Erika	Huggins.	The	pair	faced	charges	connected	to	the	murder	of	
nineteen-year-old	Party-member	and	accused	informant	Alex	Rackley,	whom	local	
Panthers	had	shot	to	death	after	torturing	him	for	several	days	with	a	coat	hanger	and	
boiling	water	in	a	supposed	effort	to	uncover	evidence	of	police	infiltration	of	the	
organization.	Coming	on	the	heels	of	charges	against	the	Chicago	Eight,	the	Panther	
Twenty-One,	Huey	Newton,	Angela	Davis,	and	other	prominent	radicals,	many	in	the	
U.S.	Left	viewed	the	charges	against	Seale	and	Huggins	as	the	latest	round	of	the	
government’s	efforts	to	crush	the	antiwar	and	Black	Power	movements.70	In	the	minds	
of	Kunstler	and	other	leftists,	Hoover’s	accusations	against	the	East	Coast	Conspiracy	to	
Save	Lives	demonstrated	that	the	Nixon	administration’s	efforts	to	repress	domestic	
political	dissent	were	not	limited	to	Black	Panther	and	SDS	militants.	“If	Catholic	priests	
and	nuns,	sensitive	religious	people,	can	be	indicted	for	crimes	punishable	by	the	death	
penalty,”	he	asked,	“who	is	safe?”71			
	 Hoover’s	allegations	also	turned	members	of	Congress	against	him,	particularly	
those	in	the	liberal	wing	of	the	Democratic	Party.	Representative	William	R.	Anderson	
(D-TN),	an	esteemed	World	War	II	Navy	veteran	and	self-described	“lifelong	admirer	of	
Mr.	Hoover,”	responded	to	the	charges	with	what	one	reporter	referred	to	as	“the	
sharpest	criticism	of	FBI	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	ever	heard”	in	the	House	of	
Representatives.	Accusing	Hoover	of	being	“involved	in	a	process	destructive	of	the	
institution	he	has	loved	and	served	with	such	dedication,”	Anderson	accused	the	
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Director	of	utilizing	“tactics	reminiscent	of	McCarthyism.”72	The	controversy	erupted	
only	days	after	former	Attorney	General	Ramsey	Clark	publicly	criticized	the	FBI	for	
wiretapping	Senators	and	lobbyists	during	the	mid-1960s.	Hoover	responded	by	calling	
his	former	superior	a	“jellyfish”	who	was	“soft”	on	criminals.73	In	a	television	
appearance,	Senator	Birch	Bayh	(D-IN)	described	Hoover’s	comments	as	“very	
unbecoming,”	remarking,	“this	type	of	response	would	lead	me	to	believe	he’s	forgotten	
what	his	job	is	and	perhaps	we	should	find	someone	who	has	a	better	memory.”74	
	 The	Berrigan	conspiracy	blowout	may	have	been	a	product	of	the	ongoing	
bureaucratic	struggle	at	the	top	of	the	FBI	hierarchy.	In	his	1979	memoir,	Mark	Felt	
insinuated	that	William	C.	Sullivan	fed	information	about	the	Berrigan	conspiracy	to	
Hoover	in	an	attempt	to	undermine	him,	knowing	that	the	Director	would	provoke	
damaging	public	backlash	if	the	media	picked	up	his	testimony.75	Sullivan,	however,	
insisted	that	he	had	explicitly	warned	Hoover	not	to	discuss	the	case.76	Whichever	the	
case,	the	result	was	increased	strain	on	the	FBI’s	public	image.	Under	pressure	to	justify	
his	public	statement,	Hoover	convinced	the	Department	of	Justice	to	convene	a	grand	
jury,	which	indicted	Philip	Berrigan	and	seven	others	on	conspiracy	charges	in	early	
January	1971.	On	January	12,	FBI	agents	arrested	the	seven	non-incarcerated	activists.	
Along	with	Philip	Berrigan,	they	became	known	as	the	“Harrisburg	Eight,”	after	the	
Pennsylvania	city	that	hosted	the	grand	jury.	But	the	indictment	backfired.	Hundreds	of	
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protesters	demonstrated	at	the	defendants’	court	hearings,	and	the	Harrisburg	Eight	
became	leftist	causes	célèbres	with	Ramsey	Clark	serving	as	their	head	attorney.77			
Outcry	over	the	Harrisburg	Eight	indictment	erupted	at	the	same	time	that	other	
controversies	stained	the	FBI’s	image.	On	January	31,	1971,	Senator	George	McGovern	
charged	Hoover	with	“vindictiveness”	for	firing	Jack	Shaw,	an	FBI	special	agent	who	had	
privately	critiqued	the	Director	in	a	paper	written	for	a	college	criminal	justice	course.	
Days	after	Shaw	filed	a	lawsuit	against	the	FBI,	McGovern	called	for	a	Senate	
investigation	of	the	matter.78	Citing	Hoover’s	age	of	seventy-six,	his	career	spanning	
over	half	a	decade,	and	growing	controversy	surrounding	his	leadership	and	allegations	
of	illegal	surveillance,	prominent	newspaper	editors	now	called	upon	the	Director	to	
resign.79	
			 President	Nixon	privately	considered	firing	Hoover	during	this	period	as	well,	
but	not	because	of	the	Director’s	alleged	civil	rights	violations.	Nixon	remained	
frustrated	with	the	powerful	bureaucrat’s	refusal	to	follow	his	orders.	On	February	3,	
1971,	Hoover	once	again	blocked	the	Nixon	administration’s	attempt	to	revive	a	version	
of	the	Huston	Plan.	In	a	memo	to	the	Justice	Department,	he	indicated	that	the	FBI	
would	“not	provide	personnel”	for	the	Nixon	administration’s	proposed	inter-agency	
Intelligence	Evaluation	Committee	(IEC)	on	internal	security	headed	by	White	House	
Council	John	Dean	and	Assistant	Attorney	General	Robert	Mardian.80	The	Director	failed	
to	mention,	however,	that	the	FBI	had	already	begun	to	institute	many	of	the	Huston	
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Plans	provisions	on	its	own.	Hoover’s	snub	compelled	the	IEC	to	move	forward	without	
the	FBI’s	involvement,	a	move	that	prefigured	Nixon’s	formation	of	the	“Plumbers”	
several	months	later.81	The	day	after	Hoover	issued	his	memo	to	the	Justice	
Department,	President	Nixon,	Attorney	General	Mitchel,	and	Chief	of	Staff	H.R.	
Haldeman	held	a	two-hour	meeting	to	discuss	Hoover’s	fate	as	FBI	Director.	According	
to	Haldeman,	the	President	“made	it	clear	that	Hoover	has	got	to	be	replaced	before	the	
end	of	Nixon’s	first	term.”82	
	 Though	he	managed	to	stay	in	office	and	safeguard	the	FBI’s	institutional	
autonomy,	Hoover’s	problems	continued	to	mount.	Americans’	views	on	the	FBI	grew	
increasingly	polarized,	as	leftists	and	liberals	decried	Hoover’s	repression	of	leftwing	
activists,	while	growing	numbers	of	other	Americans	demanded	stepped-up	efforts	to	
capture	leftist	guerrillas.	At	the	same	time	that	prominent	Democratic	lawmakers	such	
as	Edward	Kennedy	and	Hale	Boggs	called	for	Hoover’s	dismissal,	for	example,	the	FBI	
endured	criticism	from	the	International	Association	of	Chiefs	of	Police	and	others	who	
questioned	why	leftist	bomber	fugitives	continued	to	elude	the	FBI	despite	the	Bureau	
receiving	“bigger	and	bigger”	appropriations	every	year.83		
	 Ongoing	leftist	violence,	meanwhile,	lent	credence	to	Hoover’s	warnings	that	
revolutionary	guerrillas	posed	a	serious	danger	to	public	safety	and	national	security.	
On	March	1,	1971,	in	their	most	brazen	attack	to	date,	the	Weather	Underground	
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bombed	the	U.S.	Capitol	Building,	causing	$300,000	in	damage.84	The	bombing	followed	
Weather’s	December	1970	“New	Morning,	Changing	Weather”	communiqué,	in	which	
Bernadine	Dohrn	toned	down	her	violent	rhetoric,	renounced	the	organization’s	
previous	rejection	of	grassroots	movement-building,	and	pledged	that	the	Weather	
Underground	would	consciously	avoid	casualties	in	future	bombings	carried	out	to	
draw	public	attention	to	U.S.	injustice.85	The	FBI	took	note	of	the	Weather	
Underground’s	newly	articulated	policy,	but	continued	to	view	the	organization	as	a	
dangerous	threat.86	Hundreds	of	FBI	agents	throughout	the	country	continued	their	
search	for	the	organization’s	fugitives	after	the	Capitol	bombing,	as	Congressional	
leaders	offered	a	$100,000	award	for	information	leading	to	their	capture.87	
	 While	the	Capitol	bombing	caused	great	frustration	for	the	FBI,	a	nonviolent	
burglary	a	week	later	caused	far	more	damage	to	the	Bureau.	Late	at	night	on	March	8,	
1971,	while	much	of	the	country	watched	Joe	Frazier’s	televised	championship	boxing	
bout	with	Muhammad	Ali,	the	Citizens’	Committee	to	Investigate	the	FBI	carried	out	
their	heist	of	thousands	of	classified	documents	from	a	Resident	Agency	in	Media,	
Pennsylvania.	The	FBI	did	not	know	it	at	the	time,	but	the	burglars	were	a	group	of	
eight	local	peace	activists	led	by	William	C.	Davidon,	a	physics	professor	and	member	of	
the	Harrisburg	Eight	indicted	for	the	Kissinger	kidnapping	conspiracy.	Infuriated	by	the	
Harrisburg	indictments,	the	Citizens’	Committee	carried	out	their	burglary	in	an	
attempt	to	find	documentary	evidence	that	the	FBI	was	engaged	in	covert	disruption	of	
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the	U.S.	Left.	They	were	successful	beyond	their	greatest	expectations.	The	burglars	
uncovered	documents	demonstrating	the	FBI’s	extensive	surveillance	of	student	and	
Black	activist	organizations;	their	use	of	local	police,	postal	workers,	telephone	
operators,	and	campus	security	officers	in	surveillance	operations;	and	their	attempts	
to	instill	in	activists	the	paranoid	sense	that	they	were	being	constantly	watched	by	“an	
FBI	agent	behind	every	mailbox.”88	The	group	secretly	sent	the	documents	to	
journalists	and	members	of	Congress.	Despite	FBI	and	Justice	Department	orders	not	to	
publish,	the	Washington	Post	and	New	York	Times	began	running	articles	on	the	
revelations	just	over	two	weeks	later.89		
	 According	to	Mark	Felt,	Hoover	was	“enraged”	when	he	learned	of	the	document	
heist;	another	source	described	the	Director	as	“apoplectic.”90	Hoover	immediately	
launched	an	enormous	investigation,	codenamed	MEDBURG,	which	rivaled	the	Weather	
Underground	investigation	in	size	and	scope.	MEDBURG	consumed	vast	Bureau	
resources,	as	Hoover	dispatched	over	200	agents	to	the	work	on	the	case	in	the	
Philadelphia	area,	where	they	set	up	around-the-clock	physical	surveillance	of	
Philadelphia	peace	activists,	and	pored	over	mountains	of	evidence,	including,	among	
other	things,	over	a	decade’s	worth	of	surveillance	photos	of	antiwar	activists.	On	more	
than	one	occasion,	FBI	agents	broke	into	the	homes	of	Philadelphia	peace	activists	
whom	they	suspected	of	involvement	in	the	Media	burglary.	Other	investigators	
followed	leads	throughout	the	country,	from	Los	Angeles	to	North	Carolina	to	Boston.	
Still	more	agents	drew	massive	overtime	pay	for	security	duty	after	Hoover,	fearful	of	
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additional	burglaries,	closed	103	of	the	FBI’s	remote	Resident	Agencies	and	required	
agents	to	maintain	twenty-four	hour	guard	at	the	Bureau’s	more	than	400	other	small	
offices.91	The	FBI,	however,	was	unable	to	find	the	culprits.	After	mailing	off	the	
documents,	members	of	the	Citizen’s	Commission	to	Investigate	the	FBI	parted	ways,	
agreeing	to	never	speak	to	one	another	again	out	of	fear	that	doing	so	would	aid	the	
Bureau’s	investigation.	One	member	of	the	group,	Judi	Feingold,	moved	to	the	west	
coast	and	went	underground.	The	rest	remained	aboveground	in	the	Philadelphia	area,	
hiding	in	plain	sight.92	
	 The	Media	burglary	prompted	an	important	change	in	FBI	practices.	On	April	28,	
1971,	Hoover	quietly	discontinued	all	FBI	COINTELPROs,	though	he	reserved	the	
prerogative	to	carry	out	similar	programs	in	the	future	on	an	“ad-hoc	basis.”93	The	
public	had	not	yet	learned	of	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	programs,	but	Hoover	knew	
it	was	only	a	matter	of	time	before	activists	and	journalists	began	to	inquire	about	the	
“COINTELPRO”	code	word	typed	in	the	heading	of	a	document	stolen	from	Media.	By	
this	point,	however,	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	programs	were	of	little	use.	
COINTELPRO-New	Left	had	never	been	very	effective,	and	was	of	even	lesser	value	now	
that	SDS	had	disintegrated	and	mass	antiwar	protest	had	significantly	declined.	
COINTELPRO-BNHG	had	successfully	exploited	the	Black	Panther	Party’s	internal	
divisions	and	violent	tendencies,	but	by	April	1971	the	Party	was	essentially	defunct	
outside	of	Oakland.94	Moreover,	as	FBI	officials	had	acknowledged	for	the	past	year,	
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counterintelligence	was	not	an	effective	tactic	for	fighting	clandestine	revolutionary	
guerrillas.	
	 For	the	FBI,	however,	the	most	damaging	outcome	of	the	Media	burglary	was	the	
damage	it	inflicted	upon	the	Bureau’s	public	image.	Immediately	following	the	news	
stories	on	the	stolen	documents,	public	criticism	of	the	FBI	surged,	particularly	among	
American	liberals.	Editors	of	the	Washington	Post,	New	York	Times,	Philadelphia	
Inquirer,	and	other	major	papers	blasted	the	FBI’s	tactics	and	notion	of	internal	
security.95	The	Post	called	the	FBI’s	tactics	“appropriate,	perhaps	for	the	secret	police	of	
the	Soviet	Union	but	wholly	inconsonant	with	the	idea	of	a	Federal	Bureau	of	
Investigation.”96	Democratic	Senators	Edmund	Muskie	of	Maine,	Gaylord	Nelson	of	
Wisconsin,	Mike	Mansfield	of	Montana,	and	John	V.	Tunney	of	California	joined	
newspaper	editors	in	calls	for	Congressional	investigations	of	FBI	practices.97		
	 William	Sullivan	and	J.	Edgar	Hoover	discussed	public	criticism	of	the	FBI	in	an	
exchange	of	letters	in	April	1971.	Sullivan	sought	to	console	his	boss	through	a	
sycophantic	letter.	“It	would	be	misleading	to	say	that	the	attacks	made	on	you,	the	FBI,	
and	the	rest	of	us	are	not	damaging,”	he	conceeded.	But	Sullivan	assured	Hoover	that	
the	controversy	would	pass.	“You	not	only	have	the	support	and	backing	of	FBI	
employees	but	of	far	greater	significance	the	backing	of	people	throughout	the	country	
on	a	grass-roots	level,”	he	wrote.	“Even	the	critics	admit	this	and	point	out	that	your	
strength	is	too	great	for	anyone	to	replace	you.”98	In	his	reply,	Hoover	acknowledged	
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that	the	public	criticism	was	great,	and	that	he	was	taking	it	personally.	It	was	also	clear	
that	Hoover	did	not	suspect	Sullivan’s	duplicity:	
Dear	Bill,	
	 It	was	indeed	most	thoughtful	for	you	to	write	your	most	encouraging	
letter	of	April	5	commenting	on	the	series	of	attacks	on	me	and	the	Bureau.	I	do	
not	think	it	is	possible	to	always	completely	ignore	or	be	able	to	not	let	such	
things	get	under	one’s	skin,	but	when	one	stops	to	analyze	it,	the	true	character	
of	the	sources,	which	is	nothing	but	a	pack	of	jackals,	surfaces.	I	have	always	
been	able	to	count	on	your	staunch	support,	loyalty,	and	assistance,	not	only	
when	things	are	blackest,	but	day	in	and	day	out,	and	I	did	want	to	thank	you	and	
express	my	deep	appreciation	to	you.	I	feel	certain	that	by	each	of	us	carrying	on	
and	doing	the	job	to	the	best	of	our	ability	and	adhering	to	the	right	principles,	
our	record	will	speak	for	itself.	
	 Thank	you	for	writing	as	you	did.	
	 Sincerely,	
	 J.E.H.99	
	
	 The	damage	inflicted	on	the	FBI,	however,	was	irreparable.	After	the	Media	
burglary	revelations,	the	FBI’s	image,	along	with	Hoover’s,	entered	a	downward	spiral	
from	which	it	would	never	fully	recover.	Growing	numbers	of	Americans	expressed	
their	distrust	of	the	Bureau	and	its	leaders,	viewing	the	FBI’s	politically-motivated	
policing	as	a	far	greater	threat	to	their	freedom	than	the	violent	antics	of	a	handful	of	
guerrilla	revolutionaries.	Consequently,	FBI	agents	now	pursued	leftist	guerrillas	amid	
intense	public	scrutiny	of	Bureau	investigative	tactics.			
	
Conclusion	
When	journalists	and	newspaper	editors	wrote	about	revelations	uncovered	in	the	
Media	burglary,	they	emphasized	the	negative	ramifications	of	the	FBI’s	intrusion	into	
the	lives	of	law-abiding	activists.	For	instance,	the	New	York	Times	charged	the	Bureau	
with	engaging	in	“political	surveillance	which	far	exceed[ed]	legitimate	efforts	to	
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protect	the	national	interest,”	while	the	Washington	Post	condemned	“the	poisonous	
effect	which	[FBI]	surveillance	…	has	upon	the	democratic	process	and	upon	the	
practice	of	free	speech.100	They	had	a	point.	Most	of	the	FBI’s	surveillance	targeted	
individuals	who	had	no	involvement	in	revolutionary	violence,	and	were	engaged	in	
legal,	constitutionally	protected	activities,	such	as	organizing	antiwar	demonstrations	
and	black	student	activist	groups.	The	revelations	were	particularly	shocking	given	the	
fact	that	U.S.	officials	had	repeatedly	denied	the	existence	of	such	mass	surveillance.	
The	day	after	the	Media	burglary,	for	example,	Assistant	Attorney	General	William	H.	
Rehnquist	swore	to	the	Senate	Subcommittee	on	Constitutional	Rights	that	U.S.	
intelligence	agencies	engaged	in	virtually	no	surveillance	of	Americans.	A	couple	weeks	
later,	when	the	new	FBI	revelations	made	headlines,	reporters	made	a	point	of	
highlighting	the	falsehood	of	Rehnquist’s	testimony.101	
	 Missing	from	journalistic	accounts,	however,	was	an	explanation	for	why	the	FBI	
engaged	in	mass	surveillance.	Some	journalists	reported	on	the	FBI’s	responses	to	the	
information	disclosed	in	the	stolen	documents.	Betty	Medsger	and	Ken	Clawson,	for	
example,	noted	in	the	Washington	Post	that	Attorney	General	Mitchell	accused	the	
burglars	of	taking	the	documents	out	of	context,	and	selectively	mailing	to	Congressmen	
and	journalists	only	those	that	“seem	to	discredit	the	FBI.”102	As	an	example,	Mitchell	
argued	that	a	memo	revealing	the	FBI’s	use	of	local	police,	a	neighbor,	a	postmaster,	
campus	security,	and	a	campus	switchboard	operator	to	keep	tabs	on	a	Philadelphia	
professor	agents	described	as	a	“hippie”	and	a	“radical”	gave	the	impression	that	the	
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FBI	was	watching	the	man	solely	because	of	his	political	views.	In	reality,	Mitchell	
claimed,	the	document	was	part	of	a	packet	on	the	September	1970	killing	of	
Massachusetts	police	officer	Walter	Schroeder,	and	the	FBI	suspected	that	Ten	Most	
Wanted	guerrilla	fugitives	Katherine	Power	and	Susan	Saxe	might	attempt	to	contact	
the	professor.103	Medsger	and	Clawson	also	noted	that	Mitchell	would	not	comment	on	
the	release	of	the	FBI’s	September	1970	memo	authorizing	employment	of	campus	
informants	aged	eighteen	to	twenty-one.104	But	this	order,	as	well	as	Hoover’s	
November	1970	directives	massively	expanding	campus	surveillance,	was	undertaken	
as	part	of	the	FBI’s	desperate	hunt	for	leftist	guerrillas.	In	the	media	and	in	Congress,	
condemnation	of	FBI	misdeeds	and	shock	at	the	Bureau’s	duplicity	overshadowed	
discussion	of	leftist	guerrillas’	influence	upon	the	Bureau’s	tactics.		
	 An	understanding	of	the	FBI’s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas,	however,	is	
crucial	to	comprehending	the	Bureau’s	late-1970	expansion	of	domestic	surveillance,	
the	Media	burglary,	and	ensuing	controversy	over	FBI	operations.	Under	intense	
pressure	from	the	Nixon	Administration	after	the	collapse	of	the	Huston	Plan,	the	FBI	
lifted	previous	restraints	on	domestic	surveillance	in	late	1970	in	an	unsuccessful	effort	
to	thwart	leftist	guerrilla	violence.	Hoover’s	massive	expansion	of	surveillance	on	the	
student	antiwar	and	Black	Power	movements,	reauthorization	of	teenaged	informants,	
and	pressuring	of	field	offices	to	informally	partake	in	mail-covers,	mail-opening,	
warrantless	wiretaps,	and	break-ins	was	a	direct	response	to	Jonathan	Jackson’s	bloody	
Marin	County	courthouse	attack,	the	New	Years	Gang’s	deadly	University	of	Wisconsin	
bombing,	the	killing	of	Officer	William	Schroeder,	and	the	Weather	Underground’s	
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October	1970	“Fall	Offensive.”	Hoover’s	loathing	of	leftists	undoubtedly	influenced	the	
measures	as	well,	but	this	alone	does	not	explain	the	Director’s	actions.	Hoover	would	
not	have	lifted	his	restrictions	on	domestic	surveillance,	and	risked	the	possibility	of	
public	exposure	tainting	the	FBI’s	image,	if	it	were	not	for	ongoing	leftist	guerrilla	
attacks	and	the	Bureau’s	inability	to	prevent	them.	
	 Ultimately,	Hoover’s	worst	fear	materialized.	The	American	public	did	end	up	
learning	about	FBI	domestic	surveillance,	and	the	Bureau’s	image	suffered	as	a	result.	
This	too,	however,	was	partially	an	outcome	of	guerrilla	violence.	In	his	zealous	attempt	
to	secure	funding	and	support	for	the	FBI’s	war	on	violent	revolutionaries,	Hoover	
made	a	calamitous	miscalculation	when	he	accused	the	Berrigan	brothers	and	the	East	
Coast	Conspiracy	to	Save	Lives	of	conspiring	to	kidnap	Kissinger	and	launch	an	attack	
on	Washington	D.C.’s	municipal	infrastructure.	In	the	wake	of	government	efforts	to	
convict	several	other	prominent	radicals,	and	amid	continuous	police	infiltration	and	
attacks	on	activists,	American	leftists—including	those	who	went	on	to	carry	out	the	
Media	burglary—understandably	interpreted	the	Harrisburg	Eight	indictment	as	part	of	
an	FBI-led	assault	on	the	U.S.	Left.	When	he	lodged	his	false	allegations	against	the	
Harrisburg	Eight,	Hoover	inadvertently	provoked	the	Media	burglary.	
	 Hoover’s	expansion	of	domestic	surveillance	did	not	improve	the	FBI’s	success	in	
preventing	leftist	guerrilla	violence.	Instead,	his	announcement	of	the	far-fetched	
Kissinger	kidnap	conspiracy	backfired	against	the	FBI.	In	his	zeal	to	combat	
revolutionary	violence,	Hoover	badly	undermined	the	public’s	trust.	A	growing	number	
of	Americans	now	saw	the	FBI’s	politically-motivated	policing	as	a	far	greater	threat	to	
their	freedom	than	a	handful	of	revolutionary	guerrillas.	As	a	consequence,	the	FBI’s	
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pursuit	of	clandestine	revolutionaries	became	significantly	more	difficult,	and	Hoover’s	
conflict	with	Nixon	grew	even	more	contentious.	
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CHAPTER	5	
MOUNTING	CRISES:	THE	BLACK	LIBERATION	ARMY,	THE	PENTAGON	PAPERS,	
AND	ILLEGAL	SURVEILLANCE	
	
Waverly	Jones	and	Joseph	Piagentini	were	walking	their	beat	outside	a	Harlem	public	
housing	complex	when	they	became	the	latest	casualties	in	America’s	domestic	
guerrilla	war.	On	the	evening	of	May	21,	1971,	two	gunmen	ambushed	the	pair	of	New	
York	City	police	officers	from	behind,	riddling	the	unsuspecting	patrolmen	with	bullets.	
Jones,	a	thirty-two-year-old	African	American	father	of	two,	died	instantly	when	the	
first	of	nine	rounds	entered	his	body.	Piagentini	was	still	alive	when	the	assassins	fled	
on	foot,	leaving	the	twenty-eight-year-old	Italian	American	bleeding	on	the	sidewalk,	
dying	slowly	from	twelve	bullet	wounds.1	Two	days	later,	the	Black	Liberation	Army	
(BLA)	took	credit	for	the	attack.	In	a	communiqué	issued	to	the	New	York	Times,	the	
BLA	declared,	“Revolutionary	justice	has	been	meted	out	again	by	righteous	brothers	of	
the	Black	Liberation	Army	with	the	death	of	two	Gestapo	pigs	gunned	down	as	so	many	
of	our	brothers	have	been	gunned	down	in	the	past.	But	this	time	no	racist	class	jury	
will	acquite	[sic]	them.”2		
	 The	Jones-Piagentini	killings	inflamed	tension	between	the	FBI	and	the	Nixon	
administration	amid	their	ongoing	institutional	conflict	over	how	to	respond	to	
revolutionary	violence.	The	FBI-White	House	feud	had	surfaced	a	year	earlier	when	J.	
Edgar	Hoover	sabotaged	the	Huston	Plan,	the	Nixon	administration’s	effort	to	combat	
“revolutionary	terrorism”	by	consolidating	the	nation’s	intelligence	agencies	and	
																																																								
1	Robert	Tanenbaum	and	Philip	Rosenberg,	Badge	of	the	Assassin	(New	York:	E.P.	Dutton,	1979),	1-2.	
2	BLA	communiqué	quoted	in	ibid,	22-23.		
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overriding	the	Director’s	ban	on	break-ins,	mail-opening,	warrantless	wiretapping,	and	
other	illegal	domestic	surveillance	practices.	Hoover	and	President	Nixon	shared	the	
view	that	the	state	needed	to	combat	leftist	violence	with	punitive	policing	and	
“preventative”	surveillance	measures	designed	to	obtain	advanced	warning	of	guerrilla	
attacks.	They	fiercely	disagreed,	however,	over	what	federal	office	should	lead	the	war	
on	leftist	guerrillas	and	what	tactics	should	be	used	to	destroy	the	revolutionary	
underground.	While	Nixon	sought	to	exercise	direct	White	House	control	over	federal	
intelligence	agencies	and	bring	back	illegal	surveillance	techniques,	Hoover	opposed	
reauthorizing	such	tactics	in	order	to	safeguard	the	FBI’s	institutional	autonomy	amid	
growing	public	criticism.	In	May	1971,	two	months	after	documents	stolen	from	the	FBI	
office	in	Media,	Pennsylvania	sparked	a	national	controversy	over	the	Bureau’s	
domestic	surveillance	practices,	a	poll	revealed	that	forty-three	percent	of	Americans	
believed	Hoover	should	resign	as	FBI	Director.3	In	this	political	climate,	Hoover	
remained	unwilling	to	risk	approving	illegal	operations	that	would	undermine	the	FBI’s	
popular	legitimacy	if	ever	revealed	to	the	American	people.	Nixon	was	reticent	to	
provide	written	authorization	for	illegal	surveillance	tactics	for	similar	reasons.	Seeking	
reelection	in	1972,	the	President	also	wished	to	avoid	authorizing	measures	that	could	
result	in	a	scandal.	Nixon	and	Hoover	both	wanted	to	expand	the	state’s	“preventative”	
surveillance	capacities,	but	neither	was	willing	to	take	the	political	risks	such	efforts	
entailed.		
	 During	the	yearlong	period	from	the	emergence	of	the	BLA	in	May	1971	to	
Hoover’s	death	from	a	heart	attack	on	May	2,	1972,	three	important	developments	
																																																								
3	Holland,	Leak,	13.	
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escalated	the	FBI’s	war	on	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	and	the	Director’s	conflict	with	
Nixon.	First,	the	BLA’s	lethal	attacks	on	police	officers	raised	alarms	in	both	the	White	
House	and	FBI	Headquarters,	prompting	Hoover	to	initiate	a	new	round	of	“intensified”	
investigations	of	leftist	guerrillas.	Under	Hoover’s	orders,	the	FBI	launched	a	massive	
nationwide	investigation	into	the	Jones-Piagentini	assassinations	codenamed	
NEWKILL,	for	“New	York	killings.”	The	FBI’s	New	York	field	office	established	a	special	
squad	of	more	than	eighty	agents	assigned	to	NEWKILL	and	several	other	cases	
involving	“terrorist	acts”	carried	out	by	suspected	black	“extremists,”	and	developed	
close	liaison	with	the	New	York	Police	Department	and	other	local	police	agencies.4		
	 Secondly,	a	few	weeks	after	the	Jones-Piagentini	killings	a	leak	of	classified	
documents	on	the	U.S	war	in	Vietnam	precipitated	the	worst	fallout	between	the	
President	and	the	FBI	Director	since	the	Huston	Plan.	On	June	13,	1971,	the	New	York	
Times	published	excerpts	of	the	Pentagon	Papers,	a	collection	of	secret	government	
documents	that	revealed	a	pattern	of	federal	officials	lying	to	the	American	people	
about	the	war	in	Vietnam	throughout	the	administrations	of	Presidents	Harry	S.	
Truman,	Dwight	Eisenhower,	John	F.	Kennedy,	and	Lyndon	B.	Johnson.	When	Hoover	
refused	to	launch	an	aggressive	investigation	of	the	Pentagon	Papers	leak	and	the	
government’s	prime	suspect,	Daniel	Ellsberg,	a	forty-year-old	former	RAND	policy	
analyst	and	Defense	Department	aide	who	had	turned	against	the	U.S.	war	effort,	Nixon	
and	his	staff	formed	their	own	covert	intelligence	unit.	Nixon	charged	his	new	secret	
Special	Investigations	Unit,	better	known	as	the	“Plumbers,”	with	stopping	leaks	of	
																																																								
4	FBI	NITEL,	Director	to	New	York,	May	25,	1971,	and	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SAC	Newark,	August	12,	
1971,	Dhoruba	Moore	FBI	File	(hereafter	Moore	FBI	File),	FBI	Investigation	and	Surveillance	Records	
Series	90,	Kenneth	O’Reilly	Research	Materials,	Box	19,	Folder	4,	Special	Collections	and	University	
Archives,	Raynor	Memorial	Libraries,	Marquette	University,	Milwaukee,	Wisconsin.	
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declassified	state	secrets	that	he	viewed	as	a	threat	to	his	political	power	and	war	
efforts	in	Southeast	Asia.		
	 Heightened	fear	of	leftist	guerrilla	violence,	coupled	with	increased	tensions	
between	Hoover	and	Nixon,	led	to	the	third	development.	After	the	Pentagon	Papers	
leak,	both	Nixon’s	Plumbers	and	the	FBI	engaged	in	break-ins	and	other	illegal	
surveillance	techniques	recommended	in	the	Huston	Plan.	On	September	3,	1971,	the	
Plumbers	broke	in	to	the	Los	Angeles	office	of	Daniel	Ellsberg’s	psychiatrist,	Dr.	Lewis	J.	
Fielding,	in	hopes	of	finding	information	they	could	use	to	discredit	or	convict	the	
Pentagon	Papers	whistleblower.	Meanwhile,	the	FBI	continued	targeting	suspected	
supporters	of	the	Weather	Underground	with	break-ins,	mail-opening,	and	warrantless	
electronic	wiretapping.	Local	FBI	field	offices	had	informally	revived	such	illegal	
surveillance	techniques	after	August	1970,	when	Hoover	ordered	“intensified”	guerrilla	
investigations	following	the	Marin	County	courthouse	attack	and	the	University	of	
Wisconsin	bombing.	Nixon’s	formation	of	the	Plumbers	and	Hoover’s	continued	wink	
and	nod	authorization	of	FBI	break-ins	set	the	stage	for	the	scandals	that	would	later	
upend	the	presidency	and	the	Bureau.	
	 Mounting	surveillance	crises	within	the	Nixon	administration	and	the	FBI	sprung	
from	officials’	unwillingness	to	address	the	root	causes	of	violent	social	conflict.	As	
longstanding	anticommunist	conservatives,	Nixon	and	Hoover	both	opposed	left-liberal	
convictions—such	as	those	promoted	in	the	1968	Kerner	Report—that	the	best	way	to	
reduce	violent	civil	disorder	was	through	ceasing	overseas	military	intervention	and	
launching	ambitious	state	initiatives	to	eliminate	poverty	and	racial	inequality.	Instead,	
the	President	and	FBI	Director	debated	illegal	“preventative”	surveillance	tactics:	When	
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were	such	tactics	appropriate?	Who	should	conduct	them?	Under	whose	authority?	
After	the	Pentagon	Papers	leak,	Nixon	sought	to	covertly	undermine	all	of	his	perceived	
political	opponents,	whether	antiwar	activists,	government	whistleblowers,	or	his	
Democratic	Party	rivals.	Hoover	encouraged	his	agents	to	utilize	illegal	surveillance	
techniques	with	the	more	limited	objective	of	preempting	guerrilla	violence,	though	he	
did	so	informally	so	as	to	avoid	liability	for	his	agents’	unlawful	actions.		
	 	However,	the	FBI’s	“preventative”	surveillance	efforts	did	not	preempt	guerrilla	
attacks	or	help	investigators	locate	clandestine	revolutionary	fugitives.	Instead,	BLA	
and	Weather	Underground	members	redoubled	their	commitment	to	urban	guerrilla	
warfare	in	the	face	of	police	violence	against	African	Americans	and	what	they	viewed	
as	a	government	conspiracy	to	destroy	the	Black	Power	movement.	For	example,	the	
August	21,	1971	killing	of	Black	revolutionary	prisoner	George	Jackson	by	guards	in	
California’s	San	Quentin	Prison	and	the	slaughter	of	twenty-nine	striking	prisoners	in	
Attica	State	Penitentiary	three	weeks	later	motivated	both	groups	to	launch	retaliatory	
guerrilla	attacks.	By	condoning	and	even	applauding	such	instances	of	state	violence,	
President	Nixon	and	the	FBI	remained	partially	responsible	for	BLA	and	Weather	
Underground	violence.	Deadly	BLA	attacks	continued	over	the	course	of	1971	and	early	
1972,	though	the	police	managed	to	capture	members	of	the	group	on	the	scenes	of	
police	ambushes,	robberies,	and	other	high-risk	actions.	The	Weather	Underground,	
meanwhile,	remained	at	large	after	carrying	out	four	bombings	during	the	fall	of	1971.		
	 Instead	of	preventing	guerrilla	violence,	illegal	surveillance	tactics	generated	
simmering	crises	within	both	the	Nixon	White	House	and	Hoover’s	FBI.	The	Nixon	
administration’s	turn	to	break-ins	after	Hoover	refused	to	aggressively	investigate	the	
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Pentagon	Papers	leak	is	well	documented.	Historians	have	widely	acknowledged	that	
the	the	formation	of	the	Plumbers	“synthesized	the	concern	of	the	White	House	for	
controlling	and	disciplining	the	bureaucracy,	as	well	as	its	willingness	to	utilize	illegal	
methods	and	abuses	of	power	for	doing	so.”5	Until	now,	however,	scholars	have	not	
sufficiently	analyzed	the	FBI’s	informal	resumption	of	illegal	surveillance	tactics	or	how	
this	development	influenced	the	Bureau.	As	the	public	turned	against	the	FBI	in	late	
1971	and	early	1972,	agents’	morale	plummeted.	Investigators	in	leftist	guerrilla	
squads	sought	to	prevent	clandestine	revolutionary	violence	with	illegal	surveillance	
techniques.	They	did	so	anxiously,	however,	worried	about	the	future	of	their	careers,	
and	unsure	if	Hoover	would	support	them	if	they	ever	got	caught	breaking	the	law	in	
the	name	of	national	security.	Guerrilla	violence	and	illegal	surveillance	tactics	
established	the	conditions	for	the	fully-fledged	crisis	of	legitimacy	that	would	envelop	
the	FBI	after	Hoover’s	death.	
	
Police	Killings	and	Institutional	Conflict	
A	year	after	Hoover	sabotaged	the	Huston	Plan,	the	Jones-Piagentini	killings	renewed	
tensions	between	Nixon’s	White	House	and	the	FBI	over	the	problem	of	leftist	guerrilla	
violence.	President	Nixon	convened	a	private	meeting	on	the	killings	on	May	26,	1971,	
the	same	day	that	thousands	of	uniformed	police	and	supporters	gathered	in	New	York	
for	the	slain	officers’	funerals.	The	President	met	in	Washington’s	Executive	Office	
Building	with	J.	Edgar	Hoover,	Attorney	General	John	N.	Mitchell,	Chief	Domestic	
Advisor	John	D.	Ehrlichman,	and	Ehrlichman’s	deputy,	Egil	“Bud”	Krogh	Jr.	Nixon	
																																																								
5	Kutler,	Wars	of	Watergate,	112.	
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commenced	the	meeting	by	emphasizing	his	desire	for	a	strong	federal	response	to	the	
police	murders.	“Goddamn	it,”	he	declared,	“we’ve	got	to	do	something…	other	than	just	
talk	about	these	police	killings.”6		
	 Jones	and	Piagentini	were	not	the	first	police	victims	of	a	guerrilla	ambush.	The	
Black	Liberation	Army	carried	out	its	first	publicized	attack	two	days	before	the	Jones-
Piagentini	slaying	when	members	of	the	group	unloaded	a	.45	caliber	machine	gun	into	
a	squad	car	occupied	by	New	York	police	officers	Thomas	Curry	and	Nicholas	Binetti.7	
The	ambush	occurred	as	the	officers	stood	guard	outside	the	apartment	of	District	
Attorney	Frank	S.	Hogan,	head	prosecutor	of	the	Panther	21,	whose	home	the	Weather	
Underground	had	firebombed	a	year	earlier.	Though	critically	wounded,	both	
patrolmen	survived	the	attack.	A	BLA	communiqué	took	credit,	announcing,	“The	armed	
goons	of	this	racist	government	will	again	meet	the	guns	of	oppressed	Third	World	
peoples	as	long	as	they	occupy	our	community	and	murder	our	brothers	and	sisters	in	
the	name	of	American	law	and	order.	Just	as	the	fascist	marines	and	army	[who]	occupy	
Vietnam	in	the	name	of	democracy	and	murder	Vietnamese	people	in	the	name	of	
American	imperialism	are	confronted	with	the	guns	of	the	Vietnamese	Liberation	Army,	
the	domestic	armed	forces	of	racism	and	oppression	will	be	confronted	with	the	guns	of	
																																																								
6	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	conversation	253-23,	May	26,	1971,	4:11-5:20pm,	Executive	Office	Building.	
Richard	Nixon’s	presidential	recordings	are	available	in	different	forms	in	three	different	online	archives:	
Richard	Nixon	Presidential	Library	website,	White	House	Tapes,	
https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/index.php;	Nixontapes.org;	and	The	Miller	
Center,	Richard	Nixon	White	House	Recordings,	http://millercenter.org/presidentialrecordings/nixon.	
7	The	BLA	carried	out	four	earlier,	unclaimed	attacks	in	California:	an	October	1970	bombing	of	a	slain	
police	officer’s	funeral,	two	January	1971	police	shootings,	and	an	attempted	bombing	in	March	1971.	
Muntaqim,	On	the	Black	Liberation	Army,	5.	
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the	Black	Liberation	Army”8	The	BLA’s	two	police	ambushes	occurred	amid	a	growing	
number	of	assaults	on	New	York	police	officers.	Twenty-eight	other	New	York	
policemen	had	been	wounded	in	the	line	of	duty	since	the	start	of	1971,	a	significant	
increase	in	the	rate	of	forty-five	wounded	the	entire	previous	year.	Five	officers	had	
died.	Edward	J.	Kiernan,	president	of	the	Patrolmen’s	Benevolent	Society,	summed	up	
the	feelings	of	many	New	York	police	officers	following	the	Jones-Piagentini	killings	
when	he	declared,	“We’re	in	a	war…	It’s	open	season	on	cops	in	this	city.”9	
	 Nixon	convened	his	May	26	Executive	Office	Building	meeting	to	press	his	
administration,	the	Justice	Department,	and	the	FBI	to	tackle	the	problem	of	police	
assassinations.	In	a	memo	typed	immediately	after	the	meeting,	Hoover	informed	the	
FBI’s	top	seven	domestic	security	officials	that	the	President	was	“very	concerned	about	
police	officers	killed,	particularly	the	two	in	New	York	and	in	other	parts	of	the	country	
and	we	are	developing	a	kind	of	program	to	focus	attention	on	that.”10	The	FBI	had	been	
tracking	the	Black	Panther	Party’s	violent	rhetoric	and	advocacy	of	guerrilla	warfare	for	
nearly	three	years,	but	neither	the	Bureau	nor	anyone	else	outside	of	the	militant	left	
had	heard	of	the	Black	Liberation	Army	prior	to	the	recent	New	York	police	ambushes.	
After	the	attacks,	Hoover	ordered	the	FBI’s	New	York	field	office	to	determine	if	the	
perpetrators	were	Black	radicals,	and	to	“maintain	close	liaison”	with	the	New	York	City	
																																																								
8	The	communiqué’s	reference	of	the	“Vietnamese	Liberation	Army”	was	likely	a	mistaken	reference	to	
South	Vietnam’s	Communist	National	Liberation	Front	(NLF).	BLA	communiqué	quoted	in	Tanenbaum	
and	Rosenberg,	Badge	of	the	Assassin,	11.		
9	Kiernan	quoted	in	Tanenbaum	and	Rosenberg,	Badge	of	the	Assassin,	9-10.	
10	FBI	memo,	J.	Edgar	Hoover	to	Tolson,	Sullivan,	Bishop,	Brennan,	Gale,	Rosen,	and	Casper,	May	26,	1971,	
5:34PM,	FBI	Investigation	and	Surveillance	Records,	Series	90,	Kenneth	O’Reilly	Research	Materials,	
Tolson	File,	Box	25,	Folder	2,	Special	Collections	and	University	Archives,	Raynor	Memorial	Libraries,	
Marquette	University,	Milwaukee,	Wisconsin.	
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Police	Department.11	Specifically,	the	Director	instructed	New	York	field	agents	“to	
determine	complete	intelligence	data	and	to	identify	black	extremist	influence	or	
participation”	in	the	assaults	by	reviewing	“appropriate	files	of	black	extremist	
organizations,	including	those	of	so-called	Third	World	groups.”	He	also	asked	agents	to	
consider	the	possibility	that	the	attacks	were	acts	of	“revenge	taken	against	NYC	police	
by	the	Black	Panther	Party”	for	the	arrest	of	the	Panther	21	in	April	1969.12	Despite	
Hoover’s	quick	response,	the	President	stressed	his	concern	about	the	FBI’s	
investigation	of	the	police	killings	in	two	follow-up	phone	calls	to	the	Director	after	the	
May	26	meeting,	the	first	less	than	two	hours	later,	and	the	second	on	May	28.13	
	 In	general	philosophical	terms,	Nixon	and	Hoover	agreed	on	how	the	state	
should	respond	to	leftist	guerrillas.	They	shared	the	belief	that	the	best	way	to	combat	
revolutionary	violence	was	not	by	addressing	the	sources	of	radicalism	through	policy	
initiatives	aimed	at	reducing	socio-economic	inequality	and	state	violence,	but	through	
punitive	policing.	During	their	May	26	phone	conversation,	the	pair	mocked	liberals	
whom	they	speculated	would	attribute	the	BLA’s	police	ambushes	to	environmental	
conditions.	Nixon	made	no	efforts	to	conceal	his	resentment	when	he	sarcastically	
quipped,	“the	New	York	Times	will	probably	write	an	article	saying	the	man	who	shot	
[New	York	police	officer	Waverly	Jones]	was	raised	in	a	bad	neighborhood.”	“It’ll	be	
poverty,	yes,”	Hoover	bitterly	replied,	“the	slums	of	New	York,	and	housing,	and	all	that	
																																																								
11	FBI	NITEL,	Director	to	New	York,	May	25,	1971,	Moore	FBI	File.	
12	Ibid.	
13	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	Conversation	003-145,	May	26,	1971,	and	Conversation	003-196a,	May	28,	
1971.	
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sort	of	thing.”	“But	that’s	not	the	reason,”	Nixon	said,	“These	people	are	bad	people.”	
Hoover	concurred.14		
	 The	president	and	the	FBI	Director	disagreed,	however,	over	tactics.	Indeed,	
despite	affirming	their	shared	conservative	law-and-order	ideologies,	Nixon	and	
Hoover’s	telephone	conversations	after	the	Jones-Piagentini	killings	revealed	the	limits	
of	the	President’s	ability	to	influence	the	FBI’s	surveillance	operations.	In	their	May	26	
telephone	conversation,	Nixon	seemed	to	convey	his	desire	for	the	FBI	to	engage	in	
illegal	surveillance	practices	that	the	White	House	had	sought	to	revive	through	the	
Huston	Plan.	Referring	to	the	Jones-Piagentini	killings,	Nixon	stressed	“since	the	people	
have	not	been	apprehended,	the	national	security	information	we	seek	is	unlimited	…	
And	you	tell	the	Attorney	General	that’s	what	I	suggested—well	ordered—and	you	do	it,	
okay?”15	Hoover	agreed.	“We’ll	go	all	out	on	the	intelligence	on	this	thing,”	he	
affirmed.16		
	 Given	that	Nixon	had	pressed	Hoover	to	reinstate	illegal	surveillance	practices	at	
least	twice	during	the	previous	year—in	his	June	1970	attempt	to	institute	the	Huston	
Plan	and	after	the	deadly	guerrilla	attacks	of	August	1970—Hoover	surely	must	have	
understood	Nixon’s	request	for	“unlimited”	intelligence	as	yet	another	such	order.	
Nixon,	however,	was	also	well	aware	of	Hoover’s	reticence	to	utilize	illegal	surveillance	
tactics	without	written	authorization	from	the	President	or	Attorney	General.	Nixon	
implicitly	acknowledged	this	in	his	May	28	telephone	conversation	with	Hoover.	
Speaking	again	in	vague	euphemisms,	the	President	questioned	the	Director	about	
																																																								
14	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	Conversation	003-145,	May	26,	1971.	
15	Ibid.		
16	Ibid.	
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possibilities	for	authorizing	restricted	surveillance	practices.	Nixon	asked	Hoover	if	he	
would	be	willing	to	order	the	FBI	to	“go	in	with	everything	you’ve	got,	in	other	words	
surveillance,	electronic	and	everything”	in	cases	involving	“attacks	on	law	enforcement	
officials”	when	“there	is	evidence	or	suspicion”	that	the	perpetrators	were	“Panthers”	or	
other	ideologically	motivated	assailants.17	
	 Hoover’s	answer	demonstrated	his	upper	hand	in	the	FBI’s	institutional	conflict	
with	the	White	House.	The	Director	confidently	informed	the	President	of	what	the	FBI	
was	already	doing	to	investigate	the	New	York	police	killings	and	prevent	similar	
attacks	in	the	future.	He	described	the	FBI’s	New	York	field	office’s	formation	of	a	
special	squad	assigned	to	the	case,	the	Bureau’s	cautions	to	avoid	a	jurisdictional	
dispute	with	the	NYPD,	and	his	plans	to	meet	with	police	chiefs	from	around	the	
country	during	the	following	week	in	order	to	announce	the	creation	of	new	FBI	
training	programs	to	help	local	police	departments	investigate	police	killings.	Hoover	
assured	Nixon	that	the	FBI	had	the	investigation	under	control,	and	that	he	would	
inform	the	President	if	he	needed	further	assistance	from	the	White	House.	He	also	
promised	to	prepare	a	memo	that	Attorney	John	Mitchell	could	use	to	explain	the	FBI’s	
handling	of	the	case	to	the	press.18	Hoover	avoided	Nixon’s	vague	requests	for	the	
reinstatement	of	illegal	surveillance	tactics	while	neglecting	to	mention	that	the	FBI	was	
already	using	such	techniques	on	an	unofficial	basis.	As	was	the	case	when	Nixon	tried	
																																																								
17	Nixon	started	the	call	by	validated	Hoover’s	reluctance	to	involve	the	FBI	in	most	police	murder	
investigations,	affirming	his	opposition	to	a	bill	Senator	Richard	Schweiker	(R,	PA)	proposed	after	the	
New	York	police	ambushes	that	would	have	mandated	FBI	involvement	in	all	police	killings.	Hoover	
agreed	that	the	FBI	should	not	participate	in	this	form	of	what	he	called	“national	policing,”	noting	that	in	
over	ninety-six	percent	of	police	murder	cases,	local	law	enforcement	agencies	successfully	apprehended	
suspects	within	thirty	days.	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	Conversation	003-196b,	May	28,	1971.	
18	Ibid.	
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to	instate	the	Huston	Plan,	the	Director	maintained	firm	control	over	the	FBI	and	its	
leftist	guerrilla	investigations.	
	
The	BLA	and	the	FBI	
Though	members	of	the	Black	Panther	Party	had	begun	to	form	an	underground	
infrastructure	and	prepare	for	urban	guerrilla	warfare	as	early	as	1968,	the	BLA	did	not	
begin	to	carry	out	publicized	armed	actions	until	early	1971.19	During	this	period,	
approximately	fifty	Panthers	loyal	to	Eldridge	Cleaver	formed	BLA	cells	in	several	cities	
after	Huey	Newton	expelled	Cleaver	and	the	Panther	21	from	the	Party.20	Amid	the	
BPP’s	implosion,	and	ongoing	police	attacks	on	the	group,	New	York’s	Cleaver-aligned	
Panthers	determined	that	the	time	for	urban	guerrilla	war	had	come.	In	an	April	1971	
interview	with	a	leftist	reporter,	exiled	Panther	Kathleen	Cleaver	conveyed	the	Cleaver-
faction’s	perspective:	“What	is	necessary	now	is	a	party	to	advance	and	expedite	the	
armed	struggle…	There’s	a	revolutionary	war	going	on.	The	people	are	ready	for	a	real	
vanguard,	for	military	action…	We	need	a	people’s	army	and	the	Black	Panther	party	
vanguard	will	bring	that	about.”21	There	was	little	evidence,	however,	that	“the	people”	
of	America	were	prepared	for	a	mass	revolutionary	uprising.	Fortunately	for	Hoover,	
the	BLA’s	involvement	in	high-risk	actions	enabled	police	to	capture	its	members	
relatively	quickly,	though	the	guerrillas	managed	to	inflict	several	more	casualties	along	
the	way.		
																																																								
19	Umoja,	“The	Black	Liberation	Army,”	227,	235.	
20	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	200.	
21	Cleaver	quoted	in	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	370.	
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	 While	Weather	Underground’s	preferred	activity	remained	planting	bombs	in	
empty	buildings,	New	York	City	BLA	members	carried	out	a	series	armed	robberies	(or	
as	they	called	them,	“expropriations”)	of	banks	and	alleged	drug	dealers	in	order	to	
fund	their	underground	infrastructure.22	The	BLA	viewed	their	attacks	on	drug	dealers	
not	only	as	a	fundraising	effort,	but	as	part	of	a	strategy	to	fight	back	against	a	recent	
flood	of	heroin	into	black	communities,	which	they	viewed	as	part	of	a	government	
conspiracy	to	undermine	African	Americans’	potential	for	collective	resistance	to	
racism	and	oppressive	living	conditions.23	Racially	biased	police	neglect	seemed	to	
confirm	the	BLA’s	theory.	Former	BLA	member	Jamal	Joseph	later	recalled	observing	a	
Harlem	drug	den	“where	fifty,	maybe	a	hundred,	junkies	flitted	about	buying	drugs	and	
running	into	the	shooting	galleries	in	full	view	of	the	community,	with	cops	avoiding	the	
area	or	ignoring	it	as	they	rode	by	in	squad	cars.”24	As	far	as	Joseph	and	other	Panthers	
who	joined	the	BLA	were	concerned,	the	drug	epidemic	had	been	“brought	on”	with	the	
“assistance	and	encouragement”	of	the	same	government	forces	that	had	indicted	the	
Chicago	8,	the	Panther	21,	and	various	other	leftists;	waged	imperialist	war	in	Vietnam;	
and	killed	Fred	Hampton	and	countless	African	American	activists	and	community	
members.25	
	 Ironically,	BLA	members	justified	their	actions	along	similar	lines	as	those	Hoover	
and	Nixon	used	to	rationalize	punitive	policing:	aggressive	tactics,	they	reasoned,	were	
necessary	to	fight	a	ruthlessly	violent	enemy.	The	emergence	of	the	BLA	marked	the	
																																																								
22	“Spring	Came	Early	This	Year	(A	Message	to	the	Third	World	from	the	Black	Liberation	Army),”	
undated	BLA	paper,	ca.	January	1972,	in	The	Black	Liberation	Party	and	the	Program	of	Armed	Struggle,	
1970-1983	(hereafter	BLA	FBI	File),	Section	1.3,	Gale	Cengage	Learning	Archives	Unbound	digital	
database.	
23	Umoja,	“The	Black	Liberation	Army,”	235.	
24	Joseph,	Panther	Baby,	197.	
25	Ibid,	196.	
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realization	of	a	guerrilla	foco	strategy	that	Cleaver	and	other	Panthers	had	been	
promoting	for	the	past	three	years.	The	turn	to	guerrilla	warfare	also	reflected	the	
Cleaver-faction	Panthers’	conspiratorial	view	of	state	violence	and	the	drug	scourge,	
which	saw	armed	struggle	as	the	only	way	to	maintain	revolutionary	resistance	in	a	
time	of	escalating	repression.	The	main	motivation	uniting	the	group,	however,	was	a	
visceral	determination	to	retaliate	for	police	violence	against	black	activists	and	
communities.	As	former	BLA	member	Assata	Shakur	later	recalled,	“I	understood	some	
of	my	more	impatient	sisters	and	brothers.	I	knew	that	it	was	tempting	to	substitute	
military	for	political	struggle,	especially	since	all	of	our	aboveground	organizations	
were	under	vicious	attack	by	the	FBI,	the	CIA,	and	the	local	police	agencies.	All	of	us	
who	saw	our	leaders	murdered,	our	people	shot	down	in	cold	blood,	felt	a	need,	a	desire	
to	fight	back.”26	Accordingly,	the	BLA	adopted	“revolutionary	executions”	of	police	
officers	as	their	second	major	tactic.27	Just	as	leftist	guerrilla	violence	provoked	heavy-
handed	responses	from	the	FBI	and	other	law	enforcement	agencies,	police	violence	
radicalized	the	Black	revolutionary	underground.	
	 Unlike	the	rigidly	hierarchical	Weather	Underground,	the	BLA	was	organized	in	
autonomous	cells	whose	members	decided	on	their	own	what	actions	to	carry	out.	This	
structure	was	a	result	of	Cleaver’s	belief	that	independent	cells	of	six	to	twelve	
guerrillas	could	evade	police	surveillance	more	successfully	than	a	centralized	
																																																								
26	Assata	Shakur,	Assata:	An	Autobiography,	2nd	ed.	(Chicago:	Lawrence	Hill	Books,	2001),	243.	Shakur’s	
statement	aligns	with	sociologists’	argument	that	many	1970s	leftist	radicals	adopted	clandestine	armed	
struggle	for	“affective”	rather	than	purely	ideological	reasons.	See	Zwerman,	et	al.,	“Disappearing	Social	
Movements,”	89.	
27	“Spring	Came	Early	this	Year,”	BLA	FBI	File.	Indeed,	the	BLA	planned	their	first	publicized	attack,	the	
May	19,	1971	ambush	of	officers	Curry	and	Binetti,	after	an	April	19	shootout	between	police	and	
Cleaver-faction	Panthers	that	resulted	in	the	death	of	twenty-one-year-old	Panther	Harold	Russell	and	
the	wounding	of	two	other	Panthers	and	two	police	officers.	See	ibid	and	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	191.	
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organization	that	could	be	neutralized	through	the	arrest	of	its	leader.28	Cleaver’s	
decision	also	sprung	from	his	personal	desire	to	publicly	distance	himself	from	guerrilla	
activity	amid	his	deteriorating	relationship	with	the	Algerian	government,	whose	
officials	had	forbid	him	using	their	country	as	a	base	to	organize	acts	of	violence	abroad.	
Moreover,	as	the	Algerian	government	sought	to	improve	its	relations	with	the	United	
States	in	hopes	of	increasing	oil	exports,	Cleaver	worried	that	his	hosts	would	close	the	
Panther	embassy.29	
	 The	BLA’s	involvement	in	high-risk	guerrilla	actions	reflected	its	members’	social	
positions	as	working-class	African	Americans	as	well	as	the	group’s	ad-hoc	strategy.	
Unlike	the	white	and	largely	middle-class	Weather	Underground	(with	some	members	
from	very	wealthy	families),	the	BLA	did	not	have	access	to	inherited	money.	They	were	
constantly	short	on	funds.	Nor	could	the	BLA’s	members	easily	get	away	with	
shoplifting	and	check-fraud—as	did	their	white	Weather	Underground	counterparts—
in	a	society	that	tended	to	view	all	blacks	as	potential	criminals.	The	Weather	
Underground’s	preferred	tactic	of	planting	homemade	bombs	equipped	with	timing	
devices	in	government	buildings	and	corporate	offices	was	also	largely	off-limits	to	the	
BLA,	whose	black	members	had	few	hopes	of	entering	such	establishments	without	
being	subjected	to	racial	profiling.		
	 Instead	of	sparking	a	guerrilla	uprising,	the	BLA’s	police	ambushes	provoked	
new	police	mobilization.	Nixon	held	a	White	House	meeting	with	police	officials	on	the	
Jones-Piagentini	killings	on	June	3,	1971,	and	four	days	later,	the	FBI	hosted	a	
conference	on	the	matter	“attended	by	one	hundred	top	law	enforcement	officials	from	
																																																								
28	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	193-194.		
29	Ibid.	
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throughout	the	country.”30	With	BLA	members	in	hiding,	the	FBI	and	other	police	
agencies	directed	much	of	their	investigation	at	the	dwindling	aboveground	Black	
Panther	Party.	The	BLA’s	limited	aboveground	support	dried	up	as	a	result.	The	FBI	and	
NYPD	maintained	intensive	surveillance	of	Harlem’s	small	Cleaver-aligned	Black	
Panther	office,	where	members	distributed	Right	On!,	a	newspaper	published	with	the	
assistance	of	white	Weather	Underground	supporters	that	promoted	violent	attacks	on	
police	officers.31	The	FBI	also	monitored	office	staffers’	international	phone	calls	with	
Cleaver’s	Panther	Embassy	in	Algeria.	In	an	FBI-monitored	call	to	Algiers	after	the	May	
attacks,	Panther	Lumumba	Shakur,	who	was	also	a	secret	BLA	member,	lamented	that	
police	harassment	was	scaring	away	the	New	York	BPP	chapter’s	remaining	members.	
“They	all	running	and	hiding	in	fear,”	he	complained.32	
	 As	was	the	case	in	most	of	their	leads	in	the	BLA	investigation,	New	York	police	
made	their	first	break	by	chance,	on	June	5,	after	officers	in	the	Bronx	responded	to	the	
sound	of	gunfire	inside	the	Triple	O	nightclub.	Inside	the	after-hours	establishment,	
police	arrested	BLA	guerrillas	and	former	Panther	21	defendants	Moore	and	Joseph,	
who	had	been	holding-up	patrons	at	gunpoint	along	with	two	accomplices.33	Police	
soon	identified	a	.45	caliber	machine-gun	seized	during	the	Triple	O	arrests	as	the	one	
used	to	ambush	officers	Curry	and	Binetti.	In	July,	New	York	officials	indicted	Moore	
and	Joseph	with	a	slew	of	charges	related	to	skipping	bond	in	the	Panther	21	case,	the	
																																																								
30	“Proposed	Release	by	the	White	House,”	attachment	to	FBI	memo,	E.	S.	Miller	to	A.	Rosen,	November	
23,	1971,	in	FBI	NEWKILL	documents,	downloaded	from	the	website	of	currently	incarcerated	former	
BLA	member	Jalil	Muntaqim	(formerly	Anthony	Bottom):	
http://www.freejalil.com/newkilldocuments.html	(hereafter	FBI	NEWKILL	documents).	
31	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	197;	Bloom	and	Martin,	Black	Against	Empire,	369.	
32	Shakur	quoted	in	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	196.	
33	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	197-198;	Joseph,	Panther	Baby,	210-212.	
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Triple	O	hold-up,	the	Curry-Binnetti	ambush,	and	the	March	1971	murder	of	Newton-
faction	Black	Panther	Sam	Napier.34	
	 The	FBI’s	leads	in	the	NEWKILL	investigation	temporarily	relieved	tensions	
between	Hoover	and	the	Nixon’s	White	House.	Nixon	and	Hoover	had	discussed	the	
FBI’s	investigation	of	the	New	York	police	killings	in	a	telephone	conversation	four	days	
prior	to	Moore’s	arrest.	Hoover	informed	the	president	that	the	FBI	laboratory	had	
identified	fingerprints	from	the	BLA	communiqués	sent	to	the	New	York	Times	
following	the	Curry-Binetti	and	Jones-Piagentini	police	ambushes.	“Good!”	Nixon	
exclaimed	in	approval	of	the	FBI’s	apparent	lead	in	its	high-profile	investigation.35	One	
set	of	fingerprints,	it	later	turned	out,	belonged	to	Moore.	It	appeared	as	though	the	FBI	
was	making	satisfactory	progress	in	its	BLA	investigation,	a	perception	echoed	in	the	
press,	and	seemingly	corroborated	by	the	fact	that	the	BLA	had	not	carried	out	further	
known	attacks	on	police	since	the	Jones-Piagentini	killings.	Hoover	and	Nixon’s	
relationship,	however,	was	about	to	take	another	turn	for	the	worse.		
	
Bureaucratic	Conflict	and	Nixon’s	Break-In		
Though	the	FBI’s	leads	in	the	BLA	investigation	temporarily	averted	an	escalation	in	
Hoover’s	institutional	conflict	with	the	White	House,	the	New	York	Times’	publication	of	
excerpts	from	the	Pentagon	Papers—eight	days	after	police	arrested	Dhoruba	Moore	
and	Jamal	Jacob—renewed	the	Nixon-Hoover	feud	with	a	vengeance.	In	a	July	1,	1971	
telephone	conversation,	Hoover	advised	Nixon	not	to	make	a	public	statement	about	
the	previous	day’s	Supreme	Court’s	ruling,	which	permitted	the	New	York	Times	and	
																																																								
34	“Black	Panther	Here	is	Charged	in	the	Shooting	of	2	Policemen,”	New	York	Times,	July	31,	1971.	
35	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	Conversation	004-017,	June	1,	1971.	
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Washington	Post	to	continue	publishing	excerpts	of	the	Pentagon	Papers.36	Hoover	also	
cautioned	against	an	aggressive	investigation	of	Daniel	Ellsberg.	“We	oughta	be	awful	
careful	about	what	we	do	in	the	case	of	this	man	Ellsberg,”	Hoover	said.	The	press	
would	“make	a	martyr”	out	of	Ellsberg,	the	Director	warned,	if	it	seemed	that	the	
government	was	persecuting	the	whistleblower.	Always	sensitive	to	public	perceptions,	
Hoover	knew	that	such	a	scenario	would	undermine	the	credibility	of	both	the	FBI	and	
the	Nixon	administration.	“I	doubt	whether	we’re	going	to	be	able	to	get	a	conviction	of	
him,”	Hoover	asserted,	referring	to	the	Justice	Department’s	indictment	of	Ellsberg	
under	the	Espionage	Act	of	1917.	“I	hope	so,	but	I	doubt	it.”37		
	 Nixon	was	not	satisfied	with	Hoover’s	statements	on	Ellsberg.	“Well	I’d	like	to	
check	some	of	the	other	people	around	him.	I	think	there’s	a	conspiracy	involved,”	he	
said.38		
	 Hoover	dodged	Nixon’s	comment.	The	Director	launched	into	a	rant	complaining	
about	journalists	at	the	Times	and	Post	before	returning	the	conversation	to	the	
President’s	press	strategy.39	As	he	had	done	a	month	earlier	in	response	to	Nixon’s	
suggestion	that	the	FBI	utilize	illegal	surveillance	techniques	in	its	BLA	investigation,	
Hoover	resisted	Nixon’s	efforts	to	influence	the	FBI’s	investigation	of	the	Pentagon	
Papers.	
																																																								
36	Nixon	White	House	tapes,	conversation	number	6-84,	July	1,	1971.	The	Court’s	decision	overruled	an	
injunction	a	lower	court	had	filed	on	the	President’s	behalf.	Hoover	cautioned	the	President	that	“the	
enemies	of	the	administration”	were	“trying	to	bait”	him	into	taking	a	stand	against	freedom	of	the	press	
that	would	divert	negative	attention	away	from	Kennedy	and	Johnson’s	Vietnam	policies	towards	Nixon’s	
war	efforts,	which	the	Pentagon	Papers	did	not	cover.	
37	Ibid.	
38	Ibid.	
39	Ibid.	
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	 Nixon	flew	into	a	rage	after	the	call,	interpreting	Hoover’s	evasiveness	as	a	
refusal	to	investigate	the	Pentagon	Papers	leak	beyond	Ellsberg.	Nixon	complained	to	
Chief	of	Staff	H.R.	Haldeman	the	next	day:	“I	talked	to	Hoover	last	night	and	Hoover	is	
not	going	after	this	case	as	strong	as	I	would	like.	There’s	something	dragging	him.”40	
Again,	Nixon	brought	up	his	suspicion	of	a	conspiracy.	“I	want	to	go	after	everyone.	I’m	
not	so	interested	in	Ellsberg,”	Nixon	said,	“but	we	have	to	go	after	everybody	who’s	a	
member	of	this	conspiracy.”41	To	make	matters	worse,	Nixon	had	learned	from	William	
Sullivan	that	Hoover	did	not	want	his	agents	to	interview	Ellsberg’s	father-in-law	Louis	
Marx,	a	wealthy	toy	manufacturer	who	contributed	annually	to	a	Christmas	charity	run	
by	the	Director.42		
	 The	Pentagon	Papers	leak	sent	Nixon’s	paranoia	through	the	roof.	Though	the	
Papers	dealt	only	with	the	administrations	of	Lyndon	Johnson	and	previous	presidents,	
Nixon	and	some	of	this	staff—particularly	National	Security	advisor	Henry	Kissinger—
believed	the	leaks	undermined	the	federal	government’s	authority	and	threatened	their	
administration’s	efforts	to	achieve	a	military	victory	in	Vietnam.43	Daniel	Ellsberg’s	
explanation	for	why	he	decided	to	leak	the	Pentagon	Papers	stoked	Nixon	and	
Kissinger’s	fears.	In	a	secretly	recorded	television	interview	with	news	anchor	Walter	
Cronkite	aired	on	June	23,	Ellsberg	announced	that	he	had	chosen	to	leak	the	Papers	
after	learning	from	colleagues	close	to	the	White	House	that	Nixon	planned	to	escalate	
																																																								
40	Nixon	quoted	in	Weiner,	Enemies,	297.	
41	Ibid,	298.	
42	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	131;	Nixon,	RN,	513;	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power,	469;	Weiner,	
Enemies,	296.		
43	Kutler,	Wars	of	Watergate,	109-110;	Nixon,	RN,	509,	513.	
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U.S.	aerial	bombing	of	North	Vietnam,	just	as	Johnson	had	done	in	1964	and	1965	with	
disastrous	consequences.44		
	 Nixon	began	discussing	covert	operations	in	response	to	the	Pentagon	Papers	
leak	even	before	speaking	with	Hoover.	Not	long	before	his	phone	conversation	with	
the	Director	on	July	1,	Nixon	spoke	with	Haldeman	about	his	belief	that	the	Brooking	
Institution,	a	liberal	Washington	think	tank,	might	have	files	linking	Ellsberg	to	a	wider	
conspiracy	to	leak	classified	state	secrets.45	“We’re	up	against	an	enemy,	a	conspiracy…	
We’re	going	to	use	any	means!”	he	exclaimed.	The	President	knocked	on	his	desk	with	
each	word	for	emphasis.	“I	want	the	Brookings	Institute	safe	cleaned	out!”46	
	 Ultimately,	Nixon	formed	the	Plumbers	because	of	Hoover’s	unwillingness	to	
aggressively	investigate	the	Pentagon	Papers	case.	As	Nixon	recalled	in	his	memoir,	“If	
the	FBI	was	not	going	to	pursue	the	case,	then	we	would	have	to	do	it	ourselves.”47	The	
President	put	Ehrlichman	in	charge	of	establishing	the	unit.	On	July	17,	1971,	
																																																								
44	Linda	Charlton,	“Ellsberg	Blames	U.S.	for	25	Years	of	War,”	New	York	Times,	June	24,	1971.	Nixon,	RN,	
512.	
45	In	his	memoir,	Nixon	wrote	that	unnamed	sources	informed	him	that	a	friend	of	Ellsberg	who	was	a	
“former	Defense	Department	employee”	and	“Fellow	at	the	Brookings	Institution”	had	taken	secret	
documents	from	the	Pentagon	pertaining	to	President	Lyndon	B.	Johnson’s	late-1968	halt	of	the	U.S.	air	
war	in	Vietnam.	Nixon	recalled	that	he	wanted	Johnson’s	bombing	halt	documents	as	election	year	
“ammunition	against	the	antiwar	critics,	many	of	whom	were	the	same	men	who,	under	Kennedy	and	
Johnson,	had	led	us	into	the	Vietnam	morass	in	the	first	place.”	Nixon,	RN,	512,	515-516.	
46	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	Conversation	534-2(3),	July	1,	1971.	Nixon	wrote	in	his	memoir	that	he	first	
verbally	expressed	approval	for	a	break-in	at	the	Brookings	Institution	during	a	June	17,	1971	meeting	
with	Kissinger,	Haldeman,	and	Ehrlichman.	“I	saw	absolutely	no	reason	for	[the	bombing	halt]	report	to	
be	at	Brookings,	and	I	said	I	wanted	it	back	right	now—even	if	it	meant	having	to	get	it	surreptitiously,”	
he	recalled.	Nixon,	RN,	512.	There	is	no	evidence,	however,	that	anyone	ever	carried	out	a	break-in	at	the	
Brookings	Institution.	According	to	Edward	Miller,	who	took	over	Charles	Brennan’s	role	as	Assistant	
Director	in	charge	of	the	FBI’s	Domestic	Security	Division	and	was	later	convicted	for	approving	break-
ins	against	suspect	Weather	Underground	associates	in	the	year	after	Hoover’s	death,	Nixon	had	been	
inspired	by	William	Sullivan	to	initiate	break-ins.	Miller	recalled	in	an	oral	history:	“Because	of	Sullivan’s	
influence	on	the	White	House	and	Tom	Charles	Huston.	They	became	enamored	with	surreptitious	
entries	as	being	a	gangbuster	investigative	technique.	And	that’s	when	the	White	House	decided	to	create	
their	own,	what	they	called	their	Plumbers	Unit.”	Edward	S.	Miller,	oral	history	interview	by	Stanley	A.	
Pimentel	on	behalf	of	the	Society	of	Former	Special	Agents	of	the	FBI,	Inc.,	May	8,	2008,	123.	
47	Nixon,	RN,	513.	
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Ehrlichman	assigned	Krogh	and	Kissinger’s	former	National	Security	Council	staffer	
David	Young	to	take	direct	charge.	Lacking	intelligence	training,	Krogh	and	Young	hired	
former	CIA	investigator	E.	Howard	Hunt	and	FBI	veteran	G.	Gordon	Libby	to	assist	
them.48	In	late	August,	Ehrlichman	approved	the	unit’s	plans	to	break	into	Ellsberg’s	
psychiatrist’s	office	on	one	stipulation:	“that	it	is	not	traceable.”49	Hunt	and	Libby	
traveled	to	Los	Angeles	and	carried	out	the	break-in	on	September	3,	1971	with	the	
assistance	of	anti-Castro	Cuban	operatives	Bernard	Barker,	Eugenio	Martinez,	and	
Felipe	DeDiego.50	Inside	Dr.	Fielding’s	office,	the	Plumbers	used	a	crow	bar	to	open	a	
locked	metal	filing	cabinet,	leaving	it	visibly	dented.51	In	their	search	for	information	
that	could	damage	or	discredit	Ellsberg,	however,	the	operatives	came	up	empty-
handed.52	
	 While	Nixon’s	staff	formed	the	Plumbers,	conflict	over	the	Pentagon	Papers	
prompted	Hoover	to	reshuffle	the	FBI	hierarchy.	On	July	1,	1971,	the	same	day	that	
Hoover	spoke	with	Nixon	about	the	Pentagon	Papers	investigation,	the	Director	
promoted	W.	Mark	Felt	to	the	newly	created	position	of	Deputy	Associate	Director,	
making	him	the	Bureau’s	new	number	three	official	beneath	aging	Associate	Director	
Clyde	Tolson.	According	to	Felt,	Hoover	informed	him	that	a	key	requirement	of	his	new	
job	was	to	“control	Sullivan,”	who	had	undergone	a	de	facto	demotion	as	a	result	of	the	
former	Inspector’s	new	appointment.53		
																																																								
48	Ibid,	414;	Michael	A.	Genovese,	The	Watergate	Crisis	(Westport,	CT:	Greenwood	Press,	1989),	16;	
Kutler,	The	Wars	of	Watergate,	113.	
49	Genovese,	The	Watergate	Crisis,	16	
50	Ibid.		
51	Dr.	Fielding’s	filing	cabinet	today	sits	at	the	Smithsonian	National	Museum	of	American	History.	
52	Kutler,	Wars	of	Watergate,	115.	
53	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	133.	
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	 Hoover	had	begun	to	question	Sullivan’s	loyalty	in	October	1970,	when	the	
Associate	Director	publicly	emphasized	guerrilla	violence	as	a	greater	threat	to	
America’s	domestic	security	than	Communist	subversion.	After	the	FBI’s	capture	of	
Angela	Davis,	Sullivan	stated	at	a	press	conference	that	the	United	States	would	be	
dealing	with	revolutionary	violence	from	radical	students	and	Black	militants	“to	a	
greater	or	lesser	extent	if	the	Communist	Party	in	this	country	didn’t	exist	at	all.”54	
Hoover	sternly	rebuked	Sullivan	in	a	handwritten	note,	emphasizing	“We	must	be	most	
careful	not	to	downgrade	the	activities	of	the	C.P.,”	which	the	Director	inaccurately	
described	as	“a	real	continuing	factor	to	our	unrest.”55	Since	the	Pentagon	Papers	leak,	
Hoover	had	learned	that	Sullivan	and	Brennan	were	undermining	his	authority,	telling	
Nixon	officials	that	their	boss	was	stalling	the	Ellsberg	investigation.	Hoover	also	
suspected	Sullivan	of	leaking	information	that	Washington	Post	journalists	Robert	
Novak	and	Roland	Evans	used	to	publish	a	series	of	articles	asserting	that	in	his	old	age,	
the	Director	was	no	longer	fit	to	run	the	FBI.56		More	than	two	years	after	Sullivan	and	
Brennan	first	went	behind	his	back	to	collaborate	with	Tom	Huston,	the	Director	had	
finally	come	to	believe	that	his	top	Domestic	Security	officials	were	disloyal.	
	 In	early	September	1971,	Hoover	demoted	Brennan.57	At	Felt’s	suggestion,	the	
Director	promoted	Edward	Miller—a	seasoned	operative	who	had	participated	in	black	
bag	jobs	against	alleged	Communists	in	the	1950s	and	worked	as	a	bureaucrat	under	
																																																								
54	UPI	newswire,	October	1970,	attached	to	FBI	memo,	Sullivan	to	Tolson,	October	13,	1970,	WCS	FBI,	
Section	7.	
55	Hoover	handwritten	note	on	FBI	memo,	W.	C.	Sullivan	to	Mr.	Tolson,	October	13,	1970,	WCS	FBI,	
Section	7.	Felt	recalled	this	incident	in	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	130.	
56	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	131;	Weiner,	Enemies,	296.	
57	Hoover	had	tried	to	demote	Brennan	two	months	earlier	after	the	Domestic	Security	cheif	interviewed	
Daniel	Ellsberg’s	father-in-law	Louis	Marx	against	the	Director’s	explicit	orders.	Hoover	backed	off,	
however,	under	pressure	from	Attorney	General	John	Mitchell,	who	had	learned	of	the	incident	from	
William	Sullivan.	See	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	131;	and	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power,	469.	
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Felt	in	the	Inspection	division—to	fill	the	role	of	Assistant	Director	of	Domestic	
Security.58	On	September	30,	Hoover	fired	Sullivan,	who	had	given	copies	of	the	FBI’s	
top	secret	1969	“Kissinger	Wiretaps”	to	Assistant	Attorney	General	and	Watergate	
conspirator	Robert	Mardian,	in	hopes	of	using	the	tapes	to	blackmail	the	FBI	Director.59	
When	Felt	confronted	Sullivan	over	the	matter,	the	pair	nearly	got	into	a	fistfight.60	
	 While	Hoover	fired	disloyal	FBI	officials,	Nixon	attempted	to	fire	Hoover.	
Sullivan	instigated	the	President,	possibly	in	a	last	ditch	effort	to	win	a	position	as	
Hoover’s	successor.	According	to	Nixon,	Sullivan	told	him	that	Hoover	“was	trapped	in	
outdated	notions	of	the	communist	threat	and	was	not	moving	with	flexibility	against	
the	new	violence-prone	radicals.”61	On	September	20,	1971,	Nixon	invited	Hoover	to	a	
private	breakfast	in	which	he	almost	asked	the	Director	for	his	resignation.	The	
President	tried	“as	gently	and	subtly”	as	he	could	to	convince	Hoover	to	resign	on	his	
own	accord.	Nixon	later	recalled	telling	Hoover	“it	would	be	a	tragedy	if	he	ended	his	
career	while	under	a	sustained	attack	from	his	long-time	critics	instead	of	in	the	glow	of	
national	respect	that	he	so	rightly	deserved.”62	But	the	President	backed	down	after	
Hoover	pulled	a	classic	bureaucratic	power	maneuver,	informing	his	superior	that	he	
would	resign	only	under	direct	orders.	“More	than	anything	else,	I	want	to	see	you	re-
elected	in	1972,”	Hoover	replied.	“If	you	feel	that	my	staying	on	as	head	of	the	Bureau	
hurts	your	chances	for	re-election,	just	let	me	know.”63	Afraid	of	alienating	the	
Director’s	large	base	of	conservative	supporters	ahead	of	the	1972	election,	Nixon	
																																																								
58	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	141.	
59	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power,	471-473;	Kutler,	Wars	of	Watergate,	120..	
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61	Weiner,	Enemies,	298;	Nixon,	RN,	596.	
62	Nixon,	RN,	598.	
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ultimately	decided	that	firing	Hoover	“would	raise	more	political	problems	than	it	
would	solve.”64	Just	as	he	had	maintained	control	over	the	FBI	in	the	aftermath	of	
Huston	Plan,	the	New	York	police	shootings,	and	the	Pentagon	Papers	leak,	Hoover	once	
again	blocked	Nixon’s	effort	to	control	the	FBI.	
	
Leftist	Guerrillas	and	Hoover’s	Break-Ins	
Nixon’s	conflict	with	Hoover	heated	up	as	the	Bureau	made	modest	progress	in	the	BLA	
investigation	but	remaining	stymied	in	its	hunt	for	Weather	Underground	fugitives.	The	
FBI’s	relative	success	in	its	BLA	investigation	had	little	to	do	with	its	preventative	
intelligence	efforts.	Indeed,	the	FBI	had	been	steadily	increasing	its	surveillance	of	Black	
Power	activists	since	1967,	but	did	not	learn	of	the	Black	Liberation	Army’s	existence	
until	the	group	took	credit	for	the	May	1971	New	York	police	ambushes.	BLA	and	
Weather	Underground	attacks	continued	during	the	fall	of	1971	following	two	major	
incidents	of	state	violence:	the	August	21,	1971	killing	of	black	revolutionary	prisoner	
George	Jackson	and	the	massacre	of	forty-two	prisoners	and	guards	in	New	York’s	
Attica	prison	three	weeks	later.	The	FBI	remained	unable	to	infiltrate	the	BLA’s	
clandestine	revolutionary	underground	or	obtain	advanced	warning	of	guerrilla	attacks.	
However,	with	millions	of	dollars	in	resources	and	man-hours	poured	into	anti-guerrilla	
investigations,	FBI	agents	did	manage	to	identify	BLA	suspects	and	to	distribute	
photographs	and	other	information	to	police	agencies	around	the	country.	Accordingly,	
the	FBI,	NYPD,	and	other	police	agencies	were	well	prepared	to	capture	or	kill	BLA	
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members	when	the	guerrillas	made	tactical	mistakes—including	botched	robberies	and	
assassination	attempts—that	attracted	the	attention	of	local	police.		
	 The	FBI’s	differing	fortunes	in	its	respective	leftist	guerrilla	investigations	were	
largely	a	result	of	the	two	organizations’	disparate	structures	and	tactical	repertoires.	
While	the	BLA’s	involvement	in	deadly	shooting	attacks,	robberies,	and	other	higher-
risk	actions	exposed	its	members	to	police	capture,	the	Weather	Underground’s	
sophisticated	clandestine	infrastructure	and	engagement	in	periodic	nighttime	
bombings	enabled	its	members	to	maintain	evasion	of	the	FBI’s	surveillance	network.	
Between	the	New	York	police	ambushes	of	May	1971	and	Hoover’s	death	on	May	2,	
1972,	the	FBI	and	other	police	agencies	captured	sixteen	BLA	members	and	killed	four	
during	shoot-outs	that	occurred	in	the	midst	of	police	efforts	to	conduct	arrests.	Along	
the	way,	the	BLA	killed	two	more	cops	and	a	taxi	driver,	and	seriously	wounded	two	
other	police	officers.	The	FBI’s	break-ins,	however,	did	not	result	in	the	capture	of	
Weather	Underground	guerrillas	or	the	prevention	of	bombings.	The	Weather	
Underground	pulled	off	four	bombings	during	the	fall	of	1971.	The	main	reason	they	did	
not	carry	out	more	was	because	internal	differences	were	tearing	the	group	apart	from	
the	inside,	as	members	continued	to	grapple	with	an	existential	crisis	amid	their	failure	
to	revive	a	declining	U.S.	left.	The	FBI	faced	a	mounting	internal	crisis	as	well,	as	
Headquarters	continued	pressuring	field	agents	to	carry	out	break-ins	without	the	
Director’s	formal	approval.		
	 A	pair	of	botched	BLA	guerrilla	actions	in	August	1971	resulted	in	a	second	
round	of	breakthroughs	in	the	FBI’s	investigation	of	the	group.	On	August	4,	police	
surrounded	a	taxi	that	BLA	guerrillas	had	commandeered	after	holding	up	Thelma’s	
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Lounge	in	Harlem.	Teenaged	BLA	member	Twymon	Meyers	temporarily	held	off	the	
police	with	machine	gun	fire	and	managed	to	escape	back	to	a	BLA	safe	house,	but	the	
clash	resulted	in	the	arrest	of	his	three	accomplices	and	the	death	of	the	taxi	driver.65	In	
the	second	incident,	on	August	27,	San	Francisco	police	officer	George	Kowalski	led	the	
arrest	of	nineteen-year-old	Anthony	Bottom	and	thirty-year-old	Albert	“Nuh”	
Washington	after	the	pair	attempted	to	assassinate	him	with	a	machine	gun.	At	the	
police	station,	Bottom	bragged	to	a	cellmate—who	was	working	secretly	as	a	police	
informant—that	he	and	other	Bay	Area	Panthers	were	responsible	for	a	string	of	
unclaimed	local	bombings	and	other	attacks	over	the	previous	year,	including	an	
ambush	on	a	police	station	in	San	Francisco’s	Ingleside	neighborhood	two	days	after	
Bottom	and	Washington’s	arrest	that	resulted	in	the	death	of	Sergeant	John	Young	
(Bottom	had	cased	the	station	five	days	earlier	while	filing	a	phony	stolen	bicycle	
report).	Bottom	also	indicated	that	he	had	participated	in	the	killing	of	New	York	police	
officers	Jones	and	Piagentini.	Police	officers’	discovery	of	Waverly	Jones’s	service	
revolver	in	Bottom	and	Washington’s	car	seemed	to	verify	this	claim.66	Bottom’s	loose	
talk	provided	police	with	information	that	enabled	them	to	identify	other	suspects	in	
the	Jones-Pagentini	case,	including	Herman	Bell,	who	had	gone	into	hiding	in	New	
Orleans.67		
																																																								
65	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	201.	
66	Tanenbaum	and	Rosenberg,	Badge	of	the	Assassin,	37-45;	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	202-203.	The	FBI	and	
NYPD	also	traced	the	BLA	to	two	New	York	City	bank	robberies	in	July	and	August	of	1971.	According	to	
journalists	Tanenbaum	and	Rosenberg,	who	based	their	research	primarily	on	New	York	police	reports,	
Bottom	bragged	about	his	exploits	to	a	cellmate	who	worked	as	an	informant	for	the	police.	
67	Tanenbaum	and	Rosenberg,	Badge	of	the	Assassin,	84-89.	The	other	suspects	were	Albert	“Nuh”	
Washington	and	brothers	Gabriel	and	Francisco	Torres,	all	of	whom	had	loose	ties	to	the	Black	Panther	
Party.	Herman	Bell	and	Anthony	Bottom,	who	changed	his	name	to	Jalil	Muntaqim,	today	remain	
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prison	on	April	28,	2000.	
	 223	
	 As	always,	the	leftist	guerrillas	had	carried	out	their	attacks	in	response	to	state	
violence.	Police	arrested	Bottom	and	Washington	six	days	after	guards	in	San	Quentin	
Prison	shot	and	killed	black	revolutionary	icon	George	Jackson,	theorist	of	urban	
guerrilla	warfare	and	older	brother	of	the	deceased	Jonathan	Jackson.	Guards	shot	
Jackson	in	the	middle	of	the	prison	yard,	after	he	and	other	convicts	used	a	handgun	to	
stage	a	rebellion	in	which	they	took	five	other	correctional	officers	hostage—the	latest	
episode	in	a	two-year	cycle	of	deadly	violence	between	guards	and	revolutionary	
prisoners	in	California’s	prison	system.	San	Quentin	officials	later	claimed	that	Jackson’s	
attorney	Steven	Bingham	had	smuggled	the	gun	into	the	prison	during	a	visit,	and	that	
Jackson	had	hid	it	under	a	wig	covering	his	Afro.68	With	the	assassinations	of	Medgar	
Evers,	Malcolm	X,	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.,	and	Fred	Hampton	fresh	in	their	memories,	
however,	many	questioned	the	official	San	Quentin	story.	For	many	on	the	left,	Jackson’s	
death	was	the	latest	example	of	a	state	conspiracy	to	violently	repress	dissent	in	
America.	Literary	icon	James	Baldwin	expressed	such	sentiment	when	he	quipped,	“no	
black	person	will	ever	believe	George	Jackson	died	the	way	they	say	he	did.”69	Over	two	
thousand	supporters	gathered	for	Jackson’s	funeral	on	August	28,	1971,	spilling	onto	
the	sidewalk	outside	the	overcrowded	St.	Augustine’s	episcopal	Church	in	Oakland,	
where	Huey	Newton	and	other	Black	Power	leaders	gave	eulogies.70	
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	 Leftist	guerrillas	swiftly	retaliated	for	the	state’s	killing	of	a	revolutionary	leader.	
A	few	hours	before	Jackson’s	funeral,	a	pair	of	Weather	Underground	bombs	exploded	
in	Sacramento	and	San	Francisco,	each	damaging	buildings	housing	offices	of	the	
California	Department	of	Corrections.	In	a	communiqué	issued	to	the	San	Francisco	
Examiner,	the	Weather	Underground	explained	their	attack	as	retaliation	for	Jackson’s	
“assassination.”71	Once	again,	the	Weather	Underground	articulated	a	conspiratorial	
analysis	of	American	state	violence,	one	that	generalized	state	actors	and	their	motives,	
conceiving	every	act	of	violence	inflicted	upon	a	leftist	as	part	of	a	conscious	plan	to	
crush	dissent.	According	to	the	Weather	Underground,	Jackson’s	death	was	part	of	a	
broader	“pattern”	in	America’s	“attempts	to	control	colonial	peoples”	through	the	
“periodic	assassination	of	major	leaders”	such	as	Patrice	Lumumba—the	socialist	
Congolese	President	killed	by	domestic	rivals	in	1961	with	CIA	backing,	and	Malcolm	X,	
whom	NOI	gunmen	murdered	in	1965.72	The	Weather	Underground	downplayed	
Jackson’s	violent	role	in	the	conflict	at	San	Quentin,	asserting	that	his	“execution	
represents	a	major	attempt	at	mass	propaganda—to	convince	the	youth	who	are	now	
entering	the	Folsoms	and	the	Quentins	that	rebellion	is	hopeless,	that	those	who	inspire	
and	lead	will	pay	the	price	of	death.”73	The	BLA	promoted	a	similar	view.	In	a	
communiqué	taking	credit	for	the	August	29	Ingleside	police	station	attack,	the	BLA’s	
“George	L.	Jackson	Assault	Squad”	announced	that	it	had	killed	Sergeant	Young	to	
																																																								
71	Weather	Underground,	“George	Jackson,”	August	30,	1971,	in	Dohrn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	Song,	175.	
72	Ibid,	177.	
73	Ibid.	
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avenge	the	“intolerable	political	assassination	of	Comrade	George	Jackson,	in	particular,	
and	the	inhumane	torture	of	P.O.W.	(Prisoner	of	War)	Camps	in	general.”74	
	 George	Jackson’s	killing	unleashed	another	round	of	bloodshed:	more	political	
rebellion,	another	major	incident	of	state	violence	against	prisoners,	and	further	leftist	
guerrilla	retaliation.	On	September	9,	in	New	York’s	Attica	State	Prison,	a	silent	protest	
mourning	Jackson’s	death	escalated	into	a	full-blown	four-day	uprising	as	prisoners—
black,	Puerto	Rican,	and	white—overtook	the	institution’s	D	yard.	Holding	forty-two	
guards	hostage,	Attica’s	prisoners	igniting	a	24-hour	television	news	drama	viewed	
throughout	the	world	as	they	issued	a	list	of	demands	for	basic	reforms	in	the	
institution’s	policies.	“We	are	men,	we	are	not	beasts,	and	we	do	not	intend	to	be	beaten	
or	driven	as	such,”	the	prisoners	declared,	explaining	their	rebellion	as	a	response	to	
the	“unmitigated	oppression	wrought	by	the	racist	administration	network	of	this	
prison.”	Governor	Nelson	Rockefeller,	however,	refused	to	negotiate.	Instead,	he	called	
in	the	New	York	State	Police,	who	stormed	the	prison	in	hail	of	teargas	and	bullets,	
killing	twenty-nine	prisoners	and	ten	hostages.75		
	 Four	days	later,	a	Weather	Underground	bomb	exploded	in	a	ninth-floor	
women’s	bathroom	next	to	the	offices	of	the	New	York	State	Commissioner	of	
Corrections	in	Albany.	“We	must	continue	to	make	the	Rockefellers,	Oswalds,	Reagans,	
and	Nixons	pay	for	their	crimes,”	the	group	stated	in	their	subsequent	communiqué.	
“We	only	wish	we	could	do	more	to	show	the	courageous	prisoners	at	Attica,	San	
																																																								
74	BLA	communiqué	quoted	in	Eric	Mann,	Comrade	George:	An	Investigation	into	the	Life,	Political	
Thought,	and	Assassination	of	George	Jackson	(New	York:	Harper	&	Row,	1974),	135.	
75	For	a	comprehensive	account	of	the	Attica	uprising	and	massacre,	as	well	as	its	background	and	
aftermath,	see	Heather	Ann	Thompson,	Blood	in	the	Water:	The	Attica	Uprising	of	1971	and	its	Legacy	
(forthcoming,	New	York:	Pantheon,	2016).	
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Quentin,	and	the	other	20th	century	slave	ships	that	they	are	not	alone	in	the	fight	for	
the	right	to	live.”76	
	 The	George	Jackson	killing	and	Attica	massacre	were	not	products	of	a	
coordinated	state	conspiracy,	as	the	Weather	Underground,	BLA,	and	others	on	the	
militant	left	insinuated.	Rather,	these	incidents	were	part	of	a	longstanding	pattern	of	
federal	officials	looking	the	other	way,	or	offering	encouragement,	while	local	police	
and	prison	guards	inflicted	violence	against	political	dissidents	and	racialized	
minorities.	In	some	instances	in	the	American	past—such	as	when	international	outcry	
over	the	1964	murder	of	Mississippi	civil	rights	workers	James	Chaney,	Andrew	
Goodman,	and	Michael	Schwerner	compelled	President	Johnson	to	demand	that	
Hoover’s	FBI	crack	down	on	the	Klan	and	its	collusion	with	Southern	police	forces—
organized	leftist	social	movements	managed	to	pressure	the	federal	government	to	take	
action	against	local	repressive	police	violence.	Such	federal	intervention	was	not	
forthcoming,	however,	amid	the	disintegration	of	the	U.S.	left	and	the	Nixon	
administration’s	law-and-order	response	to	civil	disorder,	national	security	leaks,	and	
leftist	guerrilla	violence.	
	 After	the	George	Jackson	killing	and	Attica	massacre,	Nixon	and	Hoover	
condemned	leftist	violence	while	condoning	police	violence.	In	a	phone	call	after	the	
Attica	slaughter,	Nixon	reassured	Governor	Rockefeller.	“You	did	the	right	thing,”	the	
President	said.	“It’s	a	tragedy	those	poor	[hostages]	were	shot,	but	I	just	want	you	to	
know	that’s	my	view,	and	I’ve	told	the	troops	around	here	they’re	to	back	that	to	the	
																																																								
76	Weather	Underground,	“Attica,”	September	17,	1971,	in	Dorhn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	Song,	180.	
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hilt.”77	Instead	of	mandating	an	FBI	investigation	of	laws	broken	by	New	York	State	
officials	in	the	Attica	massacre,	the	President	praised	Rockefeller’s	mass	killing	of	
prisoners	and	hostages	to	suppress	the	prisoner	rebellion.	Nixon	affirmed	his	belief	that	
if	Rockefeller	had	granted	the	prisoners’	request	for	immunity	from	prosecution	for	
their	actions,	“it	would	have	meant	that	you	would	have	prisoners	in	an	uproar	all	over	
the	country.”	“The	courage	you	showed…	it	was	right,”	Nixon	told	Rockefeller,	“and	I	
don’t	care	what	the	hell	the	papers	or	anybody	else	says.”78		
	 Meanwhile,	Hoover’s	FBI	responded	to	a	request	from	the	Justice	Department’s	
Civil	Rights	Division,	who	faced	pressure	from	liberals	in	Congress	to	oversee	San	
Quentin	guards’	handling	of	the	incidents	that	led	to	George	Jackson’s	death.	In	a	
memorandum	to	the	San	Francisco	field	office,	Hoover	revealed	his	clear	sympathies	
with	the	prison	authorities.	The	Director	explicitly	instructing	his	agents	to	inform	San	
Quentin	officials	and	staff	that	the	FBI	was	conducting	the	investigation	at	the	“specific	
request”	of	David	L.	Norman,	Assistant	Attorney	General	in	charge	of	the	Justice	
Department’s	Civil	Rights	division.79	By	relaying	such	information	to	San	Quentin	
officials,	FBI	agents	signaled	that	their	investigation	was	a	mere	formality	undertaken	
begrudgingly	on	behalf	of	the	Justice	Department.	After	conducing	a	“limited”	three-day	
investigation	of	George	Jackson’s	death	in	October	1971,	FBI	agents	determined	that	
																																																								
77	Audio	and	transcripts	from	excerpts	of	Nixon	and	Rockefeller’s	post-Attica	conversations	are	available	
online	at	Democracy	Now!,	“40	Years	After	Attica	Rebellion,	New	Tapes	Reveal	Nixon,	Rockefeller	Praised	
Deadly	Crackdown,”	September	16,	2011,	
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/9/16/40_years_after_attica_rebellion_new.	Also	see	Sam	Roberts,	
“Rockefeller	on	the	Attica	Raid,	From	Boastful	to	Subdued,”	New	York	Times,	September	12,	2011.	
78	Democracy	Now!,	“40	Years	After	Attica	Rebellion.”	
79	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SAC,	San	Francisco,	October	5,	1971,	and	FBI	Report,	“UNKNOWN	SUBJECTS-
GUARDS,	San	Quentin	Prison,	San	Quentin	(Marin	County),	GEORGE	LESTER	JACKSON-VICTIM,”	October	
15,	1971,	in	George	Lester	Jackson	FBI	File,	Part	4,	FBI	Vault	online	database.	
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prison	staff	had	committed	no	wrongdoing.80	Meanwhile,	California	Governor	Ronald	
Reagan	wrote	an	op-ed	on	George	Jackson	for	the	New	York	Times	that	sounded	as	if	it	
could	have	been	written	by	Hoover	or	Nixon.	Defending	San	Quentin	and	Attica	officials’	
use	of	deadly	force	against	prisoner	rebellions,	Reagan	insisted	that	all	Americans	
would	“become	prisoners”	of	deadly	chaos	if	they	accepted	“the	falsehood	that	violence,	
terror	and	contempt	for	the	moral	values	of	our	society	are	acceptable	methods	of	
seeking	redress	of	grievances.”81	
	 Federal	authorities	did	not	unanimously	side	with	Rockefeller	and	Reagan	in	
promoting	repressive	state	violence	as	a	solution	to	social	conflict.	After	the	Attica	
uprising,	the	U.S.	Congress	Select	Committee	on	Crime	spent	two	years	investigating	
prison	rebellions,	and	determined	that	such	outbreaks	were	a	product	of	a	failed	prison	
system	that	reinforced	social	inequities.	In	its	1973	report,	the	Committee	called	for	
sweeping	changes	in	America’s	criminal	justice	practices,	including	increased	public	
oversight	of	state	and	federal	correctional	institutions;	federally-mandated	training	of	
correctional	staff;	increased	parole	opportunities,	half-way	houses,	and	work	and	
educational	furloughs;	monetary	compensation	for	prisoners’	work;	and	the	
substitution	of	enormous,	rural	prisons	like	Attica	with	smaller	institutions	located	
within	urban	centers	where	the	families	of	most	prisoners	resided.82	“The	painful	
lessons	of	the	recurrent	waves	of	prison	riots,”	the	report	concluded,	“is	that	the	
present	system	has	created	and	nurtures	even	more	serious	threats	to	security	and	
public	safety	caused	by	the	frustration	and	desperation	that	drives	men	to	rebellion.	
																																																								
80	FBI	Report,	“UNKNOWN	SUBJECTS-GUARDS,”	October	15,	1971.	
81	Ronald	Reagan,	“We	Will	All	Become	Prisoners,”	New	York	Times,	October	7,	1971.	
82	House	of	Representatives,	Select	Committee	on	Crime,	Reform	of	Our	Correctional	Systems:	A	Report	by	
the	Select	Committee	on	Crime	(1973),	HR	93-329,	47-52.	
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Only	through	a	drastic	restructuring	can	we	hope	to	correct	our	correctional	system.”83	
To	Nixon	and	Hoover,	however,	the	views	of	the	Congressional	Select	Committee	on	
Crime	were	as	irrelevant	as	the	findings	laid	out	in	the	Kerner	Report	published	five	
years	earlier.	
	 While	local	state	officials	and	police	engaged	in	violence	with	impunity,	Hoover	
assured	Nixon	and	his	staff	that	the	FBI	was	making	significant	progress	in	its	BLA	
investigation.	After	the	arrests	of	Bottom	and	Washington,	the	Director	sent	John	
Ehrlichman	several	memos	outlining	the	Bureau’s	progress	during	the	fall	of	1971.84	In	
a	phone	call	on	November	22,	Nixon	informed	the	Director	that	he	was	“just	delighted”	
over	the	FBI’s	success	tracking	down	the	five	“terrorists”	responsible	for	the	Jones-
Piagentini	killings.	“Be	sure	you	let	the	boys	over	there	[in	the	FBI]	know	I	think	it’s	just	
great,”	said	the	President.85	The	next	day,	Assistant	Director	Edward	Miller	sent	the	
White	House	a	prepared	statement	for	Nixon’s	Press	Secretary	Ron	Zeigler	that	
celebrated	the	FBI’s	achievements	combating	“urban	guerrilla	warfare	which	involves	
attacks	on	police	and	other	terrorist	actions	against	citizens	of	this	country.”86				
	 Despite	the	FBI’s	breakthroughs	in	the	NEWKILL	investigation,	Hoover	worried	
that	the	BLA	had	more	violence	in	store.	Accordingly,	in	October	1971	the	Director	
provided	FBI	field	offices	with	a	new	round	of	ambiguous	orders	that	some	agents	may	
have	interpreted	as	the	latest	wink	and	nod	encouragement	to	carry	out	illegal	
																																																								
83	Ibid,	52.	Other	reports	commissioned	by	government	bodies	and	non-profit	organizations	during	this	
period	reached	similar	conclusions,	including	the	New	York	State	Special	Commission	to	investigate	the	
Attica	rebellion.	For	an	overview,	see	Daniel	S.	Chard,	“SCAR’d	TIMES:	Maine’s	Prisoners’	Rights	
Movement,	1971-1976,”	(MA	thesis,	University	of	Massachusetts	Amherst,	2011),	9-11.	
84	Hoover	memos	to	Ehrlichman,	September	8,	September	18,	September	28,	and	November	5,	1971,	FBI	
NEWKILL	documents,.		
85	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	Conversation	15-106,	November	22,	1971.	
86	“Proposed	Release	by	the	White	House,”	attachment	to	FBI	memo,	E.	S.	Miller	to	A.	Rosen,	November	
23,	1971,	FBI	NEWKILL	documents.	
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surveillance	practices.	“During	the	past	several	months,”	Hoover	wrote,	“the	Cleaver	
faction	of	the	Black	Panther	Party	has	moved	on	a	course	of	increased	violence,	
lawlessness,	and	terror	…	Although	many	of	these	criminals	have	been	arrested	for	
extremist-related	activity,	a	substantial	hardcore	of	fanatics	remains	highly	active	and	I	
consider	their	potential	for	violence	and	disruption	greater	today	than	ever	before.”87	
Conveying	information	gleaned	from	paid	informants,	Hoover	warned	his	agents	that	
Cleaver-faction	Panthers	were	considering	kidnapping	businessmen	or	police	officers	in	
efforts	to	bargain	for	the	release	of	“jailed	extremists.”88	In	order	to	prevent	such	
attacks,	Hoover	instructed	his	men	to	pursue	the	BLA	“with	renewed	vigor	and	
imagination.”	“I	consider	no	extremist	investigation	to	be	routine,”	he	emphasized.	
“Investigations	must	be	of	the	highest	degree	of	thoroughness	and	informant	coverage	
must	never	be	considered	adequate.”89	In	an	exception	to	his	April	1971	ban	on	such	
activities,	Hoover	also	encouraged	his	agents	to	propose	counterintelligence	operations	
against	aboveground	supporters	of	guerrilla	violence,	including	“disruptive	efforts	to	be	
aimed	at	the	Cleaver	Faction	and	similar	groups”	and	“use	of	news	and	publicity	media	
to	counter	frequent	proextremist	programs.”90	The	Director	stressed	that	the	aim	of	FBI	
operations	was	to	prevent	leftist	guerrilla	attacks.	Surveillance	of	suspected	black	
“extremists,”	he	explained,	“must	have	preventative	capabilities,	that	is,	we	must	know	
in	advance,	wherever	possible,	of	plans	and	propensities	for	violence.”91	
																																																								
87	FBI	airtel,	Director	to	SACs	Charlotte,	Cincinnati,	Detroit,	Los	Angeles,	New	York,	Philadelphia,	San	
Francisco,	“Black	Panther	Party—Clever	Faction,	Extremist	Matters,”	September	24,	1971,	FBI	Moore	File.	
88	Ibid.	
89	Ibid.		
90	Ibid.	
91	Ibid.	
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	 Hoover	issued	this	directive	as	agents	in	the	FBI’s	Weather	Underground	squads	
engaged	in	break-ins	and	other	illegal	surveillance	tactics	intended	to	help	them	locate	
clandestine	guerrillas.	Such	operations	had	been	ongoing	for	fourteen	months,	since	
Hoover’s	August	1970	orders	for	“intensified”	guerrilla	investigations	following	the	
Marin	County	courthouse	attack	and	the	University	of	Wisconsin	bombing.	Sources	
documenting	the	FBI’s	use	of	illegal	surveillance	practices	are	scarce.	Since	the	practices	
were	illegal	and	unauthorized,	agents	intentionally	kept	written	records	minimal	so	as	
to	avoid	self-incrimination.	FBI	agents	also	destroyed	many	sources	documenting	illegal	
surveillance	tactics	in	1976	as	rumors	gathered	that	the	Justice	Department	planned	to	
indict	Bureau	personnel	involved	in	illegal	surveillance	operations.	However,	
documents	from	the	legal	proceedings	of	John	Kearny,	L.	Patrick	Gray,	Edward	Miller,	
and	W.	Mark	Felt—FBI	officials	who	faced	criminal	charges	in	the	late	1970s	for	their	
involvement	in	such	activities—offer	a	glimpse	into	the	FBI’s	use	of	illegal	surveillance	
measures	in	its	Weather	Underground	investigation.		
	 Most	of	the	FBI’s	surveillance	targeted	aboveground	activists	and	family	
members	of	Weather	Underground	guerrillas	whom	agents	hoped	would	lead	them	to	
the	revolutionary	underground.	For	example,	the	New	York	Field	Office’s	Weather	
Underground	squad,	known	simply	as	“Squad	47,”	made	widespread	use	of	illegal	mail	
surveillance.	Between	August	1970	and	June	1972,	under	the	leadership	of	Special	
Agent	John	J.	Kearney,	Squad	47	agents	acquired	keys	to	New	York	mailboxes	belonging	
to	suspected	aboveground	supporters	of	the	Weather	Underground.	In	a	practice	they	
informally	referred	to	as	“mail	runs,”	agents	would	remove	mail	from	their	targets’	
boxes,	bring	it	back	to	the	FBI	office	on	201	East	69th	Street,	and	open	the	envelopes	
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using	a	special	“steamer”	that	enabled	them	avoid	noticeable	evidence	of	tampering.	
After	photocopying	all	of	their	targets’	mail,	agents	would	reseal	the	envelopes	and	
return	them	to	the	mailboxes.92	
	 Squad	47	agents	also	carried	out	illegal,	warrantless	electronic	wiretaps	of	
suspected	Weather	Underground	supporters,	as	well	as	individuals	suspected	of	
sheltering	Ten	Most	Wanted	leftist	fugitive	Cameron	Bishop.	Kearney	held	regular	
meetings	with	Squad	47	about	wiretapping,	and	maintained	a	schedule	of	agents’	shifts	
monitoring	suspects’	phone	conversations	with	the	Bureau’s	eavesdropping	equipment.	
Kearney	also	kept	files	of	notes	his	agents	compiled	describing	monitored	phone	calls.	
Squad	47	maintained	at	least	eleven	illegal	wiretaps	in	New	York	City	between	August	
1970	and	June	1972,	though	there	may	have	been	more.93	Weather	Underground	
squads	in	other	cities	also	utilized	illegal	wiretaps.	Los	Angeles	agent	Wesley	
Swearingen,	for	example,	claimed	to	have	installed	over	two	hundred	unauthorized	
wiretaps	as	part	of	the	Weather	Underground	investigation.94		
	 Weather	Underground	squads	throughout	the	country	also	carried	out	
unauthorized	illegal	break-ins.	In	some	cases,	FBI	agents	may	have	conducted	
“surreptitious	entries”	with	the	verbal	permission	of	Justice	Department	officials.	
Special	Agent	in	Charge	Robert	Kunkel,	who	supervised	the	FBI	Washington	Field	Office	
recalled	that	his	agents	broke-in	to	the	residence	of	a	“member	of	the	so-called	New	Left	
element”	in	order	to	investigate	allegations	that	the	individual	possessed	dynamite	that	
																																																								
92	U.S.	District	Court	for	the	Southern	District	of	New	York,	U.S.	v.	John	J.	Kearny,	grand	jury	indictment,	
April	7,	1977,	Freedom	Archives	Online	Database,	COINTELPRO	Collection,	
http://search.freedomarchives.org/search.php?view_collection=150.		
93	Ibid.	
94	Swearingen,	FBI	Secrets,	72-73.	
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he	planned	to	use	in	a	bombing.	According	to	Kunkel,	his	agents	carried	out	their	black	
bag	job	with	permission	from	Assistant	Attorney	General	William	Rehnquist,	who	
verbally	authorized	a	request	from	the	FBI’s	then	Assistant	Director	William	Sullivan.	
Kunkel	recalled	that	his	office	kept	no	written	record	of	the	break-in.95		
	 For	the	most	part,	however,	local	FBI	Field	Offices	approved	break-ins	without	
authorization	from	the	Justice	Department	or	FBI	Headquarters.	In	early	1972,	for	
example,	agents	from	the	FBI’s	Phoenix	Weather	Underground	squad	carried	out	two	
black	bag	jobs	in	Tucson,	Arizona.	On	March	28,	1972,	a	Phoenix	agent	took	
approximately	twenty	photographs	of	documents	inside	the	Tucson	apartment	of	a	
suspected	Weather	Underground	supporter.	Two	weeks	later,	an	FBI	agent	stole	a	small	
piece	of	yellow	paper	that	appeared	to	contain	a	handwritten	key	to	a	secret	
communications	code	from	a	Tucson	apartment.96	In	their	paperwork,	Phoenix	agents	
referred	to	the	break-in	as	an	“anonymous	source,”	using	language	similar	to	the	
terminology	W.	Mark	Felt	and	Edward	Miller	would	later	adopt	in	their	memos	
authorizing	break-ins	in	the	year	following	Hoover’s	death.97	After	forging	a	duplicate	
version	of	the	paper	and	returning	it	to	a	“small	box	containing	several	old	letters	and	
other	items”	located	in	the	apartment,	Phoenix	agents	forwarded	the	original	paper	to	
the	FBI	Headquarters	in	Washington	for	fingerprint	identification	and	cryptanalysis.98		
	 Former	FBI	agent	M.	Wesley	Swearingen	also	recalled	conducting	break-ins	
without	approval	from	Headquarters.	In	his	memoir,	Swearingen	wrote	that	he	and	
																																																								
95	FBI	memo,	Lee	Colwell	to	Director,	“U.S.	v.	W.	Mark	Felt,	et	al;	Discovery	Procedures,”	September	5,	
1979,	LPG	FBI,	1222537-0	-	62-118045	-	Section	8	Serial	1.	
96	Francis	J.	Martin	to	Paul	V.	Daly,	“[Redacted]	Bag	Job,”	November	3,	1978,	LPG	FBI,	1222537-0	-	62-
118045	-	Section	8	Serial	1.	
97	FBI	report,	“Phoenix	Review,”	September	10,	1976,	LPG	FBI,	1222537-0	-	62-118045	-	Section	8	Serial	
1.	
98	FBI	airtel,	SAC	Phoenix	to	Director	(Attn:	FBI	Laboratory),	“WEATHFUG,”	April	24,	1972.	
	 234	
other	members	of	the	Los	Angeles	Weather	Underground	squad	(Squad	19)	carried	out	
at	least	seven	black	bag	jobs.	Among	the	targets	were	two	leftist	attorneys	who	had	
defended	SDS	activists.99	New	York’s	Squad	47	agents	also	carried	out	unauthorized	
black	bag	jobs	and	provided	intelligence	gathered	from	their	actions	to	FBI	
Headquarters.	Presumably,	like	their	Phoenix	counterparts,	Squad	47	agents	disguised	
their	sources	in	their	memoranda	as	“anonymous,”	though	none	of	these	documents	
survived	the	Bureau’s	purging	of	such	sources	in	1976.100	According	to	Swearingen,	
none	of	the	FBI’s	illegal	break-ins	helped	prevent	violence	or	capture	Weather	
Underground	fugitives.101	
	 It	is	unknown	whether	or	not	FBI	agents	acted	on	Hoover’s	October	1971	call	for	
“imaginative”	and	“intensified”	investigations	of	Cleaver-faction	Black	Panthers	by	
incorporating	illegal	counterintelligence	operations	or	surveillance	tactics	into	their	
BLA	investigation.	However,	police	managed	to	capture	or	kill	many	BLA	members	in	
late	1971	and	early	1972,	as	the	BLA	unleashed	a	haphazard	crescendo	of	bloody	
violence.	In	October,	New	York	police	captured	H.	Rap	Brown	after	wounding	him	in	a	
gun	battle	in	a	black	social	club	that	fugitive	on	the	FBI’s	Ten	Most	Wanted	list	had	been	
trying	to	rob.102	On	November	3,	Twymon	Meyers	and	Freddie	Hilton	assassinated	
police	officer	James	Greene	in	Atlanta,	where	New	York	BLA	guerrillas	had	gone	to	
escape	the	NYPD’s	manhunt.	Five	days	later,	Atlanta	police	arrested	BLA	members	
Andrew	Jackson,	Samuel	Cooper,	and	Ronald	Anderson	outside	a	convenience	store	
																																																								
99	Swearingen,	FBI	Secrets,	77-78.	
100	FBI,	8/24/1976,	untitled	summary	of	interview	with	Detroit	special	agent.			
101	Swearingen,	FBI	Secrets,	78.	
102	It	is	unclear	if	Brown	was	part	of	the	BLA,	but	the	word	on	the	street	was	that	the	robbery	for	which	
he	was	arrested	was	one	of	several	BLA-style	robberies	targeting	drug	dealers	that	he	had	participated	in	
while	underground.	Thelwell,	“H.	Rap	Brown/Jamil	Al-Amin,”	xxiv-xxv.	
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after	noticing	that	the	men	were	carrying	firearms	(they	were	on	their	way	to	carry	out	
another	police	ambush).	On	November	11,	a	firefight	broke	out	as	police	attempted	to	
pull	over	a	carload	of	BLA	members	in	Catawba	County,	North	Carolina,	resulting	in	the	
arrest	of	four	guerrillas	and	the	paralyzing	of	sheriff’s	deputy	Ted	Elmore.103	On	
December	21,	BLA	members	rolled	an	M-26	fragmentation	grenade	under	an	NYPD	
squad	car	to	prevent	police	from	chasing	them	after	a	bank	robbery;	the	two	officers	
inside	miraculously	survived	the	explosion	unscathed	(the	BLA’s	“Attica	Brigade”	later	
took	credit	for	the	assault,	warning,	“We	have	more	grenades,	and	we	will	be	back”).104	
FBI	agents	arrested	BLA	member	John	Thomas	and	shot	dead	fellow	guerrilla	Frank	
Fields	ten	days	later	outside	a	hotel	in	Odessa,	Florida	after	an	employee	phoned	the	
police	to	report	suspicious	activity.105	On	January	19,	1972,	police	arrested	Mark	Holder	
and	one	other	BLA	member	in	Philadelphia	with	a	suitcase	full	of	guns.106	The	BLA	
assassinated	two	more	New	York	policemen	on	January	27,	gunning	down	officers	
Gregory	Foster	and	Rocco	Laurie	as	they	walked	their	beat	in	the	East	Village.107	BLA	
guerrillas	involved	in	the	Foster	and	Laurie	killings	fled	to	St.	Louis,	where	police	pulled	
them	over	on	the	evening	of	February	16	as	they	drove	in	a	green	1967	Oldsmobile	with	
cardboard	Michigan	license	plates.	A	firefight	erupted,	followed	by	a	high-speed	chase,	
then	a	second	gun	battle.	When	it	was	offer,	a	police	officer	was	critically	wounded,	BLA	
member	Ronnie	Carter	was	dead,	and	guerrillas	Thomas	“Blood”	McCreary	and	Henry	
“Sha	Sha”	Brown	were	in	police	custody.	One	BLA	guerrilla,	Twymon	Meyers,	managed	
																																																								
103	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	205-206.	
104	Ibid,	209.	
105	Ibid,	206-207.	
106	Ibid,	207.	
107	Ibid,	210-211.	
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to	flee	on	foot.	St.	Louis	police	uncovered	New	York	Officer	Rocco	Laurie’s	pistol	in	the	
Oldsmobile.108	The	FBI,	NYPD,	and	other	police	agencies	continued	their	investigations	
of	the	BLA	after	the	St.	Louis	arrests,	but	for	the	time	being,	the	group	had	been	severely	
damaged.	The	BLA	would	not	launch	another	attack	until	nearly	a	year	later.		
	 Amid	the	spike	in	BLA	violence,	the	Weather	Underground’s	guerrilla	offensive	
began	to	recede.	After	a	bombing	at	the	Massachusetts	Institute	for	Technology	on	
October	15,	1971	targeting	the	offices	of	former	CIA	analyst	and	Vietnam	War	advisor	
William	Bundy,	it	would	be	another	eight	months	before	the	Weather	Underground	
launched	another	attack.109	The	FBI	did	not	realize	it,	but	the	Weather	Underground	
was	shrinking	as	its	members	concluded	that	their	bombings	had	done	little	to	reverse	
the	U.S.	left’s	steady	decline.	During	1971,	the	Weather	Underground’s	leadership	
ordered	several	of	its	lesser-known	members	to	surface	and	rejoin	society	with	the	
same	aim	of	reestablishing	leftist	contacts	and	building	an	aboveground	revolutionary	
socialist	organization.	Other	members	drifted	away	from	the	radical	politics	all	
together,	including	Mark	Rudd,	who	left	the	organization	and	took	refuge	in	Santa	Fe	
with	his	girlfriend.	By	the	middle	of	1971,	the	Weather	Underground	only	had	about	
fifteen	active	clandestine	members.110		
																																																								
108	Ibid,	215-217.	
109	The	Weather	Underground’s	MIT	bomb	exploded	behind	a	ceiling	panel	in	a	women’s	bathroom,	
causing	minor	damage	to	Bundy’s	adjacent	office.	The	group	explained	their	attack	as	retaliation	for	
Bundy’s	role	in	the	Vietnam	War.	Ibid,	224.	
110	Ibid,	218-219.	Although	agents	did	not	know	it,	the	FBI’s	massive	investigation	had	played	a	role	in	
weakening	the	group.	The	FBI	made	a	break	in	its	Weather	Underground	investigation	in	late	1970	and	
early	1971.	On	December	16,	1970,	FBI	agents	arrested	Weather	guerrilla	Judy	Clark	at	a	Manhattan	
movie	theater	after	recognizing	her	by	chance	from	a	wanted	poster.	Clark’s	fake	id,	forged	with	the	
identity	of	an	infant	named	Yvette	Kirby	who	had	died	in	the	1940s,	helped	agents	figure	out	the	Weather	
Underground’s	methods	for	developing	false	identification.	Within	six	weeks,	agents	in	San	Francisco	had	
determined	that	the	local	Department	of	Motor	Vehicles	had	recently	issued	eighteen	licenses	to	
individuals	using	the	names	of	long-deceased	infants,	all	of	whom	they	suspected	to	be	Weather	
Underground	fugitives,	including	Kathy	Boudin,	Mark	Rudd,	Jeff	Jones,	and	Bernadine	Dohrn.	A	short	time	
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	 While	the	slowed	pace	of	the	Weather	Underground’s	bombings	reduced	public	
concern	over	the	group,	the	FBI’s	investigation	was	contributing	to	a	mounting	crisis	
within	the	Bureau.	By	1972,	members	of	Squad	47	and	other	Weather	Underground	
units	began	to	question	whether	the	group	continued	to	warrant	a	large	share	of	the	
FBI’s	resources.	Squad	47	agents	jokingly	referred	to	the	Weather	Underground	as	“the	
terrible	toilet	bombers,”	since	the	group’s	main	activity	consisted	of	periodically	
planting	bombs	in	restrooms.	Moreover,	agents	grew	increasingly	anxious	as	Hoover	
pressured	them	to	win	the	war	against	leftist	guerrillas,	using	unsanctioned	illegal	
surveillance	tactics	as	necessary.	Agents	conveyed	their	anxiety	in	the	term	they	coined	
for	unauthorized	warrantless	wiretaps:	“suicide	bugs.”	According	to	a	Detroit	
investigator,	agents	used	this	term	because	“if	you	got	caught”	utilizing	illegal	wiretaps,	
“you	were	on	your	own.”111	In	other	words,	agents	were	uncertain	whether	or	not	
Headquarters	would	support	them,	or	protect	them	from	a	felony	indictment,	if	they	
ever	got	caught	installing	illegal	wiretaps.	Burdened	with	the	dual	responsibility	of	
preventing	leftist	guerrilla	violence	and	avoiding	prosecution	for	their	use	of	illegal	
surveillance	techniques,	agents	worried	about	their	professional	vulnerability.	
																																																																																																																																																																												
later,	in	March	1971,	San	Francisco	FBI	agents	narrowly	missed	an	opportunity	to	apprehend	Jones	and	
Dohrn.	The	pair	escaped	an	FBI	dragnet	after	Jones	picked	up	a	Western	Union	money	transfer	from	an	
aboveground	supporter	in	Chicago	whom	the	Bureau	had	placed	under	surveillance.	In	the	San	Francisco	
Western	Union	office,	Jones	correctly	suspected	that	a	group	of	men	hanging	out	in	the	lobby	were	
undercover	FBI	agents;	the	agents	did	not	arrest	Jones	on	the	spot	because	they	were	unsure	whether	or	
not	they	had	found	their	suspect.	After	departing	the	office,	Jones	hopped	into	a	car	driven	by	Dohrn,	who	
made	a	series	of	quick	turns	and	managed	to	shake	off	the	agents	who	followed	her	in	a	black	sedan.	The	
Weather	Underground’s	San	Francisco	cell	immediately	fled	the	city,	worried	that	their	local	safehouse	
could	be	compromised.	The	FBI	found	the	group’s	abandoned	apartment	a	week	later	after	receiving	a	
call	from	the	landlord.	Inside,	agents	discovered	piles	of	leftist	literature,	disguises,	and	bomb-making	
equipment.	The	Weather	Underground’s	New	York	cell	also	abandoned	their	safehouse	after	the	close	call	
in	San	Francisco.	By	forcing	the	Weather	Underground	to	establish	new	safe	houses	and	IDs,	this	
disruption	contributed	to	the	group’s	shrinking	size	and	reduced	pace	of	bombings.	See	ibid,	162-168.	
111	FBI,	8/24/1976,	untitled	summary	of	interview	with	anonymous	(name	redacted)	Detroit	special	
agent,	LPG	FBI,	File	Number	1222537-0-62-118045,	Section	8,	Serial	1	
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Conclusion	
If	anyone	at	FBI	Headquarters	understood	field	agents’	anxieties	around	leftist	guerrilla	
investigations	and	illegal	surveillance	tactics,	it	was	W.	Mark	Felt.	Before	Hoover	
promoted	him	to	Deputy	Associate	Director	in	June	1971,	Felt	had	worked	for	nearly	six	
years	as	the	FBI’s	Chief	Inspector,	visiting	field	offices	throughout	the	country	for	
annual	inspections	of	agents’	investigative	work,	including	that	carried	out	by	the	
Domestic	Security	Division.	Years	later,	while	facing	federal	indictments	for	approving	
break-ins	against	Weather	Underground	supporters	after	Hoover’s	death,	Felt	would	
publicly	claim	that	he	had	no	knowledge	of	agents’	involvement	in	black	bag	jobs	prior	
to	his	reauthorizing	the	practice	in	September	1972.	During	his	1979	trial,	however,	
Felt’s	defense	team	introduced	Hoover’s	August	17,	1970	memo	calling	for	
“intensification”	of	leftist	guerrilla	investigations	as	evidence	that	his	1972	decision	to	
officially	reauthorize	break-ins	merely	formalized	a	practice	that	agents	had	begun	
practicing	two	years	earlier	at	the	late	Director’s	request.	Moreover,	Felt	was	aware	of	
agents’	anxieties	over	restricted	surveillance	practices	in	September	1970,	when	he	
successfully	convinced	Hoover	to	lower	the	FBI’s	minimum	informant	age	from	twenty-
one	to	eighteen	in	order	to	help	agents	prevent	leftist	“terrorist	violence.”112	Edward	
Miller	was	also	likely	aware	of	the	crisis	brewing	within	the	FBI	during	the	last	year	of	
Hoover’s	life.	As	Assistant	Director	in	charge	of	the	Domestic	Security	Division	following	
William	Sullivan’s	ouster	in	October	1970,	Miller	received	reports	from	Weather	
Underground	squads	in	New	York,	Phoenix,	and	other	major	cities	that	relayed	
																																																								
112	See	Chapter	3	for	further	discussion.	
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information	gleaned	from	so-called	“anonymous	sources,”	a	euphemism	for	illegal	
break-ins	that	he	and	Felt	would	adopt	in	their	memos	after	reauthorizing	the	practice.	
	 Though	Hoover	had	no	way	of	realizing	it	at	the	time,	his	decision	to	promote	
Felt	and	Miller	amid	the	FBI’s	institutional	conflict	with	the	Nixon	administration	was	a	
fateful	one.	After	Hoover’s	death,	Felt	would	further	escalate	both	the	hostilities	with	
Nixon	and	the	FBI’s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas.	In	his	role	as	“Deep	Throat,”	
Felt	would	secretly	leak	documents	from	the	FBI’s	Watergate	investigation	to	the	press	
and	help	topple	the	Nixon	presidency,	while	at	the	same	time	colluding	with	Miller	to	
officially	reinstitute	the	FBI’s	use	of	break-ins	for	“terrorism”	investigations.	In	the	
meantime,	a	final	battle	between	Hoover’s	FBI	and	the	White	House	piqued	Felt’s	
resentment	towards	Nixon.	
	 In	March	1972,	Nixon	sought	to	enlist	the	FBI’s	assistance	in	covering	up	a	
controversy	involving	the	ITT	Corporation	and	its	lobbyist,	Dita	Beard.	Columnist	Jack	
Anderson	had	printed	a	story	on	February	19	on	a	leaked	memo	in	which	Beard	
allegedly	boasted	to	her	employer	that	Attorney	General	Mitchell	agreed	to	quash	an	
antitrust	case	against	the	company	in	exchange	for	a	$400,000	contribution	to	the	
Republican	Party	for	the	1972	national	convention.	Beard	claimed	the	memo	was	
forged,	however,	and	Nixon’s	staff	sent	the	document	to	the	FBI	Laboratory	to	
corroborate	the	lobbyist’s	claim.113	The	Nixon	administration’s	request	came	directly	to	
Felt	on	March	10,	1972	from	L.	Patrick	Gray,	a	former	World	War	II	Navy	submarine	
captain	and	longtime	Nixon	supporter	who	had	assumed	the	position	of	Assistant	
Attorney	General	a	little	more	than	a	week	earlier	(Gray	had	taken	the	place	of	Richard	
																																																								
113	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power,	475-476;	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	165-167.	
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Kleindienst,	who	had	become	Attorney	General-designate	after	Mitchell	stepped	down	
on	March	1	to	direct	Nixon’s	reelection	campaign).114	According	to	Felt,	Assistant	
Attorney	General	Gray,	Assistant	Attorney	General	Robert	Mardian,	and	White	House	
counsel	John	Dean	repeatedly	interfered	with	the	FBI	Lab’s	analysis	over	the	course	of	
the	following	week	in	an	attempt	to	pressure	the	Bureau	to	find	that	the	Beard	
document	was	a	forgery.115	The	FBI	Lab	determined	that	Beard’s	memo	was	authentic,	
however,	and	Nixon	was	furious	when	he	heard	that	Hoover	and	Felt	stood	behind	the	
analysis.116	As	far	as	Felt	was	concerned,	the	Dita	Beard	incident	was	the	latest	example	
of	Nixon’s	attempts	to	exert	control	over	the	FBI	in	order	to	advance	a	partisan	political	
agenda.	“Looking	back,”	Felt	later	wrote,	“I	am	glad	that	the	FBI	was	able	to	resist	White	
House	pressure	to	take	part	in	a	cover-up	which	in	some	ways	was	a	prelude	to	
Watergate.”117	
	 Less	than	six	weeks	later,	Hoover	died	unexpectedly	in	his	sleep.	Felt	fully	
expected	that	Nixon	would	appoint	him	or	another	top	FBI	official	to	serve	as	the	
longtime	Director’s	successor.	Nixon	had	other	plans,	however.	The	President	
appointed	L.	Patrick	Gray	to	serve	as	the	FBI’s	Acting	Director,	promising	to	appoint	a	
fulltime	Director	after	the	November	election.	Gray	was	surprised	as	anyone	by	Nixon’s	
choice.	Indeed,	when	he	received	notice	that	the	President	wanted	to	speak	with	him,	
Gray	assumed	that	Nixon	wanted	to	discuss	a	development	in	the	ITT	controversy.	To	
																																																								
114	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	167.	
115	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	167-174.	
116	Powers,	Secrecy	and	Power,	146.	
117	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	174.	
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Felt,	the	President’s	choice	for	Hoover’s	successor	sent	a	clear	signal:	Nixon	wanted	“his	
man”	to	control	the	FBI.118	
	 Nixon	conveyed	his	vision	for	the	future	of	the	FBI	at	Hoover’s	funeral.	In	his	
eulogy,	delivered	before	a	live	national	television	broadcast,	the	President	revealed	
nothing	of	his	conflict	with	the	Director	over	the	past	three-and-a-half	years.	Instead,	he	
praised	Hoover	and	his	forty-eight	year	career	as	“the	invincible	and	incorruptible	
defender	of	every	American’s	precious	right	to	be	free	from	fear.”119	Moreover,	amidst	
increasing	public	controversy	over	FBI	domestic	surveillance,	Nixon	promised	to	
uphold	rather	than	alter	Hoover’s	policing	practices.	“There	is	a	belief	that	the	changing	
of	the	guard	will	also	mean	a	changing	of	the	rules,”	Nixon	declared.	“With	J.	Edgar	
Hoover	this	will	not	happen.	The	FBI	will	carry	on	in	the	future,	true	to	its	finest	
traditions	in	the	past.”120			
	 Nixon	fully	supported	the	FBI’s	mass	surveillance	of	America’s	antiwar	and	Black	
Power	movements,	especially	when	carried	out	in	an	effort	to	prevent	leftist	guerrilla	
attacks.	Now,	with	Hoover	gone	at	last,	the	President	sought	to	exert	direct	White	
House	influence	over	the	Bureau.	Nixon’s	institutional	conflict	with	Hoover’s	FBI	had	
entered	its	final	phase.		
	
	
																																																								
118	Ibid,	208.	
119	Richard	Nixon,	“Eulogy	Delivered	at	Funeral	Services	for	J.	Edgar	Hoover,”	May	4,	1972,	online	by	
Gerhard	Peters	and	John	T.	Woolley,	The	American	Presidency	Project,	
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3397.	
120	Nixon,	“Eulogy	Delivered	at	Funeral	Services	for	J.	Edgar	Hoover.”	
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CHAPTER	6	
DEEP	THROAT’S	SECRET	WARS:	BREAK-INS,	ANTI-TERRORISM,	AND	THE	ROAD	
TO	WATERGATE	
	
Four	months	into	L.	Patrick	Gray’s	term	as	Acting	Director	of	the	FBI,	a	guerrilla	attack	
halfway	around	the	globe	prompted	an	urgent	new	round	of	Bureau	and	White	House	
efforts	to	combat	“terrorism.”	In	the	predawn	hours	of	September	5,	1972,	eight	
commandos	from	the	Palestinian	nationalist	Black	September	Organization	stormed	an	
apartment	unit	on	the	site	of	the	20th	Summer	Olympic	Games	in	Munich,	West	
Germany.	Inside	slept	the	Israeli	Olympic	team.	After	killing	two	team	members	who	
resisted	the	siege,	the	heavily	armed	guerrillas	held	nine	athletes	and	coaches	hostage.	
The	militants	sought	to	exchange	their	captives	for	the	freedom	of	234	Palestinian	
prisoners	held	in	Israeli	prisons	as	well	as	two	Red	Army	Faction	guerrillas	imprisoned	
in	West	Germany.	As	television	crews	covering	the	Olympics	shifted	their	focus	to	the	
hostage	crisis,	the	Munich	siege	became	an	international	media	sensation.	For	eighteen	
hours,	an	estimated	900	million	viewers	throughout	the	world	watched	the	unfolding	
drama:	as	West	German	officials	negotiated	with	the	hostage-takers;	as	Israeli	Prime	
Minister	Golda	Meir	announced	her	government’s	refusal	to	meet	the	guerrillas’	
demands;	and	as	West	German	police	bungled	a	rescue	mission	that	resulted	in	the	
deaths	of	a	police	officer,	five	Black	September	guerrillas,	and	all	of	the	Israeli	
hostages.1	
																																																								
1	The	rescue	attempt	occurred	at	the	Munich	Airport,	where	West	German	police	transported	the	Black	
September	militants	and	their	hostages	in	a	helicopter	with	a	promise	to	deliver	them	by	airliner	to	an	
unspecified	Arab	country.	West	German	police	captured	the	three	surviving	Black	September	militants	in	
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	 A	number	of	scholars	have	written	about	the	Munich	siege,	explaining	the	bloody	
incident	as	a	watershed	moment	in	the	history	of	the	Palestinian	nationalist	struggle,	
anti-Arab	racism,	and	state	efforts	to	combat	the	problem	of	“international	terrorism.”2	
Some	of	these	scholars	also	analyzed	President	Nixon’s	response	to	the	Munich	attack,	
focusing	on	his	administration’s	formation	of	the	Cabinet	Committee	to	Combat	
Terrorism	(CCCT),	a	group	comprised	of	Secretary	of	State	Henry	Kissinger,	FBI	Acting	
Director	Gray,	and	several	other	Executive	Branch	officials	whom	the	President	charged	
with	establishing	means	to	prevent	domestic	and	international	terrorism.3	This	chapter,	
however,	is	the	first	academic	work	to	explain	how	the	Munich	attack	influenced	the	
FBI	in	the	midst	of	the	Watergate	Scandal.4		
	 The	Munich	attack	was	a	turning	point	in	the	history	of	the	FBI	and	its	efforts	to	
combat	insurgent	violence.	After	Munich,	the	FBI	officially	reauthorized	the	use	of	
illegal	break-ins,	known	in	Bureau	lingo	as	“surreptitious	entries”	or	“black	bag	jobs,”	
for	the	first	time	since	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	banned	the	practice	in	1966.	On	
September	7,	two	days	after	the	Munich	bloodbath,	the	FBI’s	second	and	third-ranked	
officials	Associate	Director	W.	Mark	Felt	and	Assistant	Director	Edward	Miller	
authorized	a	request	from	the	Bureau’s	Dallas	field	office	for	a	break-in	to	the	office	of	
																																																																																																																																																																												
the	siege,	but	released	them	on	October	29,	1972,	after	Palestinian	militants	hijacked	Lufthansa	Flight	
615	from	Damascus	to	Frankfurt,	and	threatened	to	blow	up	the	plane.	Paul	Thomas	Chamberlin,	The	
Global	Offensive:	The	United	States,	the	Palestinian	Liberation	Organization,	and	the	Making	of	the	Post-
Cold	War	Order	(Cambridge:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	142-143,	161-167.	Also	see	One	Day	in	
September,	directed	by	Kevin	McDonald,	Passion	Pictures,	1999.	
2	Chamberlin,	The	Global	Offensive,	142-143,	161-174;	Melani	McAlister,	Epic	Encounters:	Culture,	Media,	
and	U.S.	Interests	in	the	Middle	East	since	1945,	2nd	ed.	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2005),	
178-181;	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror,	21-27;	Naftali,	Blind	Spot,	54-55.	
3	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror,	27-28;	Naftali,	Blind	Spot,	59-61.	Also	see	the	CCCT’s	founding	
document,	White	House	memorandum,	Nixon	to	Kissinger,	“Action	to	Combat	Terrorism,”	September	25,	
1972,	Digital	National	Security	Archive,	http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com	(hereafter	DNSA).	
4	For	a	brief,	journalistic	narrative	that	makes	connections	between	leftist	guerrillas	and	Watergate,	see	
Weiner,	Enemies,	307-319.	
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the	Arab	Information	Center,	a	public	relations	outfit	affiliated	with	the	Arab	League.5	
FBI	agents	stole	a	briefcase	from	the	office	containing	a	list	of	ninety-four	Arabs	and	
Arab	Americans	living	in	the	United	States.	Alleging	that	the	individuals	on	the	list	were	
involved	in	a	conspiracy	to	commit	terrorist	attacks,	FBI	agents	throughout	the	country	
visited,	interrogated,	and	harassed	all	of	them.	Two	weeks	after	the	Dallas	break-in,	
Gray	verbally	informed	top	FBI	officials	that	he	had	reinstituted	the	Bureau’s	use	of	
black	bag	jobs,	and	charged	Felt	and	Miller	with	authorizing	all	field	office	requests	to	
utilize	the	technique.	Felt	and	Miller	subsequently	approved	at	least	twelve	more	FBI	
break-ins,	two	of	them	targeting	Arabs	and	seven	of	them	focused	on	suspected	
associates	of	the	Weather	Underground.6		
	 The	FBI’s	response	to	Munich	helps	answer	a	critical	question	that	has	eluded	
Watergate	scholars	since	2005,	when	Mark	Felt	came	forward	as	“Deep	Throat,”	the	
confidential	source	whose	disclosures	enabled	Washington	Post	journalists	Bob	
Woodward	and	Carl	Bernstein	to	expose	Nixon	Cabinet	members’	involvement	in	the	
notorious	June	17,	1972	break-in	to	headquarters	of	the	Democratic	National	
Committee	in	Washington’s	Watergate	office	complex.	Felt’s	activities	as	Deep	Throat	
helped	spark	the	Watergate	Scandal	that	culminated	in	President	Richard	Nixon’s	
August	1974	resignation.	Felt’s	confession	led	several	scholars	to	rebut	the	claims	
Woodward	and	Bernstein	made	in	their	bestselling	1973	book	All	the	Presidents’	Men—
that	“Deep	Throat”	acted	in	a	principled	effort	to	defend	the	U.S.	Constitution	and	the	
																																																								
5	Nicholas	M.	Horrock,	“New	Senate	Panel	May	Study	F.B.I.	Drive	on	Arab	Terrorism,”	New	York	Times,	
February	13,	1975;	L.	Patrick	Gray	III,	In	Nixon’s	Web:	A	Year	in	the	Crosshairs	of	Watergate,	with	Ed	Gray	
(New	York:	Times	Books,	2008),	114;	FBI	memo,	E.	S.	Miller	to	Mr.	Felt,	“Al	Fatah;	Internal	Security—
Middle	East,”	September	7,	1972,	LPG	FBI,	File	No.	1222537-0-62-118045,	Section	8,	Serial	1.	
6	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	120-122;	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	Inside,	326.	Felt	and	Miller	authorized	the	
remaining	three	break-ins	as	part	foreign	espionage	investigations.	The	memos	documenting	these	
break-ins	are	available	in	LPG	FBI,	File	No.	1222537-0-62-118045,	Section	8,	Serial	1.	
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American	presidency	from	Nixon’s	unlawful	abuses	of	executive	power.7	Historian	
Beverly	Gage	demonstrated,	for	instance,	that	Felt	acted	not	so	much	out	of	lofty	ideals,	
but	in	a	calculated	attempt	to	preserve	the	FBI’s	institutional	autonomy	from	what	he	
perceived	as	Nixon’s	efforts	to	exert	White	House	control	over	the	Bureau.8	In	addition,	
journalist	Max	Holland	has	underscored	Felt’s	deep	resentment	over	Nixon’s	
appointment	of	Gray,	a	longtime	campaign	supporter	and	FBI	outsider,	as	Acting	
Director	following	the	death	of	Director	J.	Edgar	Hoover	on	May	2,	1972.9	Neither	Gage	
nor	Holland,	however,	explain	Felt’s	authorization	of	the	Weather	Underground	break-
ins,	which	brought	the	former	Associate	Director	into	the	national	spotlight	during	the	
late	1970s,	as	he	and	Edward	Miller	faced	federal	indictments	and	eventual	felony	
convictions	for	their	actions.10	These	scholars	leave	a	key	question	unanswered:	why	
did	Felt	leak	information	on	the	Nixon	Administration’s	use	of	illegal	break-ins	while	at	
the	same	time	authorizing	similar	break-ins	for	the	FBI’s	Weather	Underground	
investigation?	
	 Felt,	Miller,	and	Gray’s	post-Munich	decisions	to	reauthorize	illegal	break-ins	
were	critical	episodes	in	the	FBI’s	institutional	conflict	with	the	Nixon	administration,	a	
																																																								
7	Carl	Bernstein	and	Bob	Woodward,	All	the	President’s	Men	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster,	1974),	243.	
8	Gage,	“Deep	Throat,	Watergate,	and	the	Bureaucratic	Politics	of	the	FBI,”	176.	Also	see	Woodward,	The	
Secret	Man,	104-105;	and	W.	Mark	Felt	and	John	O’Connor,	A	G-Man’s	Life:	The	FBI,	Being	‘Deep	Throat,’	
and	the	Struggle	for	Honor	in	Washington	(New	York:	Public	Affairs,	2006).		
9	Holland,	Leak,	9-11.	Holland	argues	that	Felt’s	disclosures	to	Woodward	and	other	reporters	were	part	
of	a	covert	effort	aimed	not	to	take	down	Nixon,	but	to	discredit	Gray,	so	that	the	President	would	appoint	
him	to	the	position	of	FBI	Director.	Though	his	book	is	otherwise	well	researched,	and	provides	
important	new	insights	into	Felt’s	Deep	Throat	activity,	Holland	does	not	provide	enough	sources	to	
prove	his	theory	that	Felt’s	aim	was	to	undermine	Gray	as	part	of	a	“war	of	FBI	succession.”	Gage	and	
Holland	both	published	their	works	around	the	same	time;	neither	engages	with	one	another’s	
arguments.	
10	The	Carter	Justice	Department	indicted	both	men,	along	with	Gray,	in	April	1978.	A	judge	soon	threw	
out	charges	against	Gray,	however,	because	prosecutors	were	unable	to	provide	documentary	proof	that	
the	former	Acting	Director	verbally	instructed	Felt	and	Miller	to	reauthorize	break-ins	for	the	Weather	
Underground	investigation.	Felt	and	Miller	were	convicted	in	November	1979,	but	President	Ronald	
Reagan	pardoned	both	men	five	months	later,	shortly	after	taking	office.	
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conflict	triggered	three	years	earlier	by	America’s	domestic	revolutionary	insurgency.	
After	Hoover’s	death	and	Nixon’s	appointment	of	Gray,	Felt	emerged	as	a	leading	actor	
in	this	conflict.	Felt	did	not	object	to	illegal	break-ins	per	se.	Rather,	he	opposed	Nixon’s	
use	of	the	tactics	for	purely	partisan	objectives,	as	well	as	the	president’s	efforts	to	
impose	White	House	control	over	the	Bureau.	Accordingly,	Felt	exploited	the	Watergate	
break-in,	and	his	role	overseeing	the	FBI’s	investigation	of	the	burglary,	in	an	effort	to	
undermine	both	Nixon	and	Gray.11	At	the	same	time,	Miller	and	Special	Agents	in	
Charge	throughout	the	country,	with	Felt’s	support,	urged	Acting	Director	Gray	to	
reauthorize	break-ins,	warrantless	wiretapping,	and	mail	opening.	These	officials	
believed	such	tactics	were	necessary	to	locate	guerrilla	fugitives	and	prevent	future	
attacks,	and	that	official	authorization	would	assure	agents	they	would	not	be	
sanctioned	for	their	involvement	in	illegal	operations.	They	petitioned	Gray	while	
concealing	the	fact	that	FBI	agents	had	been	carrying	out	such	illegal	surveillance	
tactics	on	an	informal	basis	since	August	1970	in	response	to	Hoover’s	instructions	to	
intensify	leftist	guerrilla	investigations.	Gray	was	reluctant	to	agree,	but	after	the	
September	1972	Munich	attack	prompted	fears	of	a	similar	bloody	incident	inside	the	
United	States,	Felt	and	Miller	authorized	the	Dallas	break-in	on	their	own,	and	
convinced	their	boss	to	officially	reauthorize	black	bag	jobs	for	“terrorism”	
investigations.		
	 The	FBI	and	Nixon	administration	responded	to	the	Munich	attack	in	the	context	
of	their	ongoing	institutional	conflict	and	struggle	to	combat	guerrilla	violence	in	the	
United	States.	Just	as	he	exploited	the	Watergate	burglary	in	order	to	undermine	Gray	
																																																								
11	Some	researchers	have	asserted	that	Felt	did	not	act	as	Deep	Throat	alone.	See	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	
291-302;	Holland,	Leak,	40-41.	
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and	Nixon,	Felt	seized	Munich	as	an	opportunity	to	reinstate	break-ins	as	a	form	of	
surveillance	that	he	and	other	FBI	officials	hoped	could	be	used	to	both	locate	Weather	
Underground	fugitives	and	obtain	advanced,	preventative	warning	of	guerrilla	attacks.	
Meanwhile,	Nixon	formed	of	the	CCCT	after	four	years	of	political	debate	and	
institutional	conflict	over	the	problem	of	“revolutionary	terrorism.”	In	the	aftermath	of	
the	aborted	Huston	Plan,	and	amid	growing	public	scrutiny	of	his	Cabinet’s	involvement	
in	the	Watergate	break-in	and	cover-up,	however,	Nixon	did	not	make	another	attempt	
to	consolidate	America’s	federal	intelligence	agencies.	Instead,	in	a	move	that	shielded	
the	White	House	and	all	other	federal	agencies	from	the	liabilities	of	combating	
clandestine	political	violence	inside	the	United	States,	Nixon	granted	the	FBI	sole	
jurisdiction	over	responding	to	“terrorist”	attacks	on	American	soil.	Nixon’s	formation	
of	the	CCCT,	coupled	with	growing	calls	for	reform	in	the	wake	of	Hoover’s	death,	
prompted	Gray	to	reduce	domestic	surveillance	of	American	leftists	in	order	to	redirect	
the	FBI’s	resources	towards	combating	“terrorism.”	
	 The	FBI’s	post-Munich	operations,	however,	did	little,	if	anything,	to	prevent	
guerrilla	violence.	Rather	than	preempting	an	identifiable	Palestinian	nationalist	
guerrilla	attack	inside	the	United	States,	the	FBI	responded	to	Munich	by	frantically	
chasing	false	leads	and	harassing	innocent	people,	while	the	Weather	Underground	
remained	on	the	lam.	The	Watergate	Scandal	also	did	not	shield	the	Bureau	from	
government	oversight.	Instead,	Felt’s	secret	war	against	Nixon	and	Gray	backfired.	
Watergate	led	to	the	downfall	of	Gray,	Nixon,	and	Felt,	and	was	a	major	impetus	for	the	
Senate	“Church	Committee’s”	massive	1975	investigations	of	FBI	operations.	Moreover,	
by	1980	most	Weather	Underground	members	emerged	from	the	revolutionary	
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underground	and	reintegrated	into	American	society	with	minimal	legal	consequences,	
while	Felt	and	Miller	were	convicted	of	felonies.		
	
The	Weather	Underground	and	Watergate	
L.	Patrick	Gray	faced	multiple	challenges	upon	stepping	into	his	role	as	the	FBI’s	Acting	
Director.	For	one,	Nixon	demanded	that	Gray	assure	the	FBI’s	fidelity	to	the	White	
House.	According	to	a	memo	penned	by	his	aide,	Nixon	instructed	Gray	during	their	first	
meeting,	immediately	after	Hoover’s	funeral	on	May	4,	1972,	“to	consolidate	control	of	
the	FBI,	making	such	changes	as	are	necessary	to	assure	its	complete	loyalty	to	the	
Administration.”12	As	Gray	recalled	the	Oval	Office	encounter,	Nixon	called	for	a	
“housecleaning”	of	the	FBI	after	the	Bureau’s	top	officials	had	time	to	mourn	Hoover’s	
death.13	At	the	same	time,	Gray	felt	tremendous	pressure	from	members	of	Congress,	
the	press,	and	the	American	public	to	reform	the	FBI’s	administrative	and	domestic	
surveillance	practices,	which	had	come	under	increasing	scrutiny	during	Hoover’s	final	
year	in	office.	These	twin	pressures	grew	increasingly	difficult	for	Gray	to	manage	after	
the	June	17,	1973	Watergate	break-in,	which	put	him	in	the	awkward	position	of	
overseeing	the	FBI’s	investigation	of	Nixon’s	Cabinet	members.	Was	Gray	supposed	to	
maintain	loyalty	to	his	superior	or	carry	out	an	impartial	investigation	as	the	American	
people	expected?	At	the	same	time,	Gray	also	inherited	Hoover’s	war	on	domestic	leftist	
guerrillas.	While	leftist	attacks	had	decreased	significantly	over	the	past	year,	the	
Weather	Underground	remained	at	large,	and	in	one	of	their	most	brazen	actions,	the	
																																																								
12	Ehrlichman,	Memorandum	for	the	President,	May	3,	1972,	quoted	in	Gage,	“Deep	Throat,	Watergate,	
and	the	Bureaucratic	Politics	of	the	FBI,”	171.	
13	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	33.	
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group	bombed	the	Pentagon	two	weeks	after	Gray	took	office.	Moreover,	despite	the	
decline	in	domestic	revolutionary	violence,	a	series	of	deadly	Palestinian	nationalist	
guerrilla	attacks	on	commercial	airliners	flying	over	the	Middle	East	and	Europe	roused	
fears	over	the	problem	of	international	terrorism,	and	the	potential	threat	it	posed	to	
America’s	national	security.	
	 Gray	grappled	with	these	challenges	while	naïve	to	the	depths	of	the	institutional	
conflict	between	Hoover’s	FBI	and	the	Nixon	White	House	that	proceeded	his	entry	into	
the	Bureau.	The	Acting	Director	was	particularly	unaware	that	his	number	two	official	
W.	Mark	Felt,	who	effectively	ran	the	FBI	on	his	own	while	Gray	traveled	the	country	
making	speeches	and	visiting	field	offices,	was	actively	working	to	undermine	him.	Felt	
exploited	the	Watergate	break-in,	and	his	role	overseeing	the	FBI’s	investigation	of	the	
burglary,	to	wage	a	“private	counterintelligence	program”	against	Gray	and	Nixon,	
disclosing	classified	information	to	the	press	in	an	effort	to	undermine	and	discredit	
both	men.14	At	the	same	time	that	he	leaked	information	on	Nixon	Cabinet	members’	
utilization	of	illegal	break-ins,	he	supported	other	FBI	officials’	efforts	to	persuade	Gray	
to	reauthorize	the	use	of	black	bag	jobs	for	the	Bureau’s	Weather	Underground	
investigation.	Meanwhile,	Gray	provided	the	Nixon	administration	with	political	
intelligence	linking	the	Vietnam	Veterans	Against	the	War	(VVAW),	an	antiwar	
organization	comprised	of	combat	veterans,	to	the	campaign	of	1972	Democratic	
presidential	candidate	George	McGovern.	The	Acting	Director	also	agreed	to	provide	
White	House	Counsel	John	Dean	with	classified	information	from	the	Watergate	
investigation	and	destroyed	an	envelope	containing	top	secret	documents	from	
																																																								
14	Holland,	Leak,	25.	
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Watergate	burglar	Howard	Hunt’s	safe.	These	actions	would	later	raise	suspicions	of	
Gray’s	complicity	in	the	Nixon	administration’s	Watergate	cover-up,	and	undermine	his	
chances	of	a	permanent	appointment	as	FBI	Director.	
	 Upon	assuming	his	position	as	FBI’s	Acting	Director,	Gray	felt	“appalled	to	learn”	
that	despite	one	of	the	most	intense	manhunts	in	its	history,	the	Bureau	had	captured	
only	three	Weather	Underground	fugitives.15	Indeed,	in	the	approximately	two	years	
since	the	March	6,	1970	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	bombing,	the	FBI’s	nationwide	
Weather	Underground	investigation	(“WEATHFUG”)	had	generated	more	than	ninety	
thousand	pages	of	documents,	focusing	on	280	individuals	throughout	the	country.	This	
included	twenty-six	fugitives	and	forty	other	individuals,	whereabouts	unknown,	whom	
the	FBI	suspected	of	Weather	Underground	membership.	In	a	report	on	the	WEATHFUG	
investigation	issued	five	days	after	Gray’s	appointment,	FBI	Internal	Security	Chief	R.	L.	
Shackelford	noted,	“only	a	few	fugitives	have	been	apprehended”	while	“the	key	
Weatherman	leaders	remain	at	large.”16	More	than	two	years	after	Hoover	initiated	the	
FBI’s	Weather	Underground	investigation,	the	massive	WEATHFUG	operation	remained	
largely	fruitless.	
	 As	if	to	taunt	the	FBI’s	new	Acting	Director,	the	Weather	Underground	bombed	
the	Pentagon	eleven	days	after	Shackelford	released	his	report—on	May	19,	1972	,	Ho	
Chi	Minh’s	birthday.	The	guerrillas	outlined	the	reasons	for	the	bombing	in	an	erudite,	
six-page	communiqué,	explaining	their	attack	as	a	means	to	protest	President	Nixon’s	
																																																								
15	Gray	actually	stated	in	his	memoir	that	the	FBI	had	not	yet	captured	any	Weather	Underground	
fugitives,	but	in	reality,	agents	had	captured	Judith	Clark	in	February	1970	and	Linda	Evans	and	Dianne	
Dongi	in	April	1970.	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	120;	W.	Mark	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside	(New	York:	
J.P.	Putnam’s	Sons,	1979),	326.	
16	Quoted	in	Ivan	Greenberg,	The	Dangers	of	Dissent:	The	FBI	and	Civil	Liberties	since	1965	(Lanham,	MD:	
Lexington	Books,	2010),	78.	
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recent	orders	for	the	mining	of	North	Vietnamese	harbors	and	intensified	aerial	
bombardment	of	both	North	and	South	Vietnam.	“It	has	become	clear	to	everyone	that	
the	[South	Vietnamese]	Thieu	regime	and	the	Army	of	the	Republic	of	Viet	Nam	would	
collapse	within	a	matter	of	days	without	U.S.	air	and	naval	power,”	the	Weather	
Underground	wrote.	“The	risk	taken	by	the	Vietnamese	at	this	time	is	to	face	that	U.S.	
military	might	in	a	fight	to	regain	their	homeland.”17	Viewing	Nixon’s	military	escalation	
as	cruel	and	pointless,	the	Weather	Underground	urged	Nixon	to	accept	the	Provisional	
Revolutionary	Government	of	South	Vietnam’s	recent	peace	proposal.18	The	Weather	
Underground’s	bomb,	detonated	at	12:53	am	in	a	fourth	floor	women’s	restroom,	
caused	minor	damage.19	However,	the	organization’s	ability	to	strike	the	symbolic	
center	of	American	military	power	underscored	its	members’	continued	evasion	of	FBI	
surveillance.	The	headline	of	a	Washington	Post	article	on	the	bombing	emphasized	this	
point:	“Who	Are	Weather	People—Ask	FBI.”20			
	 While	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	domestic	guerrillas	remained	at	
large,	attacks	by	Palestinian	militants	and	their	allies	in	Western	Europe	and	Israel	
prompted	growing	concern	throughout	the	world,	including	within	the	FBI,	over	the	
problem	of	international	terrorism.	On	February	22,	1971,	Palestinian	nationalist	
guerrillas	gained	five	million	dollars	in	ransom	after	hijacking	a	Lufthansa	airliner	
departed	from	Delhi	with	the	aim	of	freeing	Palestinian	captives	held	in	West	
																																																								
17	Weather	Underground,	“The	Bombing	of	the	Pentagon,”	May	19,	1972,	in	Dohrn,	et	al.,	Sing	a	Battle	
Song,	181	
18	Ibid.	Nixon’s	intensified	bombings,	calculated	as	a	means	to	force	the	Vietnamese	to	accept	U.S.	terms	
to	a	peace	deal,	included	bombardment	of	Hanoi	and	critical	civilian	infrastructure	including	ports	and	
dikes.	
19	Bart	Barnes,	“Bombing	Fails	to	Disrupt	Pentagon,”	Washington	Post,	May	20,	1971,	A1.		
20	Betty	Medsger	and	B.	D.	Coien,	“Who	are	Weather	People?—Ask	FBI,”	Washington	Post,	May	20,	1972,	
A12.	The	article	did	not	cite	any	recent	FBI	sources.	
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Germany.21	On	May	8,	militants	from	the	Black	September	Organization—a	faction	
within	the	larger	Palestinian	Liberation	Organization	(PLO)—hijacked	a	Belgian	Sabena	
passenger	jet	en	route	from	Vienna	to	Tel	Aviv,	seeking	to	swap	the	plane’s	passengers	
in	exchange	for	the	release	of	a	hundred	Palestinians	held	in	Israeli	prisons.	After	a	
twenty-three	hour	standoff,	Israeli	commandos	stormed	the	jet;	two	hijackers	and	a	
passenger	perished	in	the	ensuing	gun	battle.22	An	even	bloodier	incident	occurred	on	
May	30,	when	three	Japanese	Red	Army	guerrillas	working	under	the	command	of	the	
Popular	Front	for	the	Liberation	of	Palestine	(PFLP),	a	Marxist-Leninist	PLO	faction,	
fired	machine	guns	and	hurled	hand	grenades	into	a	crowd	at	Tel	Aviv’s	Lod	Airport,	
killing	twenty-six	and	injuring	seventy-eight.23	According	to	historian	Paul	Thomas	
Chamberlin,	after	this	series	of	attacks	“the	Palestinian	armed	struggle…	emerged	as	the	
first	global	resistance	movement,	and	the	PLO	would	soon	be	labeled	as	the	first	group	
to	employ	international	terror	tactics.”24	Acting	Director	Gray	later	recalled	the	period	
after	the	Lod	Airport	massacre,	which	occurred	less	than	a	month	after	he	took	office,	as	
“a	time	of	great	unease	among	all	the	responsible	agencies	in	the	federal	government,”	
when	“international	terrorism	was	a	new	and	fast-growing	phenomenon.”25	
	 In	addition	to	the	problem	of	guerrilla	“terrorism,”	L.	Patrick	Gray	also	faced	
growing	public	concern	over	the	FBI’s	role	in	American	society.	The	FBI’s	public	image	
had	taken	a	serious	beating	since	journalists’	disclosure	of	declassified	surveillance	
documents	from	the	March	1971	Media,	Pennsylvania	burglary.	In	the	wake	of	J.	Edgar	
																																																								
21	Chamberlin,	The	Global	Offensive,	153.	
22	Five	other	passengers	were	wounded	and	Israeli	forces	captured	two	guerrillas.	Ibid.	
23	Seventeen	of	the	dead	were	Puerto	Ricans	on	pilgrimage	to	the	Holy	Land.	Two	of	the	Japanese	Red	
Army	guerrillas	also	died	in	the	attack,	while	the	third,	Kozo	Okamoto,	was	badly	wounded	and	arrested.		
Ibid,	154-156.			
24	Ibid,	153.	
25	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	116.	
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Hoover’s	death,	Americans	from	across	the	political	spectrum	publicly	questioned	the	
FBI’s	integrity	and	competency,	and	called	for	major	reforms,	particularly	in	the	area	of	
domestic	surveillance.	Determined	to	restore	the	FBI’s	popular	legitimacy,	Gray	
instituted	historic	reforms	immediately	after	taking	office.	He	signed	an	order	allowing	
women	to	become	FBI	agents	for	the	first	time	in	the	Bureau’s	history,	formed	an	Equal	
Opportunity	board	to	explore	avenues	for	recruiting	more	minority	special	agents,	and	
enacted	a	new	dress-code	policy	permitting	male	agents	to	grow	longer	hair	and	
mustaches	in	keeping	with	early	1970s’	fashion	trends.26	A	May	15,	1972	Washington	
Post	editorial	conveyed	the	pressure	Gray	faced	as	Hoover’s	successor,	as	critics	
demanded	the	Acting	Director	move	quickly	and	decisively	to	demonstrate	the	FBI’s	
commitment	to	safeguarding	Americans’	civil	liberties.	While	the	editorial	applauded	
Gray’s	hiring	and	dress	code	reforms,	calling	them	“pleasantly	surprising	and	
remarkably	daring,”	it	also	called	upon	Nixon	to	appoint	a	“Presidential	Commission	to	
Study	the	FBI”	to	determine	whether	the	FBI	required	oversight	from	Congress	or	
another	arm	of	the	Executive	Branch.27		
	 Gray	responded	to	the	FBI’s	flagging	image	with	a	public	relations	campaign.	The	
Acting	Director	spent	much	of	his	one-year	term	on	the	road,	visiting	field	offices	and	
giving	public	addresses	throughout	the	country.	Out	in	the	field,	many	special	agents	
welcomed	Gray’s	reforms,	especially	those	of	the	younger	generation,	who	reportedly	
received	his	visits	to	local	field	offices	with	standing	ovations.28	Los	Angeles-based	
																																																								
26	L.	Patrick	Gray,	FBI	Memorandum	4-27,	“Memorandum	to	All	Special	Agents	in	Charge,”	June	7,	1972,	
Gray	FBI	File,	No.	1222537-0-62-118045,	Section	1,	Serial	1.	
27	Washington	Post,	“The	Governance	of	the	FBI,”	May	15,	1972.	
28	Edward	S.	Miller,	oral	history	interview	by	Stanley	A.	Pimentel	on	behalf	of	the	Society	of	Former	
Special	Agents	of	the	FBI,	Inc.,	May	28,	2008,	160.	
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special	agent	Cril	Payne,	who	was	thirty-years-old	at	the	time,	later	recalled	thinking	in	
June	1972,		
It	was	amazing	how	the	entire	tone	of	the	organization	had	changed	since	Pat	
Gray	had	become	Acting	Director.	Agents	were	now	allowed	to	sport	mustaches,	
sideburns,	and	longer	hair.	White	shirts	and	conservative	dark	suits	were	no	
longer	de	rigueur.	Women	were	finally	being	accepted	for	Special	Agent	
positions.	Virtually	all	the	archaic	rules	and	regulations	were	being	reevaluated,	
and	long-overdue	changes	were	being	instituted	daily.29		
	
	 But	not	everyone	welcomed	Gray’s	entrance	into	the	FBI.	Many	senior	FBI	
officials	viewed	Gray	as	an	interloper	and	Nixon	lackey	wholly	unqualified	for	his	
position.	Indeed,	a	journalist	close	to	the	FBI	reported,	“so	tenuous	were	the	links	
between	some	of	the	FBI’s	key	personnel	and	the	Justice	Department	that	in	the	24	
hours	following	the	death	of	Hoover…	several	assistant	directors	of	the	bureau	
seriously	considered	resigning.”30	Gray	averted	a	mutiny	by	meeting	with	Hoover’s	
fifteen	top	assistants	less	than	two	hours	after	his	appointment,	and	ensuring	them	that	
both	he	and	Nixon	intended	to	“maintain	the	FBI	as	an	institution.”31	During	this	
meeting,	Gray	made	a	critical	alliance	with	Felt,	whom	he	promoted	to	Associate	
Director	and	charged	with	the	task	of	running	the	FBI’s	“day-to-day”	operations	while	
he	travelled	the	country.32	After	the	meeting,	Felt	assured	the	press	that	Gray	had	
“made	a	deep	impression	on	the	men,”	and	that	the	officials	had	reconsidered	their	
plans	to	resign.33	
	 Felt	shouldered	much	of	the	Acting	Directors’	responsibilities	throughout	Gray’s	
one-year	term.	Though	he	treated	his	superior	with	courtesy	and	professionalism	in	
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32	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	12.	
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person,	Felt	privately	resented	taking	orders	from	someone	widely	perceived	as	“a	
neophyte	not	only	to	the	FBI,	but	to	the	profession	of	law	enforcement.”34	Like	many	of	
his	colleagues,	Felt	also	perceived	Gray’s	appointment	as	political,	an	attempt	by	Nixon	
to	exert	an	influence	over	the	FBI	that	he	could	never	yield	over	Hoover,	despite	his	
many	attempts.	“Richard	Nixon,”	Felt	asserted,	“wanted	someone	from	the	outside	who	
would	be	his	man,	someone	with	no	ties	and	no	first	loyalties	to	the	FBI.”35	Moreover,	as	
the	FBI’s	number	three	official	under	Hoover	and	the	aging,	sickly	Clyde	Tolson,	Felt	
believed	that	he,	rather	than	Gray,	was	Hoover’s	logical	successor.	As	Felt	recalled,	“I	
was	next	in	line,	my	FBI	record	was	very	good,	and…	I	was	both	liked	and	respected	by	
the	rank	and	file.”36		
	 Felt	seized	the	FBI’s	Watergate	investigation	as	an	opportunity	to	undermine	
both	Gray	and	Nixon.	Nixon’s	“Plumbers”	Howard	Hunt	and	Gordon	Liddy	broke	into	
the	Democratic	National	Committee	headquarters	in	Washington	D.C.’s	Watergate	office	
complex	on	May	28,	1972,	successfully	installing	a	hidden	microphone	in	an	effort	to	
find	out	whether	DNC	Chairman	Larry	O’Brien	possessed	information	that	could	
damage	Nixon’s	reelection	campaign.37	However,	the	microphone	did	not	work,	so	on	
June	17	James	McCord,	Frank	Sturgis,	Bernard	Barker,	Eugenio	Martinez,	and	Vergilio	
Gonzalez	made	a	second	break-in.	This	time	the	operation	went	sour.	Washington	
police	arrested	the	men	inside	the	DNC	headquarters	and	confiscated	the	operatives’	
cameras,	eavesdropping	equipment,	and	large	sum	of	cash,	which	included	thirteen	new	
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35	Ibid,	208.			
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one	hundred	dollar	bills	with	their	serial	numbers	in	sequence.	The	Watergate	break-in	
did	not	initially	make	major	news	headlines,	but	the	FBI	immediately	began	to	
investigate	the	matter.38	Upon	hearing	news	of	the	break-in	while	in	California,	Gray	
called	Felt,	who	provided	a	summary	of	what	the	FBI	then	knew	about	the	arrests.	Gray,	
unaware	of	the	Nixon	administration’s	role	in	the	operation,	ordered	his	Associate	
Director	to	investigate	the	Watergate	break-in	“to	the	hilt.”39	
	 Felt	began	leaking	classified	information	to	the	press	two	days	after	the	
Watergate	arrests.	In	mid-June,	Washington	Post	reporter	Bob	Woodward	phoned	Felt	
looking	for	information	on	Howard	Hunt,	whose	name	appeared	on	two	address	books	
found	on	the	Watergate	burglars.	Woodward	figured	out	that	Hunt	was	a	former	CIA	
agent	and	worked	at	the	White	House	with	Special	Council	Charles	W.	Colson,	but	he	
sought	further	confirmation	before	publishing	a	story	connecting	the	Nixon	staffer	to	
the	break-in.	Felt	gave	Woodward	the	confirmation	he	was	looking	for.	The	FBI	had	
found	a	check	bearing	Hunt’s	name	in	the	Watergate	burglars’	hotel	room,	and	Felt	
informed	Woodward	that	the	FBI	considered	the	former	CIA	operative	a	“prime	
suspect”	in	its	investigation.	The	tip	enabled	Woodward	to	publish	his	first	major	story	
on	the	Watergate	break-in	on	June	26,	1972.40	Circumstantial	evidence	also	ties	Felt	to	
two	more	June	1972	leaks	pertaining	to	the	Watergate	investigation,	one	to	Time	
journalist	Sandy	Smith	and	the	second	to	Washington	Daily	Post	reporter	Patrick	
Collins.41		
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	 While	Felt	simultaneously	oversaw	the	FBI’s	Watergate	investigation	and	leaked	
information	to	the	press,	Nixon	officials	quickly	moved	to	stall	the	Bureau’s	efforts.	The	
day	after	the	Watergate	break-in	arrests,	Nixon’s	Chief	Domestic	Advisor	John	
Ehrlichman	put	White	House	Counsel	John	Dean	in	charge	of	handling	the	cover-up.	
President	Nixon	directly	involved	himself	in	the	cover-up	on	June	23,	after	learning	that	
FBI	investigators	were	close	to	tracing	the	one	hundred	dollar	bills	discovered	on	the	
Watergate	burglars	to	funds	from	a	Nixon	reelection	campaign	donation	laundered	
through	a	Mexican	bank.	In	a	recorded	conversation	that	would	later	become	known	as	
the	“smoking	gun”	tape	that	brought	down	his	presidency,	Nixon	instructed	his	Chief	of	
Staff	H.	R.	Haldeman	to	have	CIA	Director	Richard	Helms	ask	Gray	to	limit	the	FBI’s	
Watergate	investigation	on	the	premise	that	following	the	Mexican	lead	would	uncover	
information	on	the	CIA’s	top	secret	covert	role	in	the	botched	1961	invasion	of	Cuba’s	
Bay	of	Pigs.	Haldeman	and	Ehrichman	subsequently	met	with	Helms	and	CIA	Deputy	
Director	Vernon	Walters,	who	thereafter	called	Gray.42		
	 After	meeting	with	Walters,	the	novice	Acting	Director	agreed	to	limit	the	
investigation	to	the	seven	arrested	men.	Gray	wavered	several	times	over	the	next	
week,	however,	under	pressure	to	please	the	White	House	on	one	hand,	and	Felt	and	
other	FBI	officials	on	the	other,	while	avoiding	giving	the	impression	to	the	press	that	
the	Bureau	was	covering	up	the	Watergate	investigation.	Gray	first	reversed	his	
decision	at	the	request	of	Felt	and	Assistant	Director	Charles	Bates,	and	then	again	
limited	the	investigation	under	orders	from	Dean,	before	deciding	to	move	forward	
with	a	full	investigation	on	July	5	after	the	FBI’s	Watergate	case	agent	Angelo	Lano	
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wrote	a	teletype	complaining	that	Headquarters	was	delaying	his	efforts.43	Gray	also	
agreed	to	provide	Dean	with	documents	pertaining	to	the	FBI’s	Watergate	investigation,	
and	acquiesced	to	Dean’s	request	that	he	destroy	an	envelope	of	classified	documents	
removed	from	the	safe	of	Watergate	burglar	and	Committee	to	Reelect	the	President	
(CREEP)	member	Howard	Hunt.44		
	 Felt’s	personal	motives	can	only	be	inferred.	By	the	time	he	came	forward	as	
Deep	Throat	in	2005,	dementia	had	set	in,	forgoing	any	possibility	that	the	former	
professional	expert	in	deception	could	provide	an	honest	accounting	of	his	motives.	It	is	
clear,	however,	that	Felt	did	not	leak	information	from	the	FBI’s	Watergate	
investigation	because	he	morally	objected	to	illegal	break-ins.	It	is	also	evident	that	Felt	
carried	out	his	actions	in	the	context	of	the	FBI’s	ongoing	institutional	conflict	with	the	
Nixon	White	House.	As	Woodward	recalled	in	his	2005	account	of	his	relationship	with	
the	FBI’s	former	Associate	Director,	Felt	“never	really	voiced	pure,	raw	outrage	to	me	
about	Watergate.”	“The	crimes	and	abuses	were	background	music,”	Woodward	wrote.	
“Nixon	was	trying	to	subvert	not	only	the	law	but	the	Bureau.	Watergate	became	Felt’s	
instrument	to	reassert	the	Bureau’s	independence	and	thus	its	supremacy.”45	Felt’s	
remarks	on	the	television	news	program	Face	the	Nation,	spoken	in	1976	amid	rumors	
of	an	impending	federal	indictment	for	his	authorization	of	the	Weather	Underground	
break-ins,	confirm	Woodward’s	assertion	regarding	Felt’s	beliefs.	Felt	denied	that	he	
was	Deep	Throat,	though	he	stated,	“he	wouldn’t	be	ashamed	to	be.”	“I	think	that	
																																																								
43	Ibid,	50-52.	
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whoever	helped	Woodward	helped	the	country,”	he	explained.	Moreover,	Felt	professed	
a	belief	similar	to	that	held	by	Hoover,	that	the	FBI	functioned	best	when	autonomous	
from	the	influence	of	partisan	politics.	“I	think	that	the	Justice	Department	should	be	a	
completely	independent	department,	completely	removed	from	politics,”	he	argued.	
“The	positions	should	all	be	career	positions,	then	the	FBI	and	the	other	Bureaus	in	the	
Department	of	Justice	would	be	under	a	career	type	individual	and	not	under	a	
politician.”46	
	 Whatever	Felt’s	personal	motives,	his	leaks	demonstrated	to	both	Gray	and	the	
Nixon	administration	that	the	Acting	Director	had	little	control	over	the	FBI.	
Throughout	the	summer	John	Dean	repeatedly	complained	to	both	Gray	and	Felt	about	
information	reported	in	the	press	that	he	believed	came	from	the	FBI.	Meanwhile	in	the	
White	House,	Nixon	and	his	top	aides	questioned	Gray’s	ability	to	exert	control	over	the	
FBI.	On	August	1,	in	a	conversation	with	Haldeman,	Nixon	expressed	his	doubts	about	
Gray’s	ability	to	lead	the	FBI.	At	this	point	Nixon	and	his	aides	were	confident	that	a	
series	of	bribes	and	other	obstructions	had	successfully	limited	the	FBI’s	investigation	
to	the	Watergate	burglars,	and	that	their	trial	would	not	take	place	until	after	the	
November	election.	However,	the	President	worried	that	Gray	was	unable	to	control	the	
FBI.	“I	don’t	believe	that	we	oughta	have	Gray	in	that	job,”	he	told	his	Chief	of	Staff.47	
	 Gray	struggled	to	manage	the	Watergate	investigation	while	unaware	of	Felt’s	
resentments	and	duplicitous	activities.	At	the	same	time,	top	officials	within	the	FBI	
urged	the	Acting	Director	to	reauthorize	illegal	surveillance	tactics	to	combat	leftist	
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violence.	During	Gray’s	first	two	weeks	in	office,	for	example,	Assistant	Director	for	
Domestic	Security	Edward	S.	Miller	asked	his	superior	to	reinstitute	wiretaps,	
microphones,	and	mail	covers.	Miller,	a	Hoover	loyalist	who	participated	in	black	bag	
jobs	against	Communist	Party	members	during	the	1950s,	confirmed	to	Gray	that	the	
FBI	maintained	eight	warrantless	wiretaps	on	individuals	suspected	of	involvement	in	
revolutionary	violence,	all	of	them	targeting	either	the	Black	Panther	Party	or	alleged	
Weather	Underground	associates.	FBI	agents	in	New	York	were	also	opening	and	
tracking	the	mail	of	individuals	suspected	of	providing	aboveground	support	to	the	
Weather	Underground.	According	to	Gray,	Miller	wanted	to	drastically	expand	the	FBI’s	
usage	of	restricted	surveillance	techniques.	“I	could	use	sixty-five	taps,	thirty-three	
microphones,	and	seventy	mail	covers,”	Miller	supposedly	said.48		
	 Miller	sought	additional	surveillance	ahead	of	the	Democratic	and	Republican	
National	Conventions,	scheduled	for	June	and	August	1972,	respectfully,	both	of	them	
booked	to	take	place	in	Miami.	After	violence	marred	the	1968	Democratic	National	
Convention	in	Chicago,	FBI	officials	were	anxious	to	prevent	a	repeat	scenario	at	either	
party’s	1972	Convention,	particularly	the	Republican’s,	which	Miller	predicted	would	
draw	more	“power	and	fire”	due	to	popular	opposition	to	Nixon’s	prolonging	of	the	war	
in	Vietnam.49	Miller	informed	Gray	that	eight	percent	of	the	FBI’s	2,100	“domestic	
security”	informants	would	be	attending	the	Republican	Convention.	In	keeping	with	
longstanding	practices,	the	FBI	focused	on	preventing	violence	by	protesters	while	
implicitly	condoning	police	violence	through	their	silence	on	the	matter.	Miller	
especially	wanted	surveillance	on	VVAW,	which	over	the	past	year	had	become	a	top	
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target	of	the	FBI’s	domestic	surveillance	targets	under	the	“Internal	Security—
Revolutionary	Activities”	category,	designated	for	groups	the	Bureau	deemed	prone	to	
violence.50			
	 Gray	declined	to	approve	Miller’s	request	for	electronic	and	mail	surveillance	
after	speaking	with	Assistant	Attorney	General	Henry	Peterson,	who	advised	that	such	a	
request	would	never	hold	up	in	court.51	Though	he	sought	to	prevent	revolutionary	
violence,	Gray	was	also	sensitive	to	popular	scrutiny	of	FBI	surveillance	practices,	and	
reluctant	to	approve	tactics	that	could	damage	the	Bureau’s	legitimacy	if	revealed	to	the	
public.	The	Acting	Director	did,	however,	approve	Miller’s	request	to	order	L.A.	
undercover	agents	who	had	infiltrated	VVAW	to	participate	in	a	cross-country	caravan	
of	activists	heading	to	the	summer	1972	Democratic	and	Republican	Conventions.52	
None	of	the	longhaired,	bearded	agents	whom	the	Los	Angeles	field	office	had	
unofficially	sent	undercover	approximately	two	years	earlier	had	yet	infiltrated	an	
underground	guerrilla	cell	or	prevented	revolutionary	violence.	Nor	had	they	
uncovered	evidence	of	VVAW	members	plotting	violent	attacks.	Nonetheless,	Gray	
viewed	the	use	of	undercover	agents	as	promising,	and	lacked	Hoover’s	aversion	to	the	
tactic	on	grounds	that	it	violated	the	FBI’s	traditional	dress	code	and	put	agents	in	
harms	way.		
																																																								
50	Ibid,	57.	According	to	a	1975	FBI	letter	to	the	Church	Committee,	the	FBI	opened	its	investigation	of	
VVAW	in	August	1971	in	order	to	“determine	the	extent	of	control	over	VVAW	by	subversive	groups	
and/or	violence-prone	elements	in	the	antiwar	movement.”	Church	Committee,	Book	III,	239,	footnote	
33.	
51	Gray	wrote	in	his	memoir	that	Miller	identified	the	VVAW	as	“very	anti-government	and	terroristic,”	
and	one	of	many	leftist	organizations	secretly	“sheltering	terrorists	and	revolutionaries.”	He	also	recalled	
that	Peterson’s	feedback	“helped	reinforce	my	own	preference	for	increased	live	informant	and	
undercover	special	agent	activity	in	the	domestic	terrorism	arena.”	Contemporary	FBI	documents,	
however,	did	not	frequently	use	the	term	terrorist	in	referring	to	VVAW	and	its	members.	More	typically,	
the	FBI	identified	VVAW	members	as	“violence	prone”	and	“extremists.”	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	57.		
52	Payne,	Deep	Cover,	44.	
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	 Gray’s	authorization	of	the	FBI’s	surveillance	of	VVAW	was	not	merely	for	the	
purported	aim	of	preventing	violence.	Evidence	from	oral	histories,	contemporary	
newspaper	articles,	and	sworn	testimonies	indicates	that	the	Bureau	thoroughly	
infiltrated	VVAW	chapters	throughout	the	country	with	paid	informants,	some	of	whom	
acted—either	independently	or	at	the	urging	of	their	handlers—as	agent	provocateurs,	
attempting	to	convince	others	in	the	group	to	partake	in	acts	of	revolutionary	
violence.53	VVAW	members	throughout	the	country	also	endured	regular	surveillance	
by	plainclothes	officers	and	arrests	by	local	police	on	questionable	pretexts.54	In	
addition,	VVAW	was	a	target	of	the	Committee	to	Reelect	the	President	(CREEP),	a	
group	whose	members	John	Mitchell,	Jeb	Stuart	Magruder,	G.	Gordon	Libby,	and	E.	
Howard	Hunt	later	served	prison	sentences	for	their	involvement	in	the	Watergate	
Scandal.	Prior	to	the	1972	Republican	Convention,	Liddy	and	Magruder	discussed	ideas	
for	covertly	disrupting	VVAW	or	using	the	group	to	publicly	embarrass	the	McGovern	
campaign.	Pablo	Manuel	Fernandez,	a	paid	informant	with	links	to	Watergate	burglary	
mastermind	Howard	Hunt,	also	attempted	to	sell	hand	grenades,	machine-guns,	and	
other	weapons	to	VVAW	members	ahead	of	the	Miami	convention,	though	the	antiwar	
veterans	turned	him	down.55		
	 The	fact	that	VVAW	members	declined	Fernandez’s	weapons	offer	seems	to	
confirm	an	account	from	Cril	Payne,	one	of	the	Los	Angeles	“deep	cover”	agents	who	
infiltrated	the	group	during	its	cross-country	caravan	to	the	Miami	Republican	
Convention.	Payne	contented	that	contrary	to	FBI	officials’	claims,	VVAW	members	
																																																								
53	Andrew	E.	Hunt,	The	Turning:	A	History	of	Vietnam	Veterans	Against	the	War	(New	York:	New	York	
University	Press,	1999),	149.	
54	Ibid,	150.		
55	Ibid,	151.	
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were	not	violence	prone.	“After	eating,	sleeping,	rapping,	and	traveling	with	these	
veterans,	what	was	my	colleagues’	collective	impression?	It	was	not	what	I	expected,”	
Payne	recalled.	“According	to	the	agents,	whose	opinions	I	highly	respected,	the	VVAW	
members	they	had	traveled	with	had	no	intention	of	promoting	violent	confrontations.	
My	friends	had	reached	the	conclusion,	based	on	their	personal	experiences,	that	the	
Bureau	was	totally	wrong	in	its	assessment	of	this	group.”	56	
	 More	research	in	the	more	than	20,000	pages	of	FBI	files	on	VVAW	is	needed	in	
order	to	determine	the	motives	and	nature	of	the	Bureau’s	investigation	of	the	group.57	
It	is	clear,	however,	that	Gray’s	reasons	for	investigating	VVAW	went	beyond	supposed	
violence	prevention.	On	May	31,	1972,	less	than	a	month	into	his	term,	Gray	provided	
President	Nixon	with	intelligence	on	links	between	VVAW	and	the	McGovern	campaign.	
Gray	wrote	confidential	memos	to	Assistant	to	the	President	H.R.	Haldeman	and	
Attorney	General	Mitchell	stating	that	an	unnamed	representative	of	the	McGovern	
campaign	had	attended	a	VVAW	meeting	in	Los	Angeles	and	agreed	to	lend	a	station	
wagon	leased	by	McGovern’s	campaign	committee	to	VVAW	members	for	the	purpose	
of	“barnstorming”	California	college	campuses	to	“voice	opposition	to	the	Vietnam	
War.”58	Though	the	document	did	not	explicitly	say,	this	information	likely	came	from	
the	Bureau’s	undercover	agents	in	VVAW.59	By	providing	the	president	with	
																																																								
56	Payne,	Deep	Cover,	84.	
57	The	VVAW	FBI	files	are	currently	available	electronically	on	a	website	maintained	by	opponents	of	the	
organization	and	its	former	member	John	Kerry:	
http://www.wintersoldier.com/staticpages/index.php?page=20040518192545112	(accessed	October	
23,	2015).	Among	other	things,	more	information	is	needed	on	the	relationship	between	the	FBI’s	
investigation	and	operations	carried	out	by	local	police,	CREEP,	and	other	federal	intelligence	agencies.	
58	FBI	liaison,	L.	Patrick	Gray	to	H.R.	Haldeman,	May	31,	1972;	LBG	FBI,	File	No.	1222537-0-62-118045,	
Section	1,	Serial	1.	
59	The	Bureau	hid	the	existence	of	its	top-secret	undercover	operations	against	VVAW	by	referring	to	its	
undercover	agents	as	informants	within	its	memos.	
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information	that	could	be	used	to	smear	an	election	opponent,	Gray	demonstrated	his	
willingness	to	use	FBI	surveillance	in	the	service	of	Nixon’s	partisan	political	objectives.		
	 Top	FBI	officials	also	urged	Gray	to	reauthorize	break-ins	during	his	first	four	
months	in	office.	In	his	memoir,	Gray	acknowledged,	“people	both	inside	the	Bureau	
and	from	other	agencies…	urged	me	to	reinstate	the	capability	for	[the	FBI’s	black	bag	
job]	use	in	nondomestic	operations.”60	Miller	later	recalled	that	Gray	also	discussed	the	
option	of	using	black	bag	jobs	in	domestic	operations	against	the	Weather	Underground	
and	similar	groups.	Miller	claimed	to	have	informed	Gray	early	on	that	break-ins,	in	
addition	to	undercover	operations,	were	the	best	hope	for	locating	and	capturing	
clandestine	Weather	Underground	fugitives.	In	addition,	Miller	said	that	Special	Agents	
in	Charge	of	the	field	offices	around	the	country	whom	Gray	visited	during	his	first	
months	in	office	also	implored	the	Acting	Director	to	reauthorize	surreptitious	
entries.61	Neither	Miller	nor	Felt,	however,	informed	Gray	that	agents	in	New	York,	Los	
Angeles,	Seattle,	San	Francisco,	Portland,	and	Phoenix	had	already	been	conducting	
unauthorized	break-ins	in	search	of	leads	in	the	WEATHFUG	investigation.62			
	 Meanwhile,	field	agents	investigating	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	leftist	
guerrilla	groups	felt	tremendous	pressure	to	apprehend	revolutionary	fugitives	using	
																																																								
60	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	115.	
61	Miller	oral	history,	May	28,	2008,	159-160.	
62	FBI,	8/24/1976,	untitled	summary	of	interview	with	anonymous	(name	redacted)	Detroit	special	
agent,	Gray	FBI	File,	File	Number	1222537-0-62-118045,	Section	8,	Serial	1;	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	114-
115;	Miller	oral	history	interview,	161.	Associate	Director	W.	Mark	Felt	claimed	that	Gray	verbally	
authorized	break-ins	prior	to	the	September	1972	Munich	massacre.	In	his	1979	memoir,	Felt	asserted	
that	on	July	18,	1972,	the	Acting	Director	wrote	him	a	note	regarding	the	Weather	Underground	
investigation	that	stated,	“Hunt	to	Exhaustion.	No	Holds	Barred.”	Felt	also	claimed	that	in	a	second	note	
written	a	short	time	later,	Gray	said	“I	want	no	holds	barred	and	I	want	to	hunt	Weatherman	and	similar	
groups	to	exhaustion.”		Furthermore,	Felt	asserted	that	around	this	same	time,	Gray	ordered	top	FBI	
officials	to	“survey	the	feasibility	of	reinstituting	FBI	participation”	in	surreptitious	entries.	Felt	
purported	to	believe	that	Gray	made	these	orders	under	the	direction	of	the	Nixon	White	House,	which	he	
claimed	wanted	the	new	Acting	Director	to	“implement	portions	of	the	Huston	Plan.”	No	other	evidence	
supports	Felt’s	claims,	however.	See	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	324,	326.	
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any	means	at	their	disposal.	Miller	recalled	that	many	field	officers	and	their	agents	
interpreted	Gray’s	repeated	orders	that	agents	hunt	leftist	guerrillas	“to	exhaustion”	as	
signals	to	continue	use	of	such	tactics.63	A	special	agent	who	headed	the	Weather	
Underground	investigation	in	the	FBI’s	Detroit	office	confirmed	Miller’s	assertion.	In	
August	1972,	WEATHFUG	agents	from	around	the	country	met	in	Washington	for	a	
“Weatherman	In-Service”	to	discuss	and	coordinate	their	nationwide	investigation.64	In	
the	FBI	document	describing	the	conference,	the	name	of	the	Detroit	agent	is	redacted,	
but	his	testimony	nonetheless	attests	to	the	climate	of	pressure	and	uncertainty	that	
pervaded	the	WEATHFUG	investigation	during	Gray’s	first	four	months	in	office.65	
According	to	the	Detroit	agent,	investigators	at	the	conference	discussed	the	fact	that	
agents	from	several	field	offices	were	engaging	in	break-ins,	but	disagreed	over	
whether	or	not	the	tactic	should	be	used,	and	sought	approval	for	the	tactic	from	FBI	
headquarters.	The	agent	also	recalled	that	some	agents	on	leftist	guerrilla	assignments	
resorted	to	using	“suicide	bugs”—warrantless	electronic	wiretaps	or	hidden	
microphones	applied	without	authorization,	for	which	“if	you	got	caught	you	were	on	
your	own.”66	Under	intense	pressure	from	FBI	headquarters	to	apprehend	guerrilla	
fugitives,	but	lacking	clear	guidelines	on	how	to	do	so,	local	Special	Agents	in	Charge	
and	their	field	agents	weighed	the	advantages	and	drawbacks	of	utilizing	illegal	
surveillance	practices	in	regard	to	efficacy,	ethics,	legality,	and	their	future	careers.	
																																																								
63	Miller	oral	history,	160-161.	
64	Payne,	Deep	Cover,	138.	
65	FBI,	8/24/1976,	untitled	summary	of	interview	with	Detroit	special	agent.	FBI	agents	gathered	this	
individual’s	testimony	in	1976	as	the	Justice	Department	prepared	indictments	against	Gray,	Felt,	Miller	
and	other	Bureau	officials	and	agents	involved	in	break-ins	and	other	illegal	surveillance	tactics	during	
the	Weather	Underground	investigation.	
66	FBI,	8/24/1976,	untitled	summary	of	interview	with	Detroit	special	agent.			
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	 Gray	avoided	reauthorizing	black	bag	jobs	prior	to	the	Munich	attacks	for	the	
same	reason	that	Hoover	refused	to	reinstitute	the	practice:	he	believed	the	potential	
negative	ramifications	of	the	public	learning	about	the	FBI’s	use	of	the	illegal	tactic	
outweighed	any	investigative	benefits	to	be	gained	through	its	use.	The	Supreme	
Court’s	June	19,	1972	decision	in	the	Keith	case—delivered	two	days	after	the	second	
Watergate	break-in—played	into	Gray’s	calculation.	The	case	came	from	Eastern	
Michigan,	where	federal	district	Judge	Damon	Keith	ruled	that	Attorney	General	John	
Mitchell	could	not	withhold	evidence	of	FBI	warrantless	wiretaps	in	the	federal	
government’s	case	against	Lawrence	“Pun”	Plamondon,	the	former	White	Panther	
leader	and	Ten	Most	Wanted	fugitive	charged	with	dynamiting	an	Ann	Arbor	CIA	office	
in	1968.	In	its	first	ever	decision	on	warrantless	wiretapping,	the	Supreme	Court	
unanimously	rebuked	Mitchell’s	argument	that	his	approval	of	warrantless	FBI	taps	on	
Plamondon’s	phone	were	legal	under	the	Omnibus	Crime	Bill	of	1968	on	the	grounds	
that	the	surveillance	“gather[ed]	intelligence	information	deemed	necessary	to	protect	
the	nation	from	attempts	of	domestic	organizations	to	attack	and	subvert	the	existing	
form	of	Government.”67	Recent	Nixon	appointee	Justice	Lewis	Powell	delivered	the	
Court’s	decision.	“The	issue	before	us	in	an	important	one	for	our	people	and	their	
Government,”	he	wrote.	“It	involves	the	delicate	question	of	the	President’s	power,	
acting	through	the	Attorney	General,	to	authorize	electronic	surveillance	in	internal	
security	measures	without	prior	judicial	approval.”68	Powell	announced	that	such	
authority,	which	Attorneys	General	had	authorized	without	Congressional	or	judicial	
oversight	since	the	Roosevelt	administration,	was	illegal	under	the	Fourth	Amendment	
																																																								
67	United	States	v.	U.S.	District	Court	(also	known	as	the	Keith	case),	407	U.S.	297	(1972).	
68	Ibid.	
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of	the	Constitution,	which	outlawed	warrantless	searches	and	seizures.69	In	his	memoir,	
Gray	wrote	that	Attorney	General	Kleindeinst	ordered	the	FBI	to	drop	four	warrantless	
wiretaps	and	two	microphones	targeting	the	Black	Panthers	and	suspected	Weather	
Underground	associates	three	days	after	the	Court’s	decision.70	Why	did	Gray	not	seek	a	
warrant	for	the	wiretaps?	He	did	not	say,	but	it	could	be	that	the	FBI	either	lacked	solid	
evidence	or	had	gained	its	evidence	through	break-ins	or	other	illegal	surveillance	
tactics.	
	 Prior	to	the	Munich	attack,	Gray’s	most	significant	new	measure	to	combat	
guerrilla	violence	was	his	authorization	of	undercover	agents,	a	first	in	FBI	history.	On	
July	24,	1972,	in	a	coded	teletype	sent	to	seventeen	field	offices,	Gray	stressed	the	extra	
secrecy	and	“extreme	importance”	of	under	cover	operations	aimed	at	leftist	guerilla	
groups:		
I	expect	Weatherman	and	similar	groups	to	be	hunted	to	exhaustion.	This	can	
only	be	done	by	utilization	of	sufficient	manpower	and	penetration	into	the	
underground	by	informants	and	agents	where	warranted.	You	are	reminded	of	
the	two	objectives	to	be	achieved	in	these	cases:	one,	short-range,	the	immediate	
apprehension	of	the	fugitives	and	two,	long-range,	penetration	and	
neutralization	of	the	underground	apparatus.71	
	
A	couple	weeks	later,	FBI	Headquarters	hosted	a	national	conference	for	agents	
working	the	WEATHFUG	investigation	(participants	informally	called	the	meeting	the	
“Weathermen	In-Service”),	in	which	the	Domestic	Security	Division	announced	the	
formation	of	the	top	secret	Special	Target	Informant	Development	Program	(SPECTAR)	
dedicated	to	developing	undercover	agents	and	new	informants	capable	of	infiltrating	
																																																								
69	Ibid.	
70	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	62.	
71	FBI	teletype	printed	in	Payne,	Deep	Cover,	76.	
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the	clandestine	Weather	Underground.72	SPECTAR	formalized	a	practice	that	had	been	
going	on	since	August	1970,	including	in	Los	Angeles,	where	“deep	cover”	agents	had	
infiltrated	VVAW.	In	his	memoir,	Gray	recalled	that	he	authorized	“carefully	selected	
young	special	agents”	to	go	undercover	on	a	fulltime	basis,	“to	live	with	these	people	
[leftist	guerrillas],	to	sleep	with	these	people,	to	make	love	to	women	if	necessary,	to	
smoke	marijuana	if	necessary.”73	None	of	the	FBI’s	deep	cover	agents	ever	infiltrated	a	
leftist	guerrilla	cell,	however,	despite	fully	adopting	the	counterculture	lifestyle	and	
affinity	for	marijuana	and	LSD.74		
	 During	Gray’s	first	four	months	in	office,	the	Keith	decision,	along	with	
heightened	public	concerns	over	civil	liberties	and	FBI	surveillance	practices	prompted	
the	Acting	Director	to	resist	Miller	and	other	Bureau	officials’	calls	to	reinstitute	illegal	
surveillance	techniques.	Gray	later	acknowledged	that	his	“preference	for	increased	live	
informant	and	undercover	special	agent	activity	in	the	domestic	terrorism	arena”	was	
based	partially	on	concerns	that	the	FBI’s	use	of	warrantless	wiretapping	and	other	
illegal	surveillance	tactics	would	not	stand	in	court.75	Gray’s	position	changed,	however,	
after	Munich.	
	 		
The	Munich	Siege	and	FBI	Break-Ins	
The	Munich	Olympics	attack	was	a	critical	moment	in	FBI	Associate	Director	W.	Mark	
Felt’s	simultaneous	war	on	leftist	guerrillas	and	covert	campaign	to	undermine	L.	
Patrick	Gray	and	the	Nixon	administration.	The	atmosphere	of	panic	wrought	by	Black	
																																																								
72	Payne,	Deep	Cover,	141.	
73	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	121.	
74	Ibid.	
75	Ibid,	57.	
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September’s	siege	provided	Felt	and	Miller	with	an	opportunity	to	authorize	the	Dallas	
Arab	Information	Center	break-in	on	their	own,	without	Gray’s	knowledge.	Two	weeks	
later,	the	Nixon	administration	formed	the	Cabinet	Committee	to	Combat	Terrorism	
(CCCT),	and	designated	the	FBI	as	the	sole	federal	agency	responsible	for	responding	to	
terrorist	attacks	inside	the	United	States.	Under	intense	White	House	pressure	to	
prevent	terrorism,	Gray	was	forced	to	respond	to	Felt’s	maneuver.	Gray	could	have	
chosen	to	sanction	Felt	and	Miller	for	breaking	the	law	without	his	approval.	However,	
such	a	move	would	have	revealed	his	lack	of	control	over	the	FBI’s	daily	operations,	and	
risked	undermining	his	standing	with	both	Nixon	and	his	FBI	agents.	Instead,	Gray	
chose	an	option	that	allowed	him	to	save	face,	maintaining	a	façade	of	leadership	while	
Felt	effectively	ran	the	Bureau.	Immediately	after	his	first	meeting	with	the	CCCT,	Gray	
retroactively	reauthorized	the	FBI’s	use	of	black	bag	jobs	for	“terrorism”	investigations	
and	took	full	credit	for	the	decision.	
	 The	FBI’s	Arab	Information	Center	break-ins	have	never	received	the	type	of	
scrutiny	afforded	to	the	Weather	Underground	black	bag	jobs,	primarily	because	the	
Justice	Department	never	indicted	Gray,	Felt,	or	Miller	for	authorizing	them.76	The	few	
popular	accounts	of	the	FBI’s	post-Munich	operations	against	Arab	targets	came	from	
Gray	and	Felt,	who	both	publicly	claimed	that	the	Dallas	break-in	and	subsequent	
																																																								
76	One	reason	the	Justice	Department	did	not	charge	the	FBI	officials	in	relation	to	these	operations	is	
because	officials	considered	the	Arab	Information	Center	break-in	to	be	targeting	a	“foreign”	source	(as	
opposed	to	the	domestic	Weather	Underground),	so	the	illegality	of	the	operation	seemed	less	egregious.	
Moreover,	the	Weather	Underground	black-bag	job	indictments	came	partially	in	response	to	lawsuits	
from	individuals	targeted	by	the	break-ins;	Arabs	and	Arab	Americans	targeted	by	the	FBI	launched	no	
such	suits.	The	Justice	Department	officials	also	may	have	taken	FBI’s	account	of	the	operation	at	face	
value.	If	they	did	question	the	FBI,	Attorney	General	Griffin	Bell	and	his	staff	may	have	chose	to	focus	on	
the	Weather	Underground-related	indictments	because	prosecuting	on	the	Arab	Information	Center	
break-in	would	have	potentially	required	difficult	discovery	hearings	involving	classified	intelligence	
reports	on	“foreign	terrorists,”	and	could	have	risked	greater	public	backlash.	Racist	anti-Arab	fears	may	
have	also	played	into	the	Justice	Department’s	decision.	
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operations	were	crucial	to	thwarting	a	bloody	Palestinian	nationalist	terrorist	attack	in	
the	United	States.	Both	men	unapologetically	argued	that	although	the	FBI’s	tactics	
were	illegal,	they	were	justified	because	they	protected	American	citizens	and	national	
security	from	foreign	terrorist	violence.	In	his	1976	“Face	the	Nation”	interview,	Felt	
justified	the	Weather	Underground	break-ins	by	pointing	to	the	supposed	success	of	the	
Dallas	operation.	“The	Palestinian	Liberation	Organization,”	Felt	claimed,	was	“planning	
on	all	sorts	of	terrorism	in	the	United	States,	and	I	think	we	stopped	them	because	we	
took	that	action.”77	Felt	made	such	claims	again	in	his	1979	memoir,	contending	that	the	
FBI’s	Dallas	black-bag	job	and	subsequent	campaign	of	interviewing,	fingerprinting,	and	
photographing	the	men	on	the	list	uncovered	in	the	break-in	convinced	“foreign	
terrorists”	that	“the	FBI	was	all-knowing	and	ever-present,”	and	“ended	the	Palestinian	
terrorist	threat	of	hijacking,	massacres,	and	bombings	in	the	United	States.”78	Similarly,	
Gray	claimed	in	his	2005	memoir	that	the	FBI	“harassed…	dozens	of	Al	Fatah	
assassins…	out	of	the	country	by	knocking	on	their	doors	and	saying	we	wanted	to	
fingerprint	them.”	“Though	it	was	clearly	illegal,”	he	wrote,	“the	niceties	of	due	process	
weren’t	applied;	nobody	in	the	intelligence	community,	the	Justice	Department,	or	the	
White	House	was	willing	to	risk	the	time	that	might	allow	one	of	them	to	slip	free	and	
commit	the	atrocity	he	was	here	for.”79		
	 Many	details	surrounding	the	post-Munich	FBI	break-ins	and	Gray’s	
reauthorization	of	the	practice	remain	unknown.	Did	Gray	verbally	approved	break-ins	
solely	for	use	against	supposed	Arab	“terrorists,”	or	did	he	also	approve	the	measures	
																																																								
77	Felt,	“Face	the	Nation.”	
78	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	Inside,	325-326.			
79	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	114-115.		
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for	use	in	the	Weather	Underground	investigation?	And	what	prompted	the	Dallas	field	
office	to	initiate	the	Arab	Information	Center	break-in?	Did	FBI	Headquarters	send	a	
message	to	field	offices	after	the	Munich	siege	calling	for	measures	to	preempt	the	
possibility	of	a	similar	deadly	attack	in	the	U.S.?	These	questions	remain	unanswered	
partly	because	FBI	personnel	deliberately	kept	written	records	of	the	break-ins	
minimal,	limiting	most	of	their	communication	on	the	matter	to	verbal	exchanges	in	
order	to	avoid	self-incrimination.	To	make	matters	worse,	FBI	agents	destroyed	most	of	
the	documentation	that	did	exist	in	1976	when	the	Justice	Department	began	to	
investigate	the	FBI’s	involvement	in	the	practice.	Moreover,	Gray,	Felt,	and	Miller	all	left	
differing,	contradictory	accounts	of	who	authorized	the	break-ins,	when,	and	under	
what	conditions,	not	surprising	since	all	three	men	faced	legal	consequences	for	their	
actions.	In	1978,	the	Justice	Department	indicted	the	trio	for	authorizing	the	illegal	
Weather	Underground	break-ins.	A	federal	jury	convicted	Felt	and	Miller	in	1980,	but	a	
judge	dropped	the	charges	against	Gray,	who	maintained	that	he	had	authorized	the	
black	bag	jobs	targeting	foreign	“Arab	terrorists,”	but	not	the	operations	targeting	the	
domestic	Weather	Underground.	Felt	and	Miller	nonetheless	insisted	that	Gray	had	
verbally	authorized	break-ins	against	both	targets.80		
	 Despite	lingering	questions,	a	careful	side-by-side	reading	of	Gray,	Felt,	and	
Miller’s	memoirs	and	interviews	casts	light	on	the	role	each	man	played	in	
reauthorizing	the	break-ins.	These	personal	accounts	are	especially	illuminating	when	
analyzed	in	conjunction	with	a	series	of	thirteen	short	memos	Miller	wrote	to	Felt	
authorizing	break-ins	in	the	months	after	the	Munich	attack,	sources	that	are	available	
																																																								
80	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	Inside,	326;	Miller	oral	history,160.	
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in	Gray’s	FBI	Director’s	file	amid	other	documents	released	to	his	attorneys	through	the	
discovery	process	during	his	late	1970s	legal	battle.81	Miller	wrote	the	memos	as	part	of	
a	system	he	and	Felt	devised	after	the	Munich	Massacre,	in	which	Miller	kept	a	record	of	
break-ins	that	Felt	verbally	authorized.	Pursuant	to	their	secret	agreement,	Miller	
referred	to	the	break-ins	in	writing	as	“contact	with	an	anonymous	source”	and	marked	
the	memos	with	a	“Do	Not	File”	caption	reminding	Felt	to	store	the	documents	in	a	
secret	location	outside	the	FBI’s	official	filing	system.82	On	September	7,	1972,	Miller	
captioned	the	first	of	these	memos	“Al	Fatah;	IS	–	Middle	East,”	indicating	that	the	
operation	was	part	of	an	FBI	internal	security	investigation	of	Fatah,	the	largest	faction	
of	the	PLO,	led	by	Yasir	Arafat,	from	which	the	Black	September	Organization	had	
recently	split.83	The	September	7	memo	demonstrates	that	Felt	and	Miller	approved	the	
Dallas	break-in	two	weeks	before	Gray	met	with	Nixon’s	CCCT	and	verbally	
reauthorized	the	FBI’s	use	of	black	bag	jobs.	However,	there	is	no	evidence	that	the	
FBI’s	use	of	this	illegal	surveillance	tactic	thwarted	a	Palestinian	nationalist	attack	in	
the	United	States.		
	 The	FBI	conducted	the	Dallas	Arab	Information	Center	break-in	not	because	they	
possessed	evidence	of	an	impending	terrorist	attack	in	the	United	States,	but	as	an	act	
of	preventative	surveillance	intended	to	preempt	the	possibility	of	such	an	event.	As	
Felt	wrote	in	his	1979	memoir,	he	and	Miller	authorized	the	Dallas	supervisor’s	request	
for	“permission	to	make	a	surreptitious	entry	into	the	offices	of	a	suspected	Palestinian	
																																																								
81	All	thirteen	of	the	Miller	to	Felt	break-in	memos	are	available	in	the	LPG	FBI,	File	No.	1222537-0-62-
118045,	Section	8,	Serial	1.	
82	Miller	to	Felt,	“Al	Fatah;	Internal	Security—Middle	East,”	September	7,	1972,	Gray	FBI	File.	Gray	
explained	Felt	and	Miller’s	communication	and	filing	arrangement	in	In	Nixon’s	Web,	121;	Miller	offered	
additional	explanation	in	his	oral	history,	161,	163.	
83	Miller	to	Felt,	“Al	Fatah;	Internal	Security—Middle	East,”	September	7,	1972.	On	Black	September’s	
split	from	Fatah,	see	Chamberlin,	The	Global	Offensive,	149.	
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terrorist	group	to	learn	of	any	terrorist	plans	for	the	United	States	and	to	identify	any	
possible	terrorists	who	were	residing	here.”84	Felt’s	account	is	consistent	with	the	
Miller’s	September	7	memo,	which	stated,	
On	9/7/72	Security	Supervisor	[name	redacted]	Dallas	Office,	telephonically	
contacted	Bureau	Supervisor	[name	redacted]	and	requested	authorization	to	
contact	an	anonymous	source	in	connection	with	captioned	matter	[Al	Fatah]	at	
the	Arab	Information	Center,	Suite	1302,	Hartford	Building,	400	North	St.	Paul,	
Dallas,	Texas.	He	assured	that	such	contact	could	be	accomplished	with	full	
security.	I	was	advised	of	the	Dallas	request	during	the	course	of	this	telephone	
call	by	Supervisor	McDonnell	and	authorized	the	contact	of	an	anonymous	
source	provided	full	security	was	assured.85		
	
Dallas	FBI	agents	determined	they	could	break-in	to	the	Arab	Information	Center	
without	getting	caught	because	the	organization’s	director,	Dr.	Seif	El-Wadi	Ramahi,	
was	out	of	the	country	on	his	honeymoon.86	Because	local	FBI	offices	rarely	initiated	
unusual	actions	independently,	it	is	likely	that	the	Dallas	field	office	requested	
permission	to	conduct	the	break-in	in	response	to	a	request	from	FBI	Headquarters,	
whether	a	direct	request	for	specific	information	on	the	Arab	Information	Center,	or	a	
general	request	to	multiple	field	offices	for	intelligence	on	possible	terrorist	attacks.	
There	is	no	documentary	evidence	to	determine	this,	though	a	journalist	with	sources	
on	the	Church	Committee	reported	in	1975	that	the	FBI	had	acted	at	the	request	of	the	
																																																								
84	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	Inside,	325.	Felt’s	account	of	the	Arab	Information	Center	operation,	despite	
explaining	the	motives	behind	the	Dallas	field	office’s	break-in	request,	contains	an	important	inaccuracy.	
Felt	contended	that	a	lower-level	Domestic	Security	Division	official	at	FBI	Headquarters	authorized	the	
Dallas	supervisor’s	request,	and	that	he,	Miller,	and	Gray	only	learned	of	the	operation	after	it	was	a	“fait	
accompli.”	Miller’s	September	7,	1972	memo	to	Felt	belies	this	claim,	however,	demonstrating	that	both	
men	authorized	the	Dallas	field	office	request.	Felt	likely	made	this	claim	in	his	memoir	as	part	of	his	
efforts	to	resist	the	Justice	Department’s	efforts	to	convict	him	for	his	role	in	authorizing	the	Weather	
Underground	break-ins.		
85	Miller	to	Felt,	“Al	Fatah;	Internal	Security—Middle	East,”	September	7,	1972.	
86	Horrock,	“New	Senate	Panel	May	Study	F.B.I.	Drive	on	Arab	Terrorism.”		
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CIA,	which	was	“following	up	on	intelligence	received	from	foreign	governments,”	likely	
Israel.87	
	 Regardless	of	who	initiated	the	post-Munich	pursuit	of	preventative	intelligence	
on	Arabs	in	the	United	States,	the	Dallas	field	office	issued	their	request	in	the	context	of	
the	FBI’s	ongoing	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas.	FBI	Headquarters	had	been	
pressuring	field	offices	to	preempt	guerrilla	attacks	for	over	two	years.	By	prompting	a	
global	panic	about	the	threat	of	Palestinian	terrorism,	and	creating	an	international	
embarrassment	for	West	German	security	forces,	the	Munich	Massacre	put	even	more	
pressure	on	FBI	field	offices.	In	this	climate,	the	Dallas	field	office’s	domestic	security	
supervisor	must	have	felt	morally	and	professionally	compelled	to	seek	a	preemptive	
break-in	into	the	Arab	Information	Center	office,	even	if	he	had	no	solid	evidence	
linking	the	office	to	Al-Fatah.	The	Dallas	Special	Agent	in	Charge	made	his	decision	
knowing	that	if	a	group	like	Black	September	carried	out	a	deadly	attack	in	the	U.S.	and	
it	was	later	determined	that	the	FBI	had	foregone	an	opportunity	to	prevent	it,	he	
would	be	held	personally	responsible	by	FBI	Headquarters,	the	White	House,	and	the	
American	people.	By	officially	authorizing	the	break-in,	however,	Felt	and	Miller	
																																																								
87	Ibid.	Gray	alleged	in	his	memoir	that	Felt	called	him	in	Seattle	“within	days	of	the	[Munich]	massacre,”	
informing	him	that	the	CIA	had	passed	along	information	from	the	U.S.	embassy	in	Tel	Aviv	indicating	
that	Fatah	planned	to	carry	out	an	attack	on	an	airport	in	the	Eastern	United	States,	and	that	a	Black	
Panther	informant	in	Los	Angeles	had	corroborated	the	story.	Supposedly,	the	informant	indicated	that	
L.A.	Panthers	had	discussed	the	idea	of	receiving	training	from	Al	Fatah	guerrillas	in	Algeria	who	were	in	
contact	with	exiled	Panther	Eldridge	Cleaver	in	order	to	carry	out	political	kidnappings	in	the	United	
States.	Numerous	sources	contradict	Gray’s	claim,	however.	FBI	documents	in	Gray’s	Director’s	File,	
though	heavily	redacted,	reveal	that	the	unnamed	LA.	Panther	informant’s	warnings	of	a	possible	
kidnapping	attack	in	the	U.S.	“were	totally	unrelated”	to	the	Munich	siege.	Moreover,	documents	from	the	
FBI’s	Black	September	File	indicate	that	agents	investigated	a	Black	September	plot	to	bomb	an	airliner,	
but	that	this	investigation	occurred	two	weeks	after	the	Munich	attack,	and	was	based	on	a	rumor.	It	
could	be	that	Felt	fed	Gray	misleading	information,	and	that	Gray	repeated	this	claim	in	his	memoir	in	an	
effort	to	redeem	his	actions.	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	111;	U.S.	Government	Memorandum,	Francis	J.	Martin	
to	Paul	V.	Daly,	“Los	Angeles	Informant,”	March	5,	1979,	LPG	FBI,	1222537-0	-	62-118045	-	Section	6	
Serial	1.		
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departed	from	FBI	Headquarters’	practice	of	informally	encouraging	black	bag	jobs,	and	
provided	the	Dallas	supervisor	and	his	agents	assurance	that	Bureau	officials	supported	
the	action,	and	would	take	responsibility	for	its	criminal	nature	if	necessary.		
	 President	Nixon	also	worried	about	a	Palestinian	nationalist	attack	occurring	in	
the	United	States.	Shortly	after	the	Munich	siege,	Jean	Dixon,	an	alleged	psychic	with	a	
popular	syndicated	column,	predicted	that	Black	September	would	carry	out	a	terrorist	
attack	in	the	United	States	targeting	Yitzhak	Rabin,	Israeli’s	ambassador	to	the	United	
States.	On	September	21,	after	his	secretary	Rose	Mary	Woods	told	him	about	Dixon’s	
prediction,	Nixon	spoke	with	Kissinger	about	his	concerns.	“Suppose	[Black	September]	
kidnap[s]	Rabin,	Henry,	and	demand[s]	that	we	release	all	blacks	who	are	prisoners	
around	the	United	States,	and	we	didn’t	and	they	shoot	him?	…	We	have	got	to	have	a	
plan,”	he	insisted.	“We	have	got	to	have	contingency	plans	for	hijacking,	for	kidnapping,	
for	all	sorts	of	things	that	[could]	happen	around	here.”88	Nixon	made	his	comment	a	
few	days	after	Palestinian	militants	based	in	Amsterdam	sent	letter	bombs	to	Israeli	
targets	in	multiple	countries,	stoking	further	post-Munich	hysteria	over	the	threat	of	
international	terrorism.	One	of	the	explosives	killed	an	Israeli	diplomat	in	London,	
though	officials	intercepted	the	remaining	bombs	in	Brussels,	Geneva,	Paris,	Jerusalem,	
Montreal,	Ottawa,	and	New	York.89	
	 In	order	to	address	the	problem	of	“terrorism,”	Nixon	formed	the	CCCT	on	
September	25,	three	days	after	sharing	his	fears	with	Kissinger.	Gray	attended	the	
																																																								
88	Nixon	White	House	Tapes,	Tape	784-7,	September	21,	1972;	Naftali,	Blind	Spot,	59.	
89	Lawrence	Van	Gelder,	“Bombs	Mailed	to	Many	Israeli	Officials,”	New	York	Times,	September	21,	1972,	
A1.	
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Committee’s	first	meeting	the	same	day.90	In	the	aftermath	of	the	Huston	Plan	that	
Nixon	aborted	two	years	earlier,	the	CCCT,	formed	at	Kissinger’s	suggestion,	was	“the	
first	official	U.S.	government	body	charged	with	focusing	on	the	terrorism	problem.”91	
The	CCCT’s	authority	was	extremely	limited,	however.	While	the	Huston	Plan	attempted	
to	consolidate	and	expand	the	surveillance	powers	of	all	U.S.	intelligence	agencies	
under	the	direct	command	of	the	White	House,	the	main	purpose	of	the	CCCT	was	to	
provide	policy	analysis,	most	of	which	would	be	undertaken	by	the	committee’s	
separate	Working	Group.92	In	the	midst	of	the	escalating	Watergate	Scandal,	Nixon	did	
not	risk	another	Huston	Plan-like	attempt	to	seize	control	of	the	nation’s	intelligence	
agencies.	Instead,	the	President	charged	the	FBI,	rather	than	the	CIA	or	State	
Department,	with	“full	responsibility	for	combatting	foreign	terrorists	inside	the	United	
States.”93	Nixon’s	Assistant	John	Ehrlichman	conveyed	this	news	during	the	CCCT’s	
inaugural	meeting.	Gray	recalled	that	the	other	intelligence	officials	in	the	room	were	
relieved	by	Ehrlichman’s	pronouncement.	They	“washed	their	hands	like	Pontius	
Pilate,”	he	wrote.	According	to	Gray,	“nobody	there,	the	secretary	of	defense	or	the	rest	
of	them,	wanted	to	take	responsibility	for	these	Al	Fatah	guerrillas	and	other	types	that	
were	coming	in.”94	Gray	did	not	provide	a	direct	explanation	for	this,	but	it	is	likely	that	
other	intelligence	officials	knew	that	preventing	attacks	by	clandestine	guerrilla	
organizations	was	inherently	difficult,	if	not	impossible.	Indeed,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	
																																																								
90	White	House	memorandum,	Nixon	to	Kissinger,	“Action	to	Combat	Terrorism,”	September	25,	1972.	
91	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror,	27.	Stampnitzky	analyzes	how	CCCT-funded	research	led	to	the	rise	of	
terrorism	experts	and	the	“invention	of	terrorism,”	but	does	not	mention	the	Huston	Plan.	
92	The	committee	itself	convened	only	a	few	times,	though	its	working	group	met	regularly	from	1972	to	
1977,	providing	the	White	House	with	anti-terrorism	policy	advice,	sponsoring	a	number	of	conferences	
on	terrorism,	and	funding	several	research	projects.	
93	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	117.	
94	Ibid.		
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that	any	intelligence	official	in	his	right	mind	would	envy	the	FBI’s	burdensome	duty	to	
prevent	guerrilla	attacks	inside	the	United	States	amid	Congress’	increased	scrutiny	of	
intelligence	agencies	on	one	hand	and	the	American	public’s	rising	fears	of	terrorism	on	
the	other.	
	 Because	the	minutes	to	the	first	CCCT	meeting	are	classified,	it	is	unknown	
whether	or	not	Ehrlichman	ordered	Gray	to	reinstitute	break-ins.	However,	the	White	
House	had	been	pressuring	the	FBI	reinstitute	the	practice	since	shortly	after	Nixon	
came	into	office.	Moreover,	the	CCCT	meeting	took	place	in	Washington	on	the	very	
same	day	that	Felt	convened	a	conference	of	Special	Agents	in	Charge	from	around	the	
country.95	In	his	2008	oral	history,	Miller	stated	that	Gray	verbally	informed	him	in	
person	in	September	1972	that	he	had	decided	to	reauthorize	surreptitious	entries	for	
both	the	Al-Fatah	and	Weather	Underground	investigations,	and	instructed	Felt	to	
organize	the	conference	in	order	to	inform	them	of	the	FBI’s	new	policy	of	permitting	
break-ins	for	terrorism	investigations.	Miller	recalled	that	Gray	made	an	appearance	
during	Felt’s	meeting,	where	he	emphasized	to	the	Special	Agents	in	Charge,	“I	want	you	
to	make	damn	sure	that	you	don’t	do	any	of	these	[break-ins]	without	the	Bureau’s	
authority!”96	Felt	also	recollected	Gray’s	statement,	adding	in	his	1979	memoir	that	the	
Acting	Director	“ordered	an	all-out	effort	to	prevent	terrorism	in	the	United	States.”97	In	
all	likelihood,	Gray	addressed	the	FBI	field	supervisors’	conference	after	having	just	left	
the	CCCT	meeting.	Whether	or	not	Ehrlichman	explicitly	directed	Gray	to	reinstitute	
																																																								
95	No	author	indicated,	“Conference,	Special	Agents	in	Charge,	Washington	D.C.,	September	25-26,	1972,”	
LPG	FBI,	1222537-0-62-118045	EBF	212x1,	Section	1,	Serial	1.	
96	Miller	oral	history,	162.	
97	Felt	also	recalled	that	in	a	separate	one-on-one	conversation,	Gray	specifically	gave	Miller	permission	
to	authorize	black	bag	jobs	against	Weather	Underground	targets.	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	
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black	bag	jobs,	the	Acting	Director	made	his	orders	under	intense	pressure	from	Nixon	
and	the	American	public	to	prevent	a	bloody	Munich-like	guerrilla	attack	inside	the	
United	States.	
	 	
The	FBI	and	Anti-Terrorism	after	Munich	
After	the	Munich	attack	and	the	FBI’s	reauthorization	of	black	bag	jobs,	the	Bureau’s	
war	with	leftist	guerrillas	unfolded	in	ways	that	no	one	could	have	anticipated.	There	is	
no	evidence	to	support	Gray	and	Felt’s	claims	that	the	FBI’s	post-Munich	operations	
thwarted	a	Black	September	terrorism	conspiracy	in	the	United	States.	The	FBI	never	
arrested	anyone	on	charges	related	to	this	supposed	plot,	which	they	could	have	done	
had	they	possessed	sound	evidence.	Nor	has	the	FBI	has	ever	declassified	documents	
corroborating	these	assertions.98	Instead,	available	evidence	demonstrates	that	the	FBI	
responded	to	the	Munich	attack	by	illegally	harassing	innocent	people	and	chasing	false	
leads.	At	the	same	time,	the	CCCT’s	mandate,	coupled	with	increasing	public	scrutiny	of	
FBI	operations,	prompted	Gray	to	significantly	reorganize	the	Bureau’s	domestic	
surveillance	practices.	While	FBI	agents	carried	out	break-ins	targeting	the	Weather	
Underground,	the	Arab	Information	Center,	and	other	targets,	Gray	curbed	spying	on	
the	U.S.	left	in	order	to	more	carefully	focus	preventative	intelligence	efforts	on	groups	
and	individuals	the	FBI	deemed	prone	to	revolutionary	violence.	Gray	also	redirected	
																																																								
98	Circumstantial	evidence	suggests	that	the	FBI	was	concerned	in	mid-October	1972	over	intelligence	
from	an	unknown	source	indicating	that	“Al-Fatah”	planned	to	assassinate	Rabin	or	Sargent	Shriver,	
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October	18,	1972.	Also	see	Naftali,	Blind	Spot,	60-61.	
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Bureau	resources	towards	apprehending	guerrilla	fugitives	and	developing	contingency	
plans	for	responding	to	domestic	and	international	“terrorist”	attacks	inside	the	United	
States.		
	 None	of	these	efforts	prevented	guerrilla	violence,	however.	The	Weather	
Underground	remained	at	large.	And	despite	the	State	Department’s	“Operation	
Boulder,”	a	post-Munich	effort	to	closely	scrutinize	all	Arab	and	Middle	Eastern	
applicants	for	U.S.	visas,	PLO-affiliated	Iraqi	militant	Khalid	Duhhan	Al-Jawary	and	two	
other	guerrillas	entered	the	U.S.	in	early	1973.99	The	cell	planned	to	detonate	three	car	
bombs	outside	Israeli	banks	and	the	El	Al	terminal	at	Kennedy	Airport	in	New	York	
during	Prime	Minister	Golda	Meir’s	visit	to	the	United	Nations.	The	plot	failed,	however,	
only	because	of	the	attackers’	mistakes—faulty	design	prevented	the	hand-made	bombs	
from	detonating.100	Meanwhile,	controversy	over	Watergate	and	FBI	surveillance	
practices	continued	to	wear	away	at	the	Bureau’s	popular	legitimacy.	
	 The	FBI	did	in	fact	harass	Arabs	and	Arab-Americans	after	the	Munich	attack	and	
the	Dallas	break-in.	However,	accounts	from	individuals	targeted	by	the	FBI	challenge	
Gray	and	Felt’s	assertions	that	these	people	were	foreign	“assassins”	and	“terrorists,”	
and	that	the	Bureau	successfully	“harassed”	them	“out	of	the	country.”101	The	Dallas	
Arab	Information	Center’s	director	Dr.	Ramahi,	a	Palestinian	with	a	degree	from	
																																																								
99	On	December	7,	1972,	CCCT	Working	Group	member	Armin	H.	Meyer	of	the	State	Department	wrote,	
“as	a	result	of	FBI	deft	action,	the	ringleader	of	Fatah	in	the	United	States,	who	cleverly	by-passed	
Operation	Boulder,	was	apprehended	and	persuaded	to	leave	the	United	States	voluntarily	on	December	
6.”	It	is	unclear	if	this	claim	is	true,	however,	and	if	so,	whether	the	FBI	located	this	individual	as	a	result	
of	the	Dallas	break-in.	See	Department	of	State	memo,	Armin	H.	Meyer	to	Members	of	the	Working	Group	
Cabinet	Committee	to	Combat	Terrorism,	“Minutes	of	the	Tenth	Meeting	of	the	Working	Group,”	
December	6,	1972,	3,	Nixon	Presidential	Materials	Project,	White	House	Special	Files,	Staff	Member	and	
Office	Files,	Richard	C.	Tufaro,	Subject	Files,	Box	1,	CCCT	Working	Group	[1],	Richard	Nixon	Library.	On	
Al-Jawary,	see	Weiner,	Enemies,	320.	
100	Weiner,	Enemies,	321-322.	
101	Felt,	The	FBI	Pyramid	from	the	Inside,	325-326;	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	114-115.	
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Southern	Illinois	University,	did	not	flee	the	United	States.	On	the	contrary,	U.S.	
authorities	denied	him	a	return	visa	when	he	sought	to	come	back	to	Texas	after	his	
honeymoon.102	Ramahi’s	successor	at	the	Arab	Information	Center	was	Dr.	Munir	
Bayoud,	an	American	of	Palestinian	heritage.	Bayoud	insisted	that	Ramahi	had	no	
connections	to	terrorism,	and	that	the	document	FBI	agents	stole	from	the	former	
director’s	briefcase	was	not	a	list	of	terrorists,	but	a	mailing	list	containing	names	of	
students	and	other	people	of	Arab	descent	living	in	the	United	States.103	Bayoud	also	
revealed	that	FBI	agents	interrogated	him	after	the	Munich	massacre,	and	made	him	
feel	so	threatened	that	he	sought	out	an	attorney.104	Although	the	identities	and	stories	
of	the	other	ninety-two	individuals	the	FBI	harassed	as	part	of	its	post-Munich	
Palestinian	“terrorism”	investigation	remain	unknown	outside	of	the	Bureau,	it	is	clear	
that	Bayoud,	in	contrast	to	Felt	and	Gray’s	claims,	was	neither	a	terrorist	nor	a	
foreigner.	And	although	FBI	agents	frightened	Bayoud,	they	did	not	drive	him	out	of	his	
home	country.		
	 Fears	of	a	Munich-style	terrorist	attack	in	the	United	States	sowed	confusion	
within	the	FBI.	Declassified	FBI	documents	indicate	that	on	September	12,	1972,	a	week	
after	the	Munich	attack,	special	agents	mobilized	throughout	the	eastern	United	States	
in	response	to	information	from	an	undetermined	source	warning	that	Black	September	
militants	sought	to	blow	up	airliners	at	an	East	Coast	airport	prior	to	the	close	of	the	
Munich	Olympics,	which	Olympic	officials	had	resumed	after	a	brief	suspension	to	
																																																								
102	Ramahi	went	on	to	take	a	position	as	the	United	Arab	Emirates’	chargé	d'affaires	in	Libya.	Horrock,	
“New	Senate	Panel	May	Study	F.B.I.	Drive	on	Arab	Terrorism.”	
103	Horrock,	“New	Senate	Panel	May	Study	F.B.I.	Drive	on	Arab	Terrorism.”	
104	Lisa	Belkin,	“For	Many	Arab-Americans,	F.B.I.	Scrutiny	Renews	Fears,”	New	York	Times,	January	12,	
1991.	
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mourn	the	murdered	Israeli	athletes.105	FBI	agents	from	Boston	to	San	Juan	spent	
approximately	forty-eight	hours	warning	local	airport	security	agencies	of	possible	
violence	and	searching	for	the	origins	of	the	intelligence	before	the	New	York	FBI	office	
determined	that	the	investigation	was	“the	outgrowth	of	a	rumor	running	rampant	the	
last	several	days	and	has	no	validity	whatsoever.”106	The	FBI	dropped	the	investigation	
and	the	attack	never	materialized.	Similarly,	on	November	24,	1972,	one	hundred	and	
sixty	armed	FBI	agents	converged	on	Chicago’s	O’Hare	international	airport	in	response	
to	information	that	terrorists	were	planning	a	“Lod-style”	massacre.107	Though	the	
threat	proved	to	be	a	false	alarm,	Gray	considered	the	FBI’s	response	to	be	“an	excellent	
field	test	for	evaluating	our	emergency	procedures	for	dealing	with	threatened	terrorist	
attacks.”108		
	 The	FBI	carried	out	its	operations	under	the	belief	that	the	Munich	attacks	had	
signaled	an	escalation	in	its	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	that	necessitated	the	
Bureau’s	further	adaptation	to	the	threat	of	“terrorism.”	After	the	Chicago	scare,	Gray	
conveyed	his	thoughts	on	the	matter	to	Edward	Miller:	
We	are	in	an	age	of	terrorism.	A	potential	attack	of	the	sort	which	occurred	at	
Lod	Airport	or	which	occurred	at	the	time	of	the	Munich	massacre	could	happen	
in	the	U.S.	The	tactic	of	the	urban	guerrilla,	often	used	in	Latin	American,	Algeria,	
the	Middle	East	and	elsewhere	in	the	world,	was	introduced	into	the	U.S.	about	
																																																								
105	FBI	teletype,	SAC	Baltimore	to	Acting	Director	and	SAC	Newark,	“Threat	by	Alleged	Black	September	
Group	on	September	Twelve,	Seventy-Two	to	Bomb	Jumbo	Jet	at	East	Coast	Airport	in	Next	Few	Days,”	
September	13,	1972,	FBI	Black	September	File,	FBI	Vault.	Gray	falsely	claimed	in	his	memoir	that	
evidence	of	this	plot	surfaced	“within	days”	of	the	Munich	attack,	that	the	plot	was	authentic,	and	that	the	
FBI	thwarted	it	using	information	obtained	from	the	Dallas	break-in.	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	111.	
106	FBI	teletype,	New	York	to	Acting	Director,	Atlanta,	Newark,	and	San	Juan,	“Threat	by	Alleged	Black	
September	Group	to	Bomb	Jumbo	Jet	at	East	Coast	Airport	in	Next	Few	Days,”	September	14,	1972,	
11:45pm,	FBI	Black	September	File.	
107	William	P.	Rogers,	“Memorandum	for	the	President,”	December	27,	1972,	2,	Nixon	Presidential	
Materials	Project,	White	House	Special	Files,	Staff	Member	and	Office	Files,	Richard	C.	Tufaro,	Subject	
Files,	Box	1,	CCCT	Working	Group	[1],	Richard	Nixon	Library.	
108	FBI	airtel,	Acting	Director	to	All	SACS,	“Contingency	Plan	for	Handling	Terrorist	Attacks,”	1/9/1973,	
LPG	FBI,	1222537-0	-	62-118045	EBF	212x1	-	Section	1	Serial	1.	
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five	years	ago	and	we	have	seen	ample	evidence	of	it	in	the	form	of	ambushed	
police	officers	and	terrorist	bombings	which	have	included	the	U.S.	Capitol	and	
the	Pentagon.	We	now	accept	the	existence	of	urban	guerrilla	terrorism	and	the	
fact	that	the	urban	guerrilla’s	philosophy	of	terrorism	has	made	it	necessary	for	
law	enforcement	to	adopt	new	standards	and	adapt	to	the	constant	threat	of	
terrorist	attack.	We	recognize	that	FBI	personnel	have	been	targeted	for	assault	
or	assassination.109	
	
Gray	further	argued	that	the	terrorist	threat	required	major	FBI	field	offices	to	acquire	
caches	of	body	armor,	shotguns,	gas	masks,	bullhorns,	and	other	equipment	left	over	
from	the	Army’s	use	in	Vietnam.		
	 There	is	also	no	evidence	to	support	Felt	and	Gray’s	claims	that	black	bag	jobs	
were	an	effective	tactic	for	preventing	guerrilla	attacks.	In	the	case	of	the	Weather	
Underground	investigation,	black	bag	jobs	were	not	only	ineffective,	but	also	
counterproductive.	Felt	and	Miller	authorized	the	first	post-Munich	Weather	
Underground	break-in	on	October	24,	1972,	targeting	a	leftist	print	shop	in	Eugene,	
Oregon	run	by	supporters	of	the	guerrilla	organization.	Felt	and	Miller	authorized	six	
more	Weather	Underground	break-ins	over	the	next	six	months,	most	of	them	in	the	
New	York	metro	area.110	None	of	these	operations,	however,	uncovered	information	
leading	to	the	capture	of	the	organization’s	members.	In	October	1973,	with	the	FBI’s	
investigation	still	unsuccessful,	the	Justice	Department	dropped	their	charges	against	
Weather	Underground	fugitives.	According	to	an	FBI	memo,	the	Justice	Department	had	
prepared	its	indictments	using	illegal	surveillance	by	“another	government	agency”—
probably	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA)	or	National	Security	Agency	(NSA).111	
																																																								
109	L.	Patrick	Gray,	“Memorandum	to	E.	S.	Miller,	RE:	Contingency	Plans	for	Handling	Terrorist	Attacks,”	
undated	(ca.	January	1973),	LPG	FBI,	1222537-0	-	62-118045	EBF	212x1	-	Section	1	Serial	1.	
110	See	Miller	to	Felt	memos	in	LPG	FBI,	Number	1222537-0-62-118045,	Section	8,	Serial	1.	
111	FBI	memo	quoted	in	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	296;	WUR,	132.	The	Justice	Department	filed	a	
new	conspiracy	indictment	against	Weather	Underground	members	on	December	7,	1972,	which	
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Given	that	the	Weather	Underground	had	only	carried	out	one	bombing	during	the	past	
year,	Justice	Department	officials	calculated	that	bringing	attention	to	illegal	FBI	
surveillance	activities	in	the	midst	of	the	Watergate	Scandal	was	not	worth	the	
additional	damage	this	might	cause	to	the	reputation	of	America’s	political	institutions.		
	 In	addition	to	reauthorizing	break-ins	after	Munich,	Gray	also	reduced	the	scale	
of	the	FBI’s	domestic	surveillance	operations.	During	the	1973	fiscal	year,	which	
roughly	covered	the	period	of	Gray’s	tenure,	the	FBI	reduced	its	use	of	informants	in	
“extremist”	investigations	by	approximately	twenty	percent.112	Much	of	this	reduction	
was	due	to	Gray’s	elimination	of	the	FBI’s	“ghetto	informant”	program,	which	Hoover	
established	in	1967	in	an	attempt	to	gain	advance	warning	of	popular	rebellions	in	
African	American	inner-city	communities.	Among	FBI	personnel,	the	ghetto	informant	
program	was	widely	regarded	as	a	farce,	in	which	field	agents	regularly	contrived	
fictitious	“paper	informants”	and	false	intelligence	in	order	to	meet	FBI	headquarters’	
monthly	report	deadline.113	Gray	also	“drastically	reduced”	the	number	of	Americans	on	
the	FBI’s	Administrative	Index	(ADEX),	which	listed	individuals,	deemed	a	threat	to	
national	security.	Though	the	precise	number	of	individuals	on	the	ADEX	under	Gray’s	
																																																																																																																																																																												
dropped	charges	against	two	defendants	from	the	1970	Detroit	indictment,	but	added	charges	against	
four	more.	
112	GAO,	FBI	Domestic	Intelligence	Operations,	133-135.	The	GAO	report	published	changes	in	the	
percentage	of	the	FBI’s	domestic	security	investigations	and	use	of	informants,	but	did	not	publish	the	
actual	number	of	the	FBI’s	investigations.	Despite	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	the	FBI’s	“extremist”	
investigations	from	their	peak	in	FY	1971,	when	extremist	investigations	were	161%	higher	than	in	1965,	
“extremist”	investigations	in	FY	1973	remained	122%	higher	than	in	1965.	The	number	of	domestic	
security	informants	utilized	by	the	FBI	under	Gray’s	tenure	likely	exceeded	2,000	and	payments	to	
informants	likely	cost	over	$6	million.	According	to	the	FBI,	during	Gray’s	tenure	the	FBI	increased	its	
focus	on	the	American	Indian	Movement,	which	carried	out	a	number	of	high	profile	disruptive	protests	
during	late	1972	and	early	1973,	while	at	the	same	decreasing	its	focus	on	the	disintegrating	Black	
Panther	Party.	
113	Ibid;	FBI	report,	anonymous	author,	“Changes	in	Operation	of	Intelligence	Division	Since	May	3,	1972,”	
March	12,	1973,	Gray	FBI	File	1222537-0-62-118045	EBF	212x1	-	Section	1	Serial	1;	Author	telephone	
interview	with	former	FBI	Special	Agent	Jack	Ryan,	June	2,	2014.	
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tenure	is	unavailable,	his	efforts	contributed	to	a	reduction	of	names	on	the	list	from	
over	12,000	in	November	1971	to	1,250	in	November	1975.114	
	 Gray	reduced	domestic	surveillance	partially	for	strategic	reasons,	in	an	effort	to	
refocus	Bureau	resources	on	combating	revolutionary	violence.	However,	the	Acting	
Director	was	also	responding	to	economic,	legal,	and	political	restraints	on	the	Bureau’s	
surveillance	powers.	Public	scrutiny	over	FBI	surveillance	practices	unleashed	by	the	
April	1971	Media,	Pennsylvania	burglary	only	intensified	as	the	Watergate	Scandal	
unfolded	in	late	1972	and	early	1973.	On	January	31,	1973,	for	example,	NBC	television	
journalist	Carl	Stern	sued	the	Justice	Department	and	FBI	under	the	Freedom	of	
Information	Act	for	access	to	files	related	to	the	COINTELPRO-New	Left	program	
referenced	in	a	document	uncovered	through	the	Media	burglary.	Over	the	next	three	
years,	Stern’s	lawsuit	led	to	the	declassification	of	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	documents	
and	massive	investigations	of	the	FBI	and	other	federal	intelligence	agencies	by	the	
Senate’s	“Church	Committee”	and	the	House’s	“Pike	Committee,”	which,	for	the	first	
time,	provided	the	American	public	with	a	full	picture	of	the	Hoover	FBI’s	covert	
operations	and	surveillance	of	American	dissidents.115	Moreover,	the	FBI’s	massive	
Watergate,	Weather	Underground,	Black	Liberation	Army,	and	MEDBURG	
investigations,	each	of	which	involved	investigators	in	the	majority	of	the	FBI’s	59	field	
offices,	utilized	a	massive	amount	of	FBI	resources.	Nixon’s	mandate	through	the	CCCT	
that	the	FBI	take	responsibility	for	all	terrorist	attacks	in	the	United	States	required	still	
more	Bureau	resources,	as	officials	rapidly	worked	to	develop	training	and	operational	
																																																								
114	GAO,	“FBI	Domestic	Intelligence	Operations,”	134;	FBI	Report,	“Changes	in	Operation	of	Intelligence	
Division	Since	May	3,	1972.”	
115	Medsger,	The	Burglary,	332-333.	
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protocols	for	hostage	negotiation	and	armed	standoff	situations,	both	of	which	required	
coordination	with	additional	police	and	military	agencies.116	
	 According	to	Gray,	Nixon’s	CCCT	directive	resulted	in	the	FBI	leading	the	
government’s	response	to	the	American	Indian	Movement’s	February	27,	1973	armed	
seizure	of	Wounded	Knee,	South	Dakota,	site	of	the	U.S.	Army’s	massacre	of	more	than	
two	hundred	Lakota	Sioux	eighty-three	years	earlier.117	Lasting	71	days	and	garnering	
international	media	coverage,	the	Wounded	Knee	siege	pit	a	few	hundred	American	
Indian	militants	fortified	behind	sandbags	and	trenches	against	FBI	agents,	U.S.	
Marshals,	and	Indian	vigilantes	allied	with	Dick	Wilson,	President	of	the	Pine	Ridge	
Lakota	reservation.	Thousands	of	bullets	were	fired	in	the	stand-off,	which	resulted	in	
the	death	of	an	FBI	agent,	a	U.S.	Marshall,	and	two	Indian	activists.	The	Wounded	Knee	
siege	further	damaged	the	FBI’s	public	reputation,	as	public	opinion	largely	favored	
AIM	and	Oglala	Sioux	elders,	who	demanded	the	U.S.	uphold	its	broken	treaties	with	the	
Lakota.118	In	one	of	the	most	public	displays	of	support	for	the	Native	American	
activists,	actor	Marlon	Brando	boycotted	the	March	27,	1973	Oscar	Awards.	On	live	
television,	Apache	actor	and	activist	Sacheen	Littlefeather	accepted	Brando’s	award	for	
Best	Actor	in	the	film	The	Godfather,	and	afterwards	read	to	the	press	a	fifteen-page	
speech	Brando	had	written	in	support	of	the	Indians	at	Wounded	Knee.119	
																																																								
116	“SOP	For	Responding	to	International	Terrorist	Acts	Occurring	Within	the	United	States,”	no	author	or	
date	indicated	(ca.	September	1972),	Nixon	Presidential	Materials	Project,	White	House	Special	Files,	
Staff	Member	and	Office	Files,	Richard	C.	Tufaro,	Subject	Files,	Box	1,	Secret	Attachments	[Folder	#1],	
Richard	Nixon	Library.	
117	Gray,	In	Nixon’s	Web,	198,	204.	
118	Paul	Chaat	Smith	and	Robert	Allen	Warrior,	Like	a	Hurricane:	The	Indian	Movement	from	Alcatraz	to	
Wounded	Knee	(New	York:	New	Press,	1999).	For	an	FBI	agent’s	self-published	perspective,	see	Joseph	H.	
Trimbach	and	John	M.	Trimbach,	American	Indian	Mafia:	An	FBI	Agent’s	True	Story	about	Wounded	Knee,	
Leonard	Peltier,	and	the	American	Indian	Movement	(Outskirts	Press,	2007).	
119	Smith	and	Warrior,	Like	a	Hurricane,	236.	
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	 Meanwhile,	as	Gray	juggled	guerrilla	investigations	and	growing	public	scrutiny	
of	FBI	operations,	the	Watergate	Scandal	continued	to	undermine	his	career	prospects.	
On	January	8,	1973,	Nixon	again	told	his	staff	that	he	did	not	want	Gray	to	stay	on	as	the	
FBI’s	permanent	Director.	“Gray	can’t	cut	it,”	he	told	Haldeman.	Within	the	next	three	
weeks,	however,	Hunt,	the	five	Watergate	burglars,	and	Liddy	and	McCord	all	took	
guilty	pleas.	They	concealed	information	about	Nixon	Cabinet	officials’	connections	to	
the	burglary	in	exchange	for	hundreds	of	thousands	of	dollars	taken	from	CREEP’s	
coffers,	but	on	February	2	Judge	John	Sirica	announced	his	belief	that	the	full	Watergate	
story	had	yet	to	be	revealed,	and	five	days	later	the	Senate	voted	unanimously	to	
establish	a	bipartisan	committee	to	investigate	the	scandal.	Realizing	that	Gray	would	
likely	get	called	to	testify	before	the	new	Senate	committee,	Nixon	calculated	that	it	
would	be	best	to	maintain	Gray	as	FBI	Director.	The	president	sought	to	avoid	the	
appearance	of	attempting	to	cover-up	the	Watergate	investigation,	and	calculated	that	if	
Gray	was	going	to	testify	about	Watergate,	it	would	be	better	for	him	to	do	so	during	his	
confirmation	hearings,	as	a	loyal	ally	to	the	White	House,	than	as	an	adversary	in	the	
Senate	Watergate	investigation.	It	was	too	late,	however,	for	Nixon	to	undo	the	chain	of	
events	that	Felt’s	disclosures	had	triggered.		
	
Conclusion	
In	early	1973,	the	FBI’s	war	on	domestic	leftist	guerrillas	yielded	the	most	unintended	
of	consequences.	As	the	Watergate	cover-up	unraveled,	the	leadership	of	both	the	
Bureau	and	the	Nixon	administration	began	to	crumble	beneath	the	weight	of	the	
institutional	conflict	spawned	four	years	earlier	by	revolutionary	insurgency	against	
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war	and	racism.	Nixon	hoped	that	he	could	defend	the	federal	government’s	
prerogative	to	engage	in	illegal	surveillance	by	citing	the	threat	of	guerrilla	“terrorism.”	
The	president	conveyed	his	feelings	on	February	16,	1973,	when	he	informed	Gray	that	
he	planned	to	nominate	him	for	the	permanent	position	of	FBI	Director.		
	 In	what	was	only	their	second	Oval	Office	meeting	since	the	Acting	Director	
assumed	office	nine	months	earlier,	Nixon	ordered	Gray	to	cite	the	threat	of	“terrorism”	
as	justification	for	Bureau	surveillance	measures	during	his	upcoming	confirmation	
hearings	before	the	Senate	Judiciary	Committee.	Nixon	specifically	ordered	Gray	to	
assert	the	FBI’s	need	to	engage	in	warrantless	wiretapping.	“There’s	this	violent	Jewish	
committee	that	wants	to	kill	the	Arabs,	and	the	Arabs	want	to	kill	the	Jews	…	Hijacking	
is	another	thing,”	the	president	exclaimed.	“Some	of	that	requires	wiretapping.	It’s	your	
responsibility	to	do	this,	and	your	authority.	I	just	don’t	think	that	we	should	be	
defensive	…	We	must	not	be	denied	the	use	of	the	weapon.	The	idea	that	we’re	
wiretapping	a	lot	of	political	groups	is	bullshit.”120	
	 Nixon	also	demanded	that	Gray	eliminate	the	information	leaks	he	believed	were	
coming	from	within	the	FBI,	specifically	from	Mark	Felt.	“You	haven’t	been	able	to	do	
anything—or	have	you?—about	the	leaking	coming	out	of	the	Bureau,”	the	President	
stated.	“The	lines	lead	very	directly	to	[Felt],”	he	added.121	Gray	insisted	that	he	had	the	
FBI	under	control,	and	that	the	leaks	were	coming	from	outside	the	Bureau.	The	Acting	
Director	still	believed	Felt’s	repeated	personal	avowals	that	he	was	not	involved	in	the	
leaks.	Gray	could	hardly	get	a	word	in,	however,	as	Nixon	vented	his	frustrations	over	
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Web,	156.	
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the	unfolding	Watergate	Scandal.	Ironically,	amid	deepening	crisis,	the	president	longed	
for	the	leadership	of	his	erstwhile	friend,	J.	Edgar	Hoover.	Privately,	the	deceased	
former	FBI	Director	had	been	a	major	source	of	frustration	for	Nixon,	but	Hoover	
always	maintained	discipline	within	the	FBI,	and	in	public	he	never	hesitated	to	support	
the	president’s	calls	for	law-and-order	policing	in	response	to	civil	disorder,	
revolutionary	violence,	and	leaks	of	classified	information.	“This	stuff	didn’t	leak	when	
Hoover	was	there,”	Nixon	declared.	FBI	personnel,	the	president	insisted,	need	“to	fear	
the	man	at	the	top,	and	you’ve	got	to	get	that	again.”	“You	remember	in	World	War	II,”	
he	continued,	“the	Germans,	if	they	went	through	a	town	and	one	of	their	soldiers	was	
hit	by	a	sniper,	they’d	line	up	the	whole	goddamned	town	and	say,	‘Until	you	talk	every	
one	of	you	is	going	to	be	shot.’	I	really	think	that’s	what	has	to	be	done.	I	mean,	I	don’t	
think	you	can	be	Mr.	Nice	Guy	over	there.”122	
	 A	few	weeks	later,	however,	when	it	came	time	for	his	confirmation	hearings,	
Gray	did	not	tow	the	Nixon	line.	During	the	hearings,	which	lasted	from	February	28	to	
March	22,	1973,	members	of	the	Judiciary	Committee	and	a	string	of	expert	witnesses	
hammered	Gray	on	his	role	in	the	ITT-Dita	Beard	controversy	as	Assistant	Attorney	
General,	on	Hoover’s	secret	files	on	American	politicians,	on	warrantless	wiretaps,	on	
the	FBI’s	sharing	of	VVAW	surveillance	with	the	Nixon	administration,	on	his	long	
periods	of	time	spent	away	from	Bureau	Headquarters,	and	on	his	sharing	of	Watergate	
investigation	files	with	John	Dean.123	In	the	face	of	such	scrutiny,	the	Acting	Director	
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attempted	to	demonstrate	his	independence	from	the	Nixon	administration	by	sharing	
with	the	Senate	Judiciary	Committee	the	FBI’s	classified	files	on	the	Watergate	
investigation.	At	this	point	Gray	knew	that	the	FBI’s	investigation	was	moving	in	on	
Nixon’s	Cabinet,	but	he	did	not	realize	that	the	president	and	his	top	advisors,	including	
Ehrlichman,	Haldeman,	and	Mitchell,	had	all	conspired	to	obstruct	the	FBI.	
Inadvertently,	Gray	had	provided	the	Committee	with	evidence	that	would	lead	to	both	
Nixon’s	downfall	and	his	own.		
	 After	sifting	through	the	FBI’s	Watergate	investigation	documents,	members	of	
the	Judiciary	Committee	concluded	that	John	Dean	had	lied	to	the	Bureau	by	concealing	
the	contents	of	Howard	Hunt’s	safe.	On	March	22,	when	Senator	Robert	Byrd	asked	
Gray	if	Dean	had	lied	to	the	FBI,	the	Acting	Director	replied	in	the	affirmative.	“I	would	
have	to	conclude	that	that	probably	is	correct,”	Gray	stated.124	Gray	did	not	mention	the	
fact	that	he	had	destroyed	classified	documents	from	Hunt’s	safe	at	Dean’s	request,	but	
he	would	be	compelled	to	do	so	soon.	Meanwhile,	as	Gray	turned	against	the	White	
House,	and	the	Judiciary	Committee	turned	against	the	Acting	Director,	Nixon	decided	
to	seek	a	new	FBI	chief,	and	withdrew	Gray’s	nomination.125	
	 It	was	too	late,	however,	for	either	Nixon	or	Gray	to	prevent	the	demise	of	their	
careers.	In	early	April,	facing	a	federal	indictment,	John	Dean	began	confessing	his	
Watergate	crimes	to	a	grand	jury,	including	his	handing	of	the	secret	Hunt	documents	to	
Gray.	On	April	27,	1973,	Gray	resigned	from	his	position	as	Acting	Director,	cryptically	
citing	“serious	allegations	concerning	certain	acts	of	my	own	during	the	ongoing	
																																																								
124	Ibid,	March	22,	1973,	671.	
125	Holland,	Leak,	136;	Weiner,	Enemies,	324.	
	 290	
Watergate	investigation.”126		Three	days	later,	Haldeman,	Ehrlichman,	and	Kleindienst	
resigned	from	their	Cabinet	posts,	and	Nixon	fired	Dean.	Felt	continued	to	jockey	for	a	
position	as	Hoover’s	successor,	threatening	Nixon’s	new	appointee	for	Acting	Director,	
former	Environment	Protection	Agency	Director	William	D.	Ruckelshaus,	with	a	mutiny	
of	more	than	70	FBI	officials.127	On	May	14,	however,	at	Nixon’s	urging,	Ruckelshaus	
accused	Felt	of	leaking	classified	information	to	the	press,	and	forced	Felt	to	resign.128	
	 It	would	still	be	another	year	before	Nixon’s	August	4,	1974	resignation,	but	by	
the	summer	of	1973,	conflict	between	the	Hoover	FBI	and	Nixon	White	House	had	
already	brought	about	the	downfall	of	both	institutions.	Meanwhile,	the	prime	
organization	responsible	for	prompting	the	FBI-Nixon	feud—the	Weather	
Underground—continued	to	elude	law	enforcement.	By	this	point,	the	Weather	
Underground	was	falling	apart	as	well.	It	had	become	clear,	with	the	waning	of	mass	
street	protest	since	the	spring	of	1970,	that	their	bombings	had	failed	to	ignite	their	
longed-for	mass	revolutionary	uprising.	Facing	a	political	and	existential	crisis,	
members	of	the	group	spent	more	time	arguing,	reading	Marx,	and	reassessing	their	
strategy	than	carrying	out	bombings.	Despite	their	internal	feud,	the	organization	
would	manage	to	plant	a	few	more	bombs,	and	publish	their	1975	book-length	
manifesto	Prairie	Fire:	The	Politics	of	Revolutionary	Anti-Imperialism,	before	disbanding	
in	1976.129		
	 What	the	Weather	Underground’s	guerrillas	did	not	realize,	however,	was	that	
they	had	helped	ignite	the	greatest	political	scandal	in	United	States	history.	Without	
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the	Weather	Underground	and	other	domestic	leftist	guerrillas,	it	is	unlikely	that	
institutional	conflict	between	Hoover’s	FBI	and	the	Nixon	administration	would	have	
culminated	in	the	Watergate	Scandal.	There	would	have	been	no	Huston	Plan;	no	mass	
expansion	of	domestic	surveillance	in	1970;	no	Media,	Pennsylvania	burglary,	no	
COINTELPRO	controversy;	no	revival	of	black	bag	jobs.	Perhaps	Hoover	would	have	still	
refused	to	go	after	Daniel	Ellsberg,	and	Nixon’s	Cabinet	would	have	still	formed	the	
Plumbers.	But	without	the	bitterness	engendered	by	institutional	conflict	over	
“revolutionary	terrorism,”	it	is	unlikely	that	Mark	Felt	would	have	taken	on	his	Deep	
Throat	operations	and	exposed	Nixon’s	Watergate	cover-up	to	the	world.	The	Weather	
Underground’s	bombings	had	failed	to	spark	a	socialist	revolution	or	overthrow	the	
state.	But	inadvertently	and	indirectly,	they	had	taken	down	an	American	president	and	
irreparably	tarnished	the	legacy	of	J.	Edgar	Hoover’s	FBI.	
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EPILOGUE	
THE	POLITICS	OF	TERRORISM	
	
U.S.	officials	did	not	always	refer	to	insurgent	violence	as	“terrorism.”	FBI	documents	
from	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	also	described	leftist	violence	as	the	work	of	
“militants,”	“extremists,”	“radicals,”	“revolutionaries,”	“guerrillas,”	or	“anarchists.”	Over	
the	course	of	the	FBI’s	war	with	domestic	leftist	guerrillas,	however,	authorities	framed	
guerrilla	violence	as	“terrorism”	with	growing	frequency.	Reflecting	on	his	experiences	
investigating	the	Weather	Underground	and	other	leftist	guerrilla	groups	from	1969	
through	the	1980s,	FBI	Special	Agent	William	E.	Dyson,	Jr.	recalled	this	change.	The	
“people	who	[were]	doing	these	bombings	on	campuses,	these	anti-Vietnam	War	
people,	people	that	[were]	trying	to	overthrow	our	Government	and	get	rid	of	the	
Capitalist	system,”	Dyson	recollected,	were	“called,	well,	militants…	revolutionaries,	
radicals,	Commies,	Pinkos,	weirdos,	beatniks…	I	mean	there’s	all	sorts	of	terms.”1	It	was	
not	until	“the	early	1970s,”	he	explained,	that	“the	word	terrorism	creeps	into	our	
vocabulary.”	Indeed,	Dyson	reflected	that	he	was	“working	terrorism	before	terrorism	
[was]	accepted	as	a	term	for	this	form	of	violence.”2	
	 Declassified	state	documents	trace	authorities’	increasing	use	of	the	term	
“terrorism”	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s.	In	September	1968	Director	J.	Edgar	
Hoover	sent	a	secret	memo	to	police	agencies	around	the	country	warning	that	New	
Left	“militant	extremists”	planned	to	“launch	a	widespread	attack	on	educational	
institutions”	during	the	coming	autumn.	“It	would	be	foolhardy,”	he	cautioned,	“for	
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educators,	public	officials,	and	law	enforcement	officers	to	ignore	or	dismiss	lightly	the	
revolutionary	terrorism	invading	college	campuses.”3	Hoover	used	similar	language	in	
October	1969,	when	he	informed	his	agents	that	SDS’s	Weatherman	faction	“was	going	
underground	and	forming	commando-type	units	which	will	engage	in	terroristic	acts,	
including	bombings,	arsons	and	assassinations.”4	FBI	and	White	House	officials	utilized	
the	term	to	describe	leftist	violence	with	increasing	frequency	after	the	Weather	
Underground’s	deadly	March	6,	1970	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	explosion,	which	
precipitated	the	Huston	Plan,	the	United	States	first	proposed	federal	institution	
explicitly	dedicated	to	combating	“terrorism.”		
	 What	were	the	reasons	for	this	shift	in	terminology?	Did	Israeli	and	European	
officials’	increasing	use	of	the	term	“terrorism”	to	describe	Palestinian	nationalist	
militants’	hijacking	of	international	passenger	jets	influence	FBI	and	White	House	
officials?5	What	about	South	African,	South	American,	and	South	Vietnamese	
authorities’	use	of	the	term	to	characterize	domestic	left-wing	guerrilla	insurgencies?	
More	research	is	needed	to	determine	the	answers,	but	it	is	clear	that	Black	
September’s	bloody	attack	at	the	September	1972	Munich	Games	was	a	critical	turning	
point,	after	which	President	Richard	Nixon	formed	the	Cabinet	Committee	to	Combat	
Terrorism	(CCCT),	the	United	Nations	held	a	series	of	hearings	on	“terrorism,”	and	state	
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officials	in	the	U.S.	and	throughout	the	globe	formed	the	world’s	first	international	
treaties,	laws,	and	protocols	dedicated	to	combating	this	newly	constituted	problem.6	
	 Four	months	after	the	Munich	attacks	and	Nixon’s	founding	of	the	CCCT,	FBI	
Acting	Director	L.	Patrick	Gray	publicly	conveyed	his	impressions	on	the	Bureau’s	
responsibilities	in	the	fight	against	terrorism.	Gray	addressed	an	audience	of	police	and	
intelligence	agents	on	January	16,	1973,	at	a	National	Symposium	on	Terrorism	held	at	
the	FBI	Academy	in	Quantico,	Virginia.	“The	terrorist,”	the	Acting	Director	proclaimed,	
“is	an	outlaw,	a	wild	animal,	a	jungle	killer!”	“How	the	terrorist	got	that	way	is	not	
important,”	he	continued,	“We’re	not	interested	in	the	psychological,	philosophical,	
sociological	factors	on	the	terrorist	scene.”	The	priority	of	law	enforcement,	Gray	
asserted,	was	not	to	understand	“terrorists”	and	their	motives,	but	to	forcibly	prevent	
them	from	killing	“innocents.”7	
	 FBI	Director	Clarence	M.	Kelley	made	similar	public	comments	about	terrorists	
three	months	after	taking	his	position	as	J.	Edgar	Hoover’s	first	permanent	successor.	
Sworn	in	on	July	9,	1973,	Kelley	took	the	reigns	of	the	Bureau	amid	swirling	
controversies	over	Watergate,	FBI	civil	liberties	violations,	and	a	new	wave	of	leftist	
guerrilla	violence	led	by	California’s	eccentric	Symbionese	Liberation	Army	(SLA),	a	
mix-gendered	clandestine	guerrilla	organization	comprised	of	white	Vietnam	veterans	
and	former	student	activists	and	led	by	escaped	radical	black	convict	Donald	“Cinque”	
DeFreeze.	The	SLA	burst	into	American	consciousness	in	early	1974	after	assassinating	
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African	American	Oakland	School	Superintendent	Marcus	Foster	and	kidnapping	the	
young	white	newspaper	heiress	Patty	Hearst,	who	in	a	bizarre	turn	of	events,	
denounced	her	wealthy	parents	as	“pigs”	in	a	tape-recorded	communiqué	and	joined	
the	group	in	a	series	of	high-profile	armed	bank	robberies.	During	the	last	four	months	
of	Nixon’s	presidency,	news	of	the	SLA	and	the	FBI’s	nationwide	search	for	Patty	Hearst	
competed	with	Watergate	for	national	headlines.8	Speaking	before	a	group	of	military	
veterans	on	November	11,	1974,	Director	Kelley	asserted	that	leftist	guerrilla	
“terrorists”	acted	not	in	response	to	understandable	political	grievances,	but	because	of	
their	irrational	“hatred.”	“Urban	terrorists,”	he	declared,	“share	a	common	
denominator—that	is,	hatred	of	America,	free	government	and	other	constitutional	
liberties.”9	In	another	speech,	Kelley	upheld	the	FBI’s	prerogative	to	engage	in	
“anticipatory”	intelligence	operations	in	order	defend	society	from	a	“malignant	cancer”	
of	“terrorism	and	extremism”	practiced	in	the	U.S.	by	“guerrilla-type	groups.”10	“The	
FBI,”	Kelley	insisted,	“simply	cannot	wait	until	the	terrorist	or	extremist—the	individual	
whose	allegiance	is	to	violence—strikes	before	we	act.”11	
	 Gray	and	Kelley’s	comments	speak	to	the	greatest	legacy	of	the	FBI’s	war	with	
domestic	leftist	guerrillas:	intelligence	officials’	framing	of	“terrorism”	as	a	problem	that	
was	not	to	be	understood	but	fought,	specifically,	through	“preventative”	surveillance,	
covert	operations,	police	raids,	and	high-security	incarceration.	Lisa	Stampnitzky	has	
described	the	type	of	framework	Gray	and	Kelley	used	to	discuss	terrorism	as	a	“politics	
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of	anti-knowledge.”12	Portending	how	President	George	W.	Bush	and	other	U.S.	political	
leaders	would	discuss	terrorism	after	the	attacks	of	September	11,	2001,	Gray	and	
Kelley	engaged	in	“active	refusal	of	explanation	itself,”	removing	consideration	of	
attackers’	motives	“from	the	realm	of	political	debate.”13	Gray	and	Kelley’s	“politics	of	
anti-knowledge”	drew	upon	Hoover’s	similar,	earlier	characterization	of	Communists	as	
“deranged”	and	urban	rioters	as	senseless	“criminals”;	from	Nixon’s	attempts	to	stamp	
out	social	conflict	through	“law	and	order”	policing	rather	than	through	state	initiatives	
to	eliminate	racism,	militarism,	and	economic	exploitation;	and	from	early	FBI	officials’	
efforts	during	the	early	1970s	to	counter	leftist	guerrillas	through	“preventative”	
surveillance	operations.	
	 Despite	the	ongoing	problem	of	guerrilla	violence,	public	concerns	over	
government	abuse	of	authority	and	violation	of	Americans’	civil	liberties	prevailed	in	
the	1970s	over	fears	of	terrorism.	To	a	majority	of	Americans,	the	crimes	of	Watergate	
overshadowed	the	emergence	of	new	domestic	leftist	guerrilla	groups	such	as	the	New	
York-based	Puerto	Rican	nationalist	Fuerzas	Armadas	de	Liberación	Nacional	(FALN),	
the	Bay	Area’s	New	World	Liberation	Front	(NWLF),	Seattle’s	George	Jackson	Brigade,	
and	New	England’s	Sam	Melville-Jonathan	Jackson	Unit,	as	well	as	Palestinian	militants’	
continued	international	bombings,	kidnappings,	and	hijackings.	Some	U.S.	political	
leaders	sought	to	emphasize	the	threat	“terrorism”	posed	to	U.S.	national	security.	
Former	segregationist	and	logtime	anticommunist	Senator	Strom	Thurmond	(R,	SC),	for	
example,	presided	over	more	than	a	dozen	hearings	on	“terroristic	activity”	and	
political	violence	from	1974	to	1976	as	chair	of	the	Senate	Judiciary	Committee’s	
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Internal	Security	Subcommittee.	Gathering	testimonies	from	police,	intelligence	
officials,	and	academic	experts,	Thurmond	revived	the	Internal	Security	Subcommittee,	
an	institution	liberals	typically	dismissed	as	a	relic	of	the	McCarthy-era,	to	investigate	
groups	such	as	the	Weather	Underground,	the	SLA,	and	the	FALN.14	While	Thurmond’s	
efforts	had	little	influence	on	federal	policy,	investigations	of	federal	intelligence	
agencies	conducted	by	the	Church	Committee	and	other	government	bodies	led	to	
substantial	new	limits	on	the	state’s	surveillance	powers.	The	Foreign	Intelligence	
Surveillance	Act	of	1978,	for	example,	established	a	special	court	to	oversee	new	limits	
on	CIA	and	NSA	international	surveillance,	and	in	1976,	Attorney	General	Edward	Levi	
issued	new	guidelines	for	FBI	domestic	security	investigations	that	required	the	Bureau	
to	base	investigations	of	American	citizens	on	“specific	and	articulable	facts	giving	
reason	to	believe	that	an	individual	or	group	is	or	may	be	engaged	in	activities	which	
involve	or	will	involve	the	use	of	force	or	violence	and	which	involve	or	will	involve	the	
violation	of	federal	law.”15		
	 America’s	prevailing	views	on	terrorism	changed	dramatically,	however,	
following	the	1980	election	of	President	Ronald	Reagan.	During	the	1980s,	notions	of	
state	overreach	and	repression	did	not	anger	Americans	nearly	as	much	as	concerns	
that	the	federal	government	was	failing	to	protect	them	from	terrorism.	Reagan	came	to	
power	after	Carter’s	presidency	became	bogged	down	in	the	444-day-long	Iranian	
hostage	crisis,	in	which	a	group	of	Iranian	student	revolutionaries	stormed	the	U.S.	
embassy	in	Tehran	and	held	90	people	captive;	the	nightly	ABC	television	news	
																																																								
14	Senate	Internal	Security	Subcommittee,	Hearings	on	Terroristic	Activity,	Parts	1-9,	September	1974-
September	1976,	93rd	Cong.,	2nd	Sess.-95th	Cong.	2nd	Sess.	
15	Theoharis,	The	FBI	and	American	Democracy,	146,	158.	
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program	“America	Held	Hostage”	served	as	a	nightly	reminder	of	the	Carter	
administration’s	inability	to	resolve	the	conflict.	In	what	some	have	suspected	was	the	
result	of	a	secret	deal	between	the	incoming	Reagan	administration	and	the	Iranian	
revolutionaries,	the	American	hostages	in	Tehran	gained	their	freedom	on	January	20,	
1981,	the	day	of	the	new	President’s	inauguration.16	A	week	later	Reagan	proclaimed:		
Let	the	terrorists	beware	that	when	the	rules	of	international	behavior	are	
violated,	our	policy	will	be	one	of	swift	and	effective	retribution.	We	hear	it	said	
that	we	live	in	an	era	of	limits	to	our	powers.	Well,	let	it	also	be	understood,	
there	are	limits	to	our	patience.17	
	
	 The	conservative	“Reagan	revolution”	was	advantageous	for	Strom	Thurmond	
and	others	who	sought	to	revive	U.S.	intelligence	agencies’	“preventative”	intelligence	
capacities	in	the	name	of	fighting	terrorism.	Reagan	appointed	Thurmond	to	take	fellow	
ex-segregationist	Senator	James	O.	Eastland’s	long-held	position	as	chair	of	the	Senate	
Judiciary	Committee.	In	this	capacity,	Thurmond	established	the	new	Subcommittee	on	
Terrorism	and	Security.	Freshman	Southern	conservatives	dominated	the	new	
Subcommittee,	including	chairman	Senator	Jeremiah	Denton	(R,	AL),	and	John	P.	East	
(R,	NC).	An	influential	member	of	East’s	staff	named	Samuel	T.	Francis	had	published	a	
report	on	U.S.	intelligence	agencies	in	Mandate	for	Leadership,	the	1,093-page	
publication	of	the	conservative	Heritage	Foundation	think-tank	that	became	the	Reagan	
administration’s	policy	Bible.18		
																																																								
16	David	Farber,	Taken	Hostage:	The	Iran	Hostage	Crisis	and	America’s	First	Encounter	with	Radical	Islam	
(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005).	
17	Reagan	quoted	in	David	C.	Wills,	The	First	War	on	Terrorism:	Counter-Terrorism	Policy	During	the	
Reagan	Era	(Landham,	MD:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	2003),	1.	
18	Samuel	T.	Francis,	“The	Intelligence	Community,”	in	Mandate	for	Leadership:	Policy	Management	in	a	
Conservative	Administration,	edited	by	Charles	L.	Heatherly	(Washington:	Heritage	Foundation,	1981),	
903-953.	
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	 Seeking	federal	surveillance	capabilities	similar	to	those	outlined	in	the	Huston	
Plan,	Francis	called	in	his	report	for	an	overhaul	of	Attorney	General	Levi’s	Domestic	
Security	Guidelines;	greater	cooperation	between	intelligence	agencies	and	local	police	
departments;	reinstitution	of	the	McCarthy-era	Attorney	General’s	List	of	Subversive	
Organizations;	FBI	exemption	from	the	Freedom	of	Information	Act;	and	a	revival	of	
break-ins,	mail-covers,	and	warrantless	wiretapping.	Arguing	that	intelligence	agencies	
needed	to	detect	terrorist	plots	in	advance,	Francis	asserted,	“authorities	must	keep	
extremist	movement	under	at	least	moderate	surveillance,	become	familiar	with	the	
public	positions	and	members	as	well	as	their	unstated	goals,	adherents,	and	fringe	
elements,	and	be	prepared	to	escalate	surveillance	of	whatever	groups	seem	likely	to	
engage	in	more	extreme	activities.”19	From	February	1982	to	March	1983,	Francis	
played	a	key	role	in	filing	reports	and	drafting	policy	recommendations	for	the	Internal	
Security	Subcommittee’s	hearings	on	the	Attorney	General	Domestic	Security	
Guidelines	and	in	shaping	Attorney	General	William	French	Smith’s	new	Guidelines	for	
Domestic	Security/Terrorism.20	The	new	Smith	Guidelines	limited	Justice	Department	
oversight	over	FBI	operations	and	removed	the	requirement	that	Bureau	obtain	
evidence	of	illegal	activity	before	opening	an	investigation,	empowering	agents	to	
“anticipate	or	prevent	crime”	by	initiating	surveillance	whenever	“facts	of	
circumstances	reasonably	indicate	that	two	or	more	persons	are	engaged	in	nan	
																																																								
19	Ibid,	940.	
20	Senate	Subcommittee	on	Security	and	Terrorism,	Hearing	on	Attorney	General’s	Guidelines	for	Domestic	
Security	Investigations	(Smith	Guidelines),	98th	Cong.	1st	sess.,	March	25,	1983.	
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enterprise	[to	further]	political	or	social	goals	wholly	or	in	part	through	activities	that	
involve	force	or	violence.”21		
	 A	deadly	leftist	guerrilla	attack	carried	out	by	remnants	of	the	Weather	
Underground	and	Black	Liberation	Army	help	create	the	political	climate	necessary	for	
the	Smith	Guidelines’	expansion	of	FBI	surveillance	powers.	The	Revolutionary	Armed	
Task	Force’s	botched	October	20,	1981	robbery	of	an	armored	Brinks	truck	in	Nyack,	
New	York	left	two	security	guards	dead,	and	led	to	the	arrests	of	several	guerrillas,	
including	former	Weather	Underground	members	Kathy	Boudin	and	David	Gilbert	and	
BLA	members	Sekou	Odinga,	Kuwasi	Balagoon,	and	Mutulu	Shakur.22	The	Nyack	
robbery	and	a	series	of	other	attacks	by	leftist	guerrillas	also	prompted	the	formation	of	
the	United	States	first	FBI-led	interagency	Joint	Terrorism	Task	Forces	(JTTF),	formed	
in	New	York,	Chicago,	and	Boston	from	1980	to	1983.23		
	 Despite	defeating	the	Levi	Guidelines,	many	conservatives	continued	to	bemoan	
post-Church	Committee	intelligence	reforms,	especially	after	the	FBI	failed	to	prevent	
the	attacks	of	September	11,	2001	(9/11),	when	members	of	the	Islamic	fundamentalist	
al-Qaida	organization	flew	hijacked	airliners	into	the	Pentagon	and	New	York	City’s	
World	Trade	Center	skyscrapers,	killing	2,973	people.	The	day	after	9/11,	former	
Secretary	of	State	James	Baker	(who	served	in	the	Cabinets	of	Presidents	Reagan	and	
George	H.	W.	Bush)	claimed	in	a	television	news	interview	that	the	Church	Committee	
hearings	had	caused	the	United	States	to	“unilaterally	disarm	in	terms	of	our	
																																																								
21	Theoharis,	The	FBI	and	American	Democracy,	163.	
22	Senate	Subcommittee	on	Security	and	Terrorism,	Hearing	on	Attorney	General’s	Guidelines	for	Domestic	
Security	Investigations,	4;	Gilda	Zwerman,	“Domestic	Counterterrorism:	US	Government	Responses	to	
Political	Violence	on	the	Left	in	the	Reagan	Era,”	Social	Justice	Vol.	16,	No.	2	(1989),	44-45.	
23	Dyson	oral	history	interview,	66;	Richard	Connolly,	“Task	Force	had	Role	in	Halting	Holdup,”	Boston	
Globe,	May	20,	1984.	
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intelligence	capabilities.”24	Speaking	on	Fox	News’	rightwing	talk	show	O’Reilly	Factor,	
spy	novelist	Tom	Clancy	charged,	“The	CIA	was	gutted	by	people	on	the	political	left	
who	don’t	like	intelligence	operations…	And	as	a	result	of	that,	as	an	indirect	result	of	
that,	we’ve	lost	5,000	citizens	this	week.”25	FBI	Director	Mueller	affirmed,	“We	need	a	
different	approach	that	puts	prevention	above	all	else.”	FBI	Headquarters,	he	asserted,	
needed	the	“capability	to	anticipate	attacks.”26	
	 Within	seven	weeks	of	9/11,	President	George	W.	Bush	signed	the	USA	PATRIOT	
Act,	the	greatest	expansion	of	“preventative”	surveillance	powers	since	the	Huston	Plan.	
Under	the	PATRIOT	Act,	U.S.	intelligence	agencies	seeking	to	prevent	“terrorism”	could	
engage	in	warrantless	wiretaps	and	computer	searches;	enter	homes	without	warrants;	
seize	library,	internet,	and	business	records;	and	detain	resident	aliens	without	charges	
for	seven	days	to	six	weeks.	The	new	rules	also	empowered	FBI	agents	to	recruit	
informants	and	conduct	other	surveillance	without	approval	from	Bureau	
headquarters.27	Moreover,	after	September	11,	2001,	the	FBI	expanded	its	number	of	
JTTFs—institutions	initially	formed	to	combat	domestic	clandestine	leftist	guerrillas—
from	thirty-five	to	over	one	hundred,	including	one	in	every	one	of	its	fifty-six	field	
offices.28		
	 Federal	agents	began	to	carry	out	preemptive	arrests	even	before	the	Bush’s	
signing	of	the	USA	PATRIOT	Act,	however.	In	the	weeks	following	9/11,	authorities	
																																																								
24	Baker	quoted	in	Russell	A.	Miller,	ed.,	U.S.	National	Security,	Intelligence,	and	Democracy:	From	the	
Church	Committee	to	the	War	on	Terror	(New	York:	Routledge,	2008),	2.	
25	Clancy	quoted	in	ibid.	At	the	time	Clancy	made	this	quote,	police	had	overestimated	the	number	of	
casualties	at	5,000.	
26	Mueller	quoted	in	Theoharis,	The	FBI	and	American	Democracy,	159.	
27	Ibid,	158-159.	
28	FBI	website,	Joint	Terrorism	Task	Forces	page,	http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.	
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rounded	up	and	detained	over	1,000	immigrants,	mostly	of	Middle	Eastern	descent,	and	
transferred	an	unknown	number	of	Arab,	Arab-American,	and	Muslim	federal	prisoners	
to	segregation	units,	where	they	were	held	in	solitary	confinement.	Immediately	
following	the	9/11	attacks,	federal	prison	authorities	also	transferred	several	
incarcerated	former	leftist	guerrillas	into	solitary	confinement,	including	Richard	
Williams,	Tom	Manning,	and	Raymond	Luc	Levasseur	of	the	United	Freedom	Front;	
Antonio	Camancho	Negrón	and	Carlos	Torres	of	the	FALN;	Sundiata	Acoli	of	the	Black	
Liberation	Army;	and	white	BLA	supporter	Marilyn	Buck.29	The	documents	that	
ordered	this	round-up	of	incarcerated	dissidents	remain	classified,	but	they	appear	to	
have	come	from	the	office	of	Attorney	General	John	Ashcroft,	who	on	October	26,	2001	
signed	new	federal	rules	authorizing	“special	administrative	measures	with	respect	to	
specified	inmates.”	Outlined	in	a	document	published	in	the	Federal	Register	entitled,	
“National	Security:	Prevention	of	Acts	of	Violence	and	Terrorism,”	the	rules	enable	the	
Department	of	Justice	to	hold	prisoners	deemed	a	“threat	to	national	security”	
incommunicado	for	up	to	a	year	and	deny	them	the	right	to	attorney-client	privilege.30	
																																																								
29	Peace	activist	Phil	Berrigan	also	endured	such	treatment,	as	did	Yu	Kikumura,	a	prisoner	accused	of	
membership	in	the	Japanese	Red	Army.	Anne-Marie	Cusac,	“You’re	in	the	Hole:	A	Crackdown	on	Dissident	
Prisoners,”	The	Progressive,	December	2001,	and	Nora	K.	Wallace,	“Inmate	Questions	Post-Sept.	11	
Treatment:	Richard	Williams,	at	Lompoc	for	10	Years,	has	been	Segregated	since	Attacks,”	Santa	Barbara	
News-Press,	July	1,	2002,	reprinted	in	Interfaith	Prisoners	of	Conscience	Project	(IPCP),	They	Never	
Crushed	his	Spirit:	A	Tribute	to	Richard	Williams	(Montreal:	Kersplebedeb,	2006),	48-56,	57-59;	J.	Soffiyah	
Elijah,	“Political	Prisoners	and	9/11:	The	Reality	of	Political	Prisoners	in	the	United	States:	What	
September	11	Taught	Us	About	Defending	Them,”	originally	published	in	Harvard	BlackLetter	Law	
Journal	18	(2002),	reprinted	in	Let	Freedom	Ring:	A	Collection	of	Documents	from	the	Movements	to	Free	
U.S.	Political	Prisoners,	edited	by	Matt	Meyer	(Oakland:	PM	Press,	2008),	675.	
30	Prisons	Bureau,	“National	Security:	Prevention	of	Acts	of	Violence	and	Terrorism,”	Federal	Register:	The	
Daily	Journal	of	the	United	States	Government,	66	FR	55062	(Washington	D.C.,	October	31,	2001),	
https://federalregister.gov/a/01-27472.	These	rules	were	last	updated	in	September	2004,	and	remain	
in	place	today.	They	have	been	assailed	by	a	number	of	legal	rights	organizations,	including	the	National	
Lawyers	Guild,	the	Center	for	Constitutional	Rights,	and	Amnesty	International.	See	Cusac	in	IPCP,	50-51.			
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	 In	their	efforts	to	prevent	“terrorism”	through	surveillance	and	policing,	the	FBI	
and	Nixon	administration	established	a	legacy	as	equally	profound	as	Watergate,	the	
Church	Committee	reports,	and	the	subsequent	popular	disillusionment	that	President	
Jimmy	Carter	famously	identified	as	a	national	“crisis	of	confidence”	in	American	
political	institutions.31	By	waging	America’s	first	war	on	“terrorism,”	Nixon	and	the	FBI	
put	the	United	States	on	a	path	towards	permanent	war.	Despite	short-lived	
surveillance	reforms	instituted	after	the	Church	Committee	hearings,	U.S.	officials	
employed	mass	surveillance,	covert	operations,	police	raids,	incarceration,	and	military	
intervention	in	the	name	of	fighting	“terrorism”	at	home	and	throughout	the	globe	
throughout	the	1980s	and	1990s.	Such	activity	increased	exponentially	after	9/11,	
which	led	to	wars	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq;	covert	operations	and	drone	wars	in	
Pakistan,	Yemen,	Somalia,	Libya,	and	Syria;	the	U.S.	prison	for	“terrorists”	at	
Guantanamo	Bay,	Cuba;	CIA	water-boarding;	the	NSA’s	expansive	bulk	electronic	data	
collection	programs;	and	numerous	FBI	arrests	of	alleged	Muslim	and	anarchist	
“terrorists”	that	seem	to	be	examples	of	entrapment	rather	than	preemption	of	
authentic	terrorists	plots.32		
	 In	keeping	with	a	precedent	established	during	the	Nixon	administration,	
American	wars	on	terrorism—fought	to	preempt	insurgent	violence	carried	out	in	
response	to	U.S.	state	violence—have	proved	largely	ineffective,	if	not	
counterproductive.	Sure,	police	raids,	military	operations,	and	drone	strikes	have	
																																																								
31	Carter	quoted	in	William	Graebner,	“America’s	Poseidon	Adventure:	A	Nation	in	Existential	Despair,”	in	
America	in	the	1970s,	edited	by	Beth	Bailey	and	David	Farber	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	
2004),	157.	
32	Human	Rights	Watch,	“U.S.:	Terrorism	Prosecutions	Often	an	Illusion:	Investigations,	Trials	of	
American	Muslims	Rife	with	Abuse,”	Human	Rights	Watch	website,	July	21,	2014,	
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/21/us-terrorism-prosecutions-often-illusion	(accessed	June	1,	
2016).	
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occasionally	resulted	in	the	capture	or	extrajudicial	execution	of	key	terrorists.	But	U.S.	
military,	police,	and	intelligence	agencies’	involvement	in	countless	civilian	deaths,	
arrests,	detainments,	and	torture	sessions,	along	with	the	destabilization	of	Iraq	and	the	
greater	Middle	East,	have	also	inspired	new	“terrorist”	organizations.	Witness	the	rise	
of	the	Islamic	State	in	Iraq,	Syria,	and	Libya.	Are	America’s	latest	“terrorist”	enemies,	to	
borrow	L.	Patrick	Gray’s	terminology,	“wild	animals”	and	“jungle	killers”	whose	motives	
are	beyond	comprehension?	Or	are	the	Islamic	State’s	terrifying	insurgents,	with	all	of	
their	horrible	murder	and	destruction,	products	of	understandable	historical	
circumstances?	Until	enough	of	us	gain	the	courage	to	answer	the	latter	question	in	the	
affirmative,	and	find	creative	ways	to	overcome	the	conditions	of	state	violence	and	
global	inequality	that	foster	violent	insurgency,	self-perpetuating	wars	on	terrorism	
will	remain	a	permanent	fixture	in	U.S.	and	international	politics.	
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